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I. NATUREOFTHECASE 
This appeal involves claims against attorney Richard A. Riley ("Riley") on the grounds 
that Riley improperly withheld essential, important information from Reed Taylor ("Taylor"), 
the withholding of which prevented Taylor from appreciating the potential illegality of a 
multi-million-dollar transaction between Taylor and his former company, AJA Services. 
Not only did Riley improperly withhold this key information from Taylor, when Taylor 
attempted to get AJA Services to comply with agreements related to the multi-million-dollar 
transaction, Riley and Riley's law firm-Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley ("HTEH"}-worked 
in concert to keep this key information from Taylor and the judicial system as well. 
Only after Taylor had lost several lawsuits trying to get AJA Services to abide by their 
agreements and to get the lawyers and law firms representing AJA Services to fight fair did Riley 
come clean. When AIA Services and HTEH and their respective attorneys had secured victories 
in the underlying lawsuits and Riley thought that the truth could no longer hurt him, Riley finally 
revealed the truth: Riley finally admitted that-at the time the Opinion Letter was prepared-
Riley knew facts that should have been disclosed to Taylor in order to prevent the Opinion Letter 
from,being misleading. Riley's failure to disclose these facts--either in the Opinion Letter itself 
or any time thereafter-constitute intentional act(s) that amount to fraud and fraudulent 
concealment from both Taylor and Idaho's courts. 
By the time Taylor had access to this information, the other matters had already been 
decided. Courts had already held that Taylor was simply too late and somehow, Taylor was 
supposed to have known the contents of Riley's mind before Riley disclosed them. 
1 
to the 
transactions that were at issue in the underlying lawsuits, the issues presented on this appeal are 
separate and distinct from the issues presented in the underlying lawsuits and, indeed, for the 
reasons set forth herein, could not have been brought in the underlying lawsuits. 
By the present appeal, Taylor asks this court to examine the extent to which collateral 
estoppel and res judicata apply when the crux of a plaintiff's claims against a defendant stern 
from (i) injuries that were manifested by and through the loss of a prior lawsuit and (ii) 
inf orrnation that was purposefully withheld from the plaintiff in order to secure victories in those 
prior lawsuits. 
For the reasons that follow, this Court can and should find that Taylor has stated viable 
claims against Riley and HTEH that should not have been dismissed by the district court and, 
accordingly, remand the matter for proceedings consistent with such opinion. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL msTORY 
The original transaction that spawned the lawsuits involved in the underlying litigation as 
well as the present appeal was an illegal contract pursuant to which AIA Services was to redeem 
the shares of stock owned by Taylor for the sum of $7 .5 million and other consideration ("Stock 
Redemption Agreement" or "SRA"). R. 4707-57. For purposes of the SRA transaction, Riley 
represented AIA Services and independent counsel, Cairncross & Hempelmann ("Caimcross") 
represented Taylor. R. 813, ,r 3. 
2 
had SRA transaction 813, ,r 
3), Taylor and Riley had an attorney/client relationship regarding other, substantially related 
matters (R. 817, ,r 8). Specifically, Riley was Taylor's divorce attorney and had previously been 
his personal attorney. R. 814, ,r 4. In order to facilitate division of the maritai assets during 
Taylor's divorce, Riley provided the legal services necessary to create AIA Services. R. 814-15, 
,r 4, R. 3067-3015. Thereafter, Riley continued to serve as corporate counsel for AIA Services 
(gaining familiarity with AIA Services' corporate governance) as well as continuing to represent 
Taylor related to his divorce. R. 2375. Indeed, while Taylor and AIA Services were negotiating 
the SRA and related transactions, Riley had a current attorney/client relationship with Taylor as 
Taylor's divorce attorney. R. 2833, ,r 14; R. 3328. Even while the present litigation was 
pending, the former, long standing attorney-client relationship between Taylor and Riley was 
sufficiently close that Riley sought conflict waivers from Taylor regarding other matters. R. 821 
,r 15; R. 946-47, ,r 25; R. 1016-18. 
As is customary in complex multi-million dollar transactions, Riley, as AIA Services' 
long-term corporate counsel, agreed to provide a third-party closing opinion letter to Taylor as 
one of the conditions of closing the SRA (the "Opinion Letter" (R. 824-28 (A. 1-5))2). R. 54, ,r 
11; R. 4564, ,r 14, R. 4710 § 2.50). In the Opinion Letter, Riley opined, inter alia, that the 
1 As Taylor's independent counsel, Carincross owed to Taylor distinct, unlimited duties of care and fiduciary duties. 
See, e.g., Donald W. Glazer, et al., Glazer and FitzGibbon on legal Opinions: Drafting, Interpreting and 
Supporting Closing Opinions in Business Transactions§§ 1.1, 1.3.1 at l, 10-12 (3d ed.) ("GLAZER"); A. 157-170; 
Taylor v. Bell, 340 P.3d 951 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 352 P.3d 188 (2015); R. 1832-47. 
2 Because the record in this case contains over 6500 pages, Taylor has provided certain key documents attached 
hereto as an addendum. The addendum is cited as "A." followed by the page cite. Relevant portions of the 
documents contained within the addendum have been highlighted for the Court's converiience. 
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Services had the power and authority to enter into the transaction, all necessary shareholder 
consents had been obtained, and Taylor had perfected security interests and creditor rights. R. 
825-27 (A. 2-4). The Opinion Letter contained no qualifications, expianations, or reasoning 
supporting the opinions; in effect, the Opinion Letter said nothing that would have put Taylor on 
notice that the transaction was potentially illegal. R. 825-27 (A. 2-4), R. 6366-67 (A. 143-44), ,r 
52, R. 6368-69 (A. 145-46), ,r,r59-60, R. 6371 (A. 148), ,r 71. An opinion without any 
qualification, explanation, or reasoning is referred to as a "clean opinion." R. 6368 (A. 145), ,r 
59, TriBar Opinion Committee, Third-Party "Closing" Opinions, 53 Bus. Law. 591 (1998) 
("TRIBAR II"); A. 171-84. 
Based on the "clean opinion" issued by Riley, Taylor moved forward with the SRA 
transaction. R. 816, ,r 6, R. 4565, ,r 16. On August 17, 1995, the transaction closed and Taylor's 
shares in AIA Services were canceled. R. 4565, ,r 18, R. 4800. AIA Services defaulted on its 
obligations, and in 1996 the parties agreed to restructure the SRA. R. 4565, ,r 19, R. 4809-4900. 
AIA Services then defaulted on its obligations under the restructured agreement; when 
AIA Service's $6M Note in favor of Taylor matured, AIA Services refused to pay it. R. 4565, ,r 
20. On January 27, 2007, Taylor filed suit against AIA Services, Connie Taylor, James Beck 
and other named defendants in an attempt to enforce the SRA according to its terms (that lawsuit 
is referred to as "AJA"). R. 4565, ,r 20. Initially, AIA Services agreed that the contracts were 
enforceable and, on that ground, the AJA district court dismissed Taylor's unjust enrichment 
claim. R. 1041, ,r 9. On April 16, 2008, after the court dismissed the unjust enrichment claims, 
4 
was 
3648, R. 322. AIA Services' contention that the SRA was illegal contradicted the "clean" 
Opinion Letter. See R. 3648 and R. 824-828 (A. 1-5). 
As of the time AJA was pending, Riley had left the law firm of Eberle Berlin (where he 
was employed when he drafted the Opinion Letter) and had gone to work for HTEH. R. 565, 19. 
HTEH represented AIA Services in AJA. R. 565, 1 10. Because Riley had issued the Opinion 
Letter that was at issue in AJA, Taylor believed it was improper for Riley and/or HTEH to take 
positions that contradicted Riley's "clean" Opinion Letter; accordingly, this was one .of the 
reasons why Taylor moved to disqualify Riley and HTEH. R. 129-84; R. 1999-2036, R. 3219, 
11 6(f)-(g). HTEH opposed the motion to disqualify (R. 185-260) asserting that "Riley has not 
appeared in [AJA] and will not serve as an advocate for AIA Services Corporation at trial in this 
case." R. 250, n.18. The district court denied Taylor's motion. R. 36,125. 
On August 18, 2008, Taylor brought lawsuits against Riley, HTEH and its attorneys, 
asserting various tort claims for actions and omissions taken underlying lawsuit. R. 383-408. 
(The lawsuit is referred to as "Babbitt" in reference after AIA Services' lead counsel in AJA.) 
Taylor filed a separate suit against Clements Brown for similar misconduct ("McNichols"). R. 
409-431. Riley and HTEH moved to dismiss Taylor's claims under 12(b )( 6) for failure to state a 
claim, litigation privilege, and Taylor's lack of standing. On December 23, 2008, the Babbitt 
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss (R. 480-96; R. 497-515) and awarded 
attorney fees to Riley and HTEH (R. 542-50, R. 1042, 120; R. 753-63). 
After the order dismissing Babbitt, on December 29, 2008 in AJA, AIA Services' 401(k) 
5 
which the AJA district court could find that the SRA was illegal. R. 355-363. Taylor requested 
Riley's deposition and Riley's counsel refused, asserting (in contravention to their claim that 
Riiey would not appear or serve as an advocate in the case) that Riley was "opposing counsei." 
R. 250, n.18; R. 3241. The AJA district court stayed general discovery and prohibited Taylor 
from deposing Riley. R. 3529-32; R. 3298-3300. Taylor moved for Rule 56(f) relief asserting, 
inter alia, Taylor needed to depose Riley regarding the Opinion Letter. R. 3220-21, ~ 7a. 
On February 12, 2009, Connie Taylor and James Beck (co-defendants in AJA) alleged 
new grounds upon which the court could fmd the SRA to be illegal; i.e., the violation of I.C. § 
30-1-6. 3 R. 3575-78, R. 3584-89, R. 5968-6013. Taylor again moved for Rule 56(f) relief and, 
for a second time, moved to compel Riley's deposition: "Mr. Riley needs to be questioned why 
the opinion letter did not contain clear notification that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares 
could be construed as a violation of the statute ... " R. 3220-21; see also R. 3502. The AJA 
district court again denied Taylor's requests to depose Riley. R. 3514-18. 
On June 17, 2009, the AJA district court ruled that the SRA was illegal and unenforceable 
and that Riley's Opinion Letter was "incorrect." R. 4901-15 at 4912, n.15 (A. 10-24 at 21, n.15). 
In that June 17, 2009 ruling-which was made without the benefit of Riley's deposition, requests 
for which the court had denied twice-the district court observed that "[t]here is no question that 
all parties, including [Taylor] either ignored or failed to consider LC. § 30-1-6." R. 4913 
3 Riley later admitted that he was working with trial counsel for AIA Services: "Although I have not appeared in any 
of the proceedings relating to the AIA litigation and was not designated as trial counsel, I have communicated from 
time to time with other Hawley Troxell attorneys relative to the AIA litigation ... " R. 565-66. 
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be 
enforced because it was fraudulently induced (R. 1422-23), the AIA district court rejected this 
argument on the grounds that Taylor could not point to any affirmative representations made by 
AIA, Riley, or the Opinion Letter that were fraudulent: "The statements by [Riley] and others 
that the [SRA] did not violate any laws or regulations was offered as opinion, not fact. .. Such an 
opinion was no more a statement of fact when expressed by [Riley] in 1995 than it is now when 
asserted by [Taylor]. It is, simply, an opinion ... and cannot form the basis for a fraud claim." R. 
371. 
On October 1, 2009, while the Taylor v. AJA appeal was in progress, Taylor filed the 
present lawsuit against Riley, HTEH, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin.4 R. 25-50. Taylor promptly 
noticed Riley's deposition. R. 3487-88, R. 3667-69. Again, the defendants moved for protective 
orders to prevent Riley's deposition and to stay discovery. R. 3484-86; R. 3664-66; R. 3720-22. 
On February 3,2010, the district court granted the motion for protective order, preventing Taylor 
from deposing Riley. R. 2734-35. 
On January 15, 2010, Riley and HTEH moved for summary judgment seeking to dismiss 
several of Taylor's claims based on statute of limitations and res judicata. R. 785-809. Taylor 
opposed Riley and HTEH's summary judgment motion, arguing, inter alia, that Taylor's 
malpractice claim accrued, at the earliest, when the June 17, 2009 ruling in AIA declared the 
SRA illegal because, prior to that date, Taylor had not suffered "some damage" as a result of 
Riley's malpractice. R. 1488-1508. 
4 Taylor entered a confidential settlement with the estate of Turnbow and Eberlie Berlin. R. 6305-15. Accordingly, 
the only parties to this appeal are Riley and HTEH as they refused to mediate. R. 6299. 
7 
May Riley and sununaryjudgnien~ 
the district court found that (i) Taylor's claims for professional malpractice accrued in April of 
2008 when Taylor first incurred attorney fees defending against allegations that the SRA was 
iUegal and heid that (ii) resjudicata did not bar Taylor's fraud claims against Riiey. R. 1677-95 
(A. 25-42). The district court granted partial summary judgnient in favor of Riley and HTEH on 
the other issues and lifted the discovery stay. R. 1677-95 (A. 25-42); R. 2739-40. 
On May 19, 20 I 0, Riley moved to stay the instant case until such time as this Court 
issued its decision in Taylor v. AJA. R. 1703-07 (A. 43-47). Riley's reasoning: "[i]n the event 
the Idaho Supreme Court reverses [the AJA District Court's] decision, then the entire premise of 
the current case will cease to exist ... " R. 1704 (A. 44 ). The district court accepted Riley's 
positions and stayed the case. 5 R. 1739-40. 
On September 3, 2010, this Court affirmed the dismissal of Babbitt, holding that Taylor 
lacked standing to assert a malpractice claim and that certain other claims "[were] not ripe for 
litigation" Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845,849,243 P.3d 642, 661, 665 (2010).6 
Nearly a year later, on September 7, 2011, this Court affirmed the AJA District Court's 
decisions that the SRA was illegal and unenforceable. Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 
552, 559-73, 261 P.3d 829, 836-50 (2011). This Court adopted the district court's observation 
that: "it appears that none of the parties recognized the potential violation of LC.§ 30-1-6." Id at 
567, 261 P.3d at 844; R. 363. Additionally, citing Taylor's inability to precisely articulate any 
5 When Hawley Troxell requested fees, its billing records included "Analysis of whether deposition of Riley, if 
allowed, could be used in [Taylor v. AIA] case currently on appeal." R. 2774, 1736-37, 2766-95, 4201-16. 
6 Babbitt and McNicho/s were consolidated on appeal. 
8 
misrepresentations made or this 
that, because it was fraudulently induced, the illegal transaction should otherwise be enforced. 
Id. at 566, 261 P.3d at 843. The Taylor v. AJA Court, particularly the concurring opinion of 
Justice J. Jones, took issue with Tayior's invoivement in the transaction, severeiy criticizing him 
for being self-interested, over-reaching, and structuring the SRA in a way that prejudiced the 
minority shareholders.7 Id. at 576; 2<>1 P.3d at 853. 
On November 21, 2011, after this Court issued the decision in Taylor v. AJA, Riley 
moved to lift the stay in the instant case and sought yet another protective order to prevent his 
deposition. R. 2799-2805, R. 2808-09, R. 4312-26, R. 1739-40, R. 4255, R. 4356-65. The 
district court lifted the stay and finally allowed Taylor to depose Riley. R. 2808-09; 1/5/12 Tr. P. 
22-26. 
On December 15, 2011, before Riley's deposition occurred, Riley moved again for 
summary judgment on Taylor's fraud claims, asserting that the Taylor v. AJA Court's findings 
regarding fraud served as issue preclusion to the present fraud claims. R. 4330-4355. Taylor 
objected, again citing the need to depose Riley, but the district court-reversing its prior decision 
that Taylor v. AJA did not preclude the fraud claims against Riley-rejected Taylor's argument, 
held that res judicata barred Taylor's fraud claims against Riley, and granted summ~ judgment. 
R. 1766-74; R. 4327-55, 4437-62. 
After the district court held that issue preclusion barred Taylor's fraud claims in this case, 
7 Contrary to the impression created upon this Court by HTEH in the underlying litigation, Riley testified at 
deposition that he never witnessed Reed Taylor engage in any improper conduct: "Q: From what you could observe 
... did you see any conduct on the part of Mr. Reed Taylor as a majority shareholder whereby he attempted to obtain 
a preferential distribution? A: No." R. 2864 (A. 96). 
9 
answers 
explanation, and rationale that supported the opinions contained in the Opinion Letter. R. 2897-
2965 (A. 76-89). Thereafter, on March 29-30, 2012, Taylor finally had the opportunity to depose 
Riley. R. 2838 (A. 90). At Riley's deposition, he testified to the reasons that he believed his 
Opinion Letter was correct. E.g., R. 2855-2896 (A. 95-113). Riley also testified that he believed 
that Taylor did not engage in a preferential transaction. R. 2838, 2856 (A. 90, 96) at 105:20-25. 
Based on the substance of Riley's February 2012 disclosures and March 2012 deposition, 
Taylor finally had concrete information that the Opinion Letter improperly omitted material 
facts, thereby establishing facts needed to support causes of action against Riley for fraud and 
constructive fraud, as well as reviving claims for professional malpractice and breach of 
fiduciary duty, to the extent such claims were related to these material omissions. E.g., 
R. 2897-95 (A. 76-89); A. 90-113; A. 125-126, ,r 5; A. 129-130, ,r 4; A. 150, ,r 77. 
On August 15, 2012, Riley moved for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that the 
decisions in Babbitt barred Taylor's malpractice claim. R. 1866-79. Taylor opposed the motion 
and also sought reconsideration of portions of the 2010 decision, including that portion 
identifying April of 2008 as the accrual date of the malpractice claims. R. 2478-80, R. 2469-93. 
On October 24, 2012, the district court held that Taylor's malpractice claims involved a different 
transaction than the claims presented in Babbitt. R. 2560-63. The district court refused, 
however, to reconsider whether April of 2008 was the proper accrual date for such malpractice 
claims. R. 2569. 
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appeal 
matters involved in the present case involved the same or different transactions that were at issue 
in Babbitt. R. 2575-2590. This Court accepted Riley's interlocutory appeal and, reversing the 
district court, held that the present lawsuit invoived the same transactions as Babbitt and, on such 
grounds, held that Taylor's malpractice claims were barred. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 333, 
336 P.3d 256, 266 (2014) ("Riley I"). This Court refused to consider issues presented by Taylor 
in his proposed cross-appeal, dismissing Taylor's proposed cross appeal "without prejudice." R. 
2663-73, R. 2674-2675, R. 6348-49. Significant to the issues presented on this appeal, in Riley I 
this Court did not pass upon the correctness of the district court's decision that Taylor's 
malpractice claims against Riley accrued on April 2008. Riley I, 157 Idaho at 323. 
Following remand, the district court entered judgments in favor of Riley and HTEH on 
February 20, 2015. R. 5037-41. As there remained other claims pending against other parties, 
such judgments were not final at that time. Id. Taylor resolved his claims against Turnbow's 
estate and Eberle Berlin and the parties dismissed those claims with prejudice. R. 6305-15. On 
October 9, 2015, the district court entered Final Amended Judgments in favor of Riley (R. 6319-
21) and HTEH (R. 6313-18). 
On October 23, 2015, Taylor moved to reconsider and to clarify certain of the district 
court's prior decisions as to Riley and HETH. R. 6322-24. In support of his motion, Taylor 
introduced new facts demonstrating that Riley had failed to disclose information that rendered 
the opinions in the Opinion Letter intentionally misleading. R. 6325-43. Specifically, Taylor 
submitted the declaration of Professor McDermott who opined, inter alia, "It was impossible for 
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or to Riley 
op1mons in the Opinion Letter or to ascertain that the Opinion Letter was intentionally 
misleading ... until Mr. Riley first disclosed that information on February 22, 2012 ... " R. 6377-78 
(A. 154-55), 11 90. The motion for reconsideration also asked the district court to revisit its 
determination that the malpractice claims accrued in April of 2008, when Taylor first had to 
defend against allegations that the SRA was illegal. R. 6380-05. The district court denied 
Taylor's motion for reconsideration in its entirety. R. 6485-86. This appeal followed. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether res judicata bars claims based upon facts that were fraudulently concealed until 
after the first lawsuit. 
2. Whether "some damage" first occurs only when a judge or jury renders an adverse 
decision in a lawsuit where the outcome is dependent on whether an attorney's prior 
advice was negligent. 
3. Whether collateral estoppel bars claims that were different from those raised in the first 
lawsuit and which could not have been raised in the first lawsuit because facts supporting 
such claims were fraudulently concealed until after the first lawsuit. 
4. Whether Idaho should expand the doctrine of negligent misrepresentation to include 
claims against attorneys. 
5. Whether the district court erred in failing to take into account the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship in finding that no fiduciary duty 
existed between them. 
6. Whether a law firm is vicariously liable for damages caused by one of its attorneys' 
breach of fiduciary duty and/or fraudulent concealment of material facts. 
7. Whether the district court abused its discretion in the amount of attorney's fees awarded 
to Riley and HTEH. 
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COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
This Court should award Taylor costs on appeal from Riley and HTEH, including for cost 
of posting a supersedeas bonds. LA.R. 40. R. 6509-27, R. 6732-34. 
Because Taylor's claLrns arise from a coID_rnercial t.ransaction with Riley t.hrough the 
Opinion Letter (A. 1-5) and that letter and commercial transaction is the gravamen of this 
lawsuit, he is entitled to an award of fees from Riley and HTEH pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
12-120(3) should he prevail in this action. Riley I, 157 Idaho at 339-40, 336 P.3d at 272-73; 
Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, 157 Idaho 836, 868, 341 P.3d 580, 585 
(2015); LA.R. 41. However, an award of attorney's fees is premature at this stage and should be 
reserved. 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal is from decisions made by the trial court on a motions for summary 
judgment and motions to reconsider. 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes 
the same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the 
motion. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." When considering whether the evidence shows a 
genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 271, 281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012) (citations omitted). The 
summary judgment standard of review applies to subsequent motion to reconsider. Id. at 276. 
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are "question[s] of law upon which this Court 
exercises free review," i.e., reviewed de novo. Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 
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(2012). "The date for when a cause of action accrues may be a question of fact or law." C & G, 
Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 142, 75 P.3d 194, 196 (2003). 
VI. ARGUMEl\41 
A. Claims that accrue after the first lawsuit are not barred by res iudicata. 
The district court erred in selecting the wrong accrual date for Taylor's malpractice 
claims and, therefore, the decision that res judicata bars such claims incorrect and, to the extent 
this Court relied upon such date in deciding Riley I, the decision in Riley I is incorrect and cannot 
stand.8 Additionally, well after both the Babbitt and AJA lawsuits, in February/March of 2012 
Riley disclosed-for the first time-the he knew facts that should have been made known to 
Taylor in order to prevent the Opinion Letter from being misleading. These 2012 disclosures 
triggered accrual dates for claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment, professional malpractice, and 
breach of fiduciary duty. Because these claims accrued after Babbitt, res j udicata cannot operate 
as a bar. 
1. Because the at-issue claims accrued after the June 17, 2009 Order dismissing 
Babbitt, res judicata cannot serve as a bar to those claims. 
It is well settled that res judicata does not bar claims arising after the first lawsuit. 
Indeed, even though a lawsuit may involve the same parties and the same transaction, claim 
preclusion does not bar claims that become ripe after a first lawsuit. Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 
. . ' 
8 Due the unusual posture of an interlocutory appeal, the court was "constrained to rule narrowly and address only 
the precise question that was framed by the motion and answered by the trial court." Aardema v. U.S. Dairy 
Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d 5Q5, 509 (2009). The interlocutory appeal in Riley I addressed the 
narrow issue of whether the district court erred in detennining that Taylor's clajms in this matter did not constitute 
the "same transaction" as his claims in Babbitt. 157 Idaho at 330, 336 P.3d at 263. This court dismissed Taylor's 
cross-appeal, without prejudice for him to pursue an appeal from the final judgment. R. 6348-49. 
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on the doctrine of res judicata." Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Inv., LLC, 157 Idaho 
732, 740, 339 P.3d 1136, 1144 (2014) (citations omitted). 
It wouid be unjust for claim preclusion or issue preciusion to operate on a second lawsuit 
if claims were not ripe and, therefore, could not have even been brought, in the first lawsuit. 
This is because a party cannot bring suit on an unripe claim: "it is axiomatic that a party has no 
right to sue for damages until actual injury occurs." Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 483, 
835 P.2d 1293, 1294 (1992). When examining whether res judicata bars a claim, it is incumbent 
on the Court to determine whether the claim was ripe for adjudication in the first lawsuit. Bell 
Rapids Mut. Irr. Co. v. Hausner, 126 Idaho 752, 753-54, 890 P.2d 338, 339-40 (1995) (relying 
on Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 754, 663 P.2d 287, 290 (1983)). 
No Idaho court of appellate review has specifically addressed whether the ripeness 
exception to res judicata applies when claims become ripe after the first lawsuit is filed, or 
sometime thereafter. However, cases strongly suggest res judicata does not bar claims that 
become ripe after the first lawsuit is filed. In Bell Rapids Mut. Irr. Co, this Court opined that the 
filing date was likely the "more correct focus for determining ripeness for adjudication" but 
declined to resolve the question because, in that case, the second lawsuit did not become ripe 
until after the first lawsuit was submitted to the trial court for determination. 126 Idaho at 754 
890 P.2d at 340. Similarly, in Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, this Court held that events that 
occurred "subsequent to the first trial" were not barred by res judicata. 104 Idaho at 754, 663 
P.2d at 290 (1983). In Hindmarsh v. Mock, this Court noted that claims that were ripe when the 
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The Ninth Circuit has directly addressed the issue and has conclusively held that the bar 
of res judicata is "framed by the complaint at the time it is filed." Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. 
Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1984). "The rule that a judgment 
is conclusive as to every matter that might have been litigated 'does not apply to new rights 
acquired pending the action which might have been, but which were not, required to be 
litigated."' Id. (citations omitted). This is because the rules allow, but do not require, the filing 
of supplemental pleadings to assert rights that accrue after the first litigation is filed. Allied Fire 
Protection v. Diede Const., Inc., 127 Cal. App. 4th 150, 155 (2005). "Res judicata is not a bar to 
claims that arise after the initial complaint is filed. These rights may be asserted in a 
supplemental pleading, but if such a pleading is not filed, a plaintiff is not foreclosed from 
asserting the rights in a subsequent action." Id. 
2. The AL4 District Court's June 17, 2009 decision that the SRA was illegal and 
unenforceable was the first objecth1e proof that Taylor suffered "some damage" 
from Riley's conduct and, therefore, the date Taylor's claims for professional 
malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary accrued. 
Taylor did not suffer "some damage" resulting from Riley's conduct9 until the 
June 17, 2009 decision in AJA that the SRA was illegal and unenforceable. Accordingly, the 
district court erred in determining that the accrual date for Taylor's malpractice claims was April 
9 The district court dismissed Taylor's claims for breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds that no such duty existed 
by and between Taylor and Riley. R. 1688-90 (A. 35-37) .. Taylor has addressed that as an issue on appeal in 
Section VI, D. The district court dismissed Taylor's claims for negligent misrepresentation on the grounds that no 
such cause of action exists against attorneys in Idaho. 3/26/10 Tr., p. 119, II. 12-16, 18-20. Taylor has addressed 
that as an issue on appeal in Section VI, C. In the event that this Court reverses either or both of those decisions, the 
"some damage" analysis f>et forth in this section and the causation arguments set forth in the following section 
applies equally to determine the accrual date of those claims. 
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(when the AJA. District Court ruled that the SRA was illegal and unenforceable). R. 1686-88 (A. 
33-35). This is because the AJA. District Court's June 17, 2009 ruling that the SRA was illegal 
and unenforceable and that the Opinion Letter was incorrect (R. 4901-4915 (A.10-24)) was the 
first objective proof that Taylor suffered "some damage." The June 17, 2009 ruling was entered 
well after Babbitt was filed and, indeed, after the December 2008 order dismissing Babbitt. 
Because these claims became ripe after Babbitt, the decision that res judicata bars Taylor's claim 
is incorrect. 
Taylor cannot state a claim for professional malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, or 
breach of fiduciary duty10 until he first has objective proof of "some damage" resulting from 
such conduct. A claim for professional malpractice under I.C. § 5-219(4) accrues only when the 
tort is complete and all elements have been satisfied. Minnick, 157 Idaho at 867, 341 P.3d at 
584. "[A] cause of action for professional negligence cannot accrue, however, until 'some 
damage' has occurred." Id. "What constitutes some damage turns on the facts and circumstances 
of each case." Id. Idaho applies the "some damage" rule to fiduciary duty claims under Idaho 
10 To be clear, Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty claims include Riley's non-disclosure of information required to 
make his Opinion Letter not misleading and damages resulting after Babbitt arising from both Riley and HTEH's 
actions in failing to disclose to either Taylor or Idaho Court's the information required to make Riley's Opinion 
Letter not misleading. As discussed in Section VI, D, to the extent that Taylor's Breach of Fiduciary duty claims 
against Riley and HTEH are premised on non-disclosure, such claims accrued in February/March 2012 when Riley 
finally disclosed that he was aware of facts that required his opinion letter to be reasoned. 
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612-14, 873 P.2d 861, 866-68 (1994). 
Where the existence of "some damage" depends on a decision that demonstrates the 
advice given by an attorney was negligent, "some damage" occurs only after a judge or a jury 
enters a decision making it clear that the attorney's advice was, in fact, negligent. Depending on 
the circumstances, "objective proof [may] not occur until there was a court decision adverse to 
the client because of the attorney's negligence." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 661, 
201 P.3d 629, 634 (2009). "Negligence that increases the risk that a client will be harmed does 
not trigger the running of the statute of limitations until harm actually occurs." Id. 
In City of McCall, this Court made it clear that merely incurring fees in defending a 
lawsuit does not constitute "some damage" arising from an attorney's negligence. Id Rather, 
"some damage" occurs only after a party receives an adverse decision making it clear that the 
lawsuit was the result of the negligent advice. Id. In City of McCall, the City of McCall (the 
"City") contracted with St. Clair Contractors, Inc. ("St. Clair") to construct a storage lagoon. Id. 
After the project experienced delays, the City, on the advice of its attorneys, terminated St. Clair. 
Id at 658, 201 P.3d at 631. St. Clair's bonding company ("Wausau") hired a replacement 
contractor to complete the work, but the City, acting again on the advice of its attorneys, 
withheld payments to Wausau and hired another replacement contractor. Id Wausau filed suit 
11 Although this Court has never addressed what statute of limitations governs negligent misrepresentations, "it is 
unnecessary for [this Court] to decide which statute of limitation applies" when claims accrue prior to the expiration 
of all of the potential statutes oflimitations. Thus, this Court need not reach the issue because the result is the same. 
Mack Financial Corp., 111 Idaho at 10. I.C. §§ 5-218(4), 5-219(4), 5-224; Jones, 125 Idaho at 613; Chicoine, 122 
Idaho at 483. This Court need not address the issue now because there could not have been a misrepresentation or 
"some damage" until no earlier than June 17, 2009. 
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withholding payments." Id. On May 4, 2004, the jury awarded $4,955,096 in damages against 
the City in the Wausau lawsuit. Id. 
Within two years of that adverse decision, the City filed a lawsuit against its attorneys. 
Id. The district court dismissed the City's lawsuit against its attorneys, finding "some damage" 
occurred and, therefore, the cause of action accrued when the City first incurred attorney's fees 
in defending against Wausau's claims. Id. at 659, 201 P.3d at 631. On appeal, this Court 
reversed. Id. 
In reversing the district court's finding that the City's malpractice claim against its 
attorney accrued when the City first incurred attorney's fees in defending the Wausau claims, 
this Court made it clear that merely incurring attorney's fees was insufficient and that "some 
damage" did not occur until an adverse judgment was rendered against the City: the "mere fact 
that Wausau and St. Clair commenced litigation against the City would not have given the City a 
cause of action against its Attorneys." Id. at 661-62, 201 P.3d at 634-35; accord Chicoine, 122 
Idaho at 487, 835 P.2d at 1298 (noting that incurring attorney's fees in litigation constitutes 
"some damage" only when the "existence of the damage did not depend on the outcome of the 
lawsuits ... "). This Court explained that "[t]he giving oflegal advice often carries with it the risk 
of litigation. The fact that the City was sued does not, by itself, constitute a breach of duty by the 
City's Attorneys." City of McCall, 146 Idaho at 662, 201 P.3d at 635. 
This Court further reasoned that "it would have been difficult to conceive of a situation in 
which the City could have recovered on a malpractice claim against its Attorneys had the City 
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Attorneys regarding their legal advice ... depended upon the outcome of the litigation ... [t]here 
would not be objective proof of actual damage until that occurred." Id. at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. 
This Court further explained: 
To hold otherwise in this case "would foment future litigation initiated on sheer 
surmise of potential damages in order to avoid the likely consequence of seeing 
actions barred by limitations." Clients involved in lengthy litigation would have to 
file protective lawsuits against their attorneys when following their advice and 
strategy, without yet having any objective proof of actual damage or being able to 
prove a cause of action for professional malpractice. 
Id (quoting Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 12, 720 P.2d 191, 195 (1986)). In 
Mack Financial Corp., upon which this Court relied heavily in deciding City of McCall, this 
Court made nearly identical observations: 
Such a holding would require potential plaintiffs to sue various categories of 
professional persons who fall within the ambit of LC. § 5-219(4), even though 
those plaintiffs were unaware that they had been damaged. This would result in 
expensive and time-consuming litigation which could glut the judicial system and 
at the same time serve no purpose whatever. 
Mack Financial Corp., 111 Idaho at 12, 72 P .2d at 195. 
In deciding City of McCall, this Court distinguished the case of Griggs v. Nash, 116 
Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989), wherein this Court held that incurring attorney's fees in 
litigation did constitute "some damage" that would give rise to an action for malpractice. City of 
McCall, 146 Idaho at 662,201 Idaho at 635. In distinguishing Griggs from City of McCall, this 
Court noted that the material difference was that, in Griggs, Attorney Trout was retained only to 




This case is more like City of McCall than Griggs because in this case, the outcome of the 
underlying lawsuit was entirely dependent on whether Riley's advice was incorrect (and, indeed, 
given under circumstances that constitute fraudulent concealment). In this case, it is undisputed 
that Riley was called upon to advise both parties-his client (AIA Services) and Taylor (the 
third-party intended beneficiary of his Opinion Letter)-regarding the legality of the SRA 
transaction. R. 4564 ,i 14; R. 4710, § 2.50). Because the outcome of the underlying lawsuit 
hinged on the correctness of Riley's advice, ( similar to the outcome of City of McCall hinging on 
the appropriateness of the City's attorney's advice) rather than the negligent act failing to get a 
date down when closing a loan transaction (as alleged in Griggs) Taylor could not and did not 
incur "some damage" until a court first ruled that Riley's legal advice was, indeed, incorrect. 
The holdings and rationale in City of McCall, Mack Financial Corp., and Chicoine firmly 
establish that merely incurring attorney's fees is not sufficient, in itself, to constitute objective 
proof of "some damage." At most, incurring attorney's fees in defending against the claim that 
the SRA was illegal established only an increased "risk" of harm to Taylor; this increased risk of 
harm is not objective proof of "some damage" resulting from Riley's conduct. See City of 
McCall, 146 Idaho at 661, 201 P.3d at 634; Chicoine, 122 Idaho at 483, 835 P.2d at 1294 ("a 
party has no right to sue for damages until actual injury occurs"). 
Because the Supreme Court had never ruled on Idaho Code § 30-1-6, the ruling that the 
transaction was illegal and unenforceable was necessary to establish that Riley's opinion was 
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an 
adverse ruling, that adverse ruling is a necessary to establish objective proof of "some damage." 
This is particularly true because "[a]n opinion on a legal issue provides the opinion recipient 
with the opinion giver's professional judgment about how the highest court of the jurisdiction 
whose law is being addressed would appropriately resolve the issues covered by the opinion on 
the date of the opinion letter." TRIBAR II §1.2(a), 53 Bus. Law. at 595-96 (footnotes omitted) 
(emphasis in original and added). 12 A. 173-74. This Court's decision in Taylor v. McNichols, 
which affirmed the dismissal of Taylor's claims in Babbitt, made this clear by explaining that 
Taylor's claims were not ripe because a "cause of action cannot arise until damages are incurred, 
and the attorney's conduct can be reviewed under the totality of the case." McNichols, 149 Idaho 
at 843, 243 P.3d at 659 ( citing City of McCall). 
The district court's decision that Taylor's suffered "some damage" in April 2008 (the 
first date Taylor had to defend against the illegality defense) is error because such decision is 
directly contrary to the holdings of City of McCall, Mack Financial and Chicone. Rather, 
consistent with these cases, the date that Taylor first had objective proof of "some damage" was 
the AJA District Court's June 17, 2009 ruling that the SRA was illegal and unenforceable and 
that Riley's Opinion Letter was "incorrect." As this Court aptly pointed out in both City of 
McCall and Mack Financial, were this Court to hold otherwise, every time any party were faced 
with a lawsuit, they would be required to file protective lawsuits against their attorneys to guard 
against the possibility that the advice received was incorrect. This would lead to a glut of 
12 Riley testified that he relies upon the TriBar Reports for his opinion practice. R. 2847 (A. 93). Taylor's expert 
witness, McDermott, is a member and co-author ofTriBar II. A. 184. 
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3. The AIA District Court's June 17, 2009 decision that the Opinion Letter was 
incorrect provided the first causal connection between "some damage" and Riley's 
conduct, giving this Court an additional and alternative basis upon which to find 
that Taylor's claims for professional malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, and 
breach of fiduciary duty did not accrue until that date. 
In addition to establishing the "some damage" element of Taylor's claims, the June 
17, 2009 ruling also established the causal connection between Riley's conduct and the damages 
incurred. Even if the district court was correct in holding that Taylor incurred "some damage" in 
April of 2008 when he began incurring attorney's fees to counter the claims that the stock 
redemption agreement was illegal and unenforceable, the June 17, 2009 ruling that Riley's 
Opinion Letter was "incorrect" established the causal connection between the damages suffered 
by Taylor and Riley's conduct. Because Taylor is required to establish a causal connection 
between Riley's conduct and "some damage;' June 17, 2009 is the earliest possible date the tort 
of professional malpractice was completed. 
In order to establish claims against Riley, Taylor is required to show that damages he 
suffered (whether those damages be the inability to recover under the $6M note or the SRA m: 
the costs and fees incurred in the lawsuit m: both) were caused by Riley's conduct. The tort of 
professional malpractice requires both ''the breach of the duty or the standard of care" and a 
showing "that the failure to perform the duty was a proximate cause of the damages suffered." 
Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 44, 122 P.3d 300,303 (2005). 
The AJA. District Court's June 17, 2009 ruling provided the causal link between Riley's 
conduct and the damages incurred by Taylor when it declared: "By this ruling today, the Court 
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had no 
objective proof that Riley's Opinion Letter was incorrect or that Taylor suffered hann as a result 
of Riley's Opinion Letter. This is particularly true because, even despite this Court holding that 
PJJey's opirJons are incorrect and the transaction was illegal and unenforceable, P~ley continues 
to maintain his Opinions that conclusions reached in his Opinion Letter were correct and the 
SRA was a legal, enforceable transaction. A. 79-87, A. 95-113. Given that Riley continues to 
believe the Opinion Letter was correct, it was essential to have the AJA District Court's June 17, 
2009 ruling to establish that Riley's the causal connection between Riley's conduct (i.e., issuing 
an incorrect Opinion Letter) caused Taylor's damages. 
Riley, his co-defendant Eberle Berlin, and the district court all agreed that there had to be 
some causal connection between Riley's misconduct and the damages suffered by Taylor. When 
Riley successfully moved to stay this case pending this Court's decision in Taylor v. AJA, Riley 
argued: 
The present action is premised on the presumptive illegality and, therefore, lack of 
enforceability of a stock redemption agreement . . . . In the event the Idaho 
Supreme Court reverses [the AJA District Court's] decision, then the entire 
premise of the current case will cease to exist and this case will become moot ... it 
makes sense to stay the proceedings in the present case until a definitive ruling is 
obtained whether the 1995 redemption agreement is or is not illegal and, 
therefore, whether the 1995 opinion letter which is the subject of the present case 
was or was not correct. 
R. 1704-05 (A. 44-45); R. 1738-41, R. 4255-56. Eberle Berlin similarly argued: "the ultimate 
illegality of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and restructured 1996 Stock Redemption 
Agreement are central to Plaintiffs cause of action for professional malpractice." R. 1710. 
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professional malpractice accrued only upon Taylor incurring "some damage" as the result of 
Riley's conduct. Specifically, in response to an answer provided by Riley's attorney at the 
hearing regarding when Taylor's ciaim accrued, the district court commented: "Unless [the] view 
is that the damage did not occur until [the AJA District Court] ruled the contract was illegal. And 
up to that point, the opinion letter caused him no damage. It did not prevent him from pursing his 
other remedies." 3/26/10 Tr., p. 29, 11., 11-21. The court correctly explained "it's not just any old 
damages; it's damages from the negligent conduct." Id., p. 25, 11., 3-5. 
The lesson to be learned from these cases is that "some damage" means damage 
for which a suit could be filed and money awarded. It is not hypothetical damage. 
It is not creating the circumstance from which damage may or may not occur. It 
means actual, measurable damage. 
R. 1688 (A. 35). As these observations make clear, if this Court's decision in Taylor v. AJA 
(which affirmed the June 17, 2009 ruling) could have made the present lawsuit moot, then the 
present lawsuit could not exist prior to that June 17, 2009 ruling. R. 4901-4915 (A. 10-24). 
Additionally, the possibility that Taylor could have recovered attorney's fees is yet 
another reason why the AJA District Court's ruling that the agreement was both illegal and 
enforceable established the causal connection between Riley's conduct and the damages suffered 
by Taylor. Taylor had two separate bases pursuant to which he was entitled to recover costs and 
fees. First, the terms of the parties' agreements, including the $6M Note or the Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement. R. 366-76; R. 4726; R. 4733, § 9.4; R. 4854, § 9.4; R. 4707-57. Second, 
because the redemption was a commercial transaction, Taylor would be entitled to recover costs 
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would have been paid under the agreements and would have been entitled to recover his 
attorneys' fees and costs. In such situation, Taylor would have suffered no damages. In the 
event that Taylor prevailed but did not recover 100% of his attorneys fees and costs, there would 
be no causal connection between Riley's conduct and costs and fees incurred but not recovered. 
Accordingly, absent that June 17, 2009 decision, there was no objective proof that 
Taylor's defense of the lawsuit was caused by Riley's conduct. Nevertheless, the district court 
improperly found that April 2008 (the date the illegality defense was first raised) was the accrual 
date for Taylor's claims. Because the v.Tong accrual date is used to support the decision that res 
judicata bars Riley's claims, such decision must be reversed by this Court. 
4. Riley's February/March 2012 admissions that he knew facts that should have been 
disclosed to Taylor in order to prevent the Opinion Letter from being misleading 
was the accrual date for additional claims of fraud and constructive fraud and, to 
the extent they are premised on concealment of these facts, new claims for 
negligent misrepresentation, professional malpractice, and breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
Riley's February/March 2012 disclosures of the facts, basis, and reasoning underlying the 
opinions contained in the Opinion Letter establish the accrual date for claims for fraud and 
constructive fraud and provide an additional, secondary accrual date for Taylor's claims of 
negligent misrepresentation, professional malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty. 
Res judicata does not apply where facts were fraudulently concealed during the course of 
the first lawsuit. Res judicata also has a fraud exception and the date a claim accrues for 
purposes of the statute of limitations is the same date a claim becomes ripe. See, e.g., Kawai 
Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610,615,826 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1992) ("the doctrine of res 
26 
[the plaintiff] should have reasonably discovered" the alleged fraud at the time of the first 
lawsuit); see also Allied Fire Protection, 127 Cal. App.4th at 157, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 201 
(noting that the fraud claim existed, but was not discovered, until after the first lawsuit was filed 
and, therefore, res judicata did not apply). The fraud exception to res judicata applies where the 
defendants' misconduct prevents plaintiffs from knowing, at the time of a first suit, that they 
have a particular claim. Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, n.12 (9th Cir. 1982). 
Under Idaho law, it is settled that "[t]he cause of action ... [of fraud and constructive 
fraud] are not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake." Idaho Code § 5-218(4); Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 159 
Idaho 103, 110-11, 356 P.3d 1049, 1056-57 (2015) (holding that the discovery rule applies to 
constructive fraud). "Actual knowledge of the fraud can be inferred if the aggrieved party could 
have discovered the fraud by reasonable diligence, although the Court will hesitate to infer such 
knowledge." DBSIITRI v. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 807, 948 P.2d 151, 162 (1997). "Constructive 
fraud usually arises from a breach of a duty where a relation of trust and confidence exists; such 
relationship may be said to exist whenever trust or confidence is reposed by one person in the 
integrity and fidelity of another." Boy Scouts of America, 159 Idaho at 109, 356 P.3d at 1055. 
Constructive fraud may be involved the concealment of facts. McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 
367,371,353 P.2d 700, 762 (1960). 
In this case, Riley concealed, until February/March 2012 the facts, basis, and reasoning 
that were necessary to make the Opinion Letter not misleading. R. 1501-03; R. 6338; see also 
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information). It was not until February/March of 2012 that Riley disclosed, among other things, 
that 
• "[t]he 1995 Opinion Letter was and is beiieved by this answering defendant to be a correct, 
fair and objective opinion, given the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the 
1995 redemption transaction." (R 2936 (A. 79)); 
• "[Riley] concluded that AIA could not later disavow its obligations to Reed Taylor" (R. 2940 
(A. 84)); 
• "[Riley] found no Idaho cases addressing the statutory restrictions on distributions to 
shareholders." (R. 2938 (A. 81)); 
• "[Riley] researched . . . and found no explanation of "earned surplus" or other statutory 
accounting terms used .... " (R. 2937 (A. 81)); 
• "[Riley] concluded that, after giving effect to the $7.5 million redemption of Reed's stock, 
the corporation had sufficient net assets to satisfy the requirements of the Idaho statutory 
restrictions on redemption as construed in light of RMBCA 6.40" (R. 2940 (A. 83)); and 
• "RMBCA 6.40 expressly provides that the board of directors may, in lieu application of 
generally accepted accounting principles, base a determination that a distribution is not 
prohibited on the basis of "fair valuation and other method that is reasonable in the 
circumstances." (R. 2939 (A. 82), see also A. 100-01; 
• Riley testified that he did not understand the meaning of earned surplus under LC. §§ 30-1-2 
and 30-16 and, thus, applied a "fair value" of AIA Services' assets to justify compliance with 
the statues in his mind (A. 106); and 
• Riley testified that he did not believe a shareholder vote authorizing the use of capital surplus 
under LC.§ 30-1-6 was necessary. (A. 103, p. 138). 
In addition to these precise facts, Riley testified to a number of matters that make it clear 
that his opinions should have been reasoned. See, e.g., R. 2868 (A. 98) (Riley acknowledging 
that, based on his understanding of the terminology and restrictions found in Idaho 
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§ not 
retained earnings); R. 2870 (A. 100) (Riley admitting that he did not believe retained earnings 
had any bearing on the question of legality of the transaction); R. 2870 (A. 100) (Riley 
acknowledging that he believed the legality of the transaction should be determined based on the 
fair value of the company's assets), see also R. 2870 (A. 101 ). 
Critically, none of these qualifications or reasoning were included as required in the 
Opinion Letter nor were they ever disclosed to Taylor prior to 2012. R. 824-828 (A. 1-5), 
A. 124-26. 
Moreover, the points to which Riley testified were directly counter to the positions taken 
by HTEH before the Babbitt and AJA district courts, as well as this Court. 13 See, e.g., R. 5503 
(A. 50) ("The District Court correctly concluded that, because the agreement to redeem Reed 
Taylor's shares violated Idaho law, it is illegal and unenforceable"); R. 5509 (A. 52) ("The 
shareholders were not provided with information as to the source from which Reed Taylor's 
shares would be purchased, i.e., out of earned surplus, capital surplus or some other source."); 
R. 5510 (A. 54) ("The Amended Notice does not mention the redemption of Reed's common 
13 Additionally, HTEH took positions in AJA attempting to cause courts to believe that that Reed Taylor was 
somehow improperly masterminding the entire transaction to the detriment of minority shareholders. R. 5512 (A. 
55) ("The golden parachute was in place") and R. 5524 (A. 66) ("Through the stock redemption agreement, 
however, Reed Taylor attempted to jump in front of all other common shareholders by converting himself into a 
secured creditor.") Based on some of the language contained in Taylor v. AJA, particularly the concurring opinion of 
Justice J. Jones, wherein he notes "the overreaching of Reed Taylor'' and that "Reed Taylor engineered a contract 
for his own benefit, acting as negotiator for the corporation while at the same time acting on his own behalf as the 
other contracting party" (151 Idaho at 575, 261 P.3d at 852) it appears as though this character attack had a 
meaningful impact on this Court's decision making process. Contrary to the impression created upon this Court by 
HTEH in the underlying litigation, Riley testified at deposition that he never witnessed Reed Taylor engage in any 
improper conduct: "Q: From what you could observe ... did you see any conduct on the part of Mr. Reed Taylor as 
a majority shareholder whereby he attempted to obtain a preferential distribution? A: No." R. 2864 (A. 96). 
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16 statute 
1995 Permitted the Redemption of Stock Only Out of A Corporation's Earned Surplus") R. 5519 
(A. 60) ("Capital Surplus is irrelevant"); R. 5517 (A. 58) ("It is undisputed that AIA Services did 
not have any earned surpius with which to redeem Reed Taylor's Stock"); R. 5520 (A. 61) ("The 
Stock Redemption Agreement, and all obligations arising out of it, are illegal, void and 
unenforceable."); R. 5526 (A. 67) ('"Fair Value' and appraisals are irrelevant"). For a 
comprehensive overview of all contradictions between the Opinion Letter, positions taken by 
HTEH in the underlying litigation, and positions taken by Riley in his disclosures and 
depositions, Compare AL4 Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 559-65 and A. 10-24 with A. 1-5, 6-9, 
48-75, 76-89, 90, 95-113, 123-26, 128-30, 145-48, 150-55, 167-68, 178; R. 116, 14; 310-14, 
345-50, 366-76, 565-66, 110; 1720, 2166-68, ,, 54, 56; 2383-84, 2829-35, 3145-51, 3158-67, 
3575-78, 3584-89, 3636-50, 4120, 4127 n.l, 4127-35, 4150-53, 4154-55, 4160-61, 4565-66, 1 
20; 5236-37, 111; 5985-91, 5993-6006. 
Taylor had no way of knowing the contents of Riley's mind until Riley disclosed them: 
"There is no question that Judge Brodie and the Idaho Supreme Court were both misled because 
they were not apprised of the factual basis and legal reasoning for Mr. Riley's opinions in the 
Opinion Letter, as well as [his] belief that the Opinion Letter was correct and the transaction was 
legal .... " R. 6377 (A. 154) 189. "Mr. Riley intentionally prepared and delivered the misleading 
Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor, despite the fact that Mr. Riley knew that his opinions should have 
been reasoned and disclosures should have been made to cure the misleading Opinion Letter." 
R. 6377 (A. 154) 1 90. Neither Riley nor HTEH submitted any testimony to dispute 
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otherwise learned the contents of Riley's mind without Riley's testimony. R. 6432-56. 
The AIA district court denied Taylor's motion for additional time to conduct discovery 
on the grounds that Taylor was unable to articulate the precise information that he believed he 
would learn from additional discovery: "Plaintiff merely contends in general, without any 
specificity, that the Defendants are likely hiding information even though the record indicates 
Defendant AIA has provided Plaintiff with reasonable opportunity to inspect all 1995 and 1996 
financial information still within the possession of AIA." R. 4904. Moreover, Riley refused 
Taylor's multiple requests to speak informally with Taylor about any of these matters. R. 2865 
(A. 97). Despite Taylor's due diligence, he could not have discovered the facts necessary to 
support his fraud claims because HTEH prevented Riley's deposition inAL4. Taylor v. AL4, 151 
Idaho at 571, 261 P.3d at 848 (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not 
allowing Taylor to depose Riley). Notably, Riley and HTEH did not disclose these facts until 
after AJA had been resolved and until after the January 30, 2012 decision in which the district 
Court dismissed the fraud claims based on issue preclusion. R. 4327-55, 4437-62; 1/30/12 Tr., 
p. 27-103. 
Taylor's instincts were correct: Defendants were hiding information. However, at that 
time Taylor had no way of knowing that the information that defendants were concealing from 
him included Riley's actual knowledge that the opinions contained in the Opinion Letter were 
subject to several material, undisclosed qualifications that were known only in the recesses of 
Riley's mind. Critically, these very facts are the facts that support Taylor's current claims for 
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fraud and provide additional facts supporting new causes 
of action involving breach of fiduciary duty, professional malpractice, and negligent 
misrepresentation. Because Riley and HTEH improperly concealed these facts from Taylor (all 
while representing the exact opposite positions to the AJA District Court and this Court) the fraud 
exception to res judicata applies and the prior lawsuits cannot bar Taylor's current claims. 
Accordingly, now that these relevant facts are on the table, this Court should remand for trial. 
B. The district court erred holding that collateral estoppel barred Taylor's fraud claims 
because Taylor's fraud claims differ from those asserted in AL4 and Taylor did not 
have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the current fraud claims in A.L4. 
The district court erred in holding that collateral estoppel barred Taylor's fraud claims 
because Riley did not establish all of the requisite elements of collateral estoppel. Collateral 
estoppel (issue preclusion) bars claims only if the party asserting collateral estoppel proves all of 
the requisite elements: 
'(l) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in 
the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) 
the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) 
there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party 
against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the 
litigation.' 
Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784,795,229 P.3d 1146, 1157 (2010) (citation omitted). "A party has 
not had the requisite full and fair opportunity if he or she was unable to present critical evidence 
in the initial proceeding." Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., 973 F.2d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 1992) 
( citations omitted). "[W]hen a ground of recovery or defense could not have been asserted in the 
prior action ... the defense or ground of recovery falls outside the scope of claim preclusion." 
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Moreover, a judgment no preclusive 
effect if: (a) The claim asserted in the second action is based upon grounds that could not have 
been asserted against the defendant in the first action; or (b) The judgment in the first action was 
based on a defense that was personal to the defendant in the first action. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 (1) (1982). 
Taylor's fraud and constructive fraud claims are not barred by collateral estoppel because 
the current fraud claims are different than those litigated in AJA, and because Taylor did not have 
an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the current fraud claims in AJA. 
1. Taylor's fraud claims in this case are different from the fraud asserted in AJA. 
Taylor's failed request to have the AJA District Court enforce the SRA despite its 
illegality on the grounds that it was fraudulently induced by AJA is different from his current 
claim that Riley engaged in fraudulent conduct by failing to disclose to Taylor facts making his 
Opinion Letter not misleading. Taylor's allegations of fraud in AJA were also different from his 
current claims that Riley committed fraud by continuing to conceal material facts regarding the 
Opinion Letter from both Taylor and Idaho courts until February/March of 2012. 
When the AJA District Court rejected Taylor's argument that the SRA should be enforced 
despite its illegality, the basis of its decision was that the Opinion Letter contained only opinions, 
not statements of fact. The AJA District Court reasoned that because the Opinion Letter 
contained only opinions (albeit incorrect opinions), it could not form the basis of a fraud claim: 
The statements by [Riley] and others that the stock redemption agreement did not 
violate any laws or regulations was offered as opinion, not fact ... Such an opinion 
was no more a statement of fact when expresses by [Riley] in 1995 than it is now 
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when ,,.,.,,,,...i-,,r1 It cannot 
for a fraud claim. 
R. 371. 
Taylor's current fraud claims against Riley are not based upon the opinions set forth in 
the Opinion Letter, but rather on the material facts that Riley intentionally omitted from the 
Opinion Letter. R. 6377 (A. 154) ,i 90 ("Mr. Riley intentionally prepared and delivered the 
misleading Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor, despite the fact that Mr. Riley knew that his opinions 
should have bene reasoned and disclosures should have been made to cure the misleading 
Opinion Letter."). 
a. Riley had an affirmative dutv to disclose to Taylor those facts which were necessary 
to make the Opinion Letter not misleading and failure to make such disclosures 
constitutes fraud. 
Riley had an affirmative duty to disclose the reasoning behind the opinions contained in 
the Opinion Letter under both the law regarding third-party closing letter opinion practices and 
well-settled common-law concepts regarding fraudulent non-disclosure. Respecting third party 
closing letter opinion practice: 
An opinion the opinion preparers believe to be misleading should not be delivered 
until disclosures are made to cure the problem... When considering if any 
opinion to be given will mislead the opinion recipient, opinion preparers must 
think not only about the opinion itself but also about areas excluded from the 
opinion... The question the opinion preparers must consider is whether under the 
circumstances the opinion will cause the opinion recipient to misevaluate the 
specific opinion given. 
R. 6362 (Expert Witness Declaration of Richard T. McDermott quoting TRIBAR II, 56 Bus. Law. 
at 602-03) (emphasis in original). A. 178-79. "The requirement that opinions not be misleading 
is a common sense part of the customary practice." Id. Attorneys providing information to third 
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same 1s anc)thi;:r 
attorney negotiating at arm's length." Vega v. Jones Day, Reavis & Pogue, 121 Cal. App. 4th 
282,293, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 34 (2004) (citations omitted). 
Not only is it the common sense part of customary practice of third-party closing 
opinions to render opinions that are not misleading, such practice is entirely consistent with 
well-settled black-letter law on fraudulent non-disclosure: 
Even though one is under no obligation to speak as to a matter, if he undertakes to 
do so, either voluntarily or in response to inquiries, he is bound not only to state 
truly what he tells but also not to suppress or conceal any facts within his 
knowledge which will materially qualify those stated. If he speaks at all he 
must make a full and fair disclosure. 
Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 91, 97,390 P.2d 826, 830 (1964) (emphasis added). When a party 
undertakes a duty to speak respecting a matter, he is under a duty to make a full and fair 
disclosure of all matters that would impact the accuracy of the statements made. 
In the context of third-party opinion practice, the process pursuant to which an opinion 
giver discloses facts that materially qualify his opinions is through the issuance of a "Reasoned 
(or Explained) Opinion": 
A reasoned ( or "explained") opinion is typically rendered when, in the view of the 
opinion giver, the opinion's conclusions should not be stated apart from its 
underlying reasoning (for example, when the opinion giver reaches a conclusion 
despite the existence of possibly contradictory authority). By setting forth the 
reasoning behind the opinion, the opinion giver spells out, for evaluation by the 
opinion recipient and its counsel, such matters as lack of judicial authority, the 
presence of divided authority or contrary but outdated authority. The conclusions 
expressed in a "reasoned" opinion are sometimes limited by the phrase ''while the 
matter is not free from doubt" or some similar phrase. However, at other times 
the opinion, although containing reasoning, will not be limited in this way 
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because the opinion 
further characterization. 
to 
TRIBAR II, 56 Bus. Law. at 607. A. 183. The TriBar report explains that the rationale behind 
placing a duty upon the opinion giver to make such disclosures is because "the opinion recipient 
must decide whether to proceed with the transaction in view of the qualification or reasoning set 
forth in the opinion letter." Id. 
"Even an opinion that has been prepared with care and that is technically correct may be 
misleading to the opinion recipient" GLAZER§ L8, at 52. A. 167. "The opinion process would 
be subverted if, with knowledge of the opinion preparers, a closing opinion instead became a 
vehicle for misleading the opinion recipient about the very matters on which the opinion 
preparers have been asked to provide their professional judgment" Id. at 54. A. 168. "[I]f the 
opinion preparers recognize that an opinion will be misleading to the opinion recipient they 
should disclose the problem to the recipient (or decline to give the opinion)." Id. at 53. A. 167. 
b. Riley committed fraud by failing to disclose information required to make his 
Opinion Letter not intentionally misleading. 
From the date Riley issued the Opinion Letter until February/March 2012, Riley had an 
affirmative duty to Taylor to provide the basis and reasoning necessary to clarify his misleading 
opinions. Riley breached this duty by concealing the material fact that Riley's opinions were not 
truly "clean opinions," but rather, there were significant reasoning and qualifications necessary 
to support Riley's opinions. To summarize the facts known to Riley which should have been 
disclosed to prevent the Opinion Letter from being misleading: 
(a) Mr. Riley had deviated from the plain and ordinary meaning of 'earned 
surplus' under LC. § 30-1-2; (b) Mr. Riley had relied upon a so-called 'fair value' 
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test to purportedly comply with the 'earned surplus' § 
6; ( c) Mr. Riley had allegedly relied upon the compliance of § 30-1-6 based 
on certain payments to Reed Taylor for the redemption being subordinate to the 
payments to Donna Taylor ... ; and (d) Mr. Riley had relied upon LaVoy Supply 
Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127 369 P.2d 45 (1962), which stated that 'A 
corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegal,' to 
support his opinions because AIA Services Corporation could not purportediy 
disavow its obligations to Reed Taylor. 
R. 6368-69 (A. 145-46(. Based on this unrebutted opinion of Richard T. McDermott, such 
actions were "a breach of the duty of care owed to Reed Taylor by delivering to him an 
intentionally misleading Opinion Letter." R. 6375,, 82 (A. 152). 
Riley's failure to disclose those material facts is a breach of Riley's duty as it exists under 
third-party opinion practice and black-letter law regarding fraudulent non-disclosure. If Riley 
failed to disclose those material facts with the intent to mislead Taylor, such failure constitutes 
fraud; if Riley did not have the intent to mislead Taylor, his failure to disclose these material fact 
constitutes constructive fraud. A. 123-26, A. 128-30, A. 147-48, A. 150-55. Additionally, 
Riley's continued intentional actions in thereafter failing to disclose this information to Taylor 
during the course of several years of litigation involving the legality of the transaction constitute 
:fraudulent concealment. Id. 
If these facts had been made known to Taylor before the Opinion Letter was delivered, 
then the Opinion Letter would not have been intentionally misleading. "If the Opinion Letter 
had disclosed that it was based on ... reasons purportedly utilized by Mr. Riley to justify 
compliance with LC. § 30-1-6, rather than the plain language of that statute, Reed Taylor or any 
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152), see also A. 152-55. 
If Riley had disclosed these facts to Taylor and/or Idaho court's before or during the AJA 
iitigation, much of the time and expense associated with the discovery disputes involved in those 
lawsuits could have been avoided. R. 6376, ,r 86 (A. 153). Because Riley-with the support and 
assistance of HTEH--continued to breach his duty to disclose these material facts during the 
course of the AJA litigation, this Court should reverse the district court's holding that collateral 
estoppel bars Taylor's current fraud claims against Riley. 
2. Taylor's fraud claims in this case are different from the fraud asserted inAL4. 
The April 5, 2012 decision that collateral estoppel barred Taylor's fraud claims was error 
because during the time AlA was pending, Riley improperly concealed from Taylor (as well as 
the AJA District Court and this Court) material facts relevant to Taylor's claims for fraud, thereby 
preventing him from fully and fairly litigating those claims. Riley did not have a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate his current claims inA.lA because it was not until February/March of2012 
that Taylor learned that Riley had been concealing these material facts. A party does not have a 
fully and fair opportunity to litigate claims if they are "unable to present [that] critical evidence." 
Snider, 973 F.2d at 559. 
In AJA, the District Court held, and this Court affirmed, that the Opinion Letter was 
merely incorrect and there were insufficient facts to establish fraud. 151 Idaho at 566, 261 P.3d 
at 843. However, the decisions in AJA were rendered over the protestations of Taylor's counsel 
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was not to 
behind Riley's opinions. R. 3220-21. 
In rejecting Taylor's claim that the illegal SRA should still be enforced despite its 
illegality because it was fraudulently induced by the incorrect opinion letter, this Court made 
clear: "[Taylor] does not actually argue that anyone intended to mislead him in this case and 
points to nothing in the record suggesting that anyone had such intent." Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho 
at 566, 261 P.3d at 843. Taylor could not have raised claims against Riley in AJA because, while 
AJA was pending, Taylor did not know that Riley had fraudulently concealed this information 
I 
from him. "It was impossible for Reed Taylor or [Rod Bond] to obtain the disclosures and 
reasoning Mr. Riley relied upon for his Opinions in the Opinion Letter or to ascertain that the 
Opinion Letter was intentionally misleading when such disclosures and reasoning were omitted 
from the Opinion Letter until Mr. Riley first disclosed that information February 22, 2012 .... " 
R. 6377-78, i[90. 
In the present case, when Taylor was finally allowed to depose Riley, Riley testified to 
the facts, basis, and reasoning underlying his opinions and they turned out to be significant 
material facts that Riley was under a duty to disclose to Taylor but which Riley had improperly 
concealed including, but not necessarily limited to, "[t]he 1995 Opinion Letter was and is 
believed by this answering defendant to be a correct, fair and objective opinion, given the totality 
of the circumstances existing at the time of the 1995 redemption transaction." R. 2936 (A. 79)); 
"[Riley] concluded that AIA could not later disavow its obligations to Reed Taylor" (R. 2940 (A. 
84)); "[Riley] found no Idaho cases addressing the statutory restrictions on distributions to 
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surplus" or other statutory accounting terms used .... " (R. 2937 (A. 81)); "[Riley] concluded that. 
after giving effect to the $7.5 million redemption of Reed's stock, the corporation had sufficient 
net assets to satisfy the requirements of the Idaho statutory restrictions on redemption as 
construed in light of RMBCA 6.40" (R. 2940 (A. 83)); and "Ri.\1BCA 6.40 expressly provides 
that the board of directors may, in lieu application of generally accepted accounting principles, 
base a determination that a distribution is not prohibited on the basis of "fair valuation and other 
method that is reasonable in the circumstances" (R. 2939 (A. 82)).14 For a comprehensive 
overview of all contradictions between the Opinion Letter, positions taken by HTEH in the 
underlying litigation, and positions taken by Riley in his disclosures and depositions, Compare 
AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho at 559-65 and A. 10-24 with A. 1-5, 6-9, 48-75, 76-89, 90, 95-
113, 123-26, 128-30, 145-48, 150-55, 167-68, 178; R. 116, 14; 310-14, 345-50, 366-76, 565-66, 
110; 1720, 2166-68, ,, 54, 56; 2383-84, 2829-35, 3145-51, 3158-67, 3575-78, 3584-89, 3636-
50, 4120, 4127 n.1, 4127-35, 4150-53, 4154-55, 4160-61, 4565-66, 120; 5236-37, 1 11; 5985-
91, 5993-6006. 
Because Riley had a continuing, affirmative duty to disclose these facts to Taylor, Riley's 
failure to make such disclosures any time prior to the conclusion of the AJA litigation prevented 
14 In addition to these precise facts, Riley testified to a number of matters that make it clear that his opinions should 
have been reasoned. See, also R. 2868 (A. 98) (Riley acknowledging that, based on his understanding of the 
tenninology and restrictions found in Idaho Code § 30-1-06, he did not think it was necessary advise Taylor that 
AIA Services had negative retained earnings); R. 2870 (A. 100) (Riley admitting that he did not believe retained 
earnings had any bearing on the question of legality of the transaction); R. 2870 (A. 100) (Riley acknowledging that 
he believed the legality of the transaction should be detennined based on the fair value of the company's assets), see 
also R. 2870 (A. 101 ). 
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For these reasons, this Court can and should find that Taylor did not have a fully and fair 
opportunity to litigate his fraud claims in AJA and, therefore, the district court erred in holding 
that coilateraJ estoppel barred Taylor's claims in the present lawsuit. 
C. This Court should expand the tort of negligent misrepresentation to include omissions 
by attorneys providing opinion letters. 
Because there is no principled reason to limit negligent misrepresentation claims to only 
accountants, this Court should expand Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 
895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995) to include attorneys who provide opinions letters upon which third 
parties are invited to rely. Moreover, the tort of negligent misrepresentation should include 
material omissions where a duty to disclose the informa~ion exists. Upon expanding the tort of 
negligent misrepresentation to include claims against attorneys, this Court should remand this 
matter for proceedings consistent with such opinion. 
1. There is no principled reason why the tort of negligent misrepresentation should 
be limited to only accountants. 
The district court dismissed Taylor's negligent misrepresentation claims against Riley on 
the grounds that Idaho law recognizes a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against 
only accountants, and no others. Specifically, the district court stated: 
Well, I have to take [the Idaho Supreme Court] at their word. And they didn't say: 
We've limited it to professionals or we're limiting it to CPAs and similar people 
with a professional relationship. They flat said: We're limiting it to accountants. 
I'm not saying that's a decision I would make if it were mine to make, but it's not 
mine to make. 
3/26/10 Tr., p. 119, 11. 12-16, 18-20. As noted by the district court, Idaho currently recognizes a 
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cause 
relationship involving an accountant." Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203. Because 
there is no principled reason why the tort of negligent misrepresentation should be limited to 
only accountants and no others, th.is Court should expai.-id such cause of action to include 
attorneys who provide opinion letters upon which they invite third parties to rely. 
"The premise of negligent misrepresentation is a direct duty to the nonclient plaintiff. The 
nonclient's entitlement, however, often arises from a duty owed the client ... The most common 
basis for a claim of negligent misrepresentation is an opinion expressed by an attorney on which 
the plaintiff claims to have relied detrimentally." Ronald E. Mallen, et al., I Legal Malpractice§ 
7:34 (2016 ed.). While never addressed by this Court, numerous other jurisdictions have 
recognized the cause of action as one that may be asserted against attorneys under the same 
rationale as accountants. Finova Capital Corporation v. Berger, 794 N.Y.S.3d 379 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2005); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Baik, 55 P.3d 619 (Wash. 2002); Kirkland Construction 
Co. v. James, 658 N.E.2d 699 (Mass. 1995); Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Central Bank 
Denver, N.A., 892 P.2d 230 (Col. 1995); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey, Ballantine, 
Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318,320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
As in Prudential, Riley was well aware that his opinion letter would be relied upon by 
Taylor for the stock redemption transaction and "the end and aim of the opinion letter was to 
provide [Taylor] with the .. .information [he] required" as a condition for the redemption of his 
shares. A. 1-5; R. 4710, § 2.50); accord Prudential, 605 N.E.2d at 322. "[A]s fully expected by 
[Riley, Taylor] unquestionably relied on the opinion letter in agreeing" to sell his shares; (A. 
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Court ruled: "[Taylor] relies heavily on an August 15, 1995 opinion letter from Richard 
Riley .... " 15 A. 21 n. 15. '"Finally, by addressing and sending the opinion letter directly to 
[Taylor, Riiey] dearly engaged in conduct which evinced [his] awareness and understandil1g that 
[Taylor] would rely on that letter, and provided the requisite link between the parties." A. 1-5; 
accord Prudential, 605 N.E.2d at 322. Thus, the "bond between (Riley] and [Taylor] was 
sufficiently close to establish a duty of care running from the former to the latter." Prudential, 
605 N.E.2d at 322. 
When this Court adopted the tort of negligent misrepresentations against accountants, it 
relied heavily upon Ultrameres Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931) and Credit 
Alliance v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. 
First Bancorp of Idaho, 115 Idaho 1082, 1083-84, 772 P.2d 720, 721-22 (1989). The New York 
Court of Appeals, which authored Ultrameres, subsequently expanded the tort to include 
attorneys: "Although the defendants in many of the prior cases addressing this issue have been 
accountants, there is no reason to arbitrarily limit the potentially liable defendants to that class of 
professionals." Prudential, 605 N.E.2d at 320. (citations omitted). In expanding the tort to also 
apply to attorneys, the Prudential Court relied upon the rationale set forth in Credit Alliance, 
which was also relied upon favorably by this Court in Idaho Bank & Trust Co. See id. at 322 and 
15 Again, Taylor maintains that his independent counsel, Cairn<.,Toss, also owed him duties of care as well as 
fiduciary duties relating to the transaction. However, the duties owed by Cairncross to Taylor do not obviate the 
duties also owed to Taylor by Riley. See Watts v: Krebs, 13 !'Idaho 616, 621, 962 P 2d 387, 392 (1998) (noting that 
a parties' ability to independently verify information does not negate their right to rely on information provided to 
them by a third-person). 
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Bank 1 Idaho at 1083-84. This demonstrates that courts expanded the tort 
of negligent misrepresentation to attorneys based upon the same policy rationale previously 
accepted by this Court when adopting the claim in the first instance, which is a logical extension 
of the ciaim. 
Moreover, since this Court has adopted the claim against accounting professionals, who 
:frequently rely upon opinion letters from attorneys for their reports, it follows that claims should 
exist against attorneys if the attorneys' opinions upon which the accounting professional rely 
tum out to be negligently provided. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LA WYERS § 95 cmt. f (2000). Otherwise, accountants would have no recourse against attorneys 
who provide them with opinion letters for the same audits or reports. For these reasons, this 
Court should expand the tort of negligent misrepresentation to include attorneys. 
2. The tort of negligent misrepresentation should encompass claims where the 
misrepresentation consists of omissions of material facts. 
Negligent misrepresentation claims against accountants are appropriate when there is (a) 
an awareness by the maker of the statement that [the statement] is to be used for a particular 
purpose; (2) reliance by a known party on the statement in furtherance of that purpose, and (3) 
some conduct by the maker of statement linking it to the relying party and evincing its 
understanding of that reliance." Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bush.by, Palmer 
& Wood, 605 N.E. 2d 318, 321-22 (N.Y. 1992). Additionally, courts have also recently held the 
claim may include omissions, if a duty to disclose otherwise exists. See, e.g., Alexander v. 
Sanford, 325 P.3d 341,365 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014); accord Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616,621, 
962 P.2d 387, 392 (1998) (noting that '"silence, in circumstances where a prospective purchaser 
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conclusions, is a to 
say anything when he gave the purchasers the document containing the misstatement of tillable 
acreage amounted to a misrepresentation."). 
As has been previously discussed, the misrepresentation at issue in this case was the 
omission of material facts: i.e., the reasoning required to prevent Riley's opinion letter from 
being misleading. E.g., A 150-55. The law regarding third-party opinion practice gives rise to 
an affirmative duty pursuant to which Riley was required to disclose the reasoning necessary to 
support the opinions contained in the Opinion Letter in order to prevent it from being misleading. 
Consistent with Alexander, 325 P.3d at 365, the existence of this duty to disclose establishes 
means that Riley's non-disclosure of the reasoning supporting his opinions can support a claim 
of negligent misrepresentation. 
For these reasons, this Court should expand the tort of negligent misrepresentation to 
include attorneys, make clear that such claim can be supported by omissions of material facts 
where a duty to disclose exists, and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with such 
opm1on. 
D. Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Riley owed fiduciary duties to 
Taylor, including the duty of loyalty, arising from the prior attorney-client 
relationship, relationships of trust and confidence, as well as the third-party Opinion 
Letter. 
The district court erred in determining that Riley did not owe fiduciary duties to Taylor 
because such decision rested solely upon the lack of an attorney/client relationship by and 
between Taylor and Riley regarding the SRA transaction and failed to take into account the 
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relationship of trust and confidence between Taylor and Riley. 
The existence of the prior attorney/client relationship by and between Riley and Taylor; 
their long-standing relationship of trust, coru-'idence and superior knowledge; and the issuance of 
the Opinion Letter to Taylor as a non-client, separately or cumulatively, give rise to continuing 
fiduciary duties as to the Opinion Letter, particularly as to the duties of loyalty and to disclose. 
See Blough v. Wellman, 132 Idaho 424, 426, 974 P.2d 70, 72 (1999); Stearns v. Williams, 72 
Idaho 276, 288, 240 P.2d 833, 840-41 (1952); Beaudoin v. Davidson Trust Co., 151 Idaho 701, 
263 P.3d 755, 758 (2011); .Jones, 125 Idaho at 613-14; Bethlahmy v. Becktel, 91 Idaho 55, 62, 
415 P .2d 698, 705 ( 1966). Indeed, in Lewis v. Rosenfeld, the Court explained that an opinion 
letter is one of the rare circumstances in which an attorney can owe a fiduciary duty to a 
non-client. 138 F.Supp.2d 466, 480-81 (S.D. N.Y. 2001). 
Blough v. Wellman is instructive. In that case, this Court made clear that where there is a 
question of fact regarding the scope of an attorney's duties to another party, such question of fact 
is to be submitted to the jury for determination: "then, the ultimate question to be answered by 
the factfinder will be whether [the attorneys actions] are 'materially adverse to the former 
client's interests."' Id; accord Damron v. Herzog, 67 F .3d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1995) ("an 
attorney's representation of a client, whose interests were materially adverse to a former client in 
a matter substantially related to that in which he or she represented the former client, was an 
impermissible conflict of interest, giving rise to breach of a fiduciary duty."). This Court stated: 
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relationship a and is one trust, binding an to 
utmost good faith in fair dealing with client, and obligating the attorney to 
discharge that trust with complete fairness, honor, honesty, loyalty, and fidelity. 
(citations omitted). Rule l.7(b) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
mandates that a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that 
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client 
or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests. Loyalty to a ciient prohibits 
undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without the client's 
consent. 
Blough, 132 Idaho at 426. In other words, it is impermissible for an attorney to take positions 
against a client or former client regarding matters "substantially similar" to those in which the 
attorney provided legal services to the client. Id. at 427, 974 P.2d at 73. 
In this case, Taylor presented evidence that Riley owed fiduciary duties to Taylor based 
on their long-standing prior attorney/client relationship and relationship of trust, confidence and 
superior knowledge. 16 R. 814-17, ,, 3-8; A. 123-26. As part of that past attorney client 
relationship, Riley acted as Taylor's divorce attorney at the time of the redemption in 1995 and, 
within that representation, had previously created the entity of AIA Services. R. 814-15, ,r 4; R. 
821 , 15; R. 2375; R. 3067-3135. Thereafter, Riley continued to jointly serve as Taylor's 
personal attorney as well as corporate counsel for AIA Services until Taylor retained 
independent counsel for the redemption of his shares in 1995. R. 2375; R. 2833,, 4; R. 3328; A. 
123-24; A. 142, 1 44. Indeed, even while AJA was pending, Riley sought conflict waivers from 
Taylor (R. 946-47 ,r 25; R. 1016-18) thereby establishing that Riley was aware that his prior 
representation of Taylor and long-standing relationship of trust and confidence. 
16 Taylor is not maintaining that his independent counsel, Cairncross, did not owe him unlimited fiduciary duties as 
his independent counsel for the transaction, too. Rather, Taylor has a right to be made whole. 
47 
no court 
looked solely to the SRA transaction and wholly ignored the prior attorney/client relationship 
and relationship of trust, confidence and superior knowledge. R. 1689-96 (A. 36-37). The 
district court erred in detem1ining that no fiduciary duties existed without taking these facts into 
consideration. Accordingly, such decision must be reversed with instructions to the district court 
to consider the totality of the parties' relationship in reaching a determination regarding whether 
fiduciary duties exist. 
E. HTEH is vicariously liable for Riley's breaches of fiduciary duty, including actions of 
fraudulent concealment that occurred while Riley was affiliated with HTEH. 
The district court erred in dismissing the claims against HTEH because HTEH 1s 
vicariously liable for the damages caused by Riley's breaches of fiduciary duty and concealment 
of material facts that caused damages after Babbitt. A law firm is vicariously liable for the acts 
and omissions of its partners. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LA w GOVERNING LA WYERS § 58 
(2000) LC. § 30-24-302(2); LC. § 30-24-403(a). While it is unclear whether Riley is a general or 
limited partner (R. 562, ,r 1; 3329), HTEH is vicariously liable Riley's breaches of fiduciary 
duties and fraudulent concealment that occurred while Riley was affiliated with HTEH. R. 
432-96. 
As noted above, Riley owed continuing duties to Taylor to disclose the facts, bases, and 
reasoning necessary to make Riley's Opinion Letter not misleading. While Taylor admits that 
HTEH is not liable for Riley's breaches of fiduciary duties at the time Riley drafted the Opinion 
Letter, HTEH is certainly liable for Riley's continued breaches of those duties as he failed to 
clarify the misleading opinions in the Opinion Letter throughout the course of AJA and in the 
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is 
particularly true because HTEH took affirmative actions to shield Riley from having to testify 
and otherwise prevented Taylor from learning this critical information. To the extent the causal 
connection between HTEH's vicarious liability for Riley's acts and the damages caused thereby 
occurred after Babbitt, HTEH's liability for these damages is not barred by res judicata. 
F. This Court should vacate or substantially reduce the orders awarding fees and costs 
and the judgments. 
If this Court reverses as to any of the issues raised above, it should remand with 
instructions to vacate the any corresponding award of costs and attorney's fees and related 
judgment. Alternatively, if all of the district court's decisions are affirmed, the fee awards 
should be substantially reduced. Minnick, 157 Idaho at 868. 
Attorney fee awards under J.C. §§ 120(3) and 12-121 are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 239, 159 
P.3d 870, 876 (2007). "'A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the 
issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal 
standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason."' Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 
271, 281 P.3d at 108 (citations omitted). A court does abuses its discretion, however, if it 
"misapplie[s] the law." Jerry J Joseph C.L. U Ins. Associates, Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 
558, 789 P.2d 1146, 1149 (1990). In making attorney's fees awards below, the district court 
abused its discretion in awarding Riley $175,000 in attorney's fees and HTEH $28,750.00 in 
attorney's fees. 
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1. The district court abused its discretion by awarding Riley fees of $175,000. 
The district court's award of $175,000 in fees to Riley (R. 5822-24) was an abuse of 
discretion because it included a substantial amount of fees that were not "reasonably incurred" 
· by Riley and because such fees were not reduced by the time Riley spent defending the 
Consumer Protection Act claim, for which he was not entitled to fees. 
This Court has set out criterial for determine that which constitutes a "reasonable fee". 
Such criteria includes both "[t]he time and labor required," and "[a]ny other factor which the 
court deems appropriate in the particular case." Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 
134 Idaho 259, 263, 999 P.2d 914, 918 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted). Most significant to 
the case at bar is that many of the costs and fees unreasonably incurred by Riley as he attempting 
to postpone certain actions in the present litigation until the appeal in AJA was final. Notably, 
Riley did not seek a permissive appeal after Judge Greenwood's May 10, 2010 decision, but 
instead waiting two years to address the same issues. A. 25-42, 114-22; R. 4-24, 5125, 5073-
5233, 51-6765. 
Moreover, the billing records suggest that Riley and HTEH strategized to delay Riley's 
deposition until after the AJA appeal was final. Specifically, the October 30, 2009 entry includes 
time for "Analysis of whether deposition of Riley, if allowed, could be used in underlying case 
on appeal." R. 5241. The award of $175,000 in fees rewards Riley for his conduct in concealing 
the facts from Taylor, Judge Brodie and this Court. Had Riley properly disclosed the facts in 
2008 (instead of concealing them), Taylor and others would have saved a substantial amount of 
fees, and all of the issues could have been fairly and efficiently litigated in in 2010. Riley 
50 
he to from 
Riley I as a final judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b). R. 4538-58. Not only was such request denied, 
it served no reasonable purpose. 
The district court did not exercise reason when it rejected these arguments in favor of 
broadly reasoning that significantly reducing Riley's fees would create a rule forcing attorneys to 
seek permissive appeals in every case. R. 5823. While the court's reasoning may have been 
within the bounds of discretion in general, a district court is required to exercise reason for the 
particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. The district court's failure to do so in 
this case was an abuse of discretion. 
The district court's award of fees was also an abuse of discretion because it encompassed 
fees for defending against Taylor's consumer protection act claim, even though the district court 
acknowledge that fees under LC. § 48-608(5) (the exclusive authority for awarding fees for 
defending a consumer protection act claim) were not appropriate. Doble v. Interstate 
Amusements, Inc., 372 P.3d 362, 362 n.2, 160 Idaho 307, 307 n.2 (2016). R. 2788-89, 2791, 
5820, 5823. The inclusion of fees incurred in defending the consumer protection act claim, 
where no fees were authorized, was a misapplication of the law and, therefore, an abuse of 
discretion. 
2. The district court abused its discretion in the amount of fees awarded to HTEH. 
The di~trict court abused its discretion by awarding HTEH $28,750 in fees, or one-half of 
the applicable fees, when Taylor asserted only two claims against it. R. 5821-22. An award of 
fees must be reasonable. Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc., 134 Idaho at 263, 999 P.2d at 918. "It is 
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to present information ... as 
specifically relate to the ... part[y] seeking fees." Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 264, 706 
P.2d 1372, 1375 (Ct.App. 1985). 
In Hackett, the trial court rejected fee appiications because the ciaimants did not even an 
attempt to segregate fees between two parties represented. Id. Similarly, in this case, HTEH did 
not put on any evidence that $28,750, exactly half of the attorney's fees billed between Riley and 
HTEH during the time period that HTEH was involved in the litigation, was specifically 
attributable to HTEH. R. 2766-70, R. 6476-81. HTEH made no attempt to segregate fees 
between time spend defending itself and time spent defending Riley. 
HTEH's failure to segregate fees is particularly significant because only two of Taylor's 
six claims were even asserted against HTEH. There was no time billed for defending against 
Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty claims and there were less than one page of briefing the claim. 
R. 805, 2772-91. There were seven billing entries for the CPA claim, 6.8 hours or $1,020, R. 
2788-89, 2791, and less than one page of briefing on that claim. R. 802, 1603, 2772-91. 
However, the problem with awarding any fees for the CPA claim is that the district court denied 
fees under I.C. § 48-608(5). R. 5820. Thus, it was a misapplication of the law (and therefor an 
abuse of discretion) for the fee award to include any fees incurred in defending against the CPA 
claim because I.C. § 48-608(5) is the exclusive means of awarding fees. Doble, 160 Idaho at 
160, n.2, 372 P.3d at 372, n.2. 
Taylor sought reconsideration of only the breach of fiduciary duty claim against HTEH 
and, again, there were no fees itemized defending that claim and Hawley Troxell's brief was less 
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than one page on that claim. R. 6402-04, 6449-50, 6482-84. Riley was the overwhelming target 
of Taylor's claims and discovery (including the protective orders obtained to prevent Riley' s 
deposition to conceal the facts). R. 25-50, 2772-91, 6482-84, 51 -6765. Thus, the district court 
misappiied the law, failed to exercise reason and exceeded the bounds of his discretion by 
arbitrarily determining that one-half ($28,750) of the fees incurred for the periods of time in 
which Hawley Troxell was also at issue, and by not reducing the award for the CPA claim fees. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Court should: ( 1) reverse the district court's summary judgment and reconsideration 
orders, and remand for trial; (2) vacate the judgments entered in favor of Riley and Hawley 
Troxell; (3) vacate the award of attorneys' fees and costs in favor of Riley and Hawley Troxell; 
and (4) award Taylor costs and reserve an award of fees until a prevailing party has been named 
on remand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of September, 2016. 
By: ----,:;==-
Roderick . Bond 
Attorney for Appellant 
N 
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J,4.wQ In 8CIH,fH 
Or ¢OVHSC'L. 
T. H, t•Cll'\.C ($._.,o,,') 
..--, 
A -1 
--- This opinion is being delivered to you pursuant to Section 2.50) of the Stock Redemption 
[ 
[ 
Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ( "Agreement") by and between AIA Services Corporation, an 
Idaho corporation {"Company") and Reed J. Taylor • All capitalized tenns not defined herein 
shall have the respective meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement. The phrase *Transaction 
Documents" refers collectively 10 the Agreement, together with the Note, the Pledge Agreement, 
the Security Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and the Noncompetition Agreement, as such 
documents are defin!=(l in the Agreement. · -
We have acted as general counsel for the Company in connection with the transactions 
contemplated by the Agreement. As such general counsel, we have assisted in the negotiation, 
and have examined executed counterparts (or photostatic copies of executed counterparts) of the 
Agreement and other Transaction Documents. 
In addition, we have examined originals, executed counterparts or copies of such 
agreements, corporate records, instruments and certificates, certificates of public authorities and 
such matters of law as we have deemed necessary for the purpose of rendering the opinions set 
forth herein, To the extent we deemed necessary for the purposes of this opinion, we have 
relied upon (i) the statements and representations of the Company as to factual matters, (ii) the 
corporate records provided to us by the Company, and (iii) certificates and other documents 
obtained from public officials. We have further relied as to factual matters on the representations 
and warranties contained in the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents (inclu/:fing, 
without limitation, Mr. Taylor's representations in Article IV of the Agreement) and on the 
Company's representations in Schedule m (attached) to the Agreement; and we have assumed 
the completeness and accuracy of all such representations and warranties as to factual matters. 
We have assumed the genuineness of all signatures (other than those of the Company), the legal 
capacity of Mr. Taylor to execute the Agreement and all other documents we have reviewed, 
the authenticity of all documents submitted to us as originals, and the conformity to original 
documents of all documents submitted to us as certified, photostatic, reproduced or conformed 







Reed J. Taylor 
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been duly authorized, executed and delivered by Mr. Taylor and are enforceable against him in 
accordance with their respective terms, and that the execution, delivery and performance of the 
Agreement and the other Transaction Documents by Mr. Tay,or does not and wiU not result in 
a breach of, or constitute a default under, any agreement, instrument or other document to which 
Mr. Taylor is a party, or any order, judgment, writ or decree applicable to such party to which 
Mr. Taylor's property is subject. · 
WbelleYer our opbuoa with respect IO tho ailtenco or abmace of facts ls lndicaU:id 1i> be l 
bued on our knowledge, we are refentn& to the ICQJal knowledae ot R. M. Turnbow and 
Rictwd A. Riley , who are tbc IOle attorneys in Bberie, Berlin, Kadiol, TUrabow & McXlveen, 
Ow1ered who tave represented the Company durina tlla COW11 of oar n,preeentadoll in ·tbia 
b'IDIICdon. Except as expressly set forth herein, we have not undertaken any independent legal 
or factual investigation to determine the existence or absence of such facts, and no inference as 
to out knowledge of the existence or absence of such facts shouJd be drawn from such 
representation. 
Based upon and subject to our examination and assumptions as aforesaid and subject to 
the qualifications hereinafter set forth, we are of tile opinion~ except as set forth in the 
attached Schedule Ill and/or the Schedule3 attached to the Agreement: 
1. The Company ls a corporation duly organized and validly existing under 
the laws of the State of Idaho. Based solely on the attached Certificates of Corporate Status 
issued by the Idaho Secretary of State, the Company, The Universe Life Insurance Company 
(·Universe"), AIA Insurance, Inc. (" AIAI ") and Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc. 
("Farmers") are corporations incorporated under the corporation faws of the State of Idaho and 
in good standing on the records of the Idaho Secretary of State. 
2. The Company and tu Sublldmia haw run~ power and authority 
to enia into, QeCUte and deliYS th6 Tranactions Docwnem IDd to perform their ~
obllptiom tbmunder, all corporlle 1Ctlo11 on the put ot Company and its Sublkffaries, nd 
their rapectM dhectors and lhardlol.dera, ne c 111 ry for the autbormlioo, execution, delivery 
and performance by Company and ib Sublidiariel of tbe Transacdon Ooc:uments and the 
CQNUrnmadon or ttie transacdonJ comemplated thereby hu been cabn; and the 'n'amactioa 
Documcnu have been duly executed and ddiwrcd by Company and its Subsidlarlea. 1'be 
Tranacclon Documents consuture Che valid and binding oblipdon of Company and ha 
ubsidiaries enfcnceable against !hem in accordance with their rmpoctive tenns, e:x.ctl)t that 
enforceabiUty may be 1lrnJ1ed by (a) applicable benknrptcy, imomncy, mora&orium, 
reorpnizadon, fraudulent transfer, rccdvershJp, cooaerva&orlbip or limiJar laws atfecdna 
creditor's rights aeoai.Uy, (b) the exerche of judlclal ductetiOII la accordasa with genen.J 
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policy. ~ 
3. Neither tho eo=udoa and delivery of tbe Trlmlcdo1I Doc:amontl by 
Company ltld Its Subsldlaria, nor the comummadon of the traoncdonl coatalpla1ed thereby, 
will (I) coafflct with ar violate any provision of lbeir' tapeedw Ardclel of IDcorpomloa or 
Bylaw,, u amended; or (b) comtllata I vlolldoD er defull UDdar any mdlbCednea, lndellhrls, 
mortpp. deed of truat. **, boad, Uceme, lcue ..-meat, or other IIIMll1al q.eemait or 
instrumen1 to whk:b Company or any of iu Subadiariea it a party or IO wblcb any of iu uaell l 
or I.he amts of its Subaldiarte.s 1D1J be aubjecti or (o) to tM bat of our knowledp, violate any 
law, rule, licenso., regulation, judgment, order, rullns, or cleczee, blclud.iq any 1mmanco·1aws 
or regulations of any jurildicdon to whtdl Crmpuy or any ol iu Subddiarlel are abject, 
p,ernlna or affilc:tiq the ope,adon of Compay or ill Swltdkdel ID uy IDllilldll telpCICt. 
Neldler tho execution ml ddlvery of the Traallcdon .DoculMDtl by Company md l.rl 
Subsldllrla, nor the COlllWJJJllation of the lrlJllldlona comempi.d dlereby, will oomdtult ID 
event permiUing tamlnation of any fflllSial a,recmcnt or Ibo accderldon of my lndd,11'.di,ea 
of lbe Company or odle:r liability, with or without notice or Japa of dine, or rauJt in the 
Q'eltion or lmposltlon of any lien upon Ibo Collarsal. 
4. No cooseo1, authortzadon, approval or exenrpdon by, or fllina with, anyl 
Per,on or any GoYernmenlaJ Authority ls requiRd in connection willl the aecution, ddiwry and 
performance by Compeny and hs Subsidiaries of the Transaction Docwnentl, or tho taking of 
any action con&emplated thereby, ~c:ept auch u have been obtained prior IO Clostn&, 
5. All of the currently outstanding Pledged Shares are owned beneficially and 
of record by Company and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no warrants, options, or 
other rights to purchase such Pledged Shares. 
6. Except for the lien of First rnterstate Lien upon the First Interstate Shares, 
and any interest in the Commission collateral created or granted in favor of The Centennial Life 
Insurance Company pursuant to that certain Reimbursement Agreement dated August 11, 1995 
among The Centennial Life Insurance Company·, AIA Services Corporation, Af.A Insurance, 
Inc:• The Universe L. ife Insurance Company and AIA MidAmerica, Inc., 1M CoUaticral it tree l 
[ 
and clear of all pledges, liens, oncumbrancea, ,ccurity fntereaas, cqulliea, claims, or optlons. 
Upon delivery of certificates nipn:,en~ the Pledged Shares of AIAI and Plrmers to 
Sharcholder at Closing, Shan:holdcr lhl.U b&ve al CJ~ing a pedec:tcd fint priority ICCW'ity 
inten:st In such Pledacd Shares. 
7. . To our knowledge, there are no claims, actions, suits, proceedings or 
investigations pending or threatened against or relating to Company or any of its Subsidiaries, 
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proceeding or investigation been pending during the three-year period preceding the date hereof. 
Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiaries is in default with respect to any adjudicatory order, 
writ, injunction or decree of any Governmental authority, and neither Company nor any of its 
Subsidiaries ls a party to any cease and desist order, supervisory agreement or arrangement, 
consensual or otherwise, with any Governmental Authority. 
r The foregoing opinions are limited to the !aw. s and regulations of the State of Id~~ 
~eluding the principles of conflicts of laws); and we have not considered and expressed no 
opinion on the laws or regulations of any other jurisdiction. This· opinion is rendered only with 
respect to the laws and the rules, regulations and orders (excluding the principles of conflicts 
of laws) of the State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date hereof. We assume no 
responsibility for updating thls opinion to take into account any event, action, interpretation or 
change of Jaw occurring subsequent to the date hereof that may affect the validity of any of the 
opinions expressed herein. 
The enforceability opinion expressed in opinion 12 Qf this letter is subject to the 
following additional qualifications: 
(i) The terms of any commission agreement, iookbox agreement or other 
account agreement which may affect the Commission Collateral, the rights of the parties 
(other than Company or any of its Subsidiaries) to any such agreement, and any claim 
or defense of such parties against the Company or any of its Subsidiaries rising under or 
outside any such agreement. 
(ii) The qualification that certain rights, remedies and waivers contained in the 
Transaction Documents may be rendered ineffective, or be limited, by applicable Idaho 
laws or judicial decisions governing such rl&hts, remedies and waivers: bul Ibo lncluilon 
of such ri&hts, temedie.l lftd waiYen dOQ not afftlct the Ylllcltty or enfon:abl.lity of Giber 
provisions of the Translction Docwneou and, lo the event the Company or any of its 
Subsidlariea does not comply with die malerial terms of the Trarmcdon Documenb, Mt. 
Taylor may a:en::ite remedies that would normally be availlble under Idaho law m • 
secunid party provided tdaho law applies llDd Mr. Taylor proceeds in eccorda.nce wtlJ\ 
such law. 
(iii) We express no opinion with respect to the perfection or the relative 
priority of the security interests granted to Mr. Taylor in the Commission Collateral. 
-'-I 
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This opinion is furnished by us solely for your benefit for use in connection with the 
Transaction Documents and the transactions contemplated thereby; and it may not be furnished 
or quoted to, or relied upon, by any other person. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. 
JOHN ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-01765 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
FORDAMAGES 
COMB NOW Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John.Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard 
A. Riley and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxelr,), ( collectively referred to 
as "answering Defendants'), by and through their counsel of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., and 





Plaintiffhas failed to mitigate his damages sought in his Complaint 
FlfilI AFFI&MA TIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to state with particularity all averments of fraud and/or conspiracy as 
required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSij 
Certain of Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statutes of limitation pursuant to Idaho 
Code Sections 5-219(4) and 48-619. 
Plamtiif s claims apiast Defondams are based on an unenforceable fQ1d illegal agreement 




These answering Defendants reserve the right, after discovery, to amend this Answer to 
add additional affirmative defenses supported by the facts, and a failure to include all such 
defenses in this Answer shall not be deemed a waiver of any right to further amend this Answer. 
REQUEST FOR AIIQRNBY FEES 
These answering Defendants hereby request that they be awarded their attorney fees and 
costs incurred herein pursuant to Sections 12-120(3), 12-121, 12-123, and 48-608 of the Idaho 
Code, and RlA~t 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Complaint on file herein, these answering 
Defendants pray as follows: 
ANSWER TO COMPLA:nff FOR DAMAGES - 13 
001720 
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1. That the Complaint herein be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiff take 
nothing thereby; 
2. That these answering Defendants be awarded their attorney fees and costs 
incurred herein; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 
DA TED this .25_ day of September, 2008. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A 
ANSWER TO COMPLAJNT FOR DAMAGES - 14 
') ~.3 ,.> j,.'. • OS183.0082.1291409.2 
001721 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .;J£ day of September, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Michael S. Bissell 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof, ) 
BRIAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE ) 
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA ) 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation; and JAMES BECK and ) 
CORRINE BECK, individually and the ) 











REED J, TAYLOR, a single petson, ) 
) 
Counterdefendant. ) 
T czylor v. AJA, et aL l 
Opinion & Order on Plaintiff's Rule S6(f) Motion 
NO. 4461 
CASE NO. CV07-00208 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
P.,-10 
RULE S6(f) CONTINUANCE; 
PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANTS' 




MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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This matter is before the Court on: (1) Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance; 
(2) Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Connie Taylor, James Beck and 
Corrine Beck; (3) Motion for Reconsideration filed by Intervenor 40 l(k) Plan; and ( 4) various 
Motions to Strike Expert Witness Affidavits. Defendants AIA Corporations, John Taylor and 
Intervenor 401(k) Plan filedjoinder in the Motion for Partial Sununary Judgment. A hearing on 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was held on April 23, 2009 and a hearing on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 56(:f) Continuance was held on May 14, 2009. Plaintiff Reed Taylor 
was represented by attomeys Michael S. Bissell and Roderick C. Bond. Defendants A1A 
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. were represented by attorney Gary D. Babbitt. 
Defendant R.. John Taylor was represented by attorney Michael E. McNichols. Defendants 
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck were represented by attorney David R. Risley. 
Defendants Jolee Duclos and Bryan Freeman were represented by attomey David A. Gittens. 
Intervenor 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan was represented by attorney Chades A. Brown. The 
Court, having read the motions, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the parties> having considered 
only those affidavits or portions thereof that are relevant and admissible, having heard oral 
arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its Opinion. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The above~entitled matter was filed January 29, 2007. Since its inception, this case has 
regularly been before the Court on numerous motions filed by the parties. As a result, the 
underlying facts of the case have been articulated by the Court in several written Opinions over 
the course of the proceedings. Therefore, rather than repeat facts already articulated in prior 
opinions, the Court will note only those facts specifically relevant to the motions to be decided. 
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In March 1995, Resolutions 2. 1 adopting and approving purchase 
shares owned Reed Taylor were passed a majority of AIA shareholders. 1 payment 
terms included a $1.5 million promissory l'.\ote payable in July 1996 and a $6 million promissory 
note payable in 2005.2 By July 1995, negotiations reached final agreement and on July 18, 1995, 
a majority vote approved the purchase of Reed Taylor's 613,494 shares and Agreement 
documents were executed July 22, 1995.3 However, by April 1996, AIA was in default on 
several terms relative to the stock redemption agreement.4 After some negotiations, the payment 
tenns were restructured and, 5m July 1, 1996, a Stock Redemption Restructuring Agreement was 
executed. 
It is the non-payment of the $6 million Promissory Note, along with other terms u1 the 
l 99S agreement and 1996 restructured payment terms, that resulted in the filing of the above-
entitled lawsuit. Defendants now assert the redemption of Reed Taylor's AIA shares in 1995 
was an illegal and unenforceable agreement. 
(A) PLAINTIFF'S RULE 57(f) MOTION 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of 
the court and will not be disturbed absent the showing of an abuse of disctetion. Gunter v. 
Murphy 1s Lounge, LLC., 141 Idaho 16, 105 P.3d 676 (2005). Plaintiff seeks a continuance 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f), which teads: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
1 See Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Jolee Duclos tiled December 29, 2008 [Bates stamp AIA002S233 end 
AIA0025241-Al'A002S242]. 
2 Numerous other terms were included in the agreement but are not relevant to this analysis. 
3 See Bxhibit B to the Affida:vit of JoLee Duclos flied December 29, 2008 [Bates stamp AXA002S507 and 
AIA0025S 16 - AlA0025S 17]. 
4 See Exhibit I to the Affidavit of JoLee Duclos filed December 29, 2008. 
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continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just 
4 -13 P.4 
Defendants' pending motion asserts the 1995 agreement between Plaintiff Reed Taylor 
and AIA was unlawful as it violated then existing statutory law. Plaintiff contends that before he 
can sufficiently defend against Defendants' assertion, he needs to conduct additional discovery. 
Since the inception of this case more than two years ago, Plaintiff has aggressively conducted 
disoovery and, by his own admission, has obtained boxes and boxes of documents relative to the 
issues raised in his Complaint, although still not all the discovery requested. The Court 
recognizes Defendants' motion brings into question the :financial status of AIA as it existed in 
1995. However) Defendants' motion was filed in April 2008, more than one year ago, during 
which time discovery has been ongoing. 5 Plaintiff has failed to direct the Court to any particular 
information or doCUDlent relevant to the 1995 fmancial status of AIA that has been denied to him 
through the discovery process. Plaintiff merely contends in general. without: any specificity, that 
the Detendant$ me likely biding im'ornumon even though the record f.Ddicates Defendant AIA 
has provided Plaintiff l-vith reasonable opportunity to inspeet all 1995 and 1996 financial 
information still within the possesSion of AIA. 6 
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden a., required by Rule 56(f). His request for a 
continuance in order to conduct additional discovery is based on mere speculation and on 
presumptions unsupported by fact ofla.w, despite PI~frs "Voluminous filings. Discovery fa 
the instant matter has been actively and aggressively conducted by the Plaintiff since the filing of 
the Complaint over two years ago and during the year since Defendants filed their motion for 
5 In January 2009, the Court entered an order limiting discovery to the S\lnunary Judgment issues pending hearing 
ftlld decision on the motion. 
6 Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Rod Bond in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Rule So(£) Continuance, filed April 22, 
2009. 
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additional discovery will produce new or relevant :infonnation not previously disclosed and such 
disco'Very would. only come at substantial additional oost to all parties with attendant delay in 
pending proceedings. Therefore~ the Co\u-t denies Plaintiff's motion for continuance pursuant to 
Rule 56(f). 
(B) MOTIONS TO STRIKE EXPERT AFFIDAVITS 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike seeks to strike in its entirety the Expert Witness Affidavit of 
Drew Voth filed by Intervenor AIA 401 (K) Plan and the Expert Witness Affidavit of Kenneth 
Hooper filed by Defendants/Countercla.itnants Connie Taylor and James Beck. Intervenor 
40l(K) Plan fl.led a Motion to Strike portions oftb.e Ex.pert Witness Affidavit of Paul Pederson 
filed by Plaintiff. The Court finds there are inadmissible statements in each of the Affidavits 
filed in support of and in opposition to the respective motions for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The Court will, therefore, disregard those portions of the Affidavits it finds inadmissible and will 
consider only those portions it finds admissible. 
(C) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Under I.RC.P. 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, ·depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw.11 The party seeking 
summary judgment faces the buiden of proving the absence of material facts 
Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960,963 (1994), but if 11a party 
moves for summary judgment on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists with regard to an element of the non-moving party's case, the non-moving . 
party must establish the existence of an issue of fact regarding that element." 
Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,273,869 P.2d 1365, 
1368 (1994). In other words, the non-moving party must 11make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on 
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id (internal quotations 
omitted). 
Moreover, the non-moving party cannot withstand summary judgment when 
there is only a "slight doubt as to the facts, 11 as "there must be sufficient evidence 
upon which a jury could reasonably return a verdict resisting the motion. 11 
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Harpole v. State~ 131 Idaho 437,439,958 P.2d 594, 596 (1998). Finally, ''[a]ll 
disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and 
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in 
favor of the non-moving party.11 Bear Island Water Association, Inc. v. Brown, 
125 Idaho 717, 721, 874 P.2d 528, 532 (1994). 
BMC West Corporation v. Hotkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399 (2007). 
In April 2008, Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck filed a Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, asserting the 1995 stock redemption agreement and 1996 stock 
redemption restructure agreement between Reed Taylor and AIA were unlawful as the agreement 
violated I.C. § 30-1-6 as it existed in 1995 and 19967• However, due to the extremely 
contentio1is nature of this case, the motion remained pending while a number of other motions 
were addressed by the Court, including a motion to intervene filed by the AIA 401 (k) Profit 
Sharing Plan (4' 401(k) Plan''). The Court granted the 401(k) Plan's motion to intervene and, 
thereafter, Defendants AIA, John Taylor, and the 401(k) Plan filed Joinder in the Motion for 
Partial Summary J'udgment. Extensive briefing and affidavits were filed by the parties and, 
approximately one year after filing, the Defendants' motion was heard by the Court. 
In 1995, LC. § 30-1-6 read in relevant part: 
A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, receive or othenvise 
acquire, hold, own, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of its own shru:es, but 
purchases of its own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the 
extent of ttnreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefore, and, if 
the articles of incorporation so pemrit or with the affirmative vote of the holders 
of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon, to the extent of umeserv.ed and 
unrestricted capital surplus available therefore. 
No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the 
corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it 
insolvent. 
Idaho Code§ 30~H5 (1995). 
1 Idaho Code § 30· l ·6 was repealed in 1997. 
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The Defendants' motion, along with Plaintiff's opposition,; but tw'o questions before 
the Court: (1) In 1995 and 1996, did AIA have earned surplus to the extent of the stock purchase 
agreement bet\-Veen Reed Taylor and AIA and, (2) if there was insufficient earned surplus, was 
there an affirmative vote of the majority shareholders to use capital surplus for the stock 
purchase to the extent that capital surpius was available. If the answer to both questions is no, 
then the 1995 stock purchase agreement and the 1996 restructured agreement entered into 
between Reed Taylor and AIA violated I.C. § 30-1-6 as it then existed.8 
The illegality of a contract [ ] can be raised at any stage in litigation. The Court 
has the duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte. Morrison v. Young, 136 
Idaho 316, 318, 32 P.3d 1116, 1118 (2001); Qui.ring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 
566, 944 P.2d 695, 701 (1997). Whether a contract is illegal is a question oflaw 
for the court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. 
Morrison, 136 Idaho at 318, 32 P.3d at 1118; Quiring, 130 Idaho at 566, 944 
P.2d at 701 (citing Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276,283,240 P.2d 833,840 
(l 952)). An illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting 
of any act or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy. Quiring, 130 
Idaho at 566, 944 P.2d at 701 (citations omitted). The general rule is that a 
contract prohibited by law is illegal and unenforceable. Id.; Williams v. Cont'! 
Life & Acc. Co., 100 Idaho 71, 73, 593 P.2d 708, 710 (1979); Whitney v. Cont'l 
Life and Acc. Co., 89 Idaho 96,105,403 P.2d 573,579 (196S). A contract 
"which is made for the purpose of furthering any matter or thing prohibited by 
statute ... is void." Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611, 990 P.2d 
1219, 1222 (Ct.App.1999) (quoting Porter v. Caeyon County Farmers' Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co., 45 Idaho 522,525,263 P. 632,633 (1928)). This rule applies on 
the ground of public policy to every contract which is founded on a transaction 
prohibited by statute. Id. (citing Porter, 45 Idaho at 5ZS, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928) 
(citations omitted)). The Idaho Court of Appeals has suggested that 11where a 
statute intends to prohibit an act, it must be held that its violation is illegal, 
without regard to the reason of the inhibition ... or to the ignorance of the parties 
as to the prohibiting statute.'' Id. (quoting 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts§ 251 
(1991)). 
Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6-7, S6 P.3d 765 (2002). 
1 AIA's 1996 financial status was discussed in briefing and in discovery requests. During oral arguments, however, 
counsel for the parti~s treated the 1995 financial status of AUi. as key to whether the stock redemption violated I.C. 
§ 30-1-6. The Court agrees that it is the 199S financial figures that are critical to the analysis, as the 1996 
restcUctUring of the· agreement did not involve the redemption of any additional shares, but rather was merely a 
restru.cturing of payment terms for the redemption that bad already occurred in 1995. 
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De:fendants and Plaintiff employed the assistance of experts to review audited financial 
statements and address the earned surplus question :raised by Defendants1 motion. Plaintiff filed 
the affidavit of accountant Paul. Pederson. Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine 
Beck filed the affidavit of accountant Kenneth Hooper. The 401 (k) Plan filed the affidavit of 
accountant Drew Voth. Without exception, each of the accountants, inciuding Plaintift" s eXpert, 
found AIA had no eamed surplus in the years 1995 and 1996, but instead had an earned deficit. 
During oral arguments, counsel for Plaintiff conceded that the earned surpltlS numbers for ArA 
in 1995 and 1996 were in the negative and that no ainount of accounting adjustment of numbers 
would tum the earned deficit into an earned surplus sufficient to cover the $7.5 million debt 
incurred to Reed Taylo,:. Nevertheless, Plaintiff's counsel argued that the language of the statute 
requires the Court to look not only at earned surplus in 1995 but also at the 1995 capital surplus. 
The portion ofI.C. § 30-1-o that limits a corporation's l'edemption of its own shares 
based on its earned surplus or capital surplus is an issue of :tlmt impression in Idaho.9 It is 
Plaintiff's position that when the majority of shareholders voted in favor of purchasing Reed 
Taylor's AJA shares pursuant to the negotiated agreement, that vote constituted an affinnativo 
vote to draw on capital surplus in addition to earned surplus for the purchase. The Court finds 
Plaintiffs reading of the statute overly broad and inconsistent with statutozy construction. The 
relevant portions of the statute read: 
. . 
A corporation shall have the right to purchase ... its own shares ... to the extent 
of ... earned surplus available ... and, with the affirmative vote of the holders 
of a majority of all shares entitled to vote, ... to the extent of ... capital surplus 
available 
t Idaho's Supreme Co\lrt 1w previously addressed the impact ofI.C. § 30·1 ·6 where a. corporation was insolvent at 
the time it redeemed its own shares, but the limitation based on earned surplus or capital su.q,lus has not been 
previo11sly addressed by Idaho's Appellate Courts. 
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If, under the statute, a mere affirmative vote to purchase shares also meant the shares 
could be purchased to the extent of earned surplus and capital surplus, the statute would not have 
distinguished the two sources, but would have merely stated that a corporation may purchase its 
O'Wll shares to the extent of earned and capital surplus. However, it is not so worded. Under the 
language of lC. § 30wl .. 6, the Court finds that, in order for a corporation to draw upon its capital 
sU1plus to purchase its own shares, a.majority of shares entitled to vote must affirmatively vote 
!lOt omy to purchase .the shares, but must specifically authori%e the use of capital surplus for the 
purchase. Plaintiff, despite being the majority shareholder at the time, has provided no evidence 
that such a vote was taken and, as aresul~ has produced no evidence that there was an 
affirmative vote to draw on capital SU1plus for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Neither 
the approved resolutiom nor tho agi;eements themselves identified earned surplus or capital 
surplus as the source of fauds for the redemption of the shares. 
The Court can. reach but ®.e result-the 1995 stock redemption agreement entered into 
between Reed Taylor and AIA violated I,C. § 30-1-6 as it existed in l99S and, therefore, the 
contra.et between the parties is mega! and unenforceable. Plaintiff, however, contends that, even 
if the Court finds the 199 5 contract illegal, it should find it enforceable. 
Plaintiff first asserts that all of the Defendants, as well as the Intervenor 401(k) Plan, 
lack standing to assert an illegality defense. It is generally accepted that c•stock repurchase 
statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority stoc~olders from corporate 
mismanagementofassets.,,10 Minnelusa Companyv. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1323 
(Colo.1996). Because neither the 40 l(k) Plan nor any of the Defendants were a creditor of AIA 
when the agreement was entered into, standing to challenge the legality of the contract is 
to On page 9 of the Intervenor 40 l(k) Pla11's Supplement.al Brief in Support of Motion to Intervene filed December 
29, 2008, the Plan noted its understanding that stock rep\lrohase statutes are designed to protect creditors and 
minority stockholders. 
Taylorv. AJA, at al, 9 
Opinion & Order on Plaintiff's Rule S6(£) Motion 
Exhibil50• 15 004909 
JUN. 17. 2009 4: 13PM D :JCT COURT NO. 4461 P.~ • 19 
contingent upon being a shareholder when the contract was entered into. The 401(1<) Plan, by its 
own admission, was not a stockholder until March 1996 when AJ.A exchanged $565,000.00 of 
401 (k) Plan funds for AIA Preferred C Stock. 11 The Plan, therefore, is without standing to assert 
an illegality defense to an agreement entered into before the Plan was a shareholder. 12 
Defendants James and Corrine Beck are also without standing to assert the defense as there is no 
evidence in the record that the Becks were shareholders at the time of the agreement. 13 Under 
the law in Idaho, AIA is also without standing to assert the defense. "A corporation itself cannot 
have a stock repurchase declared illegal ... ," La Voy Supply Company v. Young, 84 ldaho 120, 
127, 369 P.2d 45 (1962). Lastly, Connie Taylor and Jobn Taylor are without standing. At the 
time the stock redemption agreement was entered into, Connie Taylor and John Taylor were 
husband and wife and owned shares as community property. John Taylor, as a board member of 
AIA in. 1995, was intimately involved in the negotiations to redeem Reed 1'aylor1s shares and 
voted, for the community, in the affirmative on the question of whether AIA should enter into the 
1995 stock redemption agreement.14 Shareholders who consent and approve of a corporation's 
redemption of shares cannot be heard to complain of the purchase. La Voy Supply Compat1,y v. 
Young, 84 Idaho 120,127,369 P.2d45 (1962). 
The Court, having found those asserting the illegality detense to be without standing to 
assert the defense, must now determine tho impact, if any, that I.e. § 30-1-6 has on the above-
entitled matter. In 2002, quoting from its earlier opinion in Quiring v. Quiring, 13 0 Idaho 560, 
u Page 11 of Intervenor1s Supplemental Briefin Support of Motion to Intervene filed December 29, 2008 and 
:Exhibit J to the Affidavit of Jolee K. Duclos in SUpport of Supplemental Briefre: Motion to httervene tiled 
De er 29 2008. 
The parties a;ree that the Becks' conditioned their purchase of AJA shares on the redemption of Reed Taylor's 
shares occurring first 
14 niere is no dispute that Connie Taylor and Iohn Taylor were husband and wife in 1995, held AJA shares as 
community property and that John Taylor voted the community shares in the affirmative to redeem Reed Taylor's 
shares. 
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944 P.2d 695 (1997), Idaho's Supreme Court unambiguously stated that a court in Idaho has a 
duty to raise the issue of illegality at any stage of the litigation regardless of whether it is pled. 
Eyta v. Finley, 137 Idaho 755, 757-758, 53 P.3d 338 (2002). This Court cannot simply ignore 
the knowledge it now :possesses. In 1995, when AIA redeemed the shares owned by Reed Taylor 
it did so in violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6. "A contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence 
unenforceable." Quiring~ 130 Idaho at 566, citing Miller, 129 Idaho at 351. Of the exceptions 
to the illegality doctrine recognized by Idaho's appellate courts, only one is relevant to the 
instant matter. 
Courts on occasion, however, apply an exception to the illegality doctrine where 
both parties concur in the illegal act, but the parties are not equally at fault by 
reason of that fact that one party commits :frau~ or there is duress, oppression, or 
undue influence over the other. See, e.g., Nat'l Bank & Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189 
U.S. 423, 23 $.Ct. 512, 47 L.Ed. 879 (1903) (agreement induced by fraud); In re 
Resorts Int'!, Inc., 181 F.3d 505, 512 (3rd Cir.1999); Singleton v. Foreman, 435 
F.2d 962,969 (5th Cir.1970); Gon-inge v. Reed, 23 Utah 120, 63 P. 902, 905-06 
(1901 ). In such a situation the courts have allowed the less guilty party to 
recover. Some courts that have adopted this exception focus on the existence or 
nonexistence of confidential relations between the parties. See Novak v. Nowak, 
216 Ind 673, 25 N.E.2d 993 (1940); Rogers v. Samples, 207 Ky. 150, 268 S.W. 
799 (1925). 
Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 9, 56P.3d 765 (2002). 
In the instant matter, while Plaintiff has asserted claims for fraud in the management of 
AIA over the thirteen plus years since his shares were redeemed, he has not asserted any fraud, 
duress, oppression or undue influence relative to the negotiations or events that resulted in 
Plaintiff and AIA entering into the stock redemption agreement or the subsequent restructuring. 
Plaintiff was the founder of AIA, was intimately familiar with the company, knew or should 
have known its financial status, and was represented by counsel during the negotiations that 
resulted in the stock redemption agreement. lt cannot be said that Plaintiff was less sophisticated 
than ot.11.ers involved in the negotiations or was at any disadvantage that would rise to the level of 
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fraud on the part of the other parties to the agreement.15 Therefore, under the current law in 
Idaho, the Comt is unable to find any exception to the illegality dootrino that can be applied to 
the case at hand If the fraud exception is to be expanded, or if additional exceptions are to be 
carved out, that must be done by a higher court, not by this one. 
Next, Plaintiff asserts any claim based on the illegality doctrine is barred by the statute of 
limitations. The Court is not persuaded, A contract that is illegal is unenforceable and a court 
must leave the parties where it finds them. Id. TI1e Court recognizes the inherent inequity that 
results when parties wait over thirteen. years to challenge the legality of an agreement, remaining 
silent as long as a benefit is flov.ring to them and becoming 'righteous' only when it comes time 
to pay the consideration promised, and after a court has round the promissory note portion of the 
agreement in default. Nevertheless, the passage of time alone does not alter the character of a 
contract that is illegal and unenforceable into one that is enforceable. 
Finally, Plaintiff contends the Court should apply rules of equity to enforce the 
agreement. "If a contract is illegal and void, the court ·will leave the parties as it finds them and 
refuse to enforce the contract. The contract cannot be treated as valid by invoking waiver or 
estoppel." Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District, 2009 WL 982690 (April 14, 2009). 
Equity is reserved to those who have clean hands. Kirkman v. Stoker, 134 Idaho 541, 6 P,3d 397 
(2000). Given the pre and post litigation conduct of the most heavily invested parties, it is 
difficult to identify any party with totally clean hands. Plaintiff has not. however, shown any 
party acted with unclean hands in the negotiations and agreement that resulted in the redemption 
15 Pll:intiff reliel heavily OD ID Aupst 15, l 99S opbuoa lelrer fiom lUchad Ri:ll,y, m lttom,y then wllb tbe Boise 
la1' film ofBbfde, Bcsfln, ICadiDa. TUmbow and MclOftllD, Cbnnd, wbo act*1 u smonl counsel for AJA In 
oonn,odoa with the aoc:t ndewplio4 asroemeat be&nen AIA ud bid Taylor. In lw lotter, IUGml)' Riley o«-d 
tile op.Inion that tho stoc:t ndempdon agreement "dul not conflict 'lrith or v:lolate . .. law, rule ar reg11latio:n" widlom 
·ma1c1n1 apecfflc rmrenoe to or dilonsing LC. § 31).1-6. See Exhibit o to the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond filed 
April 22, 2009. By lhiuwiq today, tho Comt finds the attorney opioioa lncomct. 
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of Plaintiff's AIA shares. The agreement was reached only after extensive negotiations 
involving a number of attorneys, including counsel representing Plaintiff, and there has been no 
showing that Plaintiff sold his shares other than voluntarily. There is no question that all parties, 
including Plaintift either ignored or failed to co11Sider LC. § 30-1-6, There is also no reason to 
doubt that all parties, including the Plaintiff, sought to benefit from the business agreement. That 
is simply the free market system at work and is not, without mote; evidence of unclean hands. 
The Court has considered all the a:rguments put forth by Plaintiff mhis briefing and oral 
arguments. However, except for those arguments discussed above, the Court will not address 
any additional arguments as the Court finds they are irrelevant to the issue or have become moot 
given the above analysis. 
(D) INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER PRIOR RULING 
The illegality doctrine requires a court to leave the parties where a court fmds them. For 
that reason, Intervenor's Motion for Reco11Sideration of the Court's ruling on the promissory note 
is denied and the Court's previous analysis stands. The ruling therefore remains, far what it may 
be worth, even if only as an issue on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants and Intervenor are without standing to assert the illegality doctrine 
relative to the 1995 stock redemption agreement between Plaintiff Reed Taylor and Af.A. 
However, it is the duty of the Court to address the illegality of the agreement once the Court has 
knowledge that such illegality may exist. In 1995, Idaho Code probibit<,d a corpota.tiott from 
purchasing its own shares unless the corporation had eamed surplus to the extent of the purchase 
or, upon the affmnative vote of a majority of shareholders, the corporation had capital surplus or 
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a combmation of earned surplus and capital am.plus to the extent of the purchase. In 199S, the 
eamed smplus of AIA was in the negative and there has been no evidence presented to the Court 
that there was an affirmative vote of the majority of shareholders that capital surplus could be 
looked to for the redemption ofReed Taylot•s shares. Therefore, the 1995 stock redemption 
agreement was entered in violation of Idaho co~ making the agreement illegal and 
unenforceable. Following the law in Idaho, the Com inust apply the filegality dootrlne, denying 
emorcem.ent of the oo1ltrflct and leaving the parties where the Court finds them. 
Being acutely aware of the complexities of this case and the significant impact of this 
ruling on Plaintiffs claims, the Court would entertain a request for Rule 54 certification. 
ORDER 
The Motion for Rule 56(f) Continuance filed by Plaintiff is hereby DENIED. 
Motions to Strike Expert Affidavits are hereby DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. 
'"" The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Connie Taylor, James 
Beck and Corrine Beck is hereby GRANTED. 
The Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling on the promissory note) filed 
by Intervenor 40l(k) Plan, is hereby DENIED, 
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MAY 1 0 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Cler 
By K. JOHNSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & 
HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; ROBERT M. TURNBOW, 
an individual; and EBERLE, BERLIN, 
KADING, TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, 
CHARTERED, an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BACKGROUND 
Except as noted otherwise, the material facts are not in dispute in so far as this motion is 
concerned. The history between some of the parties is extensive, going back to 1995. The 
following is but a brief summary for the purpose of outlining the basis of this decision. 
Reed J. Taylor ("Taylor") sued Richard A. Riley ("Riley"); Hawley Troxell, Ennis & 
Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell"); Robert M. Turnbow ("Turnbow"); and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, 
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle Berlin"). Taylor is the former majority stock holder 
of AIA Services Corporation. Riley is an attorney. He is currently a partner in the Hawley 
Troxell firm. Before joining Hawley Troxell, Riley was a member in the Eberle Berlin firm. 
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Robert Turnbow is an attorney and member Berlin. In 1995, when Riley was still a 
member of Eberle Berlin, Riley and Turnbow authored an opinion letter that gave rise to the 
current litigation. 
Taylor alleges t.li.at in 1995, he was solicited by other share holders of AIA to have his 
stock redeemed so they could take the company public. Negotiations ensued in which AIA was 
represented by Eberle Berlin and Taylor was represented by separate counsel. The parties 
ultimately reached an agreement for retiring Taylor's stock. The transaction was reduced to 
writing in a Stock Redemption Agreement and related documents. Under the terms of the 
agreement Taylor surrendered all his stock in AJA in exchange for cash, a $6,000,000 promissory 
note ("the Note"), debt forgiveness, and title to certain airplanes. Included in the documentation 
was an opinion letter from Eberle Berlin, over the signatures of Riley and Turnbow, addressed to 
Taylor. The letter opines, in essence, that the transaction was legal and the documents 
constituted a valid, binding obligation of AIA. The transaction closed in August 1995. 
AIA defaulted almost immediately. Taylor and AJA entered into negotiations which 
resulted in a Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement dated July 1, 1996. By its terms the 
restructure agreement superseded the Stock Redemption Agreement. Under the restructure 
agreement the $6,000,000 note continued in force. The Note matured on August 1, 2005. When 
the Note was not paid, Taylor filed suit in Nez Perce County in January 2007 against AIA, its 
subsidiary AJA Insurance, and several officers, directors, and employees of AIA, together with 
their spouses. This litigation is referred to in this opinion as the "AJA lawsuit." 
Meanwhile, Riley left Eberle Berlin and joined Hawley Troxell in 1999. Hawley Troxell 
defended the AIA entities in the AIA lawsuit. Michael McNichols and his firm, Ciements Brown 
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McNichols represented the other defendants. Taylor objected strenuously to Hawley Troxell's 
representation of the AIA defendants. In 2008 Taylor filed separate actions in Nez Perce County 
against Hawley Troxell, Clements Brown and McNichols, and the attorneys with those firms that 
participated in the AI.A litigation. Riley was one of the nan1ed defenda.11ts in the suit against 
Hawley Troxell. These suits made claims against the lawyers for actions they took in the AIA 
lawsuit. 
Ultimately, all three Nez Perce County suits were dismissed. Taylor appealed the 
dismissal of his cases against AIA and Hawley Troxell. Those appeals are currently pending 
before the Idaho Supreme Court. The status of the Clements Brown and McNichols suit is not 
clear from the record. 
The AIA suit was dismissed by Judge Brodie in the Nez Perce County case on the 
grounds that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal under Idaho law as the same 
pertained to corporations in 1995. Specifically, it appeared from the record that the corporation 
had no retained earnings constituting earned surplus from which a redemption could be made. 
Having found the transaction illegal, Judge Brodie held that neither party was entitled to enforce 
the agreement and the court would simply leave the parties where it found them. The issue of the 
legality of the stock redemption was first raised by the defendants in the AIA litigation in April 
2008. Judge Brodie actually ruled the agreements were illegal on June 17, 2009. 
Other facts, to the extent they are undisputed and necessary for this opinion are contained 
in the body of the opinion below. 
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By their motions for summary judgment, the defendants raised a number of issues. Some 
of the issues pertained to all defendants, other issues to only some defendants. After a somewhat 
lengthy and ra.111bling recitation of t.1-ie facts as he sees them, Taylor's complaint sets forth five 
legal claims labeled as "causes of action." They are: (1) negligent misrepresentation; (2) 
malpractice; (3) violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; (4) breach of fiduciary duties; 
and (5) fraud/constructive fraud. This Court dismissed the negligent misrepresentation claims 
and the Consumer Protection Act claims in a bench ruling following oral argument. The 
remaining claims will now be discussed. Defendants have raised affirmative defenses of 
collateral estoppel, statute of limitations, and, essentially, failure to state a legal claim. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Malpractice 
a. Hawley Troxell. The gist of Taylor's malpractice claim, albeit somewhat 
over-simplified, is that Riley and Turnbow were negligent in performing legal work related to the 
stock redemption transaction. His complaints relate specifically to the opinion letter, but also 
include references to other legal work performed. He alleges this negligence harmed both AIA 
and him. Hawley Troxell had no involvement in the 1995 and 1996 transactions. Taylor does 
not clearly articulate his rationale for claiming Hawley Troxell committed malpractice other than 
the broad statement early in his complaint that "Hawley Troxell is vicariously liable for certain 
acts and/or omissions of Defendant Riley." To the extent Taylor seeks to hold Hawley Troxell 
liable for Riley's conduct in participation in the 1995 and 1996 transactions, there is no legal 
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to so. status as a partner Hawley not render Hawley Troxell 
liable for conduct occurring before he joined the firm. 
b. Res Judicata At oral argument Taylor disavowed making claims against 
Hawley Troxell that were made in the earlier Hawley Troxell litigation. However, many 
paragraphs in the Complaint allege facts surrounding the AIA litigation and Taylor's claim that 
the conduct gives rise to liability. The operative facts giving rise to the claims made in the Nez 
Perce County suit against Hawley Troxell and Riley concerned Hawley Troxell' s representation 
of AIA in the AIA litigation. There is certainly an overlap in the parties and some of the same 
events figure in both suits. As best as this Court can determine, Taylor is claiming that Riley, 
and therefore Hawley Troxell, breached a duty to him by defending AIA in the AIA lawsuit and 
particularly in supporting the position that the redemption agreement was illegal. Riley and 
Hawley Troxell maintain these claims are barred by res judicata. 
The term res judicata includes two components. These are claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion. Issue preclusion is more properly analyzed under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
Claim preclusion, sometimes referred to as "true" res judicata, prevents a party from litigating 
any issue previously litigated and any issue that could have been raised in the prior litigation. 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803 (2002). See also, Rodriguez v. Dept. of 
Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 29 P.3d 401 (2001). 
In his earlier complaint against Hawley Troxell, Taylor alleged in part "defendants were 
responsible for issuing opinion letters relating to the transaction, which include various 
applicable representations and warranties. Defendants are now asserting arguments contrary to 
the representations made in the opinion letter drafted by defendants by and through defendant 
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Richard A. Riley." (Complaint, Taylor v. Babbit, Perce County No. CVOS-01765.) In 
his motion to amend the complaint in that action Taylor alleged "Defendant Riley owes Reed 
Taylor special duties by and through an opinion letter." Riley breached his duties when he 
asserted that the transaction was illegal." (ii 99, Proposed First Amended Complaint in Taylor v. 
Babbit, Nez Perce County Case No. CVOS-01765. 
In the present case Taylor alleges, among other things, 
Defendants Riley and Hawley Troxell owed duties (including duties of loyalty) to 
Reed Taylor not to argue against or contradict the terms of the Opinion Letter. 
Defendant Riley's duties owed to Reed Taylor are also acknowledged by him after 
the opinion letter was issued and delivered to Reed Taylor. Defendant Riley owed 
a duty to Reed Taylor to either force Hawley Troxell to withdraw from 
representing AJA Services or he should have left the firm of Hawley Troxell. 
Defendant Riley chose neither and instead undertook the unconscionable, 
malicious, wanton, vexatious and intentional conduct described in this complaint 
and participated in the litigation by submitting an affidavit and by reviewing and 
monitoring the litigation. In addition Defendant Riley has profited from 
Defendant Hawley Troxell's purported representation in the litigation by and 
through him being a partner at Hawley Troxell, and their receipt of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in attorney fees and costs litigating the validity and legality of 
the redemption agreement and related documents, which such conduct is again 
unconscionable, malicious, wanton, and vexatious. 
(Complaint ,i 28.) 
Judge Brudie dismissed the original complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. He also declined to allow the proposed amended complaint on the same 
grounds. That decision is now on appeal. A comparison of the Complaint in this case and the 
claims made, or that could have been made in the earlier litigation, show remarkable similarity as 
to the claimed breach of duty by Riley and Hawley Troxell. The present action, so far as it 
concerns Hawley Troxell, is no more than an effort to have this Court second guess Judge 
Brudie. The Court declines to do so. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to make a claim against 
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Troxell malpractice based on allegations the complaint, the same is barred by 
res judicata. 
Taylor has appealed Judge Brodie's dismissal of his earlier action against Hawley 
Troxell. He asserts this prevents it from having preclusive effect. Although this issue has not 
been directly decided in Idaho, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Gilbert v. State, 119 Idaho 684, 809 
P.2d 1163 (Ct. App. 1991) stated in dicta that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of Judgments 
should control the issue. The RESTATEMENT at § 13 takes the position that dependency of an 
appeal does not deprive a judgment of res judicata affect. 
This comports with common sense. Ordinarily the determination of the timing of the 
adjudication for res judicata purposes is the time at which the judgment is rendered, not the time 
when the case is filed. If these claims against Hawley Troxell are allowed to go forward in this 
action and the claims are upheld on appeal. There are two possible resolutions. Allowing this 
case to go forward after the appeal would render any decision of our appellate courts ineffective 
between these parties or it would result in these claims being dismissed at a later time as barred 
by res judicata based upon affirmance of the appeal. Conversely, a reversal on appeal of Judge 
Brodie's decision would result in two cases pending at the same time over the same issues 
leading to the possibility of inconsistent outcomes. None of these outcomes is preferred. 
On the other hand, if the present claim is barred and Judge Brudie is reversed on appeal, 
Taylor will be able to pursue these claims in that case. If Judge Brudie is affirmed, the matter is 
concluded. The fact that Taylor has appealed Judge Brudie's dismissal of his earlier action 
against Hawley Troxell does not prevent it from having preclusive effect. 
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c. Malpractice As To Remaining Defendants. stated above, the gist of 
2 Taylor's malpractice claim is that Riley and Turnbow were negligent in performing legal work 
3 related to the stock redemption transaction. The opinion letter authored by Riley and Turnbow as 
4 part oft.hat work was addressed to Taylor, specifically provided that it was for Taylor's benefit, 
s and acknowledged he would rely on it. It is on this basis he claims an attorney client relationship 
6 with Riley and Turnbow. Eberle Berlin is named as being vicariously liable for the conduct of 
7 its members. Riley and Turnbow argue strenuously that there was no attorney client relationship 
s and therefore no duty was owed to Taylor. Defendants are partly right. There is no attorney 
9 client relationship. That does not necessarily mean there was no duty. 
10 A lawyer is generally not liable in negligence to a person who is not the lawyer's client. 
11 Taylor vs. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). There are, however, exceptions to this 
12 rule. See Harrigfeldv. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004) (holding that where, as a 
13 result of the attorney's negligence, and the estate is not distributed in accordance with the 
14 testator's intent, the intended beneficiaries may maintain an action against the attorney). Another 
1 s narrow, but widely recognized, exception to this general rule is the case of opinion letters drafted 
16 and delivered to a non-client with the expectation that the non-client will rely on it. See, e.g. 
17 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood, 80 N. Y. 2d 
1e 377,605 N.E. 2d 318 (1992). Although this precise issue has not been addressed by the Idaho 
19 courts, the holding of cases such as Prudential, supra, are consistent with the reasoning of our 
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corporation breaching their fiduciary to as a minority shareholder. It was 
specifically not a derivative claim: 
Since Mallory and Jensen, as directors in this small closely held corporation, had a 
fiduciary duty to Steelman, as a minority shareholder, we cannot agree with 
appellants' contention that this case should have been dismissed because it is a 
"direct action" rather than a shareholder's derivative suit. 
Steelman, 110 Idaho at 513, 716 P.2d at 1285. 
The allegations here are not that the directors of the company breached their duties to 
minority shareholders, but that the corporate attorneys committed malpractice in their work on 
behalf of the corporation. Assume, for argument, that the attorneys in fact committed 
malpractice causing injury to the corporation. The damages recoverable inure to the 
corporation and, indirectly, to all its shareholders, not just the majority shareholder. The claims 
made here are traditional derivative claims. The derivative claims fail for failure to make 
proper demand 90 days before suit was filed. 
e. Malpractice Statute of Limitations. All of the defendants in this case 
argue the statute of limitation for malpractice bars Taylor's claims. The rule of law regarding 
commencement of the statute of limitations is well settled. For professional malpractice claims, 
the statute is two years from the negligent act; unless fraudulent concealment is involved in 
which case the claimant has the later of two years or one year from the discovery of the fraud. 
LC. § 5-218 ( 4). Notwithstanding this statute, a cause of action does not arise until the 
occurrence of "some damage" resulting from the negligent act. This requirement of "some 
damage" is not the same as a discovery rule. Numerous cases have so held. See, e.g. Elliott v. 
Parsons, 128 Idaho 723,918 P.2d 592 (1996); Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482,835 P.2d 
1293 (1992); Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,808 P.2d 876 (1991). 
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In the present controversy, application of this rule is not so clear cut. Defendants argue 
strongly that the damage here occurred upon the issuance of the opinion letter in 1995. 
Conversely} plaintiff argues no damage occurred until Judge Brudie ruled in June 2009 that the 
contract was illegal, The Court has determined upon review of Idaho cases, that yet a different 
date is appropriate. See, e.g. Elliott v. Parsons, supra, and Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 
P.2d 63 (1985) 
In Streib v. Veigel, an accountant had negligently prepared income tax returns for 
taxpayers, claiming certain deductions that were not allowable. The taxpayers filed an action 
against the accountant more than two years after the last return was prepared. The accountant 
moved for summary judgment on the basis of LC.§ 5-219(4). The Court held that the action for 
professional malpractice accrued when the Internal Revenue Service assessed the taxpayers for 
penalties and interest. The assessment by the IRS was considered by the Court to be the date 
when damage to the taxpayers occurred. The taxpayers were allowed two years after that date to 
file their action against the accountant. 
In Elliott v. Parsons, supra, the Court revisited Streib. An attorney negligently structured 
and drafted a transaction for the sale of the Elliott's business that resulted in the failure of the 
transaction to qualify for installment sales treatment, which in tum, resulted in increased liability 
and interest payment to the I.R.S. The Court distinguished Elliott's case from Streib, holding that 
some damage occurred when the Elliotts hired new tax lawyers in 1986 after receiving a 30 day 
letter from the I.RS. The hiring of the lawyer to deal with the IRS constituted "some damage." 
There are numerous other cases discussing the "same damage" rule in various contexts. Many of 
the cases are collected in Anderson v. Glenn, 139 Idaho 799, 87 P.3d 286 (2003). 
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It should be noted that the default on the Note in 1996 does not constitute damage 
13 flowing from the opinion letter, as contended by Riley and Turnbow. Taylor was not entitled 
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2. Breach of Fiduciary Duties. 
The allegation pertaining to breach of fiduciary duty, as best this Court can determine 
22 from the complaint, has two components. First, the allegation is that Riley, Turnbow, and Eberle 
23 
Berlin breached their fiduciary duties in the drafting of the opinion letter and generally in the 
24 
drafting of corporate resolutions and other services rendered to AIA in the stock redemption 
25 
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transaction. Hawley Troxell is alleged to because Riley's fiduciary duties to Reed 
Taylor are imputed to his current firm. The second component directed at Riley and Hawley 
Troxell specifically, is breach of fiduciary duty for talcing a position in later litigation contrary to 
the statements made in the opinion letter. 
As to Hawley Troxell, this claim is dismissed. As discussed above, there is no authority 
for the proposition that Hawley Troxell is vicariously liable for the conduct of one of its 
members before that member joined the firm. 
As to the remainder of the allegations to the extent they apply to Hawley Troxell, they are 
barred by res judicata. They are barred for the same reasons set forth above regarding the 
malpractice. 
As to the other defendants, the breach of fiduciary claims must also be dismissed. Riley 
and Turnbow did not represent Taylor in the stock redemption transaction. There was no 
attorney client relationship. Nor was there any other relationship giving rise to fiduciary duties. 
The only possible source of fiduciary duties owed by Riley and Turnbow to Taylor is the opinion 
letter. The rendering of the opinion letter does not create a fiduciary relationship between the 
author and the recipient in this circumstance. As pointed out above, the third party opinion letter 
circumstance is one of the rare exceptions to the rule that bars negligence suits against on 
attorney by anyone, other than by the client, for negligent legal work. In other words, the mere 





the relationship is expanded to a fiduciary transaction in every instance. The attorney owes the 
recipient of the letter the same duty to act without negligence that the attorney would owe to the 
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client. rendering of the opinion, this context, does not create an on going relationship nor 
implicate any duties beyond negligence. 
The policy underlying the rule that only a client may sue an attorney for negligence is 
founded on the concern that, to do otherwise would divide the loyalty of the attorney. The 
attorney would be faced with choosing between the best interest of the attorney's client and the 
best interest of third parties, something which the law does not allow. To require a duty of care 
owed by Riley and Turnbow to Taylor beyond the non-negligent rendering of the opinion, would 
place the attorneys in just such a quandary. Whether or not they properly advised AJA 
concerning stock holder meetings, drafting of documents, etc. may shed some light on whether or 
not they were negligent in drafting the opinion letter, but it does not give rise to any additional 
liability to Taylor. 
3. Fraud/Constructive Fraud. 
a. Hawley Troxell. As to Hawley Troxell, there is no evidence, nor 
allegation, of a false statement by anyone other than Riley upon which Taylor relied. The 
statements by Riley were made before he became a member of the Hawley Troxell firm. As 
pointed out above, Hawley Troxell is not liable for his acts before he joined the firm. The fraud 
claim, to the extent one is made, against Hawley Troxell is dismissed. Vague allegations of a 
"fraudulent scheme" do not state facts with sufficient particularity to maintain the claim. 
b. Other Defendants. Taylor's complaint claiming fraud is based on 
statements made by Turnbow and Riley in the opinion letter. In order to sustain an action for 
fraud in Idaho, a plaintiff must prove a clear and convincing evidence the following nine 
elements: (1) a statement of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speakers knowledge of 
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speakers intent to induce reliance; the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the 
statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) the hearer's right to rely; and (9) consequent proximate 
injury. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'! Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005). The person 
claiming the fraud must plead the factual circumstances with particularity. 
In this case, the allegations of fraud have to do with statements made in the opinion letter 
offered by Turnbow and Riley. This Court concludes that certain of the statements made in the 
opinion letter are statements of fact .. For example, whether or not all necessary actions required 
by the directors and shareholders to be taken had been taken is a representation of an existing 
fact Some of these statements in the opinion letter are mixed statements of law and fact For 
example, the statement that no consent by any person that was required to authorize the 
execution, etc. of the redemption agreement was needed, except those that had been obtained 
prior to closing, is just such a mixed statement. It requires legal analysis of whose consent is 
required, but it is a statement of fact as to whose consents had been obtained prior to closing. 
There is evidence in the record of all nine elements sufficient to create a disputed issue of 
material fact. The possible exception is element No. 4, the speaker's knowledge of falsity. 
Because this Court has stayed discovery in this action, the fraud claim will not be dismissed for 
lack of proof on that element at this stage. 
c. Collateral Estoppel and Riley. As to the remaining defendants, the defense 
of collateral estoppel is unique to Riley. Riley claims the benefit of collateral estoppel through 
Judge Brudie's dismissal of the fraud claims in the main AIA litigation. Riley was not a 
defendant in that case, but was a member of the firm defending AIA against nearly identical 
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claims of fraud arising the opinion a member defense firm, 
privity with the firm's client in the AIA lawsuit. 
Judge Brudie, in the course of ruling on a motion for reconsideration of his finding the 
tra.,saction illegal, declined to accept an argun1ent that the agreement was enforceable in spite of 
its illegality because one of the parties had been subject to constructive fraud. In that context, 
Taylor apparently argued that he should be entitled to enforce the agreement because the opinion 
letter stated that the agreement was legally enforceable. He pointed to that as a statement of fact 
upon which he relied. Consequently, AIA, through its then attorneys, had committed 
constructive fraud in the making of the agreement. Therefore, so the argument went, Taylor was 
not subject to the rule that says a court will not enforce an illegal agreement. Judge Brudie stated 
that this conclusion contained in the opinion letter was a mere opinion oflaw, "albeit an incorrect 
one.'1 It could not form the basis of a fraud claim. Consequently Taylor was not entitled to 
enforce the illegal agreement. 
This statement from Judge Brudie is not a sufficient specific factual finding upon which 
collateral estoppel can be based. The ruling was not directed specifically at the claims made 
against Riley. Nor was it a finding of a specific fact. It was a legal ruling based upon one 
statement in the opinion letter. The Court declines to dismiss the fraud claims against Riley on 
the basis of collateral estoppel. Genuine issues of material fact otherwise exist with respect to 
the claim. 
d. Fraud Statute of Limitations. All Defendants also raise the statute of 
limitations as a complete defense to Taylor's fraud claims. The fraud alleged here, at least so far 
as the Court is not dismissing these claims, occurred in 1995 with the issuance of the opinion 
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by Riley and Turnbow. The statute of limitations fraud is 3 years from commission 
of the fraudulent act or the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake. LC.§ 5-218. 
The determination of the discovery of the fraud is a question of fact. "Our cases have 
consistently held that where discovery of a cause of action commences the statute of limitations 
the date of discovery is a fact question for the jury unless there is no evidence creating a question 
of fact." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,773,820 P.2d 360,368 (1991). While we also 
recognized in Nancy Lee Mines that "actual knowledge of the fraud" can be inferred if the 
aggrieved party could have discovered the fraud by reasonable diligence, we have since noted in 
our cases that the courts of this state should hesitate to infer knowledge of fraud. Id. at 773, at 
368. 
This Court, at Defendants' request, stayed discovery pending the decision on the 
summary judgment motions. The Court is not going to infer knowledge on the part of Mr. Taylor 
sufficient to commence the statute of limitations running before April 2008 when the issue of 
legality was first raised in the AIA lawsuit. There are genuine issues of material fact regarding 
the running of the statute of limitation on the remaining fraud claims. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion: 
1) The Court grants summary judgment on Taylor's claims against Hawley Troxell; 
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The Court will deny summary judgment, in part, on the for malpractice against 
Riley, Turnbow, and Eberle Berlin so far as the claims arise from the issuance of the opinion 
letter. The so-called derivative claims are dismissed; 
3) The Court concludes that the Statute of Limitations on the malpractice cause of action 
began to run when Taylor incurred attorney fees to defend against allegation that the Stock 
Repurchase agreement was illegal; 
4) The Court denies summary judgment on the claim of fraud against Riley, Turnbow, 
and Eberle Berlin, both on the merits and on the statute of limitations on the basis of factual 
disputes; 
5) The Court grants summary judgment to all defendants as dismissing claims of breach 
of fiduciary duty. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this :J.__ day of May 2010. 
kJ)JJ tJd 
Rich&-d D. Greenwood 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE, 
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McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho 
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Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY'S 
MOTION FOR STAY 
Defendant Richard A. Riley requests that proceedings be stayed in the above-captioned 
action pending the outcome of Reed J. Taylor's appeal in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services, et al, 
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 36916-2009. 
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The present action is premised on the presumptive illegality and, therefore, Jack of 
enforceability of a stock redemption agreement entered into in 1995 between AIA Services 
Corporation and Reed J. Taylor, and the restructure of that agreement in 1996. In Reed Taylor v. 
AJA Services Corporation, et al., Case No. CV 07-00208, in the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State ofldaho, Nez Perce County (the "AIA Litigation"), Judge Brudie 
held that the stock redemption agreement was illegal. That decision is currently on appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 1 
In the case at bar, plaintiff contends that defendant Riley was negligent and committed 
fraud in the preparation of an opinion letter in 1995 that opined, among other things, that the 
1995 stock redemption agreement was legal, valid and enforceable according to its terms. The 
question of whether or not the redemption agreement was illegal is currently before the Idaho 
Supreme Court. In the event the Idaho Supreme Court reverses Judge Brudie's decision, then the 
entire premise of the current case will cease to exist and this case will become moot 
In the absence of a stay of proceedings in the current case, it is possible that a significant 
amount of time, effort and money could be wasted in discovery and other proceedings involving 
a potentially moot issue. The depositions alone in the case at bar promise to involve much effort 
and expense. Since common questions of law and fact are currently on appeal in the AIA case, it 
makes sense to stay proceedings in the present case until a definitive ruling is obtained whether 
the 199S redemption agreement is or is not illegal and, therefore, whether the 1995 opinion letter 
1 Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed January 15, 20 I 0, , 11 
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which is the subject of the present case was or was not correct. Additionally, a stay would serve 
to avoid the potential for inconsistent results that might otherwise be reached if the Idaho 
Supreme Court were to hold the redemption agreement legal but plaintiff in the present case were 
allowed to proceed against Mr. Riley on the premise that such agreement is illegal. 
Two District Judges in north Idaho, Judge Brudie and Judge Kerrick, have stayed 
proceedings in cases involving issues of fact and law which are common to the present case. See, 
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Plaintiff's Motion to 
Strike; Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, entered on 
January 15, 2010, in Donna J. Taylor v. R. John Taylor, et al., Case No. CV 08-1150 in the 
District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez 
Perce; and Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Defendant's Motion to Stay, in Donna J. Taylor v. AJA 
Services Corporation, Case No. CV 09-02470 in the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce.2 The reasons articulated in 
those orders are equally applicable to the present case. 
Counsel for Reed Taylor has acknowledged, albeit in a slightly different context, the 
desirability of obtaining a final appellate decision regarding the legality and enforceability of the 
1995 stock redemption agreement before proceeding with other aspects of related litigation. In 
the matters of Reed J. Taylor v. Michael E. McNichols, et al., Nez Perce County Case No. CV 
2 Supplemental Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of Richard A. Riley's Motion for Stay, Exhibits A 
andB. 
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that his pending appeal in Taylor v. AJA Services, et al., be heard and decided first in the interests 
of all parties. "3 For reasons of judicial economy and to avoid the possibility of inconsistent 
adjucations, it would be appropriate to stay the current lawsuit until a decision is reached on 
appeal in the AIA Litigation. The pragmatic approach taken by Judge Kerrick and Judge Brudie 
should also be adopted in the present case. 
DATED this _L:1.. day of May, 2010. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By:~~/~,, 
J ~ TaR.ue, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Richard A. Riley 
3 Supplemental Affidavit of James D. LaRue in Support of Defendant Richard A. Riley's Motion for Stay. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This case involves Reed Taylor's attempt to enforce an illegal agreement made in 1995 to 
redeem his shares in AIA Services Corporation {" AIA Services"). Former Idaho Code § 30-1-6 
permits the redemption of a corporation's stock only out of the corporation's earned surplus. All 
parties now agree that AJA Services had no earned surplus at the relevant time. Nevertheless, 
Reed Taylor, the majority shareholder, Board chairman and CEO of the company, entered into 
an agreement whereby AJA Services would redeem his common stock for $7.5 million, plus 
other compensation. The District Court correctly concluded that, because the agreement to 
redeem Reed Taylor's shares violated Idaho law, it is illeg1d and unenforceable. 
B. Statement Of Facts 
1. Reed Taylor Was The Founder, Board Chairman And Controlling 
Shareholder Of AIA Services 
AIA Services is a holding company. At all times relevant to this litigation, it has wholly-
owned A[A Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance"), an insurance agency based in Lewiston, Idaho. 
AIA Insurance sells health, life and other insurance products to farmers and members of various 
agricultural growers associations. AIA Services and AJA Services will sometimes be referenced 
collectively in this brief as "AIA." 
Reed Taylor was the founder of AIA Insurance and the Majority shareholder of AIA 
Services. R., Vol. I, p. 73.; Vol. XXVIII, p. 5507. In 1995, he held 63% of approximately 
973,000 outstanding shares of AIA Services common stock. Id. He also was the Chairman of 
the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer of AIA Services. Id As CEO and 
- 1 -
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majority sharehoider, Reed Taylor was in control. He called the shots and had the power to 
accept or reject proposals put to shareholder vote. 
2. AJA Services Experienced Huge Losses 
A ... 51 
Audited financial statements for the 1994 year end reported that AIA Services had 
experienced a net loss of ($4,867,962), swallowing up all prior year retained earnings and 
leaving the corporation with negative retained earnings ( deficit) of ($919,700) and stockholders 
deficit exceeding ($852,000). R., Vol. XXIX, p. 5713. It was readily apparent that the AIA 
companies were in financial trouble and faced daunting business challenges. 
3. New Capital Was Needed To Fund Redemption Of Reed Taylor's Stock 
In January 1995, the AIA Services Board of Directors approved a corporate resolution 
authorizing a private placement (the "Kinnard Private Placement") of Series B Preferred Stock 
and Series C Preferred Stock and Warrants. R., Vol. XXVIII, pp. 5514-18. A January 12, 1995 
Board Resolution explained that the purpose of the Kinnard Private Placement was to raise the 
capital necessary to restructure AJA Services. Id. Reed Taylor actively participated in the 
approval of this Board resolution and the other resolutions discussed below. Id. 
AIA Services noticed a meeting of shareholders to be held on March 7, 1995 to consider 
various corporate transactions, including (1) the authorization of735,000 shares of Series B 
Preferred Stock and 150,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock; (2) the merger of R J Holding 
Corp. with and into AIA Services; and ( 4) exercise of an option to purchase 500,000 of Reed 
Taylor's 613,494 shares of AIA Services Common Stock for $7.5 million. Id at pp. 5520-21. 
The AIA Services shareholders approved the above-described transactions at a March 7, 




foregone conclusion given that Reed Taylor voted his shares in favor of the transaction. Not all 
shareholders voted for the transaction. Shareholders holding 6,688.09 shares voted against the 
transaction and others abstained. Id. at pp. 5617-5626. 
The shareholders were not provided with information as to the source from which Reed 
Taylor's shares would be purchased, i.e., out of earned surplus, capital surplus or some other 
source. Rather, the successful completion of the Kinnard.Private Placement to raise new capital 
was a necessary condition precedent to the approved plan to redeem Reed Taylor's stock. The 
minutes to the March 7, 1995 Board meeting state: "Cumer Green questioned whether it was 
prudent to obligate the company for a $6 million note to Mr. Taylor without the B share 
financing." Id. at p. 5630. Reed Taylor, as a Director present at the meeting, was on notice that 
AIA would be unable to pay for the redemption of his shares without a funding source: 
4. The AIA Services Board Later Approved The Redemption Of All Of Reed 
Taylor's Shares Without Seeking Shareholder Approval 
The plan to redeem 500,000 of Reed Taylor's shares was not consummated because the 
Kinnard Private Placement failed to raise the necessary funds. R., Vol. XXIX, pp. 5646-49. 
Accordingly, AIA Services sent a letter to its shareholders announcing that it could not proceed 
with the previously approved plan. Id. The letter announced a new plan of reorganization, 
which included the redemption of all of Reed Taylor's Common Stock for $7.5 J1?.illion and 
certain other consideration, including airplanes and debt forgiveness. The letter sought 
shareholder approval to cancel the previously authorized Series B Preferred Stock and 
amendment of the Articles of Incorporation to increase the number of authorized shares of 
Series C Preferred Stock from I 50,000 to 500,000 shares. The letter explained that the proceeds 
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the sale of additional Series C Preferred Stock would used to certain A 
Preferred Stock, to retire bank debt and/or to fund the balance of the redemption price due to 
Reed Taylor. Again, the information provided to shareholders did not discuss whether Reed 
Taylor's shares would be redeemed out of earned surplus, capital surplus or some other source. 
Rather, the proposal was that the sale of Series C Preferred Stock would fund the transaction. Id 
The letter to shareholders was accompanied by a Confidential Private Placement 
Memorandum, dated June 1, 1995 ("PPM"), offering up to 500,000 shares of Series C Preferred 
Stock for $10 per share. Id at pp. 5650-5708. The purpose of the PPM was to raise funds for 
the new plan of reorganization, which included the redemption of all of Reed's common stock, 
not just the 500,000 shares that would have been purchased had the Kinnard Private Placement 
been successful. Among the risk factors discussed in the PPM was the risk of needing additional 
financing: "Assuming that the Company sells the maximum number of Shares offered hereby, 
the net proceeds from this private placement are expected to be sufficient . . . . If the Company 
sells only the minimum number of shares [i.e., 150,000 shares], additional financing will be 
required to complete the proposed reorganization." Id. at 5665. Further, "[n]o assurance can be 
given that the Company will be able to obtain additional financing from any source, on terms 
favorable to the Company." Id. In other words, without the sale of the maximum number of 
' . . . 
offered shares, AJA Services would be unable to fund the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. 
On July 12, 1995, AIA Services issued an Amended Notice of Special Meeting of AIA 
Services Shareholders to occur on July 18, I 995, accompanied by a Disclosure Statement. R., 
Vol. XXIX, p. 5753 - Vol. XXX, p. 5764. The Amended Notice states that changed 
circumstances necessitated changes in the plan of reorganization previously approved at the 
- 4 -
A ... 54 
special meeting of shareholders in March 1995, and that certain transactions now contemplated 
require shareholder approval. The Amended Notice does not mention the redemption of Reed's 
common stock, much less request shareholder approval for it) The Disclosure Statement and 
proxy form similarly lack any reference to the redemption of Reed's common stock. Id. at 
p. 5768. Accordingly, the shareholders were not asked to approve, and did not approve, the 
terms of the redemption of Reed Taylor's common stock at the July 181h meeting.2 
On July 18, 1995, the AIA Services Board authorized the redemption of Reed Taylor's 
common stock for $7.5 million and other consideration. Id at pp. 5769-5786. The resolution 
recognized that "the amount of the down payment for Mr. Taylor's Common Stock which [AIA 
Services] may be able to afford will depend on the amount of proceeds from commercial loans 
and from the sale of additional Series C Preferred Stock and attendant warrants." Id. at 5780. 
Reed Taylor attended that Board meeting. Id. at 5770. Thus, Reed Taylor was on notice that 
AIA Services was unable to pay even the down payment for his stock in the absence of 
additional financing. 
A June 27, 1995 Notice of Special Meeting.of AIA Services Shareholders had given 
previous notice of the July 18, 1995 shareholder vote, and that earlier notice included a 
request for a vote on the proposed redemption of all of Reed's common stock. Id at pp. 
5751-52. That notice, however, was superseded by the July 12, 1995 Amended Notice that 
did not seek a shareholder vote with regard to any redemption of Reed Taylor's stock. 
2 The earlier transaction voted for in March 1995 required shareholder approval because it 
included a merger. LC. § 30-1-1104 (requiring shareholder approval of a merger). The July 
1995 transaction did not involve a merger, and shareholder approval was not sough for the 
new reorganization plan. 
- 5 • 
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5. The Stock Redemption Agreement 
AIA Services and Reed Taylor entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement for the 
redemption of all of Reed Taylor's common stock, effective July 22, 1995. Id. at pp. 5806-5878. 
Under the Stock Redemption Agreement, AIA Services agreed to pay $1.5 million to Reed 
Taylor at the time of closing. Id. at 5809. Even before closing, however, it became apparent that 
AIA could not make that payment and the parties entered into an Addendum providing for the 
issuance of the $I.SM down payment note payable 90 days after closing. Id. at 5880-81. 
The Stock Redemption Agreement also provided additional consideration to Reed Taylor 
in the form of debt forgiveness, transfer of title to airplanes and other payments to or on behalf of 
Reed, aggregating over $2 million. R., Vol. XXXII, p. 6339. The balance of the $7.5 million 
redemption price was to be paid pursuant to a promissory note dated August I, 1995 and payable 
by AIA Services to Reed Taylor in the principal amount of $6 million (the "Note"). R., Vol. 
XXX, p. 5769-70. The Note provided for monthly payments of interest only, with the principal 
and all accrued interest due August I, 2005. As collateral for the Stock Redemption Agreement, 
the parties entered into a security agreement that essentially granted Reed Taylor a secured 
interest in most of the assets of AIA Services. Id. at pp. 5827-5834. The practical effect of the 
security agreement was to convert Reed Taylor from a common stock owner to a secured 
c'reditor, with rights superior the remaining common stock owners . 
. 
The golden parachute was in place. If the offering of Series C preferred stock succeeded, 
Reed Taylor would be paid for his AIA Services stock. If it failed, he could take the remaining 
assets of the corporation ahead of unsecured creditors and all other common shareholders. 
- 6 -
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After denying a motion for reconsideration, the District Court issued a partial Judgment 
dismissing six of the eleven causes of action in Reed Taylor's Fifth Amended Complaint. R., 
Vol. XLVI, pp. 9014-9024; 9025-28. At Reed Taylor's request, the District Court certified the 
partial Judgment as final pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(b). Id. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Whether "standing" is required to assert the illegality defense and, if so, 
whether Respondents satisfy any standing requirement. 
2. Whether Respondents are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to I.A.R. 41 and Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
3. Whether all causes of action in the Complaint should be dismissed. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 
608, 200 P Jd 1153, 1157 (2009). "The illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in 
litigation." Id. "In fact, the court has the duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte." Id. 
Respondents agree with Reed Taylor's statement of the other standards of review. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment In Favor Of 
Respondents Upon Finding That The Stock Redemption Agreement Was IUegal 
1. Under Common Law, An Insolvent Corporation Could Not Redeem Its Stock 
Idaho Courts have long recognized a common law rule prohibiting a corporation from 
redeeming its stock when the corporation is insolvent, or when redemption would render the 
corporation insolvent. See, e.g., La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127,369 P.2d 45, 49 
(1962) ("Idaho follows the rule that an insolvent corporation may not repurchase its stock."). 
Moreover, Idaho Courts have long held that a contract to redeem a corporation's stock that 
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violates this common-law rule is void and unenforceable. See id.; see also White v. lorimer's 
City Dye Works, 269 P. 90, 90 (Idaho 1928) ("A contract by a corporation to repurchase its 
capital stock is not enforceable against the corporation while insolvent."); Brown v. TB. Reed & 
Co ., 174 P. 136, 138 (Idaho 1918) ("While there is a conflict in the authorities as to the capacity 
of a corporation to purchase its own stock, the rule appears to be universal that such a purchase is 
void if made while the corporation is insolvent."). 
These early Idaho cases did not address statutory restrictions on stock redemption 
because statutory restrictions on stock redemption were not enacted until the adoption of former 
Idaho Code § 30-1-6 in 1979. 
2. The Statute In Effect In 1995 Permitted The Redemption or Stock Only Out 
or A Corpontion' Earned Surplus 
Fonner Idaho Code § 30-1-6 (as in effect in 1995) provided in relevant part; 
A corporation shall have the right to purchase , .. or otherwise 
acquire .. . its own shares, but purchases of its own shares, 
whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the extent of 
unresqyed and unrestricted earned surplus available therefore, 
and, if the articles of incorporation so pcnnit or with the 
affinnative vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to 
vote thereon. to the extent of unreserved and un~cted capital 
surplus available therefor.· 
Id. (emphasis added).3 
3 In 1997, Idaho Code§ 30-1-6 was superseded by Idaho Code § 30-1-640. However, the 
statutes in effect at the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and the 1996 Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement should be applied to this case. See In re Lake Country 
Investments, 255 B.R. 588, 600 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2000) (applying the savings provision in 
LC. § 30-1-1703 to determine that former Idaho Code § 30-1-6 applies to a 1996 stock 
redemption agreement because it was executed prior to the July 1, 1997 effective date of I.C. 
§ 30-1-640). The relevant former statutes are included in an addendum to this brief. 
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The Idaho statute at the time of the Stock Redemption Agreement allowed the 
redemption of stock only out of a corporation's earned surplus. The only exception to this rule 
was that a corporation could redeem stock out ofits capital surplus with an affirmative vote of 
the shareholders authorizing the use of capital surplus. 
"Earned surplus•' is defined as "the portion of the surplus of a corporation equal to the 
balance ofits net profits, income, gains and losses from the date of incorporation .... '' See tC. 
§ 30-1,-2(1). Earned surplus (or earned deficit} is the equivalent of"retained earnings" (or 
retained deficit) under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("OAAP''). See R,, Vol. 
XXVIIl, p • .5496; Richard A. Booth, FINANCING THE CORPORATION,§ 3: 1.30 (2009) ("[B]arned 
surplus is surplus that arises from profitable operations~ that is, it is essentially the same thing as 
retained earnings under OAAP. "). Capital Surplus is defined as "the entire surplus of a 
corporation other than its earned surplus." See former Idaho Code§ 30-1-2(m}. 
3. It Is Undisputed That AJA Services Did Not Have Any Earned Surplu1 With 
Wbieb To R•deem Reed Taylor's Stock 
Under Idaho Code § 30-1-6, AIA Services would have needed at least $7..SM in earned 
surplus to lawfully redeem Reed Taylor's shares. To conclusively determine that AIA Services 
did not have the required $7.S million in earned surplus. the Court need look no further than to 
,t\JA Services• audited Jnancial statements. 
The December 31, 1994 audited consolidated financial statements report net income 
(loss) of($4,867,962) during 1994 and negative retained earnings (deficit) of ($919,700) at year 
end. R., Vot XXXI, p. 6066. The unaudited 3/31/95 consolidated financials report negative net 




(deficit) of ($1,677,975). Id. 6139-6145. The year-to-date losses atJune 30, 1995 and 
September 30, 1995 were ($2,365,177) and ($13,630,317), respectively; and the corresponding 
retained earnings (deficits) were ($3,284,877) and ($21,740,295). ltl at 6281-6283. The 1995 
audited year end financial statements report net income (loss) for the year of($ 10,650,150) and 
negative retained earnings (deficit) of($18,827,250). R., Vol. XXXI, pp. 6066-6067. The 1996 
audited financial statements report a retained deficit of ($17,037,673) as of December 31, 1996, 
which is just shortly after the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. Id. at p. 5976. 
These audited financial statements establish that AIA Services did not have any earned surplus in 
1995 or 1996, much less the $7 .5 million in earned surplus that would have been required to 
lawfully redeem his shares. 
Reed Taylor's expert witness did not offer any opinion that AIA Services had any earned 
surplus in 1995 or 1996. Rather, the chart on page 7 of Mr. Pederson's affidavit confinns the 

















Expense Net Income 
$260,640 4,867,962 
84,479) ( I 0,650, I 50) 
868,033 1,722,454 
1,162,900 9,790,505 
820,960 . (726,381) 






MR BOND: Unless there's some whacked out error or something 
that's, you know, but I think I'd probably have a better chance of 
winning the lottery than proving that. 
See April 23, 2009 Transcript, p. I 027, LL. 1-13. 
4. Capital Surplus Is Irrelevant 
A= 60 
Initially, Reed Taylor had argued that AIA Services had earned surplus with which to 
redeem his shares. Faced with the indisputable absence of earned surplus and the District 
Court's order granting partial summary judgment, Reed Taylor switched his theory and filed a 
motion for reconsideration. In that motion, he conceded that AIA Services had no earned surplus 
and even went so far as to assert that all shareholders (including himself) knew it. R., Vol. XL V, 
p. 8887 (asserting that "[t]he shareholders ratified and approved the redemption ... knowing that 
AIA Services had insufficient earned surplus as represented in AIA Services' financial 
statements."). Under this new theory, Reed Taylor contends that, by approving the transaction, 
the shareholders consented to the redemption out of "capital surplus." This argument suffers 
from several fatal flaws. 
Idaho Code § 30-1-6 generally allowed a corporation to redeem its shares only out of its 
''earned surplus." The statute provided only one exception to that rule - that a corporation can 
redeem stock out of its ~'capital surplus" if '~the articles of incorporation so permit or with the 
affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon." As the 
District Court correctly concluded, the clear meaning of this provision is that a corporation can 
redeem its shares out of the corporation's "capital surplus" only with an "affirmative vote" of the 
shareholders specifically authorizing the invasion of capital surplus. R. Vol. XLVI, pp. 9017-18. 
Reed Taylor can point to no evidence that such an affirmative vote ever occurred. As the District 
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Court correctly found, "[n]either the redemption agreement itself nor the resolution designated 
the source of funds for the future promissory note payment." ·Id at p. 9018. In fact, as set forth 
in section I.B.4 above, the shareholders did not vote for the redemption of all of Reed Taylor's 
shares, much less affirmatively authorize the use of capital surplus to fund the purchase. 
5. Tile Stoek Redemption Agreement, And All Obligations Arising Out Of It, 
Are Illegal, Void·and Unenforceable 
Given the undisputed fact that AIA Services had no earned surplus with which to redeem 
Reed Taylor1s shares, the Stock Redemption Agreement violated Idaho Code § 30• l •6. 
Accordingly, the obligations arising out of that agreement are void and unenforceable. See, e.g., 
Field v. Haupert, 647 P.2d 952, 954 (Or. App. 1982) (stock redemption agreement was illegal 
and void because it violated a statute prohibiting the purchase of shares when the corporation 
lacked sufficient surplus same); Stevens v. Boyes Hot Springs Co., 298 P. 508, 509 (Cal. App. 
1931) (promissory note given in connection with an illegal stock redemption agreement is 
unenforceable); Naples Awning & Glass. v. Cirou, 358 So.2d 211,214 (Fla. App. 1978) ("We 
conclude that under the 1973 statute a stock purchase agreement which at time of execution 
would require payment of an amount for the stock in excess of the corporation's 'surplus of its 
assets over its liabilities including capital' is void"). 
Idaho appellat~ courts have not yet a~dressed a stock redemJ?tion agreement that violates 
a statute. However, this Court has twice held that a stock redemption agreement is void and 
unenforceable if it violates the common law rule against stock redemption that would render a 
corporation insolvent - the common law rule codified by Idaho Code § 30-1-6. See White, 269 
P. at 90; Brown, 174 P. at 138. 
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Moreover, this Court has broadly held that all illegal contracts are void and 
unenforceable: 
The law is well settled, however, that illegal contracts are void and 
cannot be enfon:ed. Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 351, 924 P.2d 
607,613 (1996). A party to an illegal contract cannot ask the Court 
to have his illegal objects carried out, as the Jaw will not aid either 
party to an illegal agreement. 
A= 62 
Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397,400, 49 P.3d 402,405 (2002) (emphasis added). In Farrell 
v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,609,200 PJd 1153, 1158 (2009), this Court explained that "[a]n 
illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act or forbearance 
which is contrary to Jaw or public policy." Id "[W]hen the consideration for a contract 
explicitly violates a statute, the contract is illegal and unenforceable." Id This Court has also 
recently reaffirmed the longstanding principle that, when faced with an illegal contract, the Court 
should "leave the parties to an illegal contract as it finds them." Farrell, 146 Idaho at 609. 
The District Court oom:ctly found that the Stock Redemption Agreement violated Idaho 
Code § 30-1-6 because AIA Services lacked sufficient earned surplus with which to redeem 
Reed Taylor's stock. The District Court also correctly concluded that the iJJegality of the Stock 
Redemption Agreement rendered it void and unenforceable. 
6. Reed Taylor's "Standing" Argument Lacks Merit 
Reed Taylor argues that the various Respondents lack "standing" to assert the illegality of 
the Stock Redemption Agreement because they are not "intended beneficiaries" of Idaho Code 
§ 30-1-6. As an initial matter, the "standing" doctrine has no application to this case. The 
standing doctrine limits a Plaintiffs ability to bring a cause of action. Butters v. Hauser, 131 
Idaho 498, 500, 960 P.2d 181, 183 (1998) ("The doctrine of standing focuses on the party 
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seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated .... [T]he essence of 
the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction has alleged 
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy .... "). Here, the respondents are not 
asserting any cause of action against Reed Taylor; nor are they seeking to invoke the Court's 
jurisdiction. Rather, Reed Taylor brought suit against Respondents, and the Respondents are 
simply defending themselves. The doctrine of standing is inapplicable. 
A-63 
To support his standing argument, Reed Taylor cites out-of-state authority, The 
Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1997), for the proposition that 
only an "intended beneficiary" of a stock redemption statute can assert the illegality of a stock 
redemption agreement. This argument that a contract can only be voided by those whom a 
statute is intended to protect has been expressly rejected by this Court. See Wheaton v. Ramsey, 
92 Idaho 33, 35-36 436 P.2d 248, 50-51 (1968); Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6-7, 56 P.3d 765, 
768-69 (2002) (explaining that "a contract prohibited by law is illegal and unenforceable 
... without regard to the reason of the inhibition") (emphasis added). 
As explained in Minnelusa, there is a split in authorities as to whether a contract in 
violation of a stock redemption statute is "illegal" or merely "ultra vires." The courts that treat a 
stock redemption agreement merely as an "ultra vires" act, like Minnelusa, sometimes conclude 
. . . 
that a stock redemption agreement will only be voided if doing so will serve to protect the 
individuals or entities that the stock redemption statutes are intended to benefit. On the other 
hand, courts that view stock redemption agreements in violation of statutes like former Idaho 
Code§ 30-1-6 as "illegal" conclude that such agreements are void and unenforceable and place 
no restrictions on which parties may assert their illegality. 
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example, in American Heritage Inv. Corp. v. Illinois Nat. Bank of Springfield, 386 
N.E.2d 905 (Ill. App. 1979), a shareholder filed suit to enforce a stock redemption agreement and 
the corporation defended on grounds that the contract was illegal and unenforceable because the 
corporation did not have sufficient surplus to repurchase the shares. The court rejected the 
shareholder's contention that the corporation could not raise the issue of the illegality of the 
contract. The court explained that "the issue of whether the corporation may raise the defense 
depends upon whether the questioned corporate act is merely beyond the power of the 
corporation or is illegal because it is immoral, against public policy, or expressly prohibited by 
statute." Id. at 908 (citing 7A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS§ 3400). The Court 
concluded that the stock redemption agreement was illegal and void, as opposed to merely ultra 
vires, because it was in violation of a statute prohibiting a corporation without sufficient surplus 
from redeeming stock. Id. at 91 O; see also Field v. Haupert, 647 P.2d 952, 954 (Or. App. 1982) 
("There is a distinction between a corporate transaction that is illegal (forbidden by statute) and 
one that is ultra vires. Corporate transactions which are illegal because prohibited by statute are 
void, and cannot support an action nor become enforceable by performance, ratification, or 
estoppel."); In re Trimble Co., 339 F.2d 838, 845 (3d Cir. 1964) (stock redemption agreement is 
unenforceable where made in violation of a statute because it is "not merely ultra vires but illegal 
and void," and "[a]n illegal contract may be d~fended against and av~ided by any of the parties 
thereto"). 
Unlike Minnelusa, Idaho courts do not treat contracts that violate statutes as merely ultra 
vires. Rather, such contracts are illegal and unenforceable. See Farrell, 146 Idaho at 609 ("An 




is contrary to law or public such a contract illegal and unenforceable"). 
The rule that an illegal contract is void and unenforceable does not depend on whether the party 
asserting the illegality of the contract is the individual the statute was intended to protect. 
Rather, the rule is based on the policy that a court should never enforce a contract that is illegal. 
As explained in Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 612, 990 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1999): 
[T]he defense of illegality prevails, not as a protection to 
defendant, but as a disability in plaintiff... . While it may not 
always seem an honorable thing to do, yet a party to an illegal 
agreement is permitted to set up the illegality as a defense. 
Id. (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts§ 272 (1963)). 
In fact, this Court has repeatedly held that a district court "has the duty to raise the issue 
of illegality sua sponte," even if not raised by a party. Trees, 138 Idaho at 6; Farrell, 146 Idaho 
at 608. As the District Court correctly held, "[t]he question is not one of standing, but only 
whether the stock redemption agreement violated Idaho Code, making the agreement unlawful 
and unenforceable." R., Vol. XLVI, p. 9017; see also Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 290, 
240 P.2d 833,842 (1952) ("[A] court of equity will not knowingly aid in the furtherance ofan 
illegal transaction; in harmony with this principle, it does not concern itself as to the manner in 
which the illegality of a matter before it is brought io its attention."). Thus, the "standing" of any 
particular defendant is a r~d herring. 
Moreover, enforcing the Stock Redemption Agreement would undermine the purpose of 
Idaho Code§ 30-1-6, part of which is to protect minority shareholders from corporate insiders 
like Reed Taylor. As recognized even in Minnelusa, one of the central purposes of stock 
redemption statutes is to prevent an insider majority shareholder like Reed Taylor from stepping 
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in front of the minority shareholders through a stock redemption agreement. Minnelusa, 929 
P.2d at 1323 (explaining that "[s]tock repurchase statutes are designed to protect .. minority 
stockholders" and that ''minority stockholders can suffer harm because stock repurchase 
agreements deplete the capital of the corporation."). 
A= 66 
Through the Stock Redemption Agreement, Reed Taylor sought to extract $7.S million 
from a corporation that had no earned surplus whatsoever at the time of the redemption, thereby 
obtaining a preference over the other common shareholders. Prior to entering into the agreement 
for the redemption of his shares, Reed Taylor stood on equal footing with all other common 
shareholders. In the event of dissolution of the corporation, Reed Taylor would have received 
the same pro-rata return on his investment as all other common shareholders. 
Through the stock redemption agreement, however, Reed Taylor attempted to jump in 
front of all other common shareholders by converting himself into a secured creditor. According 
to Reed Taylor, he is entitled to all assets of the corporation, and all other shareholders are 
entitled to nothing. See R., Vol. XIX, p. 3623 ("In addition, as everyone is fully aware, there are 
insufficient assets to pay Reed and Donna Taylor and the Plan shares are subordinate to the 
moneys owed to Reed and Donna Taylor."). Thus, if Reed Taylor prevails, he will have 
succeeded in stepping in front of all other shareholders - taking the entire value of the 
. . ' ' 
corporation's assets for himself and leaving all other similarly situated common shareholders 
empty-handed. This is precisely what Idaho Code§ 30-1-6 was intended to prevent. 
Notably, Reed Taylor brought suit against various members of the AIA Services Board of 
Directors, asserting that those directors have breached fiduciary duties. Those same fiduciary 
duties compel the AIA Services board members (and give them standing, if standing were 
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needed by a defendant} to assert the illegality of the Stock Redemption Agreement to protect the 
minority shareholders harmed by Reed Taylor's attempt to take for himself all of the assets of 
AIA Services. Thus, even if "standing" were a relevant issue, the Respondents would satisfy any 
standing requirement. 
7. Reed Taylor's Supposed Ignorance Of The Law Is Irrelevant 
Reed Taylor argues that he should be permitted to enforce the Stock Redemption 
Agreement, regardless of its illegality, because he was "an innocent party and ignorant of any 
violation oflaw." A party's ignorance of the law does not make an illegal contract enforceable. 
See Trees, 138 Idaho at 6-7 ("[W]here a statute intends to prohibit an act, it must be held that its 
violation is illegal, without regard to ... the ignorance of the parties as to the prohibiting 
statute.") (emphasis added). 
8. "Fair Value" And Appraisals Are Irrelevant 
Unable to argue that AlA Services had sufficient earned surplus with which to redeem his 
shares, Reed Taylor now relies on certain appraisals indicating that AIA services had a positive 
fair market value as a going concern in I 995 and 1996. This assertion is a red herring. The fair 
market value of a corporation is not the test under Idaho Code §30-1-6. Earned surplus is based 
on accumulated net earnings, not on fair market value of the corporation's assets or stock. See, 
e.g.: Sajer v, Pitzer. 36 Pa: D. & C.2d 33, 1964 WL 8400 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1964) (concluding that a 
stock redemption agreement violated a statute allowing the redemption of stock only out of 
earned surplus and rejecting the argument that an appraisal. of a company's value as a going 
concern can overcome the absence of earned surplus). 
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9. The Allegedly "Inappropriate" Actions Beginning In 1999 Are Irrelevant 
A large part of Reed Taylor's brief is spent arguing that AIA Services has engaged in 
"malfeasance" and "inappropriate" transactions beginning in 1999. However, those transactions 
occurred long after the redemption of his stock. See R., Vol. XXXV, p. 6866 ("(BJeginning in 
1999, AIA management begins to conduct a series of questionable transactions") (emphasis 
added). The transactions have nothing to do with the financial status of AIA Services in 1995 or 
1996, the time of the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
10. The Distriet Court Correctly Rejected Reed Taylor's Fraud Argument 
Reed TayJor contends that the Stock Redemption Agreement should be enforced, despite 
its illegality, under a theory that he was fraudulently induced to enter into the agreement by an 
opinion letter that offered the opinion that the Stock Redemption Agreement did not violate any 
laws or regulations. See R. Vol. XIV, pp. 2684-94. To establish fraud, Plaintiff must show a 
false statement of fact on which the hearer relied. See Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 
143 Idaho 595, 600-601 (2006). "Opinions and predictions cannot form the basis of a fraud 
claim because they do not speak to matters of fact." Id. at 601. The opinion letter's statement 
that the stock redemption agreement did not violate any laws or regulations is an expression of 
opinion, not a representation of fact. As the District Court correctly concluded: 
(The opinion letter] expressed an opinion that no statute was 
violated by the stock redemption agreement, an opinion currently 
postulated to the Court by Plaintiff. Such an opinion was no more 
a statement of fact when expressed by corporate counsel in 1995 
than it is now when asserted by Plaintiff. It is, simply, an opinion 
based on one's interpretation of law and cannot form the basis for a 
fraud claim. 
R. Vol. XLVI, p. 9019. 
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In The Exercise Oflts Discretion, The District Court Correctly Took Control Of 
This Case Through Its Order Regarding Case Administration 
A= 69 
The motion practice in this case has been exceptionally voluminous. Respondents' 
motion for summary judgment on the illegality issue, if granted, would dispose of most, if not 
all, of this case. In an attempt to streamline this case toward resolution of the illegality issue, the 
District Court stayed discovery unrelated to the motion for summary judgment and entered an 
Order Regarding Case Administration providing that the District Court, not the parties, would 
schedule hearings on motions in an orderly fashion. R., Vol. XXVI, pp. 5122-5124. Reed 
Taylor contends, without citing any authority, that the District Court abused its discretion by 
entering this order. 
"It has long been understood that certain implied powers must necessarily result to our 
Courts of justice from the nature of their institution." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 
( 1991 ). "These powers are governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested 
in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of 
cases." Id. These powers include the power to "control the disposition of the causes on its 
docket with economy oftime and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. North 
American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). The District Court was well within its discretion in 
scheduling the. motions filed in this case in the order the Dis~rict Court deemed appropriate. 
E. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Its Discovery Orders 
Shortly after Respondents filed their motion for summary judgment on the illegality 
issue, Reed Taylor filed an I.R.C.P. 56(f) motion asking the Court to "extend the time afforded to 
Reed to serve his Response and opposing Affidavits for at least 60 days or such time as 
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depositions may be taken and discovery conducted, whichever is later. R., Vol. XIII, pp. 2477-
82. Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's counsel agreed to vacate the hearing. However, instead of 
pursuing discovery, Reed Taylor embarked on an ill-fated mission to disqualify counsel and 
pursued what Judge Brudie deemed "frivolous" lawsuits against defense counsel. 
Following the delays created by the disqualification motion and frivolous lawsuits against 
defense counsel, the motion for summary judgment was noticed for hearing on March 12, 2009. 
In light of the potentially dispositive motion, the District Court entered an order staying general 
discovery, but allowing discovery "[r]elevant to [the] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," 
including discovery related to the stock redemption agreement and the financial status of AIA 
Services in 1995 and 1996. R., Vol. XXVI, pp. 5110-13. Reed Taylor flied another 56(f) motion 
on February 11. 2009, in which he argued that he needed to take the depositions of 
16 individuals (plus unnamed '*others") before he could adequately respond to the motion for 
summary judgment. R., Vol. XXVII. pp. 5314-5355. He filed yet another 56(f) motion one 
week later, which asserted the same arguments as the prior motion. R., Vol. XXXV, pp. 6778-
6793. After a hearing, the District Court denied the 56(f) motions for the following reasons: 
Plaintiff has failed to direct the Court to any particular information 
or document relevant to the 1995 financial status of AIA that has 
been denied to him through the discovery process .... 
Plaintiff has provided· the Court with no reasonable basis to believe. 
additional discovery will produce new or relevant information not 
previously disclosed and such discovery would only come at 
substantial additional cost to all parties with attendant delay in 
pending proceedings. 
R., Vol. XLV, pp. 8841-42. 
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1. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Staying General Discovery 
"Control of discovery is within the discretion of the trial court." Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit 
Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330,336, 48 P.3d 659, 665 (2002). Upon the filing of the partial motion for 
summary judgment, the District Court correctly perceived that there was no reason to spend the 
time and resources of the court and the litigants on discovery unrelated to the motion for 
summary judgment. The question of whether the Stock Redemption Agreement is illegal is 
answered by the financial documents of AJA Services. Reed Taylor did not explain to the 
District Court what discovery he needed in order to respond to the motion for partial summary 
judgment. Nor does he offer an explanation to this appellate Court. 
Reed Taylor also raises several issues related to the denial of various motions to compel 
and a "Motion to Compel Audit," in which Reed Taylor essentially demanded to inspect every 
document in the possession of AIA Services. R., Vol. VI, pp. 1073-74. However, he does not 
cite to any particular discovery that he was denied, much less explain how the District Court 
erred or articulate how the denial of that discovery would affect the outcome of this case. 
2. The District Correctly Denied Reed Taylor's I.R.C.P. 56(f} Motions 
The decision to grant or deny a Rule 56(f) motion for continuance is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Carnell v. Barker Management, Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 329, 48 P.3d 
651,658 (2002)." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) imposes.two requirements on a'party who 
invokes its protection: the party must explain (1) why he cannot present, by affidavit, facts that 
are essential to oppose the motion; and (2) how more time will facilitate the filing of a response 
that is sufficient to avoid summary judgment by creating a genuine issue of fact. I.R.C.P. 56(t); 
see also Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,239, 108 P.3d 380,386 (2005). 
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As the District Court correctly concluded, Reed Taylor did not identify any particular 
discovery that he needed to respond to the motion for partial summary judgment. R., VoL XLV, 
pp. 8841-42. Even now on appeal, he still does not identify any particular discovery that would 
have precluded the entry of summary judgment against him. 
F. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Various Claims In The Complaint 
After concluding that the Stock Redemption Agreement is illegal and unenforceable, the 
District Court entered a 54(b) certified partial judgment dismissing six of Reed Taylor's causes 
of action: breaches of contract; misrepresentations/fraud; conversion; constructive trust; specific 
performance; and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R., Vol. XL VI, 
pp. 9025-26. These causes of action were properly dismissed because each one relies on the 
existence or contractual obligations arising out of the Stock Redemption Agreement. which has 
been held to be illegal and unenforceable. Reed Taylor cites no authority in support of his 
argument that these causes of action should not have been dismissed. Nor does he substantively 
address any of the causes of action. 
G. The Court Should Not Consider Arguments That Are Not Supported By Cogent 
Argument And Authority Or Are Beyond The Scope Of The Partial Judgment 
Reed Taylor brought his shotgun, not his rifle, to this appeal. Rather than focus on the 
Qistrict Court's critical ~onclusions, he complains of almost every order entered by the District . . . 
Court, regardless of whether it affected the outcome of the case. While he raises a multitude of 
issues, he fails to offer any coherent argument or authority with regard to most of them. Rather, 
he merely offers the bald assertion that the District Court "erred" or "abused its discretion" 
without explaining how and often without even citing to the relevant portion of the record. 
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H. Respondents Should Be Awarded Fees On Appeal 
This case arises out of a commercial transaction - an agreement to redeem Reed Taylor's 
shares in AIA Services. If AIA Services prevails on appeal, it should be awarded its attorney 
fees on appeal pursuant to I.AR. 40, I.AR. 41 and Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ). 
V. CROSS-APPEAL 
The District Court found that the Stock Redemption Agreement violated Idaho Code 
§ 30-1-6 and is, therefore, illegal and unenforceable. R., Vol. XLV, p. 8845-46. Having found 
the Stock Redemption Agreement to be illegal and unenforceable, the District Court concluded 
that it must "leave the parties where [the Court] finds them." Id. at 8850. The District Court 
subsequently issued a partial Judgment dismissing six of the eleven causes of action in the Fifth 
Amended Complaint. Id. at pp. 9025-28. The Respondents cross-appealed on grounds that the 
District Court also should have dismissed the remaining five causes of action. Id. at pp. 9072-
9099. 
Each of the causes of action in the Fifth Amended Complaint relies on Reed Taylors 
allegation that he is a secured creditor .of AIA Services by virtue of the Stock Redemption 
Agreement and the related $6M Note. R., Vol. X, pp. 1813-1858; Id. at p. 1822 (asserting that 
"Reed was the largest and most significant creditor of AJA Services."). The Complaint does not 
allege that Respo~dents owe obligations to Reed Taylor other than arising out of the Stock 
Redemption Agreement. Given that the Stock Redemption Agreement is illegal and 
unenforceable, each of Reed Taylor's causes of action should be dismissed. 
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"[c]ivil conspiracy is no.t, by itself, a claim for relief." Id As explained above, each of the 
substantive causes of actfon has been or should be dismissed. Accordingly, the civil conspiracy 
olajm also must be dismissed, 
VI, CONCLUSION 
While Recd Taylor bas raised many (mostly irrelevant) issues on appeal, this appeal is 
actually very simple. Fonner Idaho Code§ 30-1-6 prohibited the redemption of stock otber than 
from a corporation's earned swplus. Reed Taylor concedes that AIA Services did not have any 
earned surplus at the relevant time, much less the S7.S million in earned surplus that would have 
been requited to lawfully tedeem his ~ Aocordln&lx, the Stock Redemption AgY=ncnt is 
IJlegaJ and unenforceable; 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 'J!J. day of July, 20 l 0. 
R1SLEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By~ 
~No.1789 
Attorneys for Respondents Connie Taylor, 
James Beck and Corinne Beck 
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By~..L-J,~~....,c..~~~~~~~ 
David A. Gitf s, ISB No. 6514 
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and JoLee Duclos 
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James D. LaRue ISB # 1780 
Loren C. Ipsen ISB #1767 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley 
IN TI-IE DIS1RICT COURT OF TI-IE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY 
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M. 
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE, 




ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
DEFENDANT RIGHARD A. RILEY'S 
SUPPLEMENT AL OBJECTIONS, 
. ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, 
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION 
Richard A. Riley ("Riley"), being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that he is 
a Defendant in the above-captioned matter and makes the following answers to the 
DEFENDANT RICHARD A. RILEY' S SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTIONS, ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FiRsTSET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND FffiST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION - 1 





and responses to requests production requests admission co1ntameid 
Plaintiff Reed J, Taylor's First Set of Requests for Production Documents, First Set of 
Interrogatories and First Set of Requests for Admission to Defendant Richard A. Riley dated 
December 14, 2009, pursuant to·Rules 33(a), 34(a) and 36(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Objections, if any, are asserted by counsel of record. 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. Riley objects to the "Definitions" and general instmctions contained in Plaintiff 
Reed J. Taylor's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents, First Set of Interrogatories 
and First Set of Requests for Admission to Defendant Richard A. Riley to the extent they purport 
to demand discovery on terms, or to impose obligations upon Riley, which are beyond the scope 
of, or different from, the provisions governing discovery in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Riley objects to the "Definitions" and general instructions contained in Plaintiff 
Reed J. Taylor's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents, First Set of Interrogatories 
and First Set of Requests for Admission to Defendant Richard A. Riley to the extent they seek 
discovery of infonnation that includes information and documents protected by the attorney-
client privilege, the common-interest privilege under Rule 502(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, 
the work product doctrine, and documents which contain the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
litigation. 
3. Riley objects to the "Definitions" and general instructions contained in Plaintiff 
Reed J. Taylor's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents, First Set oflnterrogatories 
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RESPONSE: answering defendant objects to Request Production No. on 
that such request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and oppressive, does not specify a 
time frame, seeks information and documents not relevant to the subject matter of this action and 
not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, seeks information and documents 
protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine or other 
applicable privilege, immunity, or other protection from disclosure provided by statute, rule, 
decision, contract or other source, seeks the discovery of information and documents not in this 
answering defendant's possession, custody or control, and exceeds the scope of discovery 
allowed under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). This answering defendant's response is 
limited to 1995 and 1996. Subject to, and without waiving the foregoing objections, this 
answering defendant responds that no documents described in such request are in his possession, 
custody or control. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 4: State with particularity the details of all facts pertaining to 
each and every one of your defenses or affirmative defenses to all of Reed Taylor's claims and 
requested relief in this action. Then identify all persons having knowledge of such defenses, 
their addresses and describe the knowledge held by each such person. 
ANSWER: It is not necessary for this answeling defendant to respond with respect to 
any defenses to plaintiffs causes of action against this defendant other than professional 
negligence because all of them have been dismissed. Additionally, it is not necessary for this 
answering defendant to respond with respect to any defenses to plaintiffs causes of action 
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& because that 
dismissed. 
The 1995 Opinion Letter was and is believed by this answering defendant to be a correct, 
fair and objective opinion, given the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the 1995 
redemption transaction, The following analysis is reflected in this answering defendant's 
handwritten note in the 1995 research file produced herewith and Bates stamped Riley 000025. 
Pursuant to letter agreement dated January l I, 1995 and confirmed by letter agreement 
dated July 18, 1995, Donna Taylor consented to the redemption of Reed Taylor's stock 
conditioned, in part, as follows: "AIA Services Corporation's note or any note payable to Reed 
J. Taylor for the $6,000,000 of the purchase price for his common shares will be subordinated to 
the [Series A Preferred Stock] redemption rights of [Donna Taylor] so that Reed J. Taylor will 
receive no principal payments on said note until Donna Taylor's stock has been completely 
redeemed. Reed l Taylor will receive no interest payments on the note payable to him if 
payments to Donna Taylor are in default." The $6 million note expressly provided: "This Note 
is subordinate to the payment of the redemption obligations owed by Company to Donna Taylor 
pursuant to that certain letter agreement dated January 11, 1995, signed by Company, Payee, 
Donna Taylor and [Donna's attorney} Cumer Green." 
Thus, in 1995, payment of principal to Reed was fully subordinated to full payment to 
Donna; and payment of interest to Reed was subordinated in the event of default in payment to 
Donna. By this subordination. Reed would be paid only after Donna was fully paid> thereby 
triggering the limitations in Section 4.2.3 of the Articles of Amendment to the Articles of 
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Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation (filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 
1995) providing that Donna's Series A Preferred Stock can be redeemed only out of legally 
available funds and in accordance with legal restrictions on the corporation's right to redeem its 
own shares: 
"(a) The holder of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have the right to 
require the corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds 
upon breach of any covenant of the corporation set forth in this Article Fourth, but 
only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares .... 
(b) The holder of Stated Value Preferred Stock shall have the right to 
require the corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds at 
any time after September 14, 1993, but only to the extent such redemption shall 
not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's 
redemption of its own shares." 
If AIA did not have legally available funds to pay Donna, then AIA was not in default in 
redeeming Donna's shares; and the subordinated $6 million note obligation to pay Reed was also 
not in default. 
In 1979, Idaho enacted the 1969 version of the ABA Model Business Corporation Act, 
which was still in effect in 1995, Idaho Code Sections 30-1-l et seq. In connection with AIA's 
redemption of Reed Taylor's common stock, this answering defendant reviewed the statutory 
restrictions on distributions to shareholders, particularly the limitation to "unreserved and 
unrestricted eamed surplus" under IC Section 30-1-6 and the interrelated statutory accounting 
terms pertinent to the definition of t'earned surplus" (including "surplus,,, "stated capital''. "net 
assets" and .. capital surplus") defined in IC Section 30-1-2. 
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This answering defendant found no Idaho cases addressing the statutory restrictions on 
distributions to shareholders. Fourteen years later, Judge Brodie later noted in his Opinion and 
Order filed June 17, 2009, in the AIA case: "The portion ofl,C. [Section] 30-1-6 that limits a 
corporation's redemption of its own shares based on its earned surplus or capital surplus is an 
issue of first impression in Idaho/' 
On an ongoing basis, the ABA updates its model acts, including the MBCA. These 
updates reflect evolving principles of corporate law as established by judicial decisions and, in 
the view of this answering defendant, embody the best of current thinking about corporate law. 
By 1995, the ABA had published the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation Act. This 
answering defendant researched the case law annotations in both the MBCA Annotated and the 
RMBCA Annotated, as well as the authoritative Fletcher's Cyclopedia of Corporations. and 
found no explanation of "earned surplus" or other statutory accounting terms used in the MBCA. 
Cf. the excerpt :from Fletcher Section 2849 quoted below. 
The RMBCA eliminated the statutory capital categories of "earned surplus" and "capital 
surplus" on the basis that these "exceedingly complex rules with various escape valves ... did not 
provide [ creditors] meaningful protection against distributions to shareholders that may impair 
the security of their position." Drafter's comments to RMBCA 6.21 (1996 Supplement). These 
deficiencies are pointed out in the RMBCA excerpts included in the research file of this 
answering defendant, as well as the Idaho Reporter's comments on Idaho Code Section 30-1-621, 
in connection with Idaho's 1997 repeal of the 1969 version of the MBCA and enactment of the 
RMBCA. 
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to include payments to redeem 
a distribution 
to a shareholder are prohibited if, either at the 
time of the redemption or after giving effect to the redemption, (i) the corporation's total assets 
would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus liquidation preferences of its preferred stock 
or (ii) the corporation cannot pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business. 
RMBCA 6.40 expressly provides that the board of directors may, in lieu application of generally 
accepted accounting principles, base a determination that a distribution is not prohibited on the 
basis of''fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances." This approach 
is sanctioned by Fletcher's Cyc Corp Section 2849 (included in the 1995 research file): 
"Many statutes also provide that the purchase may be made only from 
surplus of one kind or another, with varying definitions of 'surplus.' The 
existence or nonexistence of an adequate surplus which the corporation has to 
apply to the purchase of its own stock, should not be determined solely on the 
corporation's financial statement, but rather the authorities suggest that actual 
values not book values are determinative of the existence of a surplus." 
Lacking any authority on the meaning of "earned surplus" and understanding its 
application to be a matter of first impression in Idaho, it was concluded that a court, presented 
with the issue. would more likely than not look to the RMBCA for guidance in determining the 
legality of the redemption transaction. 
"Net assets•'. as defined in IC (1995) section 30~1-2(1) meant "the amount by which the 
total assets of a corporation exceed the total debts of the corporation.'.. It was concluded that it 
was reasonable to value AIA' s total assets at fair value. as expressly permitted by RMBCA 6.40. 
Based on our knowledge of appraisals of AIA Services for purposes of complying with federal 
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regulations relating to AIA's Employee Stock Ownership Plan. it was concluded that, after giving 
effect to the $7.5 million redemption of Reed's stock, the corporation bad sufficient net assets to 
satisfy the requirements of the Idaho statutory restrictions on redemption as construed in light of 
RMBCA6.40. 
The 1995 Opinion Letter contained a "to our knowledge" qualifier ( expressly applicable 
to the "no violation" opinion 3(c)) which stated: "Except as expressly set forth herein, we have 
not undertaken any independent legal or factual investigation to determine the existence or 
absence of such facts, and no inference as to our knowledge of the existence or absence of such 
facts should be drawn from such representation." The third paragraph of the Opinion Letter cited 
the sources of facts underlying the opinion, expressly assuming the completeness and accuracy of 
these factual matters. 
On May 26, 1995, this answering defendant faxed Scott Bell a markup of his draft of the 
Stock Redemption Agreement. The draft included a net worth covenant. I annotated the draft 
with the following handwritten comment: "will be(-) NW at closing". With respect to the 
negative net worth comment, the response note, presumably from Scott Bell, reads: "step up." 
This answering defendant interpreted this note to mean that Scott Bell assumed that net worth 
should be determined on the basis of fair value rather than book value, which supported the 
subsequently issued 1995 Opinion Letter. 
:U1 addition to the net asset value analysis. it was concluded that the discounted fair value 
of the commission income stream generated by AIA Insurance, Inc. 's book of insurance business 
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would also support a fair valuation of AIA Services sufficient to satisfy Idaho's statutory 
restrictions on distributions to shareholders. 
Research of Idaho law turned up only one tangentially related case which held that an 
insolvent corporation may not repurchase its own stock, but that the corporation itself cannot 
have a stock repurchase declared illegal, Id Vgy Sugply kompany v. Youu, 84 Idaho 129,127, 
369 P .2d 45 ( 1962). It was concluded that AIA could not later disavow its obligations to Reed 
Taylor. 
An additional factor in the analysis related to timing of payments under the stock 
redemption agreement and note payable to Reed. In reliance on Section 6.40(7) of the Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act, it was concluded that, because payment of Reed's note was 
expressly subordinated to redemption of Donna TaylorJs Serles A Preferred Stock, in turn 
payable only from legally available funds, the legality of AIA's promissory note distributed in 
payment for Reed's stock is tested not at issuance of the note but rather at the time of payment 
Subsequent analysis tended to corroborate the opinions expressed in the Opinion Letter. 
In 1996, this answering defendant participated on an Idaho Bar Association study committee 
charged with vetting the RMBCA prior to its enactment by the Idaho legislature. This answering 
defendant chaired a subcommittee that reviewed Part 6 of the RMB CA dealing with shares and 
distributions, which includes Section 6.40. This answering defendant drafted a subcommittee 
report dated May 24, 1996, which included the illustrative statutory balance sheet that was 
previously prepared by this answering defendant in connection with the 1995 Opinion Letter. 
The report stated: 
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Idaho Business Corporation Act ("IBCA") currently imposes legal 
capital requirements were initially intended for the protection of creditors 
and senior security holders by creating various capital and surplus accounts and 
limiting or prohibiting dividends and other distributions based on amounts 
allocated to those accounts. Attachment A I illustrates an IBCA balance sheet 
based on these statutory capital and surplus accounts. Attachment A2, excerpted 
from the comments to the Model Act, correlates the types of corporate 
distributions with the eligible sources of payment of such distributions. 
"The Model Act drafters, as well as other commentators (see, e.g., Fletcher 
Cyc Corp §5080 et seq.), have concluded that the legal capital requirements of 
current law are easily circumvented and thus ineffective in protecting creditors 
and senior security holders, and that "creditors generally do not rely on legal 
capital requirements in assessing creditworthiness, or in assessing the financial 
strength of a corporate debtor." Accordingly, the Model Act eliminates the legal 
accounting requirements, together with a web of related concepts including 
"stated capital," "surplus" and its components "capital surplus" and "earned 
surplus," "par value" and "no-par v!tlue" shares, and "treasury shares." In lieu of 
these concepts, §6.40 of the Model Act carefully redefines limitations on 
corporate distributions .... 
"Subsection (c) prohibits any distribution if, after giving it effect, the 
corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual 
course of business (the "equity solvency" test") or the corpqration's total assets 
would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus the amount of any 
liquidation preferences of shareholders who preferential rights are superior to the 
rights of the distributes (the "balance sheet" test). These two tests are already 
embodied in current law (see Idaho Code §§30-l-46(a) and (b), respectively). 
However, subsection (d) expands upon the balance sheet test in subsection (c)(2) 
by authorizing the board of directors to base a determination as to the legality of a 
distribution on accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the 
circumstances or on a fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the 
circumstances. Under this 12rovision. ~ b9ard coµld (for example) legally approve 
a distribution based upon a write-up of assets t9 fair market value or, in the case 
of a service business, a discQunted cash flow valuation, even ifliabilities might 
exceed assets under generally accepted accounting principles." (Emphasis added.) 
In 1997, the Idaho legislature enacted the RMBCA, effective July 1, 1997. The Idaho 
Bar Association Business Section sponsored the April 1997 issue of The Advocate to explain the 
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emtcte:a Idaho Corporation Act. answering defendant authored the article on Part 6: 
and Distributions. This article includes the balance sheet illustration that was prepared in 
connection with the 1995 Opinion Letter and explains the reasoning for the RMBCA's 
elimination of the outmoded legal capital accounts, noting: 
"These statutory capital accounts bear an uncertain relationship to the 
eguity accounts included in financial statements prepared in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles, making it sometimes difficult to 
determine the legality of a dividend or other distributions under current law. 
"Notwithstanding the current law's complicated scheme of limitations on 
distributions, most or all of a corporation's net assets, capital as well as earnings, 
can be distributed if the shareholders approve. The model act drafters, as well as 
other commentators (See, e.g., Fletcher Cyc Corp §5080 et seq.), have concluded 
that the legal capital requirements of current law are easily circumvented and thus 
ineffective in protecting creditors and senior security holders, and that "creditors 
generally do not rely on legal capital requirements in assessing creditworthiness, 
or in assessing the financial strength of a corporate debtor." Following the model 
act approach, the new law eliminates the artificial legal accounting requirements, 
together with the web ofrelated concepts of "stated capital," and "surplus" and its 
.components "capital surplus" and "earned surplus," and "par value" and "no-par 
value" shares. In lieu of these concepts, §30-1-640 of the new act carefully 
redefines the limitations on corporate distributions. 
"Section 30-1-640(7) provides that indebtedness, including indebtedness 
issued as a distribution, is not considered a liability or purposes of either solvency 
test if its tenns provide that payment of principal and interest are made only if and 
to the extent that payment of the distribution to shareholders is issued as a 
distribution, each payment of principal or interest is treated as a distribution; and 
the legality of each such payment is measured on the date of that payment. This 
provision will be useful to permit the cotporation to reacquire its shares at a time 
· when the deferred purchase p~ce exceeds the net worth of the corporation." 
{Emphasis added) 
In May 1997, the Business Law Section of the Idaho State Bar sponsored a continuing 
legal education seminar on the new Idaho Business Corporation Act. This answering defendant 
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relating to the ISB study committee's work on the new statute, this answering defendant retained 
a copy of the handwritten notes of his presentation. These notes conftrm the belief that '4earned 
surplus" and the other statutory capital accounts under the old law bore an uncertain relationship 
with generally accepted accounting principles and explain the restrictions on distributions to 
shareholders under Section 30-1-640 of the new act, including the provisions authorizing the 
board of directors to determine solvency based on fair valuation rather than book value. In 
particular, this answering defendant's notes state that valuation is not limited to OAAP book 
value, and refer to writing up appreciated assets to fair market value and to valuation of a service 
business based on discounted future cash flows. Further, reflecting this answering defendant's 
l 99S experience with AIA's redemption of Reed Taylor's stock, the notes say: 0 Under this test, 
corp might be able to redeem stk from retiring principal SH of successful svc bus (e.g. ins 
agency) which lacks significant hard assets even if( .. ) NW on OAAP basis.'' 
Toe damages claimed by plaintiff are excessive and not supported by the evidence. The 
redemption obligations to Reed Taylor under the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement consisted 
ofa down payment note of$1.5 million and a second note of$6 million. Exhibit W to the 
Affidavit of Aimee Gordon filed in the Taylor v. AIA case on February 12, 2009, is a schedule of 
cash and in-kind assets paid on the redemption obligation to Reed. During the period from 1995 
through 2008, AIA Services paid Reed Taylor $9,709,367. While the notes accrued interest 
during this period of time, Reed Taylor's damages clearly have been reduced from the various 
amounts he has claimed to be due. 
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DATED this ~hay of February, 2012 / 
Ric A. Riley 
~ . 
ORN to before me this ;2:;J.. <fay of February, 2012. 
f,Z-~ ~odtude.1 
otary Public for Idaho 
Residingat 12~ ') J ~ 
CommissionExpi~:_,.g-~ 
As to objections only: 
ELAM & BUR.KE, P.A. 
By: / ./~,.;-+-:' -, L ~ J6ulesD. LaRue, Of theFi 
Attorneys for Defendants, Richard A. Riley 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _;;J.L day ofFebruary,·2012; I ca~ed th~ original of 
the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon Roderick C. Bond, with a true and correct 
copy to Jack S. Gjording, in the manner indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond ·. V' U.S. Mail 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC Hand Delivery 
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400 Federal Express 




Micl;J.ael D. Gaffney ...... U.S.Mail 
BEARQST. CLAIRGAFFNEYPA Hand Delivery 
2105 Coronado St. Federal Express.· 




Jack S. Gjording ..- U.S. Mail 
GJORDING & FOUSER., PLLC ,Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2837 Federal Express 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837 -- Facsimile Transmission 
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Mr. Linville a mentoring position with you? 
A. He was a bank lawyer and did a lot of real 
estate and had for more knowledge about those 
transactions than I did. 
Q. For lack of a better description what lawyers, 
if any, were instrumental in quote, teaching you how to 
do Opinion Letters? 
A. Mickey Turnbow and Tom Linville. 
Q. Up until the Opinion Letter that we are 
talking about in this case with regard to the Stock 
Redemption Agreement had you done any Opinion Letters 
with Mr. Turnbow before this one? 
A. I don't re cal I. 
Q. When you were in the process of learning how 
to do Opinion Letters was there some kind of specified 
format that you were instructed to follow? 
A. [ wasn't instructed to follow anything. It 
was pretty much standard provisions in an Opinion 
Letter. 
Q. Were you given, for example, examples of how 
to lay out physically how the Opinion Letter was 
supposed to appear? In other words, an outline form, or 
a template, or·· 
A. No. 
Q. ·• something like that? 
Page 23 
A. Other than looking at prior Opinions to see 
how they were formatted. 
Q. Depending on the subject matter of the 
transaction am I correct in assuming that the Opinion 
Letter contents would vary depending on the subject 
matter? For example, if there was a finance issue there 
might be one format. If there is a stock redemption 
there might be a different format. Or are all they 
pretty much the same? 
A. They are all pretty much laid out the same. 
The substance of the requested opinions, there is a lot 
of commonality, but also some specificity for particular 
transactions. 
Q. Is there some common, what we lawyers would 
call boilerplate language, that goes into every Opinion 
Letter? 
A. There is what I understand to be customary 
practice as to the terminology of certain types of 
opinions that are typically given. 
Q. When you use the term "customary practice" can 
you tell me what your understanding of that term means? 
A. My understanding is that the typical 
terminology for standardized opinions has sort of 
accepted meaning among lawyers that have experience in 
Page 24 
o a : 32 31 With regard to customary practice in the 
00 : 32 135 formulation of Opinion Letters is that customary 
00 13214 7 usage, is that something fairly standard 
00, 32, s 6 nationwide, that you are familiar with? 
oa:32:59 5 A. Thereare,lthink,acceptedstandards 
08 : 33 11 o 6 practiced by attorneys around the. country as set forth 
o 8 : 3 3: 13 1 in various publications by authoritative sources. 
00133111 a Q. What would be some of those publications? 
o 8 , 3 3 1 2 o 9 A. In particular the TriBar repn by the New 
oa: 33 :25 to York City •• I'm not sure of the name of the bar 
o a , 3 3 1 3 o 11 association or associations in New York City. 
0813313212 Q. Doyouknowwhoactuallypublishesthose? 
08 133135 13 A. They appear in The Business Lawyer. 
08:33:40 14 Q. Do you know iftheABA has a-- the American 
08: 33 :44 15 Bar Association has customary practices, either section 
08: 33: 52 16 or guide, for example, for third-party Opinion Letters? 
08: 33: 5 9 17 A. There is an opinion section or subsection of 
08, 34: 05 18 the·· I think it is the business section of the 
OB: 34: 09 19 American Bar Association. 
08: 34: 12 20 Q. Are you a member of that? 
08:34:14 21 A. I am. 
08: 34: 15 22 Q. And do they publish guidelines as to -- and I 
08: 34: 22 23 want to confine this to what I'll call third-party 
08: 34: 2 6 24 Opinion Letters. And just so we understand the 


























your mind, as to a first-party versus a third-party 
Opinion Letter? If there is a distinction. 
A. Third-party Opinions are given to non-clients 
at the request of a client. I think a lawyer's normal 
duty to his client is to advise his client. Whether 
that's -- it's typically not a formal opinion. It's 
just the normal interaction of a lawyer and client. 
Q. So would it be more the common practice to 
prepare Opinion Letters for third parties rather than 
your own client? 
A. Correct. 
Q. In your biographical section one of the things 
that it talks about in terms of business transactions, 
it says that you do reorganizations for business, tax, 
family planning, and divorce purposes. 
Do you know how many reorganizations up to 
1995 you had done related to any divorces? 
A. I would say two. One for Reed Taylor's 
divorce. And another one for a client in Sun Valley. 
Q. What was the - in terms of the Sun Valley 
client can you give me some idea of the magnitude of the 
transaction in terms of dollars? 
MR. LARUE: And just for the record, 
Mr. Riley, I ask --since you are being asked about your 
08: 32: 27 25 opinion practice. 08136139 25 representation of another clie~t-- t~at you not 
'---------------------------------------L------------------~"i"lrt,to'H-'IJL----~r-----=r844 
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affidavits that -- my in 
08: 5 3: 09 2 several of those cases. 
08 53: 18 restrictions 011 redemptions. And I reviewed the pile of 
08 531 board minutes and shareholder meeting minutes in various 
08153137 5 proceedingsofAIAServicesin l995nnd 1996. Could you 
08153153 6 excusemewhilelgetaglnssofwater? 
08153155 7 Q. Sure. 
08153155 8 MR. LARUE: We have been going about an hour. 
0 8 1 5 3 : 5 7 9 Would now be a good time to take a break? 
08:53:58 !O MR GAFFNEY: Yeah,wecantakeabreak. 
08:54:00 11 THEVIDEOGRAPHER: Thetimeis8:53. And we 
08 154 1 04 12 are off the record. 
08154:19 13 (Recess.) 
09: 08 133 14 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are on the record. And 
09, 08: 40 I5 the time is 9:08 a.m. 
09: O 8: 4 3 16 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) On Exhibit No. 4, can you 
09108 154 17 tell me if that is the complete Opinion Letter with all 
09 1 09, 03 18 applicable attachments? 
09: 09: 09 19 A. I can't tell you that. It's been 16 years. I 
0 9 : O 9 114 w don't know if this is the entirety. It appears to be 
09: 09: 17 21 the entirety of the Opinion itself. I'm not sure that 
0 9 1 0 9 12 3 22 it is all of the attachments. 
09 109: 47 23 Q. I'm going to show you now what I would like to 
0 9 , 0 9 : 4 9 24 have be marked as Exhibit I 6. 
09: 10, 15 25 {Exhibit 16 marked.) 
091121 



























That is mine. 
Q. Now, when you say, "Opinion not yet reviewed 
by firm's oommittee,u what does that mean? 
A. The practice and procedure for issuance of 
opinions WWI that all opinions would be reviewed by 
guess Stan Tharp said yesterday by the senior person 
that practiced in that area. 
Q. When you wrote that notation on the fax cover 
sheet that the opinion had not been reviewed at that 
point by the ftrm1s committee, to whom are you 
referring? 
A. Mickey Turnbow. 
Q. It says, "Nol yet reviewed by clients" in the 
plural. Do you know what that refers to? 
A. AJA Services. 
Q. If this is a -- do you know at this point in 
time when the draft was generated, this Exhibit No. 16, 
had Mr. Turnbow looked at this Opinion Letter at all? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. At this point when the draft was presented to 
Scott Bell and Frank Taylor had you been the one that 
had prepared this draft? 
A. The Opinion -- the guts of the Opinion, the 
requested Opinions, were provided by Scott Bell or his 
firm. The statements of what was reviewed. The 
Page 35 Page 37 
09: 10118 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Exhibit 16 -- well, why qualifications. Disclaimers. Those all came from our 09:14:12 I 
09:10:23 2 don'tyoutakealookat 16andtell meifyourecognize firm. 09:14:17 2 
09:10:26 3 thatdocument? Q. Okay. Well,thisdraftisbeingsenttoScott 09:14:21 3 
09: 11: oo 4 A. I don't recall it. Bell and Frank Taylor, I assume, by virtue of that fax 09:14:28 4 
09: 11: 02 5 Q. As you look through Exhibit 16 do you know cover sheet; right? 09:14:34 5 
09111: 09 6 whose handwritten notes those are? A. It appears to be the case; yes. 09:14135 6 
09111: 14 7 MR. LARUE: There are several, Counsel. Do Q. To your knowledge, had they received a copy of 09:14:38 7 
09, 11, 17 s you want him to go through page by page? this draft before August 16 of 1995? 09:14:42 8 
09:11:20 9 THE WITNESS: Well,inanyevent,Idon't A. ldon'trecall. 09:14:49 9 
09:14152 IO 09, 11: 22 JO recognize them. Q. If this is being sent to Scott Bell and 
09: 11: 24 t 1 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) None of them? 09 :15: 00 11 Frank Taylor for their review that suggests to me that 
091 ll 129 12 A. No. 09115: 03 12 the draft document that is being provided would have 
09 1 ll 130 13 Q. Take a look at the first page of that exhibit. 09 115: 06 13 been authored by someone at Eberle Berlin. 
091 ll 136 14 It is a fax cover sheet. That's from Eberle Berlin. 09115112 14 ls that inaccurate? 
09111144 lS AnditistoScottBellandFrankTaylor. Do you see 091l5:l41S A.,~fJ\iiftli!l,Wm-•W'.Ni'.~ 
09,11,4e 16 that? 09,15119 t6 ,e:u,M:M ... ui~®'·:Wl:Ntor\tlis 
09:11:49 11 A. I do. 09:15:23 17 f1mt,;i;A:ftfffi:J''N:•u,Mijf1ild\iJJIMd.ilMfi*, 
091 ll: 50 18 Q. Under the memo section there is a typed entry 09: 15 :28 18 Q. Well, maybe my question is a little more 
09: ll: 54 19 that says, "For your review and comment." And then 09115131 19 fundamental. Who actually prepared this draft document, 
091 ll 157 20 there is some handwriting there says "drafts." And, 09: 15: 36 20 Exhibit No. 16? 
091121 Ol 21 "Not yet reviewed by clients." And, "Opinion not yet 09: 15: 38 21 A. JilifiliY;j;if.'lwfi(Jt'i 
09: 12: 04 22 reviewed by finn's committee." 09: 15142 22 Q. Do you have any idea how many drafts of the 
09:12:07 23 Do you see that? 09:16106 23 Opinion Letter were generated? 
09:12:0724 A. ldo. 0911611024 A. Notatthistime. 
09112: OB 25 Q. Do you know whose handwriting that is? 09116: 13 2s Q. You said that in preparation for the 
'-~~~~~~~--~--~~~----------~------------....,_----------------------.... r'll#,~~·-t'"._.....· .... -----,""'"-----'•847 
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claim is negligent preparation of an Opinion Letter. 
That is the only claim that is relevant. I don't mind 
Page 62 Page 64 
10,01 19 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Well, related to the 
10101122 2 lawsuit Because if there are claims not covered those 
09 58 44 
O!h58:48 
09158151 him answering the question with regard to that claim. 1 O: O l 1 2 5 would be "'''""''""''Y addressed in that Reservation of 







Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) I don't know what other claim 
I would •• I mean, the fraud claim is still there. But 
there is a likelihood that it won't be. But let's just 
talk about negligence. All right'/ 
With regard to the negligence claim has there 
been any kind of Reservation of Rights sent to you by 
ALPS? 
09:59117 ll A. Nottomyknowledge. Andldon'tbelievethat 
09 :59: 20 12 I have received any direct communication from ALPS. 
09159124 13 Q. And you know what a Reservation of Rights 
091591 26 14 letter is? 
09:59:27 15 A. l'mfamiliarwithit. l'mnotaninsurance 
09 1 59: 30 16 defense lawyer, but. 
09: 59: 33 17 Q. Do you know if that type of letter has been 
09159: 36 18 sent to your counsel? I don't know if it should have 
09159 :41 19 been, but. 
09:59:43 20 MR.LARUE: Do you want him to answer the 
09: 59: 45 21 question? Or your comment after the question? 
0 9 : 5 9 1 4 8 22 MR. GAFFNEY: My question. 
09, 59: 51 23 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) I'm just trying to think why 
09 :59: 52 24 that would have been sentto you. But you never know. 









to me. ls that the question? 
Q. Or your lawyer, Mr. LaRue. 
MR. LARUE: That would be, if I shared that 
information, an attorney-client privilege communication. 
So I'll instruct you not to answer any question relating 
to communications between you and me relating to this 
case. 
10:00:17 8 Q. (BYMR.OAFFNEY) Youhaven'treceivedacopy 
l O: 00: 21 9 of any Reservation of Rights letter? 
10100125 10 MR. LARUE: Relating to the negligence claim. 
10:00:28 11 MR.GAFFNEY: Relatingtothisclaim. 
l O: 00: 30 12 THE WITNESS: 1 have seen a copy of a letter. 
10:00:3413 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) FromALPS? 
10:00:36 14 A. Yes. 
10100: 37 15 Q. Does that letter indicate that some, but not 
10 1 00 1 4 2 16 all, of the claims may be covered? 
10: 00: 44 17 MR. LARUE: And I would instruct the witness 
10 1 0 0 1 4 6 18 to limit the answer on your recollection of reading the 
10 1 00: 50 19 letter relating to the negligence claim. 
10101:00 20 THE WITNESS: Yourquestionagain? 
10101: 02 21 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Sometimes when a Reservation 
10: 0 l : 0 5 22 of Rights letter is sent they will say, "This claim is 
1O10 l 1 09 23 within the scope of coverage, but this claim is not.• 
10: 01: 13 24 Have you received a letter like that? 
10 : 01 : 1 7 2S MR. LARUE: Relating to the negligence claim? 
10:01:31 4 







the extent that he can answer your question to limit his 
nnswer to the negligence claim, since that is the only 
claim at issue in this lawsuit. 
10:01:39 9 MR. GAFFNEY: Well, not technically right now. 
10:01:42 10 Because we haven't gotten a ruling yet. 
10:01:43 11 
10101146 12 
MR. LARUE: We have received a ruling. We 
haven't received a written ruling. He ruled from the 
1 o : o 1 : 4 9 13 bench that the fraud claim is dismissed. 
10: 01152 14 Please follow my instructions. 
10:01:57 15 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Let me make the question 
10: 0115 9 16 more simple so we don't waste time on this. Has ALPS 
10:02104 17 informed you as to the negligence claim that has been 
1O102: 08 18 asserted against you that they are reserving the right 
10: 02115 19 to challenge coverage in the event that there is a 
1 O I o 2 , 18 20 judgment taken against you? 
10: 02: 19 21 A. I don'tthink so. 
10:02:26 22 Q. All right. 
10: 02: 26 23 MR. LARUE: Are you at a point you want to 
10: 02: 29 24 take another break? 
10:02:30 25 MR.GAFFNEY: Sure. 
Page 65 
10: 02: 32 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is l0:02. And we 
10: 02: 34 2 are off the record. 
10: 02: 37 3 (Recess.) 
10 : 16: 5 0 4 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are on the record and 
10:16:56 5 the time is 10:16. 
1 o : 16 : 5 8 6 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Exhibit No.4. Were you the 
1 o : 1 7 : 4 8 7 lead attorney at Eberle BerUn responsible for 
1 o: 1 7 , 5 4 8 generating the opinion? 
1 o 1 17:59 9 A. hvould say ltook the primary rolesubject to 
1 o 1 18 : o 5 1 o consultation and review with Mickey Tlltllbow as it went 
10:18:09 11 along. 
10: 18: 09 12 Q. Let's talk a little bit about Opinion Letters 
10: 18: 2 5 13 in general. Can you explain why in transactions like 
10 118135 14 this that Opinion Letters are requested for purposes of 
10118141 15 third parties in these types of transactions? 
1011815116 A. Interestingly,Ihavereadsomestuffrecently 
l O : 18: 5 6 17 that suggests that Opinion Letters are being dispensed 
101191 00 18 with in transactions of this sort. I think historically 
10: 19: 04 19 they have been -- for example, in financing transactions 
10 119 112 20 where you are dealing with out-of-state lenders, they 
10 1 19 1 1 7 21 want to know the peculiarities of the law of the 
10 119123 22 jurisdiction in which you are making the loan. So they 
l O 119 : 2 7 23 will ask for an opinion of local counsel to let them 
10 119: 3 0 24 know if there is any peculiarities about the state law. 
10:19:37 25 
208-345-9611 M & M court Reporting service, Inc. 
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101191 Oh, couldn'tte!l you. Maybe the ABA 
1O1191 4 a 2 website or well, I don't know spe,c1t1ca1 
10119 53 3 Q. Well, regardless of whetherthey are being 
10: 19158 4 dispensed with or phased out, historically what has been 
10120: 02 5 the purpose of a third-party Opinion Letter, for 
10: 20: 06 6 example, in a transaction like this? Stock Redemption 
10120111 7 Agreement, or the sale of a business, or something like 
10 I 2 0 I 13 8 that? 
10:20114 9 A. Ithink,inpart,itistoprovidealevelof 
10:20:2310 duediligenceandtoprovidcsomecomfortforthe 
10120 :28 11 recipient that some care has been taken in evaluating 
lo: 2 o: 32 12 the transaction under applicable laws. 
10:2013613 Q. Soitisdesignedto--well,letmeaskyou 
10: 20: 48 14 this. What is your understanding of the requirement of 
10: 20: 52 15 the third party receiving the Opinion Letter to go 
lo: 20: 5 7 16 beyond the scope of the letter itself in terms of 
10: 21: 02 17 verifying the representations made? If any duty. 
10:21:07 18 MR.LARUE: Objecttotheform. Vagueand 
10:21 :09 19 ambiguous. Also, the court in this case has -- and I'm 
10 :21: 14 20 not sure, Counsel, that this is where you are going with 
10: 21: 18 21 this question. But the court has already determined 
10 :21 :20 22 that other than a duty to provide a non-negligent 
10 :21:23 23 opinion Mr. Riley owed no duty to Mr. Taylor. 
10:21:2924 MR.GJORDING: I'lljoin. 
10:21:3125 MR.GAFFNEY: Well,! believe that there is 
Page 67 
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10123106 I MR.LARUE: Sameobjection. 
10123107 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) LikethattheABAmayput 
101231 lO out or 
10 12 3 1 ll 4 MR. LARUE: And I would instructthe witness 
10 123113 5 to limit his response lo answer your question relating 
lo 12 31 l 7 6 to the August 15, 1995 Opinion, which is Exhibit 4. 
10 12 3127 7 MR. GAFFNEY: Let me restate that question, 
10123 :29 8 because I'm going someplace with this. 
10123132 9 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Andl'lljustputthisout 
10 123135 10 there. To your knowledge, is there some kind of-· and 
10: 23141 11 I hate to use the word "standard of care." 
10 :23 :45 12 Is there some kind of minimum standard of care 
10: 23: 50 13 required of an attorney that they have to comply with 
10123155 14 when they generate an Opinion Letter for a third party? 
10:23:59 15 MR. LARUE: Objectto the form. There is no 
10:24:02 16 timeparametersinthequestion. 
10:24:04 17 MR.GAFFNEY: Let's go back to 1995. 
10:24:06 18 MR. LARUE: Thank you. 
10124108 19 THEWFrNESS: HhinkthatinJudge 
1o124 1 09 20 Greenwood1s opinion he stated very well what the duties 
10:24:12 21 ofanOpiniongiverare. 
10:24:16 22 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) And what is your 
1 O 1 2 4 1 l 7 23 understanding of that duty? 
lo 1 2 4 : 18 24 A. Thatthey need to he prepared in a non-
1o:24: 21 25 negligent manner with the skill, care, and prudence of a 
Page 69 
10121: 32 I some comparative negligence defenses in this case. 10124126 1 lawyer in similar circumstances. 
10 :21: 39 2 Let's address it that way. 10: 24128 2 Q. And that is the reason I ask the question. 
10:21:41 3 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Doyouhavesometypeof 10:24:31 3 Becauselrunintothisprobleminmedmalcases. Is 
1 o : 21 : 4 7 4 llUthority that would suggest that the recipient of a 
lo , 21 : 5 o s third-party Opinion Letter has some duty to go beyond 
l o , 21 : 5 6 6 the four comers of the lelti!t itself to verify the 
lo : 22 : o o 7 contents or the opinipns of that letter? 
10: 22 1 03 B MR. LARUE: Same objection. 
1 O: 22 : 05 9 MR. GJORDING: Join. 
10 :22: 06 10 THE WITNESS: l'mnotawareof any authority 
1 o : 2 2 , o 9 11 other than the general principle that if the recipient 
1 o : 2 2 : 12 12 knows there is something wrong, or suspectS there is 
1 o , 2 2 : 16 13 something wrong with it, there would be at least some 
10122:20 14 -~ftdM'-li3fi: 
1012212215 l~OiifiJ8ij$i8n)'.f1ilD;Ni!'ii14'1MlMllll 
10122 :26 16 •••••1•••ifo;jMitt>~;-~ 
10122, 30 11 11ftM>lidMM,it1t,Mi@1itM,,J:i6 ... u 
10122132 18 'WfiiM&liWi~:'®11:~ilWJ 
10122:36 19 ii1:1NtiWmi1liitWIWZ 
10122138 20 Q. Where do you generally gel your language from 
lo 1 2 2 14 8 21 when you draft up an Opinion Letter? 
10: 22151 22 MR. LARUE: Objection; relevance. The issue 
10 122154 23 is the Opinion Letter at issue here. 
10123102 24 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Are there forms available 
10 :24: 36 4 that we get into a circular definition of what is the 
10: 24: 39 5 prudent and reasonable practice within a locale. And 
10124:45 6 thatiswhyl'masking. 
10: 24: 4 7 7 You are obviously a practitioner in this area 
10: 24, 50 B of Opinion Letters; right? 
1 o, 2 4 , 51 9 A. Part time, Some of my practice involves 
10:24:54 10 Opinions. 
10: 24: 54 l l Q. Do you provide them in places outside Idaho? 
1 o : 2 5 , o o 12 A. They are frequently issued to parties outside 
10:25:03 13 ofidaho. 
10 :25105 14 Q. And I assume that you have written Opinion 
l O 1 2 S IO 8 Is Letters that people throughout the State of Idaho have 
10 125 1 ll 16 relied on? 
10:25:12 17 MR.LARUE: Objecttotheform. 
10: 25: 22 18 THE WITNESS: I don't recall any specific ones 
10125: 24 19 rendered on just to complete the Idaho transaction other 
1012513120 than this one. 
10125: 32 21 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) So most of the Opinion 
10125133 22 Letters, I guess if I'm understanding what you just 
10 125: 36 23 said, may have implications outside the State of Idaho 
lo 1 2 5 : 41 24 in addition to inside the state? 
10:23:0425 thatyouuse? 10125:4425 A. l'mnotsurewhatyou.melll!byimplication. 
'--------------------------------------'------------------1;;;;;-'a' ............. ~i'-----A.----~855 
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outside directors to ne1!0Li,ale with Mr. 
'"'""'IIIJ)tlVH terms. 
A. I could only guess. 
Page 102 
ll142iOO s Q. Wasthistoprotect--we!l,strikethat. Was 
11142 :05 6 this to address any·· at least in part·· any conflict 
11142 i 11 7 of interest issues? 
11142 1 18 8 MR. RISLEY: Again, I'm going to raise an 
11142: 2 o 9 objection to the extent that the question invades any 
11142 122 10 attorney-client privilege communications between 
11:42 :25 11 Mr. Riley and representatives of AIA. 
11: 42: 34 12 THE WITNESS: As an attorney --
11, 42, 35 13 MR. LARUE: Wait, wait. Just a minute. Do 
l 1: 42: 38 14 you understand AIA counsel's raising of the privilege'? 
11:42 :45 15 THE WITNESS: I understand that I am not to 
111421 48 16 talk about any communications with my client. 
11:42:50 11 MR.LARUE: Yes. 
11142:5718 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) I'm sorry. I was 
11:43:0119 distracted. 
ll 143104 20 A. I can surmise from experience in dealing with 
11: 431 09 21 corporate governance issues why the committee was 
11, 43: 12 22 appointed. But why anybody else -- what the thoughts 
11, 43, 18 23 were in anybody else's head about why it was done, [ 
11:43:2224 don'tknow. 













11 :44: 17 13 
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committee was formed to determine whether this was some 
type of preferential transaction as to the majority 
shareholder? 
A. Again, I don't know why it was appointed. 
Other than r could guess. 
Q. When we looked through some of the briefing in 
some of the other cases there was a suggestion that this 
was some type of preferential -- there was some type of 
preferential treatment as to Reed Taylor. 
ls that one of your defenses in this 
particular case? 
MR. LARUE: Object to form. The defenses are 
stated in the answer. 
11144:19 14 MR.GJORDING: Join. 
11: 44: 21 IS Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) I guess what I'm asking is, 
11: 44: 24 16 is that going to become an issue at some point in this 
11144127 t7 lawsuit? 
11144:27 18 MR.LARUE: Objecttotheform. Someofthose 
ll 144 :29 19 decisions will be made by Mr. Riley's counsel. And I 
144:55 Agreement treated Mr. Reed 
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preferentially? 
11, 45 :02 2 A. Weil, I recall some minutes where Cumer Green 
11 45: 07 raised the question of whether funds that were being 
11145109 4 raised to redeem Mr. Taylor's stock should be better 
11 : 4 5 113 5 used by the corporation for the benefit of the •• 
ll 14 5 1 l 7 6 benefit of the shareholders as a whole. 
11145121 7 Q, Other than Mr. Green discussing this do you 
11 : 4 5 : 2 6 B recall any discussions among the board or the 
11: 4 5: 31 9 shareholders raising this issue? 
11 :45: 35 10 MR. RISLEY: I will restate the objection, so 
11145 136 l l that there is no invasion of the attorney-client 
11: 45: 39 12 privilege, that any such conversations would be not used 
11: 45: 44 13 by Mr. Riley in answering that question. 
11: 45: 46 14 MR. LARUE: I would instruct him to follow the 
11: 45: 48 15 instructions of his client's counsel on the 
11: 45154 16 attorney-client privilege. 
11:45:55 17 THE WITNESS: I don't believe I can respond to 
11:45:57 18 thequestion. 
11: 45: 5 9 19 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Based upon the valuations 
11: 46: 12 20 that you had seen up to August of 1995 was there 
11: 46: 24 21 anything to suggest to you that the redemption price was 
11: 4 6: 37 22 inflated or in some other fashion preferential vis-a-vis 
11:46:43 23 Reed Taylor? 
11 :46:46 24 MR. LARUE: Again.this would have to be, 











that shared with you or the source of the information 
was a member of the management of AIA. 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY} Actually, the question is 
based upon your review of the appraisals. I think you 
indicated there was some appraisals done. 
A. And your question was'? 
Q. My question was based upon the appraisals of 
AIA Services that you had seen was there anything to 
suggest that this stock redemption transaction was 
11: 4 7: 2 7 10 treating Mr. Reed Taylor preferentially? Or that the 
11: 4 7: 31 11 amounts being paid for his stock were inflated and not 
11:47:36 12 reasonable'? 








THE WITNESS: Are you talking about my 
understanding in 1995? 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Correct. 
A. r didn't have any feeling about it one way or 
the other. 
11: 44: 33 20 can't even tell you what I may or may not do in the 11 i 47: 50 20 ,f; fd#wW1--4,;.~!lifi\l;:tto:owii&, 
11: 44: 36 21 future. 11147: 59 21 .:iM?WMMd.;•1• 1•~i:f:;8~ 
11:44:37 22 MR.GJORDING: Join. 11:48:03 22 mdl&.1<14i,M'Miild';~*1lil:,M;ft1 
11:44:44 23 MR.GAFFNEY: Letmeaskitthisway. 11:48:06 23 WiMlifj!.lm:i:u'll:miWlf:r~-;~ti,izw 
1114414724 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Doyouhaveanyfactsthat 1114811424 ;~;m,~.a,~riMt~fi&!, 
l l 1 4 4 1 4 9 25 would suggest that this was -· this Stock Redemption l l : 4 8 : 18 25 ~%?.i 
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13 l 7 13 insurance laws or regulations to 
13 117: 15 2 which the company or any of i!ll subsidiaries are subject 
13117 19 3 governing or affecting the operation of the company or 
13 117 22 ifll subsidiaries in any material respect." 
13117 128 Q. Then later in a lawsuit you're basically 
13: l 7: 31 6 asserting as a defense. the claims asserted against you, 
13 117: 38 7 that the agreement is now illegal and unenforceable; 
13, l 7: 44 8 correct? 
13117: 4 4 9 MR. LARUE: The affirmative defense speaks for 
13:17:46 10 ifllelf. 
13:17150 11 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Andthentomovetotoday, 
13: 17: 5 3 12 if I've heard you a couple of times, you have indicated 
13: l 7: 56 13 that you still believe that the Opinion Letter is 
13: l 7: 5 9 14 correct; right? 
13:18:00 15 A. That's right. 
13: 181 02 16 Q. So in thatintervening time we've got a 
13, 18: 05 17 defense asserted in a legal pleading by you that the 
13: 18: 1 o 18 agreement is not legal or enforceable; correct? 
13: 18: 15 19 MR. LARUE: Objectto the form. The document 
13: 18: 17 20 speaks for ifllelf. 
13: 18: 19 21 THE WITNESS: We have an answer on behalf of a 
13: 18: 22 22 whole raft of people being sued alleging or raising 
13 : 18 : 2 7 23 illegality as an affirmative defense. 
13: 18130 24 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) And you are part of that 




Q. And when this ffl!ltter w1111 ndjudicated by 
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13 : 18 : 41 3 Judge Brudie in 2009 as to illegalit¥ in the Taylor v. 
13 110 , 4 8 4 AJA lawsuit do you recall being.cootaeted by 
13: 18: 55 5 Mr. Taylor's counsel toeltherinterveneorsomehownr 
13 : 19 : o 1 6 llllOlber Inform the court that it was your opinion that 
13 : 19 : 06 7 the aveement was legal and enforceable? 
13:19:14 8 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. You can go 
13: 19: 16 9 ahead and answer that with a "yes" or "no." 
13 119 : 18 to THE WITNESS: I don'Uhink l received 
13 : 19 : 19 II anything in those terms. 
13: 19: 21 12 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Did yon receive any requests 
13 : 19 : 2 5 13 from Mr. Reed Taylor's couuset askiq for assistance in 
13:19130 14 ~-:-111;:f:b::1N1~-
131l9:33 1S 11•"'11wlit11ie1 
13119134 16 MR. LARUE: Same objection. 
13:19135 17 THEWITNESS: fiml8i<.;jftlii£'~j:; 
13 119 138 18 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) And what was your response 
13:19140 19 to that? 
1311914220 MR.LARUE: Objecttothefonn. This has 
13119143 21 nothing to do with whether the letter when prepared was 
13 : 19 14 8 22 prepared in a non-negligent fashion is the only issue 
13: 19: 52 23 remaining in the case. 
13: 19156 24 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) :•w:-~;(il 
13, 19, s 9 zs wlii'w'•SlWJ:1:.-1!: 
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13120100 A. ldon'tbelievelmadearesponse. 
13120 143 Q. Let's take a look at Exhibits 9 and 10. What 
13120 154 will be marked as 9 and 10. 
13121:20 4 (Exh!bits9rmd lOmarked.} 
13121120 s Q. {BY MR.GAFFNEY) Takea!ookatExhibi!ll9 
13121122 6 and 10, if you would, please. Nine is a copy ofldaho 
13:21 :32 7 Code 30-1-6 as, I believe, it was worded in 1995. 
13 1 2114 7 s Does that appear to be accurate? 
13:21:49 9 A. lthinkthat'scorrect;yes. 
13:21: 51 10 Q. And Exhibit No. 10 is a copy of Idaho Code, 
13: 21156 ll Section 30-1-2, again, as it was worded in 1995? 
13 12 2: 08 12 MR. LARUE: ls there some indicator on all of 
13 :22: 12 13 these documents, Counsel, where we can date their 
13: 22: 14 14 version? When they were in effect? There may he. I 
13 : 2 2 : 19 15 just -
13:22119 16 MR.BOND: Copyright'95. '48through'95. 
17 MR. GAFFNEY: '48 through '95. 








MR. LARUE: That was for my benefit. I'm 
sure - I appreciate the witness can verify. 
THE WITNESS: ls there a question? 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Just that 30-1-2 is also the 
statute that existed in 1995? 
A. I would say not. Because it indicates it was 
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13:22:53 1 amended in 1980. 
13:23:02 2 Q. '95--
13:23:04 3 A. Oh,l'msorry. 
13:23:06 4 Q. Youhadamealittleconfused. 
13 :23: 10 5 A. Presuming that there was no amendment between 
13 :23:12 6 1980 and 1995 that isn't reflected here then this would 
13123118 7 he what was in effect in 1995. And the same with 














Q. Did you have any input into the drafting of 
Ex:hibit 9? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know if Mickey Turnbow had any input 
into the drafting of Ex:hibit 9? 
A. l think I knew or heard that he had been on 
the bar committee that looked at adopting this version 
of the Model Business Corporation Act in 1977. 
Q. In 1995, before you drafted Ex:hibit No. 4, 
you were aware of the existence of Exhibit No. 9 and the 
code, I would assume; right? 
A. I was aware of the statute. 
Q. And I believe you earlier testified that that 
13 12 4 12 3 22 was one of the articles in the research file that was 
13124129 23 provided to us that you put together related to drafting 
13:24:36 24 ExhibitNo.4? 
13:24:38 25 A. Correct. 
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in '94, and in showed negative earned surplus. 
Actually, it wu stuted a whllt's the term? I'm 
term used on the !tCtual - earned 
surplus is fine. The financial statements in '94 and 
'95 for AIA Services, they showed a negative earned 
surplus; right? 
MR. LARUE: If you remember. 
13 : 2 s 1 4 s 9 THE WITNESS: As defined by the Supreme Court 
13 , 2 5 1 4 7 !O in 2011; yes. I take thet back. The 1995. 
13:25:56 II Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Thetermiwaslookingfor 
13: 25: s 8 12 was retained earnings. Do youagree that earned surplus 
13 : 2 6 : o 1 13 and retained earnings are used interchangeably? 
13:26:05 14 A. No. Well,asdefinedbytheSUpremeCourtin 
13126108 t5 2011;yes. 
13 :26: 14 16 Q. Now,you don't have any background in 
13 , 2 6 , 1 7 l7 accounting; correct? 
13:26:18 18 A. That'scorrect. 
13:26:2119 Q. Now,youwouldhaveknownbaseduponyour 
13: 2 6: 2 7 20 review of the '94 financial statements related to this 
13: 26 1 32 21 transaction that at least according to the financial 
13 : 2 6 : 3 7 22 statements the retained earnings of AIA Services was 
13: 26: 45 23 showing a negative amount; correct? 
13:26:49 24 MR. LARUE: Objection. 











define earned surplus. If you actually looked at the 
financial sheet retained earnings is in the negative. 
A. Right. 
MR. LARUE: Object to the form. 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) And you had that knowledge 
available to you as you were drafting Exhibit No. 4; 
correct? 
A. I had the draft 1994 financial statements. 
And some earlier audited ones. Yes. 
13: 2 7: 2 5 lO Q. And all of those showed negative retained 
13 : 2 7 : 2 8 11 earnings; correct? 
13: 27: 29 12 A. I don't recall. 
13 :27: 31 13 Q. Well, if they do show that you wouldn't, as we 
13: 2 7: 34 14 sit here today, wouldn't dispute that? 
13127138 IS A. Like I say, I am not sure about that. I'm 
13: 27 141 16 thinking that maybe some of the earlier ones showed 
13127144 17 positive retained earnings. 
13: 2 7 s 45 18 Q. Nothing approaching the $7.5 million; right? 
13:27:4919 A. lcouldn'ttellyouwithoutlookingatthem. 
131281 02 20 Q. While he is looking at those. If you look at 
13: 28: 27 21 Exhibit No. 10 that gives a specific definition for the 
13 1 2 8 : 3 l 22 term "earned surplus"; correct? 








Q. Would you agree that this definition of earned 
surplus ls substantially similar to that used by Judge 
Brodie and the Idaho Supreme Court? 
MR. LARUE: Object to the form, 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) In their later decisions. 
A. 1 don't think I can answer that. I think they 
were looking at accounting terminology, Not this. But 
13:29:14 s tcouldbewrong. 
13:29:10 7 
13129124 9 Q. ln any event, given that the financial sheets 
13 :29: 35 lO for AIA Services, at least in 1994thatyou had seen, 
13 , 2 9 : 4 3 11 and I believe there are a couple interim financial 
13 1 2 9 1 4 7 12 statements that showed that AlA Services lutd negative 
13 1 2 9 1 5 4 13 retained earnings, wouldn't it have been prudent for you 
13 1 3 o I o 2 14 in your Opiniou Letter to explicitly reference the 
13: 30, 07 15 restrictions found in Idaho Code 30.1-6 as a 
13 1 3 o : 14 t 6 qualification attendant to the transaction? 
13130: 20 17 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. 
13130: 22 ts MR. GJORDING: Join. 
13: 30: 27 19 THE WITNESS: I can only say We did notthink 
13 , 3 o : 32 20 it was necessary based upon our understunding of the 
13:30:34 21 terminology. 
13: 30: 3 7 22 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) There is Exhibit 32. And 
13: 30: 39 23 that is -- this is the Consolidated Financial Statements 
13: 30, 55 24 - March 31, 1995. And these are documents provided by 
13, 31: 08 25 AIA. lf you look down in the right-hand comer there is 
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13 1 3 l : 13 Bate stamps. Do you see those? 
13:31:14 2 A. Yes. 
13 1 3 lt 14 3 Q. If you go to the third page in that exhibit 
13: 31: 18 4 under the consolidated balance sheets it gives a balance 
13: 31: 28 5 sheet for both December31 of '94 and March 31 of '95. 
13: 31: 35 6 Do you see that? 
13:31:40 7 A. Yes. 
13: 31: 41 8 Q. And if you go down to the row close to the 
13: 31: 41 9 bottom it says "Retained Earnings (deficit)." In 
13: 31: 54 10 March 31 of 1995 the AJA Services Corp. was showing 
131 32: 02 11 retained earnings of a negative $1.4 million, give or 
13:32:07 12 take;right? 
13132: 10 13 MR LARUE: Object to the form. 
13132112 14 THE WITNESS: I don't think that is correct. 
13: 32: 14 IS MR. GAFFNEY: I'm sorry, $1.6. I'm one line 
13132117 16 below. $L6million,giveortake. 
13: 32: 21 17 MR LARUE: The document speaks for itself. 
13 1 32 12 4 18 THE WITNESS: That's what it says. 
13:32125 19 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) okay. Andthenin1994at 
13132128 20 year's end the retained earnings for AIA Services was a 
13: 32 132 21 negative $900,000, give or take; correct? 
13: 32: 36 22 MR. LARUE: Same objection. 
13132137 23 THE WITNESS: Again,thatiswhatitsays. 
13 1 32: 4 O 24 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) And this information -- when 




Q. As used in the statute; right? 
A. Yes. 
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Services Corporation, wru; lhis the documenl or one 
13, 32, 50 2 the documents you reviewed in preparing the Opinion 
13 132, 54 Letter? 
13132:54 4 A. No. 
13132 158 5 Q. This would have been a fairly recent fimmcial 
13: 33, 03 6 statement since it is connoting March 31 of '95; right? 
13133, 08 7 A. That's incorrect. 
13: 33 1 l 7 s Q. Now, why would this not be a close in time 
13 133 1 34 9 statement of AIA's retained earnings? By "close in 
13133141 IO time" I mean within about four or five months of the 
13: 33: 44 11 actual Opinion Letter. 
13 133: 46 12 MR. LARUE: Objectto the form. Presupposes 
13 36 Q. wou!dlhey 
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during the 
13: 371 oo 2 year, as you recall? 










MR. GAFFNEY: '94, think:. 
THE WITNESS: Not in '94; no. 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) How about '95 then? 
A. In the materials that we produced there was a 
disclosure statement from January 1995 with respect to 
the Kennard offering. And there was a disclosure 
statement in June or July of !995. And I think there 
were some supplementnl stntements. 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Okay. Those are what I was 
13133148 13 this document was prepared or reviewed by Mr. Riley at 13: 37: 33 13 getting at. Did those have attached financial 
13:33:5114 the time. 13137:35 14 statementstothem? 
13133153 15 MR. GJORDING: Join. 13: 37: 36 15 A. I think they did. l would have to look for 
13: 33: 54 16 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Well, you indicated that you 13137140 16 sure, but l think they did. 
13 1 33: 56 17 don't·· this is not the document that you reviewed 13: 37: 41 17 Q. For AlA Services? The financial statements? 
13:33:59 18 whenyoureferredtofinancialstatements? 13:37:46 18 A. Yes. 
13:34:0219 A. That'scorrect. Thiswasnotavailableatthe 13:37:47 19 Q. Okay. 
13: 34: 04 20 time of the opinion. 13: 37: 48 20 A. And maybe also for Universal Life. 
13: 34: 34 21 Q. Well, I'm assuming if this was not available 13137151 21 Q. And as you sit here those two disclosures that 
13 , 34 : 3 8 22 to you -- are you telling me that the December 31, 1994 13 : 3 7 : 5 7 22 were prepared in '95, did those financial statements 
13 134: 53 23 retained earnings amount was not available to you in 










A. As I testified earlier there was a draft of 
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the 1994 financial statements that was available. Nol a 
final audited 1994 financial statement. 
Q. But that·· as we sit here today you're 
recollecting that particular unaudited financial 
statement. It is true, is it not, that that showed 
negative returned earnings for 1994 for AlA Services? 
MR. LARUE: If you remember. 
THE WITNESS: I need to look at it to see. 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Did you do any disclosure 
13135: 59 10 statements to AIA Services in 1995 to the shareholders, 
13, 36: 13 11 that you recall? 
13:35:50 9 
13, 36: 15 12 A. Did I do? 
13:36:1613 Q. Yeah. Anykindofdisclosures? 
13 136: 2 l 14 A. l don't know what you mean by -
13 136123 15 MR. LARUE: I'll object to the form. l don't 
13136125 16 know what disclosure statements mean. I think it is 
13136129 t7 vague. 
13136130 18 THE WITNESS: I don't know what you mean by 
13136132 19 "do." 
13136133 20 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Well.drafted. Created. 
13: 38 1 O 3 23 show negative returned earnings for AIA Services? 
13:38,0824 MR.LARUE: Ifyouremember. 
13: 38: 09 25 THE WITNESS: I wouldn't know whether they 
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13, 38, 11 showed negative retained earnings without looking at 
13:38:13 2 them. 
13: 38: 26 3 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) When you say that you 
13138: 27 4 reviewed financial statements in preparation of the 
13: 38: 29 5 Opinion Letter, Exhibit 4, are those the financial 
13:38:33 6 statementsthatyouarereferringto? Werethosetwo 
13, 38138 7 disclosures? 
13:38:40 s A. Not necessarily. lnparticular,l recall the 
13: 38: 48 9 draft 1994statements and the interim statements that 
13: 38: 51 10 were, I think, attached to a certificate that was part 
13: 38: 56 11 of the Stock Redemption Agreement documentation. 
13:39:0112 Q. Okay. Well,Ithinklaskedyouthis 
13:39:04 13 question. Idon'trecalliflgotananswer. Given 
13: 39111 14 ·t1'1?&Mr1-:waa.mfi.W;;&\1ttM11tM;t,: 
13139115 15 ~-1Mi!f:lt1~-·j-·:itiat1;fp1•• 
13139126 16 a:.~I.QiidLJiNa11:...,,1Wii18;l/ffiMi 
13139135 17 .64ilf?;l.1ltiffl,iljidfoiiQW1g'./# .. $• 
13, 39, 44 1s :taU .. ,.w;,..:11.1 .. &IN'I 
1313915119 MR.LARUE: Objecttotheform. llpresumes 
13: 3 9 1 5 3 20 that the documents the witness reviewed prior to 
13136137 21 Wrote down on paper. 13139155 21 preparing the statement reflect information you have 
13: 36142 22 A. I probably reviewed and possibly edited 13139158 2'2 assumed in your question. 
13: 3614 7 23 disclosure statements prepared by AlA. 13140 100 23 MR. GJORDING: Join. 
13136152 24 Q. Were these year-end disclosures? 13: 40: 02 24 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) ·"·}1 /fflii(fif-lrl 
13:36155 25 A. No. 13:40:04 25 •tj'b;,ffi.«~;.tkt.Sttliie.-l.•~ii: •. $iio@i'g:;giji8) 
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13 : 40 would have been 
13140, 11 prudent legal practice to expressly reference 30-1·6 of 
13 , 4 o , 1 7 the Idaho Code as a potential restriction on the use of 
13 1 40 , 2 3 funds to redeem stock; correct? 
13140125 5 MR.LARUE: Object. Vagueandambiguous. 
13140128 6 MR.GJORDING: Join. 
13: 40, 2 9 7 THE WITNESS: Those weren't the circumstances. 
13 : 40 1 32 s So I can't answer the question. 
13140134 9 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Oidyoumakeanyspecific 
13 1 4 o , 4 5 10 finding in your resea.rch as to what retained earnings 
13 14 o 1 5 4 11 were available for this stock repurchase? 
13:40159 12 A. Wedidn'tbelieveretainedeamingshadany 
13 141 : o 2 13 bearing on the question of legality of the redemption. 
13 1 411 08 14 Q. Did you make any determination as to the 
13141112 15 availability of earned surplus as defined in 
13: 41: 21 16 Ex:hibit IQ -- the availability of earned surplus 
13 141125 17 defined in Ex:hibit 10 for the stock repurchase prior to 
13141130 18 doing the Opinion Letter? 
13: 411 31 19 A. I'm not sure I followed that question in its 
13:41:33 20 entirety. 
13141: 34 21 Q. Well, earned surplus is defined in Ex:hibit 10; 
13141137 22 correct? 
13141:38 23 A. Yes. 
13: 41: 40 24 Q. Did you, using that definition of earned 
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1314314 7 fair value? 
13 143 , 4 9 2 A. We had knowledge of the ESOP appraisals that 
13 1 43 : 5 3 3 Indicated fair value of the AIA Services stock. 
13, 4 3 1 5 6 4 Q. How did you define fair value? 
13:44:00 5 A. Theappraisedvalueoftheslock. 
13144, 16 6 Q. You.in theOpinio11 l.etter,did11otaddress 
13 , 4 4 1 2 3 1 the issue of potential restriction 011 the use of earned 
13 1 4 4 : 3 9 s surplus or capital surplus to repurchase Mr. Reed 
13 : 4 4 : 4 9 9 Taylor's stock; correct'l 
13:44:51 !0 MR.LARUE: Object to form. Thedocument 
13 , 4 4 1 5 3 11 speaks for itself. 
13:44154 12 THE WITNESS: There is 110 reference to either 
13 144 , 5 6 13 of those terms in the Opinion. 
13:44, 57 14 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) There is no reference in the 
13:45: oo 15 Opinion as to how you, •youa meaningyounad/or 
13145 ,o7 16 Mr. turnbow,deternunedthat there were sufficient 
13 :45: 12 11 legally available funds, to use your term.to reporehase 
13: 45, 19 1s Mt. ReedTa,lor'sstoek; correct'l 
13: 45: 22 19 MR. LARUE: Objectto the form. The document 
13 , 4 5 , 2 4 20 speaks for itself. 
13: 4 5 , 2 5 21 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, [ drifted off at the 
13: 45: 28 22 first part of that question. Would you repeat that? 
13:45:30 23 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Thereisnothinginthe 
13 , 4 5 : 31 24 opinion that dl11eusses the fact that apparently you 
13 , 41 , 42 25 surplus, determine whether there was a positive earned 13 , 4 5 1 3 9 25 nadlor Mr. Turnbow deternuned that there was sufficient 
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13 : 41: 4 9 1 surplus for purposes of repurchasing Mt. Reed Taylor's 
13 1411 s 7 2 stock attendant to the Stock Redemption Agreement? 
13 , 4 2 : o o 3 A. We detennmed that we could not understand or 
13 , 42 , o 4 4 find any authority to help us understand what that 
13, 42, 07 5 definition meant. We ultimately concluded that the 
13 :42, 15 6 availability of legally available funds to fund the 
13 :42, 19 1 redemption.would bebasedonfairmarket value of the 
13 , 42 , 2 2 s company's assets, 
13 : 4 2 : 2 9 9 Q. So Y® deterrained that there were quote, 
13 , 4 2 : 3 7 10 legally available funds based upon -- did you say fair 
13:42:43 11 valueorfairmarketvaiue? 
13:42:45 12 A. Fairvalueiswhatlsaid. 
13 , 42 , 4 7 13 Q. Of the entire corporadon'l 
13 , 42 , 4 9 14 A. Of all of its assets; yes. Its net assets. 
13 : 4 2 , s 2 1s Q. That is not !!Ollsistent with the definition of 
13:42:55 16 eamedsurplusin30-1-2tdahoCode;isit? 
13:43:02 11 A. Idisagreewiththat, 
13: 43: 07 1s Q. Ex:plain how those two are consistent? 
13:43:13 19 A. Aslsaid,wedidnotknowwhatthat 
13 : 43 , 16 20 def'tnition meant. So we researched it to try to 
13 , 4 3 , 2 o 21 determine what it l'llelllll,, And as a result of that 
13 : 4 3 , 2 4 22 research concluded that the legality of the transaction 
13 , 4 3 , 3 o 23 should he determined by looking at the fair value of the 
13:43:33 24 company'sassets. 
13:43:43 25 Q. Did you have a business valuator determine 
13 : 4 5 , 4 3 quote, legally aYailable runds, closed quote, to 
13 , 4 5 : 4 7 2 repurchalle Mr. Reed Taylor's stock by AIA Services? 
13 : 4 5 , 5 4 3 MR. LARUE: &tme objection. 
13:45:55 4 MR.GJORDING: loin. 
13 1 4 5 : 5 6 5 Tim WITNESS: That's correct. 
13:46:05 6 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Upunlilyoudidthis 
13: 4 6 , 0 7 7 Opinion Letter related to this Stock Redemption 
13 , 4 6: 10 8 Agreement, which was a deal of the magnitude of $7 .5 
13: 46: 17 9 million, what was the largest dollar amount 
13, 4 6: 2 6 10 transactionally related to any Opinion Letters you had 
13: 46: 28 11 done up to that point? 
13:46:33 12 A. Ihavenoidea. Waytoolongagotoremember 
13: 46: 38 13 details of any transactions. 
13: 46: 42 14 Q. When the Stock Redemption Agreement was 
13 146:46 15 drafted up part of the deal was that the noncash 
13: 46: 58 16 portion, which I believe was six: million bucks, was 
13: 4 7: 02 17 going to be collateralized by assets of AIA Services; 
13:47:06 18 right? 
13: 4 7: OB 19 MR. LARUE: Objectto form. The document 
13: 4 7: 10 20 speaks for itself. 
13: 4 7: 12 21 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Mr. Reed Taylor was going to 
13: 47: 15 22 receive security interest in various assets of AIA 
13: 4 7: 18 23 Services to secure the unpaid portion of the - or to 
13 1 4 7 : 2 4 24 secure the note for six million bucks; right? 
13: 4 7: 2 B 25 MR. LARUE: Same objection. 
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THE WITNESS: consider stock of 13147130 
13:47132 2 
131471 3 










Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Things like 
stuff like that? 
A. No. 
Q. The amount that was pledged as collateral to 
Mr. Taylor to secure the $6 million note, what 
percentage of AIA Services overall assets did that 
comprise? Do you know? 
MR. LARUE: Object to form. 
and 
13:48:32 12 THE WITNESS: I don't know what you mean by 
13: 48134 13 "amount.• 
13:48:36 14 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Outofall of the available 
13: 48: 39 15 assets that AIA had available to put up as collateral, 
13 :48: 46 16 what percentage of those assets were actually pledged to 
13: 48: 49 17 Mr. Reed Taylor as collateral? 
13 ,48:55 18 MR. LARUE: The document speaks for itself. 
13:48:57 19 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Alloftheavailableassets? 
13:49,0120 Some of them? A percentage? 
13, 49: 03 21 A. I can't put a percentage on it. The stock of 
13, 49: 07 22 AIA Insurance was I think the primary asset of AIA 
13: 49: 13 23 Services. 
13, 49: 15 24 Q. So all of the stock? 
13: 49: l 7 25 MR. LARUE: Objectto form. It 
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13:49:19 mischaracterized the last answer. 
13 : 4 9 : 2 2 2 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) What about commissions that 
13: 49: 23 3 were going to come in for insurance policies? Was that 
13 149129 4 part of the collateral? 
13: 49130 5 A. Those commissions crone into AJA Insurance. 
13:49:35 6 Tl\esubsidiary. 
13: 49, 36 7 Q. Were those pledged to Mr. Reed Taylor, do you 
13:49:39 8 remember? 
13149: 40 9 A. I believe there was to be a commission 
13: 49: 42 10 collateral account set up with Mark Twain Bank. 
13:49:54 11 Q. LetmeaskyouthisabouttheOpinionLetter 
13: 50: 32 12 in terms of terminology. Because we talked about this 
13: 50: 35 13 earlier. That there is some terms of art in Opinion 
13150139 14 Letters. 
13: 50: 40 15 In the Opinion Letteritself, Exhibit No. 4, 
13: 50: 43 16 there is no discussion of any of the definitions in 
13: 50: 53 17 Idaho Code, Section 30-1-2,forexample, that define 
l 3: 51: O 1 18 earned surplus, capital surplus, et cetera; correct? 
13: 51: 06 19 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. The document 
13:51:09 20 speaks for itself. 
13 : 51 : 1 a 21 THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
13: 51: 11 22 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) The reason that that hit me 
13 : 51 : 13 23 is one of the - I think one of the qualifications 
13: 51, 18 24 related to insolvency. And even that term was not 
13 , 51 : 2 5 25 defined, right, in terms of the Idaho Corporate Code? 
13:51 30 
13:51:31 2 







A. It's defined -
MR. LARUE: The document speaks for itself. 
THE WITNESS: It's defined in 30-1-2. 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) But it's not defined within 
the Opinion Letter itself? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Are there any statutory references at all in 
the Opinion Letter? 
13: 51155 9 MR. LARUE: The opinion speaks foritself. 
13 , 5 2 119 w THE WITNESS: There are no explicit references 
13 : 52 12 2 11 to Idaho Code sections. 
13: 52: 27 12 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Do you recall if AIA 
13152136 13 Services had sufficient cash to pay the $1.5 million 
13: 52145 14 portion of payments to Mr. Reed Taylor? 
13152: 52 15 A. I don't know what its cash position was. 
13:53:47 16 Q. How did youcomeupwith-orhowdidyou 
13 1 5 3: 52 17 come to the conclusion that there was sufficient quote, 
13 : 53 : 5 7 1s legally available funds, closed quote.to - available 
13 15 4 : 00 19 to pay for the stock redemption from Mr. Reed Taylor? 
13154: 16 20 A. Ultimately because we concludedthatthere was 
13 : 5 4 : 2 3 21 sttfficlentfalrvalue to pay the - to pay theseven and 
13 1 5 4 1 3 2 22 a half million dollars, 
13: 54: 39 23 Q. When you -- this determination of fair value. 
13:54:47 24 You said "we.• Was there anybody involved in that 










A. I'm sure Mr. Turnbow was involved. 
Q. But no accountants or business valuators; 
correct? 
MR. LARUE: Object to the form. 
Mischaracterizes the source of the fair value previously 
testified to. 
THE WITNESS: As I said earlier, we were aware 
of appraisals of the fair value of the AJA Services 
stock that were prepared for purposes of the employee 
13 , 5 5 : 2 7 10 stoek ownemhip then. 
13:55:19 9 
13: 5 5: 35 11 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Did you ever report to the 
13: 55: 54 12 board of -- the independent committee - did you ever 
13: 56: 05 13 report to the independent committee that was overseeing 
13: 56: 10 14 this transaction that you were using a fair value 
13: 56: 21 15 criterion to determine the financial viability of this 
13: 56: 25 16 stock repurchase? 
13:56:29 17 MR. RISLEY: Again, I'm going to raise the 
13: 56: 30 18 objection that communications directly from Mr. Riley to 
13: 56: 34 19 principals in AIA would be protected by attorney-client 
13:56:37 20 privilege. 
13: 56: 38 21 MR. GAFFNEY: But I would assume that at this 
13: 56, 40 22 point in time Mr. Reed Tayloris one of the principals; 
13:56:46 23 correct? 
13:56:47 24 MR.RISLEY: Thecommitteethatyouare 
13: 56, 48 25 referring to was apparently formed to exclude Mr. Reed 
............. ....+~~-P;~~_....871 
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13:561 Taylor. 
13 156: 5 3 2 MR. GAFFNEY: Which brings up im interesting 
13:56:55 
1315615 a Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Do you believe. given the 
13 1 56 1 5 9 5 nature of this transaction, if a board resolution were 
13 1 s 7 1 o 4 6 sought to allow the use of earned surplus as a means to 
13 157: 18 7 repurchase the stock: that Mr. Reed Taylor's stock: would 
13 : 5 7 , 2 4 s have - shares would have been disqualified from that 
13:57:27 9 vote? 
13: 57: 28 lO MR. LARUE: Object to the form of the 
13: 57: 29 11 question. !tis an incomplete hypothetical and asks for 
13157: 35 12 speculation of an event that didn't happen. Subject to 
13 :57: 38 13 that, if you can answerthe question, go ahead. 
13157: 39 14 THE WITNESS: fentltely IOlltthatquestion, 
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13 15 9 12 9 THE WITNESS: l believe he would not have been 
13159130 disqualified from voting his shares. 
13 59, 43 MR. GAFFNEY: Let's take our hourly break. 
13 59 148 4 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 1:59. And we 
13 1 5 9 1 51 are off the record. 
13159154 6 (Recess.) 
14:16:27 7 THEVIDEOGRAPHER: Weareontherecord. The 
14116133 g time is 2: 16 p.m. 
14:16,37 9 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Thefalnalueohssets 
14 : 17 1 2 o 10 that you and Mr. Turnbow -· or fair value of the 
14 : l 7 : 2 7 11 business, I'm sorry, that you and Mr. Turnbow came up 
14 : 17 : 2 9 12 with, was that amount ever presented to the board or 
14: 17: 41 13 directorspriortopreparation ofBxhibitNo.4of AIA 
14117151 !4 Services? 
13:57:42 15 Ifyoucantrythatagain, 14:17:52 15 
13:57:43 16 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Well,assumablyifyouare 14:17:53 16 
A. By who? 
Q. By you and/or Mr. Turnbow? 
13 , s 7 1 4 4 11 going to do a resolation to use earned surplus -· I'll 
13: s 7 , 5 5 1 a use the term capital surplus-- to pay for the stock 
13 , 5 8 , o 1 19 redemption it would have required a shareholder vote; 
13:58:08 20 right? 
131581 lO 21 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. 
13 15 8: 11 22 THE WITNESS: Under 30-1-6? 
13:58:16 23 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Under30-1-6. Right? 
13 : 5 B : 16 24 A. BiJher in the Articles 'Of Incorporation so 

























could be Ulled to redeem stock. 
Q. And we know that that didn't appear In the 
Articles of Incorporation; right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So had there been a vote among the 
shareholders to do that, because of the nature of this 
transaction, would it have been your opinion that his 
shares were disqualified from voting on that resolution? 
MR. LARUE: Same objections as previously 
stated. 
THE WITNESS: You are asking me as a --
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) As a lawyer. 
A. -· lawyer in 2012? 
Q. Well, a lawyer advising AIA. 
MR. LARUE: In 1995. 
THE WITNESS: In 1995? 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) In 1995. Everything is 
1995. 
A. And the question again was? 
Q. Because of the nature of the transaction, 
because it benefited Mr. Reed Taylor, do you believe his 
shares of stock would have been disqualified from voting 
on any resolution to use capital surplus to purchase his 
13159126 24 shares? 
13159127 2S MR. LARUE: Same objection. Speculation. 
14:17:55 11 A. No. 
14 : 17 : 5 6 18 Q. And I don't want to get too repetitive. But 
14: 18 : 1 o 19 that was based upon prionaluations that you and 
14 118 114 20 Mr. Turnbow had seen? 
14:18:15 21 A. Yes. 
14 : 18 , 16 22 Q. Now, It ls true, is it aot, that had AIA 
14 118: 4 2 23 Services shareholder$ voted on a resolution allowing the 
14 : 18: 51 24 ase or capital surplus to purchase Reed Taylor's shares 
14 : 19 : o l 25 that the agreement would have been legal and 
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14, 19, 08 I enforceable? 
14:19:09 2 MR.LARUE: Objecttotheform. Thequestion 
14: 19: 12 3 presumes what the vote of the shareholders would have 
14:19:17 4 been. 
14:19:17 5 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Well,let'sassumethey 
14: 19, 19 6 approved it; okay? If they had approved the use of 
14: 19: 24 7 capital surplus in a resolution that passed then the 
14: 19: 36 B shareholders -- the Stock Redemption Agreement would 
14: 19: 40 9 have been enforceable? 
14: 19: 44 10 MR. LARUE: Object to form. Speculation. 
14119145 11 THE WITNESS: If. in fact, there were capital 
14:19:48 12 surplus;yes. 
14:19:48 13 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) lfitexisted? 
14119:50 14 A. Yes. 
14:19:50 IS Q. Okay. ~~ij,jf,NJ(;gt,v~i~i-~ 
14, 20, os 16 ~i:l,Mif!t\•iiaibit~Fti't:t•:.•i:,tJuty;<wll 
1412011411 11at:tifbf •• ij® .. WQtli9 1ltt<~:•uQ#U1, 
14,20,29 1s ~lP#:cit.:wMliifM11••1•~·M•11i 
14120, 31 19 U11Hiiltv,;11iiH1iliiu/di\11;.it .. t,-1;m.l'!ilY 
14: 20: 44 20 "*'iMt#2 .. }f:11*/i, .. ;:•!ft: 
14: 20: 49 21 MR. LARUE: Object to form. 
14120: 50 22 MR. GAFFNEY: There was no earned surplus 
14120153 23 available to do that deal based upon what you had 
l4 120 156 24 reviewed; right? 
2s MR. LARUE: Object to form. 
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THE WITNESS: Based upon the Supreme Court's 
14 121: O o 2 de(mltion ofcamed surplus, 
14121101 Q. (BY MR GAFFNEY) But if you accep! that 
14: 21: 03 definition there was none available to do the deal; 
14121107 5 right? 
14 1211 0 9 6 MR. LARUE: Same objection. 
14 : 211 11 7 THE WITNESS: Based upon the Supreme Court's 
14 1211 12 s definition of earned surplus there was no earned surplus 
14 : 21 : 16 9 in 1995 atthe time of the redemption. 
14 121121 10 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) And based upon that the only 
14 1 211 2 2 11 way to make this denl work would bsve been a shareholder 
14 : 21 : 2 7 12 resolution tbst passed to allow the Ulle of capital 
14 : 21 : 32 13 surplus to porcbsse the TaylorshaJ'llS~ correct? 
14:21:36 14 A. Tbat'aincorreet. 
14:21:38 15 Q. Whatotberoptionwasthere? 
14 1 211 4 o 16 A. There were aeveral basedor the oPinion. One 
14 : 211 4 4 11 of which waut the time of the redemption Reed 
14 : 21 : 4 8 10 Taylors - the obligation to Reed Taylor was 
14 : 211 5 o 19 subordinated to the preferred stock obligations to 
14 :21, 55 20 DonnaTaylorundertheArticlesotlncorporation. And 
14 121159 21 those Articles of Incorporation prohibited the 
14 : 22 : o 2 22 redemption of Donna 1'aylor's stock until - unless and 
14: 22: 09 23 until therewerele,allyavailablefunds todosoandoo 
14 , 2 2 113 24 violation of the Idaho Code reslrictions on redemption. 
14 : 2 2 : 2 2 25 Q. And lthink hnderstand what youare saying. 
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14 12 2 : 2 5 1 But there is nothing in the Opinion Letter referencing 
14 : 22 , 31 2 tbst Mr. Taylor's shares would be subordinate to any 
14 : 22 : 3 6 3 other obliption of AIA Services; correct? 
14 : 22 : 41 4 A. The transaction documents thm: were opined on 
14 , 2 2 : 4 4 s stated that they were •• tbm: the obliption was 
14:22:47 6 subordinated, 
14 , 2 2 : 5 o 7 Q. [ understand that. But the Opinion Letter 
14 , 2 2 : 51 s itself does not reference tbst; correct? 
14: 22: 5 5 9 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. 
14 : 2 2 : 5 7 10 THE WITNESS: As I said, the Opinion Letter 
14 , 2 2 : 5 9 11 references the transaction documents. The .opinion was 
14: 23: 02 12 given on the tmnsactiondocumentsasawhole. 
14:23:31 13 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Okay. 1 thinkl understand 
14: 2 3: 32 14 what you just told me, so. I'm sorry, I was interrupted 
14: 23: 53 15 by my alter ego here. 
14 :23:57 16 You said that there were other viable options 
14: 2 4: o 3 17 to make this deal between AIA Services and Reed Taylor 
14: 241 ll 18 work other than the capital surplus route. Or, I guess, 
14 : 2 4 1 17 19 the retained -· or earned surplus route. What were 
14:24:20 20 those? 
14124:2121 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. 
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14 124 127 there were other ways to mnke this deal work. 
14 124 : 32 2 A. There were - the transaction was legal for 
14 1 2 4: 38 3 reasons •• in 1995 it was ouropinion !bat there were 
14 : 2 4 146 4 other reasons why the transaction WttS legat, in addition 
14 , 24 15 3 s to the fair value analysis of Whitt constitutes earned 
14: 24158 6 surplus. 
14:25:00 7 Q. Okay. Maybe I misunderstood what you said. 
14:25:02 s Whatwerethose? 
14:25:04 9 A. Well.as·· 
14: 25: 05 10 Q. -· other considerations? 
14 : 2 5 : o 7 11 A. As I just said, the subordimttion to •• the 
14 :25: 11 t2 obligation to Donna Taylor. There was also the LaVoy 
14 : 2 s : 18 13 case, which is the only case we found that was even 
14 : 2 s : 21 14 ~ly relevant to the transaction·whicb said lbat a 
14 : 2 s : 2 4 15 corporation can't cbatlenge the redemption of shares of 
14 : 2 5 : 2 a 16 its shareholder. And then there iuort of a mning 
14 : 2 5 1 35 11 illllue in !bat because of the subordination to Donna 
14 : 2 5 : 3 9 10 Taylor the obtiga.tion to Reed Taylor was a contingent 
14 : 2 5 1 4 6 19 liability. Not a liability that was then due and owing. 
14 : 2 6 1 o o 20 Q. Now, I understand what you just told me. None 
14 , 2 6 : 06 21 of that is either discussed or footnoted in the Opinion 
14 I 2 6 114 22 Letter, c:otteet? 
14: 26: 15 23 A. Thereisnodiscussionof thereasoning, 
14 : 2 6 : 11 24 That's correct. 
14 : 2 6: 18 25 Q. Do you recall whether the entire amount of the 
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14 :27: 36 stockreporchase related to Mr. Taylor was subordinate 
14 : 2 7 : 4 3 2 to Donna Taylor? Or jnst part of it? 
14 : 2 7 : 4 5 3 A. The $6 million note was subordinated. 
14 12 7 : 4 8 4 Q. So the cash payment was not; correct? 
14 : 2 7 : 5 3 5 A. I don't know of a cash payment. 
14 : 2 7 : 5 5 6 Q. Well, the $15 million. However that payment 
14:27:58 7 wasgoingtobemnde, 
14 : 2 8 : o 1 8 A. That was not subordinated. 
14:28:03 9 Q. Iwanttotakealookatsomeofyour 
14: 29: 03 10 discovery. And we'll probably come back to Exhibit 4. 











Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) I wanted to look through 
these because these are requests for admission and some 
interrogatories and request for production that was 
served. And these were the requests for admission 
responses that you served on us. This was quite a while 
back. Back in January of 2010. 
Do you recognize those? 
A. !do. 
Q. Request for Admission No. 2 asks you to admit 
that "The Opinion Letter (attached as Exhibit A) was 
14124122 22 Mischaracterizes his prior testimony. 14: 30: 34 22 delivered to Reed Taylor for him to rely upon for the 
14124124 23 THE WITNESS: I don't know what you mean by 14130 :37 23 redemption of his common shares by AIA Services." And 
14: 24: 26 24 other options. 14: 30143 24 then after some general objections you admit that the 
14:24:26 2s Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) :ttial/jtit/lltif/U 14:30:50 2S letter was delivered to ReedTaylorattherequestof 
i.........------------------------------------J..-----------------E::._......_T•&..r-,;...----,A-----.873 

















Richard 1\ ..... Riley -
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into the preparation of this amended 
MR. LARUE: I'm going to object to the form of 
the question. This document was filed in -- or is dated 
in 2008. March 7. 2008. I have no reason to believe it 
wasn't filed. It doesn't have a file stamp on it. 
However - but it doesn't have nothing to do with 
whether or not Mr. Riley negligently or non-negligently 
prepared an Opinion Letter in l 995. So I think he is 
15 : 5 9: 2 8 10 not going to answer any questions about this document. 
15: 59: 33 11 MR. GAFFNEY: All right. If you are not going 
15: 59: 45 12 to answer any questions on this particular exhibit let's 
15, 59, 53 13 break for the day since it is 4:00. 
16: oo, 00 14 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Is this deposition to be 
16, oo: 02 15 continued tomorrow? 
16:00:0316 MR.GAFFNEY: Tomorrow morning. 
16: oo: 04 17 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This deposition is to be 
16: 00: 06 1s continued. The time is 4:00 p.m. And we are off the 
16:00:1019 reco~. 
16: 00, 12 20 (Deposition recessed at 4:00 p.m.) 
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o 8 : 3 3 : 2 8 J reason that we held this deposition over is that we've 
0 8 : 3 3 : 3 2 got some documents that I want you to take a look at and 
o 8: 3 3 : 3 5 5 identify for me. And I just couldn't get through them 
0 B: 3 3 : 3 8 6 yesterday efficiently. So that is fundamentally what we 
o B : 3 3 : 4 6 7 are going to be doing today. But l do have a few 
OB, 33: 48 s questions from yesterday. 
o B : 3 3 : so 9 We were talking aboutwben you were doing the 
o B : 3 3 : s s Io Opinion Letter back in August of !99S. And remember we 
o s : 3 4 : o 2 11 had the discussion of the statute defines the term 
OB, 34, 09 12 earned surplm? 
os : 3 4 : 11 13 A. l remember we talked about that; yes. 
o a : 3 4 , 13 14 Q. And you indicated that when you were doing the 
o s , 3 4 , 16 1 s Opinion Letter that what you had done wu look for·· J 
os : 3 4 : 2 4 16 believe you lilied the term "legally available funds" 
o 8 : 3 4 , 3 3 11 to .. available to AlA Services to redeem the stock. 
o a : 3 4 , 3 9 1 s And, ultimately, what you, and, J believe, Mr. Turnbow 
o s : 3 4 , 4 2 19 eame llJI with was the Idea of using fair value, 
o s : 3 4 : 4 9 20 ls that a fair SynllJ!Sis? 
08:34:52 21 A. l don't think I used "legally available 
o s : 3 4 : s s 22 funds. tt I mean, we weren't looking for lllgally 
o a : 3 4 : s 6 23 available funds. We were looklngforwhat did earned 
o a : 3 s : o 1 24 Sl.lfJlluS mean. What did those restmltlons mean. 
08:35:0425 Q. Okay. Andthatiswhetelwugettlag 
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o 8: 3 2: o 6 1 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are on the record. This 
08: 32: 0 8 2 is the continuing deposition of Richard A. Riley in the 
o 8: 3 2: 11 3 matter of Taylor V. Riley, et al., in the District Court 
08: 32: 16 4 of the Fourth Judicial District in and for the County of 
08: 32: 20 5 Ada, State ofldaho, Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868. The 
08: 32: 28 6 deposition is being taken on behalfofthe plaintiff. 
o a: 32: 31 7 Today's date is March 30, 2012. And the time 
o 8: 3 2: 3 4 s is 8:32 a.m. We are at the offices of Elam & Burke, 25 l 
08: 32: 41 9 East Front Street, Suite 300, Boise, Idaho, 83701-1539. 
08: 32: 4 7 10 This deposition is being reported and 
O 8 : 3 2 : 4 9 11 videotaped by M & M Court Reporting Service, 
o a : 32: s 3 12 Incorporated, 421 West Franklin Street, Boise, Idaho 
o a : 3 2 , s 7 13 83 702. The court reporter is Monica Archuleta. And 
o 8: 3 3 : o 1 t4 Patrick Roden is the videographer. 
O 8 : 3 3 : o 3 1 s Are there any stipulations? 
08: 33: 08 16 MR. GAFFNEY: Are we ready? 
08: 33: 10 11 1l!E VIDEOGRAPHER: Are there any stipulations? 
OB: 33: 11 18 MR GAFFNEY: No. I'm sorry. 
08:33:14 19 
20 CONTINUED EXAMINATION 
21 QUESTIONS BY MR. GAFFNEY: 
OB: 33: 16 22 Q. Mr. Riley, good morning. 
23 A. Good morning. 
O 8: 3 3: 1 B 24 Q. I need you to remember that you are still 
OB: 33: 20 2S under oath·· 
o B : 3 s , o a I somewhat confused. And you came up wilh !he idea of -
oa: 35, 12 2 well, letmeasktbequestionverysimpiy, 
o a , 3 s , 14 3 Are you equating fair value wilh earned 
o a , 3 s , 1 7 4 surplus? Or were you equating fair value wnh earned 
0 8 : 3 5 : 2 0 5 Sl.lfJilUS? 
o a , 3 s , 21 6 A. OU? conclusion was that we eouldo'Uell what 
o a , 3 s , 2 s 1 eamed Sl.lfJlius meant trom any .. we couldo't find any 
o a , 3 s : 3 o s soorces that would tell us wbatit meant. And looking 
o s : 3 s : 3 3 9 at the Revised Model Bwine$S Corporation Aet with all 
o a : 3 s , 3 a 10 of iis dmften;' comments saying that those terms' were 
o 8 , 3 s , 4 2 11 essentially 111ftningless and unrelated to any financial 
o s : 3 s , 4 a 12 reporting categories of - I'm not saying that right. 
o a : 3 s : s 7 13 But that earned SUfJi{Ull and capital surplus did not 
OS:36:0l u -.-- .. ::. Aadso, 
oa, 36, o 6 ,, itt:lt*a,i;Mf;Wftfilll:·aa1,ifiiltf:il.itu:1::11, 
oa,36,1316 ltail:IIIWIY!Wmi1WM1*1:W._:11t:ll'lfi*f 
00, 36, 11 11 .ti!bM:.ilt,_.,tt;;1W:WM:lllli~ 
oa, 36, 2s u a .. ,a::'it:iiiM,r•:~~w . w:1111tPl• 
00, 36, 27 19 ,a>~r1Y••:~+1lf+•~•/w~, 
os, 36, 31 20 ,t•M•iti,ti'.'N;_._.,ww;afl#a~ 
oa, 36, 34 21 diitH11Q.-*J1>1Wj;ttttii:DMMi 
oa, 36, 41 22 :a~:-m\A,Wu,,r ... '••t:• 
aa, 36, 43 23 ~iMJlii:~t1ai1:•i11w:•w1, 
08:36:4624 ·-1-l 
0 B: 36: 4 9 25 Q. t\lta:,:<'.lilf'•iltk<io-).fft./:;tHlfiiiQi~ 
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o a : 3 6 : s 9 1 10 do with. the board authorizing the use of •• bow do I 
o s : 3 7 want to put this question. Isn't it tme that in order 
o a , 3 7 , 1 s 3 for the board or directors or the -00rporatioo to eome up 
o a : : 2 3 4 wida definitioo or eumed surplus tbere bauo be some 
o a : 3 7 2 s type of resolution and lll:Ceptaoce ofthat by the board? 
oa:37:33 6 A. No. 
o a : 3 7 : 4 6 7 Q. When you said you looked at the Revised Model 
o 8 : 3 7 : 51 s Act. These are the comments to the act that you were 
oe: 37: 56 9 looking at? 
o 8 : 3 7 : 5 7 io A. The statute -- I guess it wasn't a statute at 
o B: 3 8: o 2 11 that point. But the actual subslantive provisions of 
o a , 3 a : o s 12 the Revised Model Act under Section 6.40 and the 
o a: 3 8, lo 13 attendant drafters' comments. 
o a , 3 a , 2 3 14 Q. So I guess if 1 undersiand what you just said. 
o a , 3 a , 2 6 1s It was your amdusion that their conclusion was that 
o a : 3 a , 2 9 16 the terms earned surplus and eapital surplus, at least, 
o s , 3 a , 3 6 11 as you would find io, fbt U,ample, Bxhibit 10 to the 
o s : 3 s , 4 3 1 s Idaho .. which is part of the Idaho Code were 
o a , 3 a , 4 a 19 meaningless? 
o a : 3 a : s 2 20 A. I think, ifl recall the .;omments, that they 
o s , 3 s , 5 a 21 were not usemJ for tbcir intended purpose of pmtcctiog 
o a , 3 9 , o 3 22 creditots, And that they were capable of being 
o s , 3 9 , o 7 23 manipulated. And my imprl:ssion from botb the uniform •• 
o s , 3 9 , 16 24 Revised Model Uniform Act, and othersoun:es we locked 
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o a : 41 : 1 o I your thought process. But you would admit that, if you 
o B: 41: U look at Exhibit 9, Idaho Code, Section 30-1-6, in terms 
08:41:24 of stock redemption it expressly uses the term 
o a: 41: 3 5 4 unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus in the text 
o a : 41 : 41 of the statute itself; right? 
o 8 : 41 : 4 3 6 MR LARUE: Object to form. The document 
o 8: 41: 4 5 7 speaks for itself. 
o a: 41: 4 7 s MR. GJORDING: Join. 
08:42:10 9 l'vtR LARUE: Do you remember the question? 
o 8 : 4 2 : l3 1 o THE WITNESS: No. Would you repeat it, 
08: 42: 15 11 please? 
o 8 : 4 2 : 2 4 12 MR. LARUE: Counsel, at the time you \11ere 
o 8 : 4 2 : 2 s 13 asking the question the witness was looking for the 
08:42:27 14 document 
08: 42: 28 IS MR. GAFFNEY: Yeah. I'll reask it. 
08: 42: 30 16 MR. LARUE: Thank you. 
08: 42: 31 11 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) And the question was pretty 
o a : 42 , 3 2 1 s simple. It was in 1995 when you were dning this Opinion 
o a : 4 2 , 3 s 19 Letter, Idaho Code, Section 30.1-6, which lalks about 
o s , 4 2, 4 o 20 the various ways that ycu can fbnd a stock repurchase, 
o a , 4 2 : 4 6 21 it expressly uses the term "earned surplUII« Ill! one or 
o a , 4 2 : s 2 22 the avw1abte avenues to do a stock repurchase; correct? 
OB:42:56 23 A. Tbat'seom:ct. 
oa: 42: 57 24 MR. LARUE: Object to the fonn. The document 
oa: 39: 1 7 25 at. including Fletcher's Encyclopedia, tbatitmadc os: 42: 59 25 speaks for itself. 
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o a , 3 g , 2 3 1 sense to look at fair llli1uc of the al!Sets in deterrninin1 
o s , 3 9 , 2 6 2 whether there was wffieient assets of the corporation 
os: 3 9: 2 9 3 to redeem the stock, 
o a : 3 g : 4 o 4 Q. So going back to my origioaJ question. Would 
o a : 3 9 : 4 9 s the effect of that decision on your part to use fair 
o s , 3 9 , s s 6 value in essence make that the equivalent of earned 
oa,4o:o3 1 surplus? 
o s , 4 o , o 4 s A. No, We es11eotiolly believed that those temis 
o a , 4 o , o a 9 were meaningless and oohelpfut. 
o a : 4 o , 12 10 Q. So would it be f'air to say that in determlaing 
o e : 4 o , 15 11 whether the Stock Redemption Agteement passed legal 
o s : 4 o : 2 4 12 m1111ter under the ldabo Code you ignored earned surplus? 
OB: 40: 2 8 13 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. Misstates 
08:40:30 14 testimony. 
08:40:31 ts MR.GJORDING: Join. 
08:40:33 16 THE WITNESS: .f'"fili:it<~ui:li/it 
00, 40, 3 4 11 ,w:••:.um;;;,;,1N:n1:•-- ~1ai/itl1:rJi~~S¥ 
00, 40, 40 1s ~1,m&t~J~:tt•,t(liifm\@ . =MM 
oa, 40, 43 19 .8.iili.ilii:~-!:~i!l!fflniiU 
08: 40: 4 7 20 imilflfj1:!;jt;.,ijj;~h'iwtffii:illt 
00, 40, so 21 ~¥.fia:>i< ... !i:twif:id~iluli'¢./it:&. 
00, 40, ss 22 il!t·••••1~i«limrii,¥1iiMJ:•1w, 
08: 41: 01 23 1~l$'i¢$/~~t;.8:U.t;~illitl,Qllas 
08: 41: 04 24 you said, pass muster, under the Idaho Code. 
08: 41: 09 2s Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) And I think I understand 
Page 190 
oa: 43: oo t MR. GJORDING: Join. 
OB:43:0l 2 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Andthenunderadifferent 
o a , 4 3 , o s 3 set of circumstallces it also exprCllllly uses the term 
os:43 ,10 4 "eapitalsurplus";rillht? 
os: 43: 12 s MR. LARUE: Same objection. 
oe: 43: 13 6 MR. GJORDING: Join. 
OB: 43: 14 7 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
08:43:15 s Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Andtbentbosctemisare 
o a , 43 : 1 7 9 both - regardless of the adequacy, or your opinion of 
o 8 , 4 3 : 21 1 o adequacy of !he definition of those two tenns, those two 
o a, 43 , 2 6 11 terms are defined. in the statute; comet? 
o B : 4 3 : 3 o 12 A. There are definitions in the statote. I don't 
o e , 4 3 , 3 3 13 know what they mean. 
OS:43:36 14 Q. Mynext-fikelsaid,.ldnn'twanttoget 
00, 43, 49 ,, ~;-•:-A&xiti-;u:MIIMqM;U 
oa, 43, s3 16 uttWa<t111nuu1ituijli*wh•1t:Yalliliha.r,,nd1m 
08: 43: 59 17 tiiai;::~:1i&ililli,ilitJj:i~-1~,-
08: 44: 03 1s 111:~·-•-M,blil ... fiimlqill\iltlillt 
08: 44: OS 19 diJt:~i$~1kHlifl41,du!>loilkiti~-)WU 
00, 44, 10 20 ida.,1:iht••:Bl·t:utnliit!Bt!fli~ 
08: 44: 17 21 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. 
o a: 44: 19 22 MR. GJORDING: Join. 
o a: 44: 21 23 THE WITNESS: mll::J't»llfc:j.-1itijidliji 
oe, 44, 24 24 ·-.:&t.ltlittm:awt#i~mtib•;llJwe 
oe, 44, 20 2s Mett1Qiif .. t1ptn .. :-Wiat;JloM1W11u.t· 
208-345-9611 M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc. Exhibi\oo.:2g9611 2885 
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Q. (BY MR GAFFNEY) No, that is not what I'm 
asking. It was you and Mr. Turnbow that did whatever 
research or collecting of information that you did in 
4 order to come up with this conclusion to use fair value. 
o a: 44: 4 6 You didn't consult with anyone else'/ 
oa: 44: 55 6 MR LARUE: I'll object to the form. I think 
OB: 44: 57 1 it mischaracterizes prior testimony. 
OS: 45: 24 8 THE WITNESS: I can't answer that without -
OS: 45: 29 9 there's an attorney-client issue involved. 
oa: 45: 3 6 10 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) The privilege being as to 
08: 45: 3 8 11 AIA Services? 
08:45:4712 A. Yes. 
OB: 45: 4 7 13 Q. Do you have any idea how much time you spent 
08: 45: 56 14 trying to determine, first of all, coming to the 
OB: 46: 02 1s conclusion that you were going to use fair value as the 
OB: 46: oa 16 benchmark as to whether the stock repurchase transaction 
OB: 46: 14 17 was legal? That is one component. And then two, how 
OB: 46: 19 18 much time you actually spent determining what that fair 
08: 46: 22 19 value was? 
08, 46: 25 20 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. Compound. 
oa: 46: 28 21 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) And I can break it into two 
O 8 : 4 6 : 3 o 22 questions, but I don't think it was all that 
OS: 46: 32 23 complicated. 
08: 46: 3 3 24 A. 1t would be helpful. I'm not at my cognitive 
o 8: 46: 3 7 25 best this morning. 
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os: 46: 3 a I Q. All right. When you say you are not at your 
08: 46: 42 2 cognitive best, could you briefly explain that? 
os: 46: 46 3 A. I'm feeling a little absent minded. I'm just 
o B , 4 6 : s s 4 not feeling I think I'm feeling some of the drug 
o 8 , 4 6 , s s s effects this morning. 
oa: 46: 59 6 Q. Are you capable of continuing on? 
oa: 4 7: 01 1 A. Yes. I just have a short-term problem. 
o 8: 4 7: o 4 Q. All right. And I'm trying to make these-· 
o a: 4 7 , 12 <> this has nothing to do with you, per se. But I'm trying 
o a : 4 7 , 15 10 to make this understandable to me. 
0 8 : 4 7 : 21 l t TJie rirst question was, do you have any 
o a : 4 7 , 2 4 12 estimate of bow much mne that yoo. did researdiing 
o a , 4 7 , 31 13 ultimately what benchmark yoo were going to use, which 
o s , 4 7 , 3 s 14 ultimately became fair market - or not fair market 
08: 47: 38 IS iljg' •• t'J~>ajlllj(-;,a,Wji'\-
08 ,47,44 16 ~tj:ilirt!f'RtiM~.M,.wcD 
os, 4,, 4e 11 ,i&i:!M4lidltffllto,.11ltl 
08, 47: 50 18 A. UltilillJi~HIIMffll~-~i-;lf 
08: 47: 53 19 ~:f'8ll:li11a.11;;(fiicl'~ 
o a : 4 7 , s s 20 Q. Would that be reflected in the billing records 
o a , 4 7: 5 a 21 of Eberle Berlin to AIA Services; do you think? 
o a : 4 a : o 3 22 A. It would have been at that time; yes. 
oa: 48, os 23 Q. And then once you decided that you were going 
o s : 4 a , o 7 24 to use fair value as the criterion as to whether this 




would be whether there was sufficient funding for the 
repurchase. What did I say'/ I'm sorry. I'm having the 
08: 49: 30 3 same problem. 
THE COURT REPORTER: Excuse me. Can we go off 
the record real quick, please? 
6 MR. GAFFNEY: Sure. 
OB: 413: 3 6 7 THE VJOEOGRAPHER: The time is 8:48. And we 
are off the record. 
(Recess.) 
08: 51: 29 iu THE VIDEOGRAPHER; We are on the record. And 
08:51:3111 thetimeis8:51 a.m. 
08:51:3712 Q. (BY MR. GAFFl'.,rEY) I think 1 just asked you if 
O 8 : 51 , 41 13 the time that you spent during research to come up with 
O 8 : 51 : 4 7 14 the idea that you were going to use fair value in the 
08: 51, 54 15 ultimate conclusions in your opinion letter would be -
08: 51 : 5 9 l6 should be reflected in the Eberle Berlin billing records 
O 8 : 5 2 : O 3 17 back when you were doing that work? 
08:52:05 l8 A. Well,thebillingrecordswouldhavereflected 
OB: 52, 07 19 the time spent on the entirety of the project. 1 don't 
0 8 : 5 2 : 12 20 know whether -- l mean, I doubt that there was a 
08: 52: 16 21 segregated time for researching that issue or --you 
O 8 : 5 2 : 21 22 might be able to read through it and come to an 
OB : 5 2 : 2 4 23 estimate. I mean, I didn't keep track separately of how 
O a : 5 2 , 2 8 24 much time was spent on doing research and how much time 
0 8 : 5 2 , 3 O 25 was spent on other functions. 
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o a , s 2 : 3 6 1 Q. And lhen once yeuuwie tha determhllltion !hat 
o s , s2 , 4 o 2 you were going to use fair value then you bad described 
o s , s 2 , 4 4 3 yesterday a tittle bit about bow that determination was 
o s : s 2 : 4 7 4 ~- You said that thare bad been some tetitem(lnt 
o s : s 3 : o o s valuations. Did I fellow that eorrecdy? BSOP or-
o a : s 3 , o s 6 A. There were appraisals dorte for tlw Employee 
o a , s 3 : 13 1 Stock Ownership Plan purposes. 
08: 53: 14 s Q. Okay. Other than those valuations did you·· 
08: 53: 20 9 you didn't use any other valuations? 
o 8 : s 3 : 2 3 10 A. Not specifically third-party valuations; no. 
oa: 53: 28 11 Q. Did you have any input in these valuations 
08: 53: 39 12 from any members of the board of directors of AIA 
u Services? 
o e : 5 3 : 4 3 !4 MR. RISLEY: I will interpose the objection 
08: 53: 46 IS that that question invades attorney-client privilege. 
oe: 53: 51 16 MR. LARUE: And based on the claim of the 
o 8: 53 , s 3 11 privilege I instruct you not to answer the question. 
08: 54: 06 18 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) •tttiii'1/i¥;.a1m,:•, 
oa,54,2019 Un~~,..._<MYl>l~M 
os, 54, 3 o 20 , •. .,,,<Mr<W;:i••;-<~u:filiiW::M 
08:54,3621 idi:11111;'1,W:,JitfM:11'1,Mi:~ 
09: 54: 45 22...,'f#iltlUJ&i,trw:Mff!Mfiliva.Wtt 
08, 54, s3 23 .-t1'11@ffilfflt0Rtai<M:Uie:'Mttf:, 








































Page 6 (PA i!.9~09 
Richard A. Riley - Vol II 3/30/2012 
Page 195 
oe, ss, 14 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. I think the 
o B , : 2 o witness has already indicated that was not the only 
o 8: : 2 3 basis. And it is somewhat argumentative. 
I OB: 55: 27 4 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) 1'111 asldng simply, don't you 
o s : 5 s , 2 9 think it would have been prudent to have included thal 
o a , s 5 , 3 2 6 information as part oftbe qualifications or exceptions 
o a , s s , 3 a 1 incorporated into the Opinion Letter? 
oa: 55: 40 s MR. GJORDING: Object to the form. 
OB: 55: 42 9 MR. LARUE: Join. 
08:55:42 IO THEWITNESS: Jnl99Swedidnotbelievethat 
o a : s s : 4 s 1 1 Wllll llelle$SIUY in light oftbe full set of eircumstances 
o a : 5 s : 51 12 in the information available to us at the time. 
oa,55:5413 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Don'tyoubelievethatit 
a 8 : s s : s s 14 would have been prudent legal praetlee to put in the 
o a : s 6 : o o Is opinion or the attendant exceptions to the opinion 11 
oa: 56, 07 16 discussion thlltthe definitions of3fM•2, for example, 
o a : s 6 : 21 11 earned surplus or eapitlli llUll)IUS w«e not being used as 




MR. LARUE: Object to form. 
MR. GJORDING: Join. 
THE WJTNESS: Again, In l99S we did not 
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o a: s a s s I MR. LARUE: Object to the form. 
OB: 58: 57 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) This ill back in '9S, again. 
o 8: 5 B: s 9 3 MR. GJORDfNG: Join. 
08: 59: 02 4 THE WITNESS: I don't knowhowtoanswerthat. 
o s , s 9 : o a ; \Ve did the research we did as reflected in the rescarch 
o s , 5 9 , 11 6 file. \Ve looked al all sources available to us to make 
o a , s 9 , 2 6 1 the determination of what those terms meant as best as 
08:59:29 8 wecoulddoatthetime. 
08:59:32 9 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Wouldthoscsourccsbe 
OB: 5 9: 3 7 10 expressly --1 haven't looked at the research file. So 
oa: 59, 40 11 I apologize. Arc those sources explicitly referenced in 
08: 59: 46 12 the research file? 
o a : 5 9 : 4 7 13 A. The copies of the documents that we copied arc 
OB: 59: 51 14 in the research file. That isn't everything that we 
08: 59: 54 15 looked at. 
08: 59: 54 16 Q. What in addition would I not find in there, if 
OB: 59: SB 11 you can recall? 
OB: 59: 59 18 A. You wouldn't find what we didn't find when we 
o 9 : o o : o 3 19 researched. By definition we looked for things and 
09: oo: 07 20 didn't find them. 
09:000821 
o a , 5 6 , 3 3 22 believe that was ffl!Cessary. o 9 , o o , 11 22 
Q. Okay. l get it. So everything you found is 
in the research file? 
os: 56: 37 23 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) And why do you believe that 09: oo: 14 23 A. I bcl icvc so. 
00: 56, 3 a 24 was notnecesoey? 09, oo, 19 24 Q. Did you confme your research to tbe 
definition of earned surplus or capital surplus just to OB:56:39 25 A. lt'Wlllloureonclusiontbatbeelluseofthelaek 09:00:33 2s 
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o a , s 6 , 4 5 1 of authority, giving any guidance as to what those terms o 9 : o o , 4 o I Idaho authority? Or did you look to other 
o a , s 6 , s 2 2 meant, that a court - the highest court of the o 9 , o o , 4 3 2 jurisdictions? 
o a : 5 6 : s 7 J jurisdiction looking at it fully briefed and presented 09: 00: 44 3 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. Asked and 
oa,s1,01 4 wouldcometothcllllfileconclusiontbatwedid. 09,00:46 4 answered. 
oa, 57, 04 s Q. Whenyouusetbeterm "our" conclusion and 09, oo, 47 s THE WITNESS: \Ve looked for other 
o a , s 7 , o 7 6 "we" who specifically are you referring to? o 9 , o o , 4 9 6 jurisdictions and any other sources that we could f'md. 
o s , s 7 , 1 o 1 A. In. ell!l(!ru:c, it was tbe opinion of the ftrm o 9 , o o , s 2 1 Including, for example, Fletchet's Eneyclopetlia. 
os, 57, 1s s generated by the opinion givers. The opinion preparers. 09: 01, 06 s Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Given the nature of this 
o a , 5 7 , 2 o 9 Meaning, me and Mickey Turnbow, 09 , o 1 , o 9 9 t:ransaetion baek in 199S wouldn't it have been 
08:57:2610 Q. Don't you believe that anytime that a lawyer 
OB: 57: 3 4 11 deviates from a statutory definition, which is basic to 
o 8 : 5 7 : 4 2 12 providing a legal opinion, that it is incumbent upon 
o 8 : 5 7 : 4 8 13 that lawycrto describe or qualify as to bow that 
08: 57: 53 14 definition has been modified? 
08:57:5915 MR. LARUE: Object tothcfonn. 
OB: 58: oo 16 MR. GJORDrNG: Join. 
o a: 5 a : o 2 11 THE WITNESS: In l 99S we did not believe that 
OB:58,0618 was necessary. 
00, ss, a, 19 Q. tf!W;:\i1tw-•t'-:~t:;&>'Nt}wiii 
08:58:0920 i•:i~it 
oa: 58: 10 21 A. J't;tl/:tl8ilf::itffl'llilt:4:i($-.!f.p; 
oe, 5a, 21 22 Q. fflrsft:,M1tfii@ilrii:itl:ildiMa 
o a, s 0, 3 o 23 tlti:)IWl:ttlt~t~<ai::.:~ilimt:il'iit~ 
08: 58: 39 24 ol::lliWffi.ffl!f:,bft.~,il:~qilfiivWM 
08: 58: 49 25 nlmfl{t:$-~l1::i~lltii1ilt 
o 9 , o 1 : 16 10 reasonable practice simply for you to get shareholder 
o 9 , o 1 : 2 3 11 approval to 1111e capltlll surplus to effettt the Stock 
o 9 , o 1 , 31 12 Redemption Agreement? 
o 9 : o l: 31 13 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. 
09: 01: 34 14 Argumenllltive. And asked and answered. 
09:0l:351s MR.GJORDfNG: Join. 
09: 01: 3 6 16 THE WITNESS: !jaaliJl,~Yeffl;/11iif/ffifnft:fit .• 
o 9, o 1, 3 9 11 .~-:.,.ilJie:.:'1l.._._Ai>IWtiil1iilY$ls:llni 
o9, o 1, 41 1s ttm,ci~r<11i1m.W,wid1it•wr,•pu1toit, 
09: 01: 48 19 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Do you have any reason to 
09: 01: so 20 believe given the negotiations that the shareholders 
09: Ol: 56 21 would have not approved that type of resolution? 
09: 02: oo 22 MR. LARUE: Object to form. Requires 
09: 02: 02 23 speculation. 
09: 02: 03 24 MR. GJORDrNG: Join. 
09: 02: 04 2s THE WITNESS: Reed Taylor controlled any 
208-345-9611 M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc. Exh i bi\oo.:2g9611 2887 
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09, 02: 08 1 shareholder vote. 
09: : 13 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Bui he was going to benefit 
09: : from this transaction; correct? 
09: : 21 A. Yes. 
09 02 24 Q. ! mean, did you even discuss this matter with 
09: 02: 27 6 any of the board -- or, excuse me. !he shareholders as 
O 9 : O 2 : 3 2 1 to whether they would be opposed to this type of 
09: 02: 37 8 resolution? 
09:02:39 9 MR. RISLEY: Once again, I have to interpose 
Page 201 
O 9 : O 6 : 22 1 is not a copy of the article itself. 
09: 06: 29 2 Q. Can you tell by looking at it that ifit is 
09:06:32 the same thing it was actually published in The 
09: 06: 35 4 Advocate'/ 
O 9: O 6: 3 5 A. No, it is not Because what would have been 
09: 06: 41 6 an illustration and diagram is it's just all screwed 
09: 06: 4 7 7 up. It is not what was in the article. There is a copy 
09: 06: SO 8 of the article in the materials that we provided to you 
09:06:53 9 indiscovery. 
09:02:4110 theobjectionthatthatinvadestheattomey-client 09:06:54 w Q. Excuse me? 
09: 02: 43 11 privilege. 09: 06: 55 11 A. There is a copy of the article in the 
09: 02: 44 12 MR. LARUE: And based upon the insertion of 09: 06: 57 12 materials we provided in discovery. 
O 9 : O 2 : 4 6 13 the privilege l instruct the witness not to answer the O 9 : 0 7 : 0 0 13 Q. What [ am fundamentally interested in is this 
09: 02, 4 B 14 question. 09: 07: 05 14 chart that has been created at the bottom of page one 
09:02:56 ts Q. (BYMR.GAFFNEY) Youmadeacommentyesterday 09:07:1115 andthetopofpagetwo. Areyoutelling--wasthat 
0 9 : 03 : 11 16 about the litigation against you and Hawley Troxell that O 9 : 0 7 : l 5 16 not in •• when you say it is screwed up. You mean that 
O 9 : O 3 : 2 2 17 up until that point you had not been paying that much 09 : 07 : 21 17 it looks different? 
09: 03: 26 18 attention to what was going on wilh AIA, and Mr. Taylor, 
09: 03: 29 19 and so-and-so. But at that point -and I don't want to 
O 9 : O 3 : 3 3 20 put words in your mouth - but your interest became 
0 9 : O 3 : 3 9 21 more -· you became more interested at that point in what 
O 9 : O 3 : 4 2 22 was going on litigation-wise. Is that accurate'/ 
O 9 : O 3 : 4 6 23 A. In essence, that is what I said. 
o 9 : o 3 : 4 s 24 Q. I assume that then yoo were aware llaat Hawley 
09: 07: 22 18 MR. LARUE: Well, let him tell you what he 
09:07:2519 means. 
09: 07: 26 20 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) okay. Tell me what you meant 
09: 07: 27 21 by screwed up? 
09: 07: 29 22 A. It isn't in a form that is intelligible. lt 
09: 07: 3 5 23 does not reflect what the chart actually shows. 
09, 07: 41 24 Q. What I'm curious about, regardless of the 
09: 03: 54 25 Troxell onyourbebalfhaddecidedtoiiselln iUegaley 09: 07: 46 25 formatting, is that at least in the chart in Exhibit 
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o 9 , 04 : o 7 1 defense to defend against Mr. Taylor's claims against 
09:04:12 2 you? 
09:04:13 3 MR.LARUE: Objecttotheform. Thequestion 
o 9 , o 4 , 1 s 4 is not relatlld to the negligent ~paration of the 
o 9 , o 4 , 2 o s Opinion Lettllr. I iMtruet the witness not to answer 
o 9 : 04: 2 2 6 the question. 
09:04:25 7 MR.GAFFNEY: l'msony. ltwastheeguys. 
o 9 , o 4 : 2 7 s that were defending you. l'm sorry. 
09: 04: 31 9 Q. {BY MR. GAFFNEY) HawfeyWIIS using that 
09, 04, 32 10 defense in the AtAcase, 
09: 04: 35 11 MR. LARUE: Same instruction. 
09:04:3612 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) Youwereawareoftbat; 
09:04,3713 right? 
09: 04: 37 14 MR. LARUE: Same inslmdion. I have 
09: 04: 3 9 IS ~flit:lititl'M•1tli'quNtt;:liJ;W 
09:04:4116 --~ 
09: OS: oo 17 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Let's take a look at 








(Exhibit 11 marked.) 
Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Do you have Exhibit 11 in 
front of you? 
A. !do. 
Q. Would you tell us what that is? 
A. It appears to be an electronic version of an 
article that I wrote for The Advocate in April 1997. It 
o 9 : o 7 : s l I No. 11, on the row that talks about redemption of 
09, 07: 56 2 shares, across from that, then it lists "Earned surplus; 
09: 08: 03 3 capital surplus (with approval of majority of shares)." 
o 9 : o a : o 9 4 Is that basically a synopsis in visual form of30- I-6? 
09: oa: 18 s MR. LARUE: Object to the form. 
09: os: 20 6 MR. GJORDING: Join. 
09:08:21 1 THEWITNESS: Thisisanexcerptfromthe 
o 9 : o a : 2 5 s commons to the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
09: oa: 3l 9 Q. {BY MR GAFFNEY) But it could also be, in 
o 9 : o a : 3 6 to essence, at least the way I look at it, it is kind of a 
09 : o B , 3 9 11 visual synopsis of 30-1-6; right? 
09: oa: 45 12 MR. LARUE: Objection. 
09: os: 46 13 Q. {BY MR GAFFNEY) That is in essence what the 
09: 08: 4 7 14 statute says? 
09: oa: 48 1s MR. LARUE: Excuse me. Object to form. 
09:0B:SO 16 MR.GJORDING: Join. 
09: OS: 51 11 THE WITNESS: !just rely on what the statute 






09: 09:08 24 
09:09:1025 
Q. (BY MR GAFFNEY) Well, within your article, 
at least within this portion of the chart, across from 
"redemption of shares• you have "earned surplus; capital 
surplus," but there is nothing in there talking about 
fair value; right? 
MR. LARUE: Object to the form. The document 
speaks for i1Self. And the witness has already 








































appears to me that that amendment was used lo create lhe 
Preferred B stock for purposes of the Kerumd offering, 
Q, (BY MR, GAFFNEY) Were you representing AIA 
Services at that point in time when you filed the 
April 11, '95 amendments to the articles'/ 
A. Yes. 
10: 02: 49 7 Q. And just so my language is more precise, 
10 02: 51 8 because sometimes l get kind of sloppy. When I say it 
10: 02: 5 6 9 would have fixed the problem. Had the articles been 
1 o O 2 : S 9 10 amended in April of 1995 to authorize the redemption 
1 O : o 3 : O 8 11 pursuant to 30-1-6, then the subsequent lawsuit, Taylor 
10: 03: 19 12 versus AIA, that illegality defense would not bave been 
l O : O 3 : 2 4 lJ an issue in that lawsuit? lt may have been an issue in 
10: 03: 27 14 that lawsuit, but it would have been likely a loser for 
lo , o 3 : 3 o 15 the defense; correct? 
10: 03: 3 O 16 MR. LARUE: Object to the form. Speculation. 
10: 03: 3 2 17 MR. GJORDING: Join. 
10:03:3318 THE WITNESS: Ican'tanswerit,becausel 
10: 03: 3 5 19 don't know what earned surplus and capital surplus -- in 
10: 03: 3 9 20 1995 I didn't know what they meant. And, in fact, it 
10: 03: 43 21 wasn't defined as to what they meant until 2011. 
10: 03: 59 22 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) When you became quote, more 
10 : O 4 : 3 O 23 active in the litigation, I believe that was the Taylor 
Page 12 PaJ),p .;.1'1i1>1 
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A. Well, again, the meaning of earned surplus and 
surplus and the conclusion that we could use 
fair value to interpret those terms were not the sole 
basis for giving the opinion. 
1 o, 07: 04 Q. In answer to my question is that no, you 
10, 07, 06 s didn't have that discussion with Scott Bell or his 
1 o: 07: o 9 9 associates? 
10: 07: 11 iO MR LARUE: Object to the form. I think this 
lo: 07, 12 11 has been asked and answered. 
10, 07: 14 12 Q, (BY MR GAFFNEY) At any time? 
1 o , 07 , 1 s I J A. As you stated the question, it assumes - I 
1 o , 07 , 2 6 14 would not have bad a conversation with Scott BeU that 
1 o , o 7 , 2 9 1 s said that the only basis for the opinion was fair value 
1 o , 01 , 3 4 16 of the assets. Beeause !hat was not the ease. 
1 o , 07 , 4 o 11 Q. Would you have had a conversation with Scott 
1 o , 07 , 4 4 1 s Bell or his assooiates that you were using fair value in 
10, o7, 49 19 lieuohamed surplus? 
10: 07, 53 20 MR LARUE: Object to the form. Asked and 
10, 07: 55 21 answered. 
10: 07: s 6 22 MR GJORDING: Join. 
1 o: 01, s 9 23 THE WITNESS: I did not have a conversation --
10: 04: 42 24 v. Hawley, et al., litigation, did you assist in any of 10: OB: oo 24 t don't recall any conversation with Scott Bell that 
dealt with restrictions on redemption. 10:04:4725 thebriefing? 10:08:03 25 
10:04:47 I 
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MR. LARUE: Object to the form. The question 
10: 04 :49 has -- I'm sorry if you hadn't finished your question. 
10: 04, 53 I apologize. Go ahead and finish your question. 
10: 04: 56 4 Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Did you assist in any of the 
10: 04: 5 9 5 briefing in that case? 
10 05: 02 6 MR. LARUE: And I'll object to the form. It 
10: 05: O 3 7 has nothing lo do with whether the opinion given was 
10: 05: 06 s negligent or not. And instruct the witness not to 
10: 05: oa 9 answerthe question. 
10:05:2510 MR. GAFFNEY: I think I know the answer to 
10: 05, 2 8 11 this question. But I'll ask it, anyway. 
10:05:3012 Q. (BY MR.GAFFNEY) DidyoueveradviseReed 
10 , o s , 3 2 13 Taylor subsequent to issuing tile Opinion Letter in 
1 o , o s , 3 7 14 August of'9S at any time that you had U!ied !his fair 
10: 05: 43 IS 'fi*lf.-,fti1'.lliiifflffltlt(li.ilj;imhiii*ffl!tiiji6 
10:05:5616 .~ •• :fiil/~liri~~ ..  
10: 06: 00 17 •<tiiilff 
10: 06: 03 18 A. '.1':J'..l.f5t>~~ 
10, 06: 04 19 Q. cfltYli@;;ttmti 
1 o : o 6 : 1 7 20 A. l{g~'l:artf'fllitif ~; 
lo : o 6 : 2 o 21 Q. Same question as to whether you informed 
10: 06: 2 8 22 Mr. Taylor's counsel, Scott Bell, or his associates, of 
10: 06: 3 3 23 that fact at any time? 
10: 06: 3 5 24 MR. LARUE: Which fact again, please? 
10: 06: 37 2s Q. (BY MR. GAFFNEY) Thiif'ffil<Will,m1-J:~i/i,hi!t 
10:08:19 I 
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MR. GAFFNEY: Here is what I want to do, guys. 
10: OB: 22 2 I've got quite a few more documents. But I think that I 
1 o : o B , 2 a 3 am going to get a plethora of objections to those 
10: oa: 31 4 documents based upon privilege. So what I would like to 
10:08:36 5 do is recess for today. Arguetheseinfrontofthe 
lo , o 8 , 4 2 6 judge. And reserve the right then, obviously based upon 
10: oe: 46 1 his ruling, to come back and look at those documents. 
1 o: o B, 51 s But I don't want to sit here, object, privilege, object, 
10: OB: 56 9 privilege, don't answer, because I just think that is an 













10: 09:50 23 
10:09:5124 
10:09:5125 
been some relevance objections, which I think we need to 
hash out. 
MR. LARUE: As to the additional documents you 
are describing, Counsel, if I understand your general 
description, they are documents that may reflect 
communications between Mr. Riley and officers, directors 
or representatives of his client? 
MR. GAFFNEY: Correct. Well, I mean, to some 
degree it is hard to separate it out. But that is the 
gist of it. 
THE WITNESS: Go off the record for a minute? 
MR. LARUE: Sure. 
MR. GAFFNEY: I mean, if you want to object, 
that's fine. 
MR. LARUE: Let's stay on the record until we 
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MR. LARUE: There arc a couple of errors in 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 4. Which I think is an 
exhibit. 
THE WITNESS: ls it Exhibit 3? 
MR. LARUE: Yes. Your Exhibit No. 3. Which 
!?age 229 
10: 28: 24 1 MR LARUE: Okay. I don't have any questions 
10: 28, 28 for the witness. 
10:28:31 MR. GAFFNEY: All right. Thanks for your time 
10:28:38 today. 
10: 28: 3 9 s THE V!DEOGRAPHER: ls the deposition 
10: 24: 43 6 arc Defendant Riley's Supplemental Objections, Answers 10: 28: 40. 6 concluded? Ornot? 
10: 24: 47 7 and Responses. Which-· 
10: 24: 57 8 MR. GAFFNEY: I can't find my glasses. 
10:25:00 9 MR LARUE: Do you want to take a break and 
10,2s,0210 find them? 
10: 25: 02 11 MR. GAFFNEY: No. Just go ahead. I can 
10, 25, 04 12 squint. What is the exhibit number? 
10, 25, 07 13 MR LARUE: Three. Mr. Riley has identified 
10, 25, 3 9 14 what he believes to be a couple of errors in response to 
10: 25 :42 15 Interrogatory No. 4, which is a part of Exhibit No. 3, 
10, 25: 54 16 that answer beginning on page 39 of Exhibit 3, that he 
1 o : 2 5 : s 9 17 wanted to clarify for the record. 
10:26:03 1s Doyoumindifhcjustidentificsthosctwo 
10: 26: o 8 19 issues for you? 
10: 26: 09 20 MR. GAFFNEY: Nope. 
10: 26: 11 21 MR. GJORDING: Which page? 
10: 26: 13 22 MR. LARUE: The answer to Interrogatory No. 4 
10, 26: 16 23 begins on page 39 of Exhibit 3. 
10:26:1924 
10: 26: 23 25 
MR. GJORDING: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Well, the easy one is on page 49 
Page 228 
1 o , 2 6 , 2 7 1 under "Waiver." There is a I ist of the documents in the 
1 o, 2 6, 3 s 2 restructure transaction that arc defined in the 
10, 26, 3 8 3 restructure agreement as "Superseded Documents." And 
1 o, 2 6, 4 2 4 the $6 million note is not a superseded document. So 
lo: 26 : 4 s 5 that should be excluded from that definition of 
10, 26: 52 6 superseded documents. I didn't say that tight. In the 
10: 26: 59 1 restructure agreement itself the definition of 
1 o : 27, o 1 s "superseded documents" does not include the $6 million 
10, 27: 06 9 note. Shall I go on? 
10:27:24!0 MR.LARUE: Yes. 
10: 27, 26 11 THE WITNESS: The second one is on page 45. 
10, 27: 3 5 12 The second sentence talking about "In reliance on 
10, 27: 39 13 Section 6.40(7) of the Revised Model Business 
10:27:4614 CorporationAct"shouldbestrickcn. Thcrcstofthc 
1 o , 2 7 : 5 o 15 paragraph is correct. 
10, 27: 51 16 MR. LARUE: The full sentence? 
10: 27, 53 11 THE WITNESS: No. The introductory clause, 
10, 27: 57 1s "In reliance on Section 6.40(7) of the Revised Model 
10, 28: 04 19 Business Corporation Act." That clause should be 
1 o , 2 s : o 6 20 stricken. 
10, 28, 10 21 MR LARUE: Arc those the only two changes to 
1 o: 2 a : 12 22 your answers to interrogatories reflected in Exhibit 3? 
lo : 2 s : 1 a 23 THE WITNESS: They are the only ones that I 
10: 28: 19 24 have discovered in reviewing the answers in preparation 
lo : 2 a : 2 2 2s for this deposition. 
10: 28: 43 7 MR. GAFFNEY: We are finished for today. But 
10, 28: 46 8 I'm not closing the deposition. 
10:28:49 9 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Okay. The time is 10:29. 
l O : 2 8: 5 8 IO And we are off the reconl. 
10, 29, 02 11 (Deposition adjourned at 10:29 a.m.) 
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NO. ____ F_,-ILEM ~  = 
A.M. 
APR O 5 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATHY JOHNSON 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ff 
STA TE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
REED J. TAYLOR, ) Case No. CV-OC-2009-18868 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
) 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; ) DEFENDANT RILEY'S MOTION FOR 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY ) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; ) 
ROBERT M. TURNBOW, an individual; and ) 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW ) 





STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Before the Court is Defendant Richard Riley's ("Riley") Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. This case has its origins in a Stock Redemption Agreement between Reed Taylor 
18 
19 ("Taylor") and AIA Services where AIA agreed to purchase all of Taylor's shares for a $1.5 
20 million down payment promissory note, a $6 million promissory note and other consideration. In 
21 the course of that transaction Defendants Riley and Robert Turnbow ("Turnbow"), and their firm 
22 Eberle Berlin represented AJA. Eberle is a party because it was Riley and Turnbow's firm at the 
23 




















Riley and Turnbow. Defendants 
supported Taylor engaging in a stock redemption agreement When 
A-115 
1995 that 
not pay as agreed, 
Taylor filed suit In the course of that s lawsuit, the stock redemption agreement was found by 
the trial court to be illegal. The ruling was upheld on appeal. Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 
Idaho 52, 261 P.3d 829 (2011). 
Meanwhile, Taylor sued Defendant Riley and his new firm, Hawley Troxell, along with 
others, in Nez Perce County for activities undertaken by them in representing defendants in the 
AJA case. That case was dismissed by the trial court and upheld on appeal. Taylor v. McNichols, 
149 Idaho 826,243 P.2d 642 (2010). In this case, filed on October 2009, Taylor sued Riley, 
Turnbow, Eberle, and Hawley Troxell. This Court issued a summary judgment in May 2010 
which dismissed some of Taylor's claims but allowed his claims for fraud to remain. 
Subsequently, a stay was issued in this case pending resolution of the appeal in Taylor v. AJA. 
The stay was premised on the fact that the present case would be rendered moot if Taylor 












In September 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in the Taylor v. AJA. 
Defendant Riley moved to lift the stay and for a protective order pending his motion to move for 
summary judgment based upon the resolution of issues in Taylor v. AJA. Thereafter Riley filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment on the fraud claims. Defendants Turnbow and Eberle 
Berlin also filed a motion for partial summary judgment, but based on different grounds. Taylor 
opposed both motions and this Court heard oral argument on January 30, 2012. 
Riley grounded his motion on res judicata based on the holding in Taylor v. AJA that the 
1995 opinion letter could not be the basis of a fraud claim against AIA. As AJA' s agent, Riley 
1 Defendant Turnbow is recently deceased. 








argued that he too could not be held Hable for fraud based on the 1995 opinion letter. Defendant 
Eberle Berlin argued on separate ground that the death of Robert Turnbow made it impossible for 
Taylor to establish the requisite knowledge of any false statement of fact. Accordingly, they 
argued, summary judgment must be granted on Taylor's cause of action against Turnbow and 
Eberle. At the hearing the Court inquired whether there was any difference between the status of 
the Defendants Riley and Turnbow and whether there was any justification to treat them 




















At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court held that the fraud claim against Riley based 
on the 1995 opinion letter was barred by res judicata. Because Defendants Turnbow and Eberle 
Berlin had not joined in Riley's motion, the Court gave the parties ten (10) days to file 
supplemental briefings as to why those Defendants should or should not be treated differently 
with respect to the res judicata ruling. 
On January 31, 2012, Defendants Turnbow and Eberle Berlin filed a motion for joinder in 
Defendant Riley's motion for partial summary judgment. On February 6, 2012, Taylor's counsel 
submitted a letter to chambers informing the Court that Taylor did not intend to file any 
supplemental briefing on this motion and that it waived any oral argument. Having received no 
subsequent supplemental briefings, requests for hearings, or other filings regarding this issue, the 
Court considers the matter fully submitted for determination. 
For the following reasons, the Court now grants partial summary judgment against 
Plaintiff Taylor's claim for fraud against the Defendants based on the 1995 opinion letter. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Res Judicata Bars Taylor's Claim For Fraud Based On The 1995 Opinion Letter. 




























Although the Court ruled from the bench that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar 
re-litigating the fraud claim against reasoning reiterated 
here for the purpose of a complete record. Taylor unsuccessfully litigated against Riley's former 
client, AIA, in Taylor v. AJA. Taylor argues that this Court already denied Defendants' collateral 
defense and that res judicata and collateral estoppel are otherwise inapplicable. Although this 
Court previously denied preclusion based on the Nez Perce Court's treatment of the 1995 opinion 
letter, that ruling is interlocutory and subject to being revisited. The Court is not free to ignore 
the holding in Taylor v. AL4. that the 1995 opinion letter could not be the basis for a fraud claim 
against AIA. 
The doctrine ofresjudicata covers both claim preclusion (true resjudicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). 
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon 
claims "relating to the same cause of action ... which might have been made." Id. Issue 
preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy. 
Rodriguez v. Dep't of Corr., 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401,403 (2001). Taylor's claim is barred 
under either theory. 
Claim preclusion entails three requirements to bar a subsequent action: ( 1) same parties 
or their privies; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 
119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007). Same claim includes not only "the matters offered and 
received to defeat the claim, but also as to "'every matter which might and should have been 
litigated in the first suit."' Id. at 126, 157 P.3d at 620 (citing Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. 
Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434,437,849 P.2d 107, 110 (1993) (Magic Valley III). Thus, "when a valid, 
final judgment is rendered in a proceeding, it extinguishes all claims arising out of the same 
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transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause action arose." Id. (internal 
omitted). "transactional concept is broad and preclusion may 
apply even where there is not a substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a 
claim, or in the evidence relating to those theories." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "Whether 
a factual grouping constitutes a transaction is to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to 
such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether 
they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' 
expectations or business understanding or usage." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
In Taylor v. AJA, Taylor sought to enforce the stock redemption agreement, despite its 
illegality, by arguing that he was fraudulently induced by AIA to enter into the agreement 
through AIA's submission to him of the 1995 opinion letter. Taylor v. AJA noted that the opinion 
letter "was written by a law firm, acting as general counsel for AIA in connection with the 
agreement, and was addressed to ... Taylor." 261 P.3d at 843. Taylor v. AM af:fmned the 
district court and determined that the opinion letter expressed an opinion that no statute was 
violated by the stock redemption agreement, that it could not form the basis for a fraud claim, 
and that Taylor had failed to put forward any evidence to satisfy his burden that the statement of 
opinion was made with intent to deceive. Id. 
Here, Taylor claims fraudulent inducement against Riley and Turnbow based on 
21 statements made by them in the opinion letter. This fraud claim is the same claim for purposes 
22 <Pi7rf.f.#ilill:4,f~if1#4 •. ;:ft#:Qf.fti;-*:tattgq~ie~.<fb,rus,if/dj;1ftl$':Qpi.-:,JJ10t:iitQ 




620 (holding that resjudicata barred party's claim for unjust enrichment because it arose "out of 
the same transaction addressed by a bankruptcy court in the prior adjudication: [the party's] 
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disbursement of sale proceeds"). 
2 
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(barring claim to pierce the corporate veil of alleged sham corporation because it "arose out of 
the same transaction ... the liability of [the defendants] personally for the breach of the 
contractual arrangement''). 
Riley and Turnbow were in privity with AIA as to the opinion letter in connection with 
the stock redemption agreement The opinion letter was authored for Taylor's benefit, but was 
done in the course of the lawyers representing AIA. C.f Gubler By & Through Gubler v. 
Brydon, 125 Idaho 107, 110, 867 P.2d 981, 984 (1994) (stating that privity is established by 
showing that the subsequent party "derived a direct interest in the outcome of the former 
litigation from the prior defendants"). An unsuccessful suit against the principal bars a 
subsequent suit against the agent arising out of the same transaction. See, e.g., Thompson v. 
SouthTrust Bank, 961 So. 2d 876,883 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); Restatement (Second) Judgments§ 
51 (1982). Because Taylor v. AJA services constituted a final judgment, res judicata is 
appropriate to bar Taylor's claim for fraud. 
Alternatively, collateral estoppel applies to Taylor's claim for fraud. "Five factors are 
required in order for issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior 
proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior 
litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be 
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precluded was actually decided in prior litigation; there was a final judgment on the merits 
2 
the prior litigation; and the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or 
3 privity with a party to the litigation." Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618 (internal citation 
4 omitted). Issue preclusion applies to Taylor's claim that he was fraudulently induced based on 





litigation on the issue of whether AJA fraudulently induced him to sell his stock by means of the 
1995 opinion letter; (2) the alleged fraud predicated on the opinion letter is the same issue as 
presented in the case at bar; (3) the fraud issue was decided against Taylor in the AJA litigation; 
10 (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the AJA litigation; and (5) Riley and Turnbow 







2. Res Judicata Applies Equally To The Defendants 
At the hearing this Court instructed the parties to address why the Defendants should be 
treated differently under res judicata based on the fact that both Riley and Turnbow were 
involved in the 1995 opinion letter and acting as agents in the AJA transaction. The parties were 
also given ten (10) days to address the issue through supplemental briefing. Having received no 
18 
19 supplemental briefing and discerning no basis to distinguish Riley from Turnbow in regards to 
20 the purported fraud based on the 1995 opinion letter, this Court concludes that res judicata bars 
21 Taylor's fraud claim based on the opinion letter against all of the Defendants. See Magic Valley 
22 Ill, , 123 Idaho at 438-39, 849 P.2d at 111-12 (holding that res judicata barred a plaintiffs claim 
23 




shareholder liable for judgment entered against a corporation). 




























the foregoing reasons the Defendants are granted Partial Summary Judgment as to 
Plaintiff Taylor's fraud claim against the Defendants based on the 1995 opinion letter. Counsel 
for Riley is requested to submit an appropriate form of ord 
DATED this y1~y of April, 2012. 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
ey SANTIAGO eARRIOS 
DEl•UTY 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Jdaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
I, Reed J. Taylor, declare: 
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868 
DECLARATION OF REED J. TAYLOR 
1. I am the plaintiff in this action, over the age of eighteen and am competent to testify 
in court, including as to the matters set forth in this declaration. This declaration is based on my 
personal knowledge and my over 40 years of experience in the insurance industry. 
2. Wi,f-~li~IWJW~::.:$-l;tl~,:$JUOSll<tluttl'1~ ... i.;;mepin.ibn:1•:~;lij:: 
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me that if Mr. Riley was not willing to deliver opinions the transaction that it would allow me 
to ask the question why. Based on Mr. Be!Ps recommendation, the Stock Redemption Agreement 
included a provision that required an opinion letter to be delivered by Mr. Riley. Once it was 
agreed by AIA Services to provide me with an Opinion Letter, J would never had agreed to sell 
my common shares without that Opinion Letter or a thorough explanation by Mr. Riley why he 
was unwilling to provide the Opinion Letter. 1 
3. The final, signed Opinion Letter arrived at AJA Services' offices for closing the 
transaction and, based on receiving the representations and opinions in the Opinion Lette1·, J agreed 
to close the transaction to redeem my shares. A copy of the final opinion letter dated August 15, 
1995 is attached as Exhibit 11 ("Opinion Letter") to my declaration dated December 15, 20 J 4. 
4. The Opinion Letter represented to me that, among other things, no laws were 
violated by the redemption of my shares, that all necessary board and shareholder consent had 
been obtained and that the Transaction Documents were enforceable according to their terms. I 
relied on the representations and opinions in the Opinion Letter, including, without limitation, the 
foregoing ones. I would not have agreed to close the redemption of my shares without receiving 
the Opinion Letter. I had no knowledge that any of the opinion or representations in the Opinion 
Letter was incorrect {and my independent counsel did not advise me that there were any issues 
regarding tile final Opinion Letter or any of the opinions or representations contained in the letter). 
f had no kn9wledge ofMr. RHey>s qndiS<.;fosed reasoning that he later provided to me for the fust 
time through his supplemental discovery responses dated February 22'" 2012. I could not p1·ovide 
1 My testimony in my declaration dated December 15, 2014 was focused on Mr. Tumbow and 
Eberle Berlin because of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision that Eberle Berlin could not be liable for 
Mr. Riley's acts and omissions. I now take the opportunity to specifically address Mr. Riley. 
DECLARATION OF REED J. TAYLOR - 2 
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Riley and how that testimony would prevent summary judgment because I had no idea what facts 
or reasoning Mr. Riley relied upon for his opinions and representations in the Opinion Letter until 
he. disclosed them to me for the very first time in his supplemental discovery answers dated 
February 22, 2012, Even though l had separate counsel, I still relied upon Mr. Riley and I trusted 
him-he was my divorce attorney and had handled other legal matters for me. To be clear, I am 
not testifying that I relied only on Mr. Riley's advice or that his advice was a substitute of the 
advice that I expected to receive from my independent counsel Scott Bell or any other attorney at 
his firm. 1 relied upon the advice of all of the attorneys involved in the transaction. 
5. When my $6M Note matured in 2005, AJA Services refused to pay it. As a result, 
I was forced to file suit against AJA Services and other defendants in 2007 (''Taylor v. AJA 
Services"). In April of200S (after l had won partial summary judgment on the default of the $6M 
Note), the defendants asserted my redemption violated J.C. § 30-1-46 and later asserted that it . 
violated J.C. § 30-1-6 in early 2009. Despite requests by my attorneys. Mr. Riley refused to advise 
me of the facts and reasoning supporting his opinions and representations in 1he Opinion Letter. It 
was not until Mr. Riley's supplemental discovery answers in this case dated February 22, 2012 
that he finally disclosed to me for the very first time that reasoning for his opinions in the Opinion 
Letter (including that he believed there was sufficient earned surplus based on his interpretation of 
J.C. § 30-1-6) and that he believed the transaction was legal.If Mr. Riley had advised me that 
redemption.did not comply with I.C. § 30-1 ~6 or had provided me with the reasoning that he now 
claims justified the legality of the redemption of my shares (or if the Opinion Letter had instructed 
me to vote my sbares or that any risk existed}, I would have either not sold my shares or called a 
shareholder meeting and voted my shares to approve a shareholder resolution or amendment to the 
articles of incorporation to authorize the use of capital surpJus in compliance with r.c. § 30-1-6. 
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Tn fad. after knowing what I know now, I would llave never sofd my shares. I bad no knowledge 
that the redemption violated Jdllbo law (including l.C. § 30-1-6) until Judge Brudie formally ruled 
that It was IHegal on June 17. 2009. 
6. Over the course of the next several years, J was forced to file two additional lawsuits 
("Taylor v. McNichols") and spend hundreds of thousands of dollars paying attorneys' fees; expert 
witness fees, costs and judgments entered against me (and attorneys' fees awarded against me). 
The funds. paid by me for these damages is addressed in Mr. Pederson's declaration dated 
December I5.. 2014. I incurred well over $1,200,466 litigating over issues caused be illegal 1995 
redemption of my shares. As a result of the illegal redemption and the inco~ct Opinion Letter 
that induced me to sell my shai·es, I have also lost the $6M Note and the $6,000,000 of the unpaid 
value of my shares, plus accrued interest. While A.IA Services paid the other agreed upon 
consideration (itJcluding the $I.5M Down Payment Note), it never paid the amounts due on the 
$6M Note based on the illegality ruling. Again, if Mr. Riley's Opinion Letter had been correct, I 
would have either voted my shares to authorize the transaction under I.C .. § 30P I M6 or I would have 
simply kept my shares and ran off the commissions genemted on the policies that had already been 
sold. Either way, I would have obtained the $6,000,000 owed to me for _my lost shares and 
unenforceable $6M Note. I would not have incurred any of the damages set forth above had Mr. 
Riley's Opinion Letter been correct or had it provided the necessary disclosures and reasoning for 
his opinions: 
I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STA TE OF 
IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUe AND CORRECT. 
October 23. 2015 at Lewiston. Idaho 
Date and City and State Signed 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 23rd day of October, 2015, I caused to be 
served true and comict copies of the foregoing document to the following parties via the method(s) 
indicated below: 
Keely E. Duke 
Kevin A. Griffiths 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
I 087 West River Street, Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83707 
James D. LaRue 
Loren C. Ipsen 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand .Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile - (208) 342-3299 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement) 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile - (208) 342<3299 
Elam &Burke, PA 
25 l East Front Sl 
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: (425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
E!y SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
. IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare: 
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868 
DECLARATION OF RODERICK C. BOND 
1. .I am one of the attorneys for the plaintiff in thi.s action, over the age of eighteen and 
am competent to testify in court, including as to the matters set forth in this declaration. This 
declaration is based on my personal knowledge. I have personal knowledge of all of the documents 
attached to this Declaration. 
2. 
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McNichols. I have intimate knowledge of what was filed and transpired both of the foregoing 
cases. 
3. When the Idaho Supreme Court granted Mr. Riley's motion for permissive review 
in the instant case, Mr. Taylor filed a notice of cross appeal. However, Mr. Riley moved to dismiss 
that cross appeal. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
Order dismissing Mr. Taylor's cross appeal, without prejudice to his rights to appeal from any 
final judgment, dated April 24, 2013. As this Court is aware, Mr. Taylor did not seek permissive 
review of any other issues or of any motions that he had filed before this Court. 
4. During Taylor v. AJA Services through the time that the Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed Judge Brudie on September 7, 2011, Mr. Taylor was never permitted to depose Mr. Riley, 
despite repeated demands and requests. Both Judge Brudie and the Idaho Supreme Court rejected 
Mr. Taylor's motion for a continuance pursuant to lR.C.P. 56{t) because neither I nor Mr. Taylor 
could state precisely what information we anticipated receiving ftom Mr. Riley relative to his 
opinions in the Opinion Letter and how that information would prevent the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants. I had no knowledge that Mr. Riley believed that his Opinion 
Letter was correct and that the· transaction was legal until he first disclosed that information 
through Defendant Richard A. Riley's Supplemental Objections. Answers and Responses to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Pro{iuction of Documents, first Set ofinterrogato{ies and First 
Set of Requests for Admission dated February 22, 2012. In fact, Mr. Riley's law firm, Hawley 
Troxell, had taken the precise opposite position in Taylor v. AJA Services through its representation 
of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance Agency. At no time during Taylor v. 
AIA Services did Mr. Riley or any other attorney from his law firm advise me that Mr. Riley's 
opinions in the Opinion Letter were reasoned opinions and that he believed his Opinion Letter was 
DECLARATION OF RODERICK BOND - 2 
006345 
From Attorney Messen Svc 1.208. 209 . 6019 Fri Oct 23 14:4! '>/'IS" ...... .,. "--- ' A. ,,__ 130 LV..L.J lflLIJ rct!:jt: Jjiiiii 'Y-
correct and the transaction w~ legal based on a nl,ltrlber of legal theories (including that be 
interpreted the definitions of Idaho Code for "earned surplus" to mean that AJA Services could 
. 
look to the ''fair value'' of its assets to support the determination that there was sufficient earned 
surplus and that a vote to approve capital surplus was not required an that AJA Services did not 
have standing to chalJenge the transaction). As a teSult, I had no specific evidence or facts to assert 
in Taylor v. AM &rvic&, or any other case that Mr. Riley's opinions were misleading because he 
did not make the proper disclosures or provide the required ~ing until February 22, 2012. Mr. 
Riley also revealed further reasooing for his opiruons in the Opinion Letter .at his deposJtion taken 
latcr in 2012 ~ his suppJcmcntal answers to Mr. Taylor's discoycry requests dated February 22. 
2012. M a result. Mr. Taylor never had a fair opportunity to assert his constructive fraud claim 
against Mr. Riley or AJA Services in Tqylor v. AJA. &nicu. because I did not learn of the facts 
regarding the d.isclOSUtCS and reasoning omitted &om Mr. Riley's Opinion Letter until no earlier 
than February 22, 2012. 
I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STA TE OF 
IDAHO TifA T THE FOREGOING IS TRUE A:bl.lllllifl11'1''5'Jll!IIII-~ 
.October 23. 2015 at Bellevue. WA 
Date and City and State Signed 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that oi1 the 23rd day of October, 20 J 5, l caused to be 
served true and correct copies of the foregoing docum~nt to the following parties via the method(s) 
indicated below: 
Keely E. Duke 
Kevin A. Griffiths 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83707 
James D. LaRue 
Loren C. lpsen 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hahd Delivered 
( ) Ovemight Mail 
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( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile - (208) 342-3299 
Elam & Burke, PA 
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
601108th Ave NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: (425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
CHRISTOPHER D. FIICH, Clerk 
Sy SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintift 
v. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual· 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLE 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership· 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Person 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING 
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
I, Richard T. McDermott, declare: 
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868 
EXPERT WITNESS DECLARATION OF 
RICHARDT. McDERMOTT 
1. I am over the age of eighteen and am competent to testify in court, including as to 
the matters s_et forth in this declarati_on. This declaration and my opinions therein ar.e based on 
perso~al knowledge, education, training, and experience. 
2. In 1962, I received a B.A. from Marquette University. In 1966, I obtained a JD. 
from Fordham University School of Law . 
. 3. In 1967, I was admitted to practice law in the State of New York. I am presently in 
good standing and licensed to practice law in the State of New York. I have been admitted to 
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practice in New York for over 47 years. 
4. I am a member of the New York State Bar Association Securities Regulation 
Committee. 
5. From 1966 through 1990, I was an Associate and Parmer with the law firm of 
Alexander &Green/Walter ConstonAlexander & Green (the :Orms combined). From 1990 through 
2004, I was a Partner of Rogers & Wells/Clifford Chance LLP (the :Orms merged in 2000). Whi1e 
at that finn, I chaired the Legal Personnel Committee, and was responsib1e for the training, 
development, evaluation and advancement of associate attorneys and counsel, as well as being 
involved in the partner selection process. 
6. From 2000 through the present time, I have been an Adjunct Professor at Fordham 
University School of Law. From 1980 through 1991, I was an Adjunct Professor at New York 
University School of Law. In both positions, I taught Jaw school classes on the Legal Aspects of 
Corporate Finance, and covered such subjects as debentures, indentures,. preferred stock, 
convertible securities, dividends and stockrepurchases as well as third party opinions in corporate 
transactions. 
· 7. I am the co-author of Chapters 1 and 2 (Introduction and Elements of Opinion 
Letters, respectively) and author of Chapter 3 (Legal Opinions on Corporate Matters) of the 
Treatise: LEG-AL OPJNION J.,E'JTERS A Comprehemtve Guide to Opinion Practice (Third 
Bdition). 
8. I have been a member of the TriBar Opinion Committee for 2S years. The 'f1;iBar 
Opinion Committee is a nationally recognized committee that publishes Reports on various aspects· 
of opinion practice. 
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9. I am the author of Legal Aspects of Corporate Finance (sth ed. 2013), which is 
published by LexisNexis Matthew Bender; it is my understanding that the book and its various 
editions have been used at twent;y-two law schools. 
10. I have authored other articles and materials (including a Teacher's Manual for 
Legal Aspects of Corporate Finance). 
11. In 1988, I was a visiting lecturer at Monash. University in Melbourne, Australia and 
the University of Adelaide, Australia, Corporate and Business Law Centre. In 1999, I co-lectured 
with former Delaware Chancellor William Allen and James Fuld, author of Legal Opinions In 
Business Transactions -An Attempt to Bring Some Order Out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. Law. 915 
(1973), on the Law and Business of Investment Banking at the New York Universify Center for 
Law and Business. 
12. From 2009 through the present time, I have served as a Special Master for the New 
York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, First Department. 
13. I have extensive experience in domestic and international corporate finance, 
mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, strategic alliances, bankruptcy reorganizations and other 
corporate matters. I have experience in the preparation of Proxy Statements and Reports to 
shareholders and the preparation of reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
14. I have prepared, delivered or approved over l 00 opinion letters in my career. I also 
served on the Committee that approved opinion letters at my. prior Jaw firms. My ~perience 
includes. bnt is not limited to, preparing. revising, reviewing. approving and delivering opinion 
letters and conducting the necessary and required investigations to support certain opinions in such 
opinion letters. I also have vast experience in qualifications, assumptions, exceptions and 
reasoning in opinion letters,, together with the ramifications for not inserting certain qualifications, 
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assumptions and exceptions in opinion letters. I am familiar with the standard of care necessary 
for providing the required disclosures and reasoning to ensure that an opinion letter is not 
misleading. 
15. I have practiced corporation and securities law for more than 35 years. I have 
represented domestic and international acquiring and acquired clients in mergers and acquisition 
transactions involving acquisition amounts :from less than $1 miJlion to more than $1 billion. 
Included in that work was the participation in and supervision of others with respect to pre-
transaction due diligence and the rendering of reports pertaining to pre-transaction due diligence. 
16. My experience in corporate law includes, but is not limited to: domestic and 
international corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, purchases and redemptions by a 
corporation of its own shares (and fonnulating and evaluating proposals therefor) from both 
substantial shareholders and the investing public in issuer tender offers and open market 
transactions, strategic alliances, going private transactions, bankruptcy reorganizations and other 
general corporate matters. 
17. I have experience representing the boards of directors of corporations in 
transactions, including, the board of directors of Fortune 500 companies. 
18. At my prior Jaw finns, I also served on committees that reviewed, revised and 
approved billing statements to clients. I have experience in addressing cJient fee disputes at my 
former firms and detennining the reasonableness and ne~ssity of the attorneys' fees and costs 
charged for a particular representation. 
19. I have never testified as an expert witness at any trials. 
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Facts, Data and Assumptions Relied Upon for My Opinions 
20. In formulating and rendering my opinions in this Declaration, I am relying on 
various facts, data and assumptions, including, without limitation, those expressly stated below. 
21. Based on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in this case, I intentionally omitted 
Mr. Riley from any ofmy prior opinions rendered after the Supreme Court's decision based on its 
holding that Eberle Berlin could not be liable for any of Richard A. Riley (''Riley'')'s acts and 
omissions. Since Mr. Taylor is now seeking reconsideration of various rulings, I will now take the 
opportunity to specifically re~der additional opinions addressing Mr. Riley. 
22. I have reviewed and/or considered the thousands of pages of documents produced 
in discovery by both sides in this lawsuit (which includes many of the pleadings and papers filed 
in Taylor v. AlA Services and other lawsuits derived from the illegal redemption ofReed Taylor's 
shares), including, without limitation: (a) the deposition transcripts and exhibits for the depositions 
of Riley and Stanley Tharp; (b) the pleadings and papers ftled with the Court, including the 
Complaint and Answers; (c) the Stock Redemption Agreement, $6 Million Promissory Note 
("$6M Note"), Security Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement and ancillary agreements and 
instruments; (d) 1995 shareholder and board meeting minutes, amended articles of incorporation 
(including both versions filed in 1995); (e) the 1996 restructured agreements and ancillary 
agreements and instruments; (f) Messrs. Bond and Taylor's affidavits filed in Taylor v. AlA 
Services; (g) other documents produced by the parties in discoveiy and the parties' discoveiy 
answers and responses; (h) the Declaration of Reed J. Taylor dated April 13, 2015; (i) the 
Declaration of Roderick C. Bond dated April 13, 2015 (with attached exhibits); (j) the deposition 
transcript of Scott Bell and attached exhibits; and (k) other documents, affidavits, declarations and 
pleadings, which have been previously filed in this case and Taylor v. AlA Services. 
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23. I have reviewed the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (which applied 
in 1995 and thereafter) and a number of authorities and appellate court decisions, including, 
without limitation: (a) I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995); (b) LC.§ 30-1-2 (1995); (c) J.C.§ 30-1-46 (1995); (d) 
I.C. § 6-1604 (and annotations thereto); (e) the TriBar Reports (which Mr. Riley testified were 
utilized by Eberle Berlin for preparing opinion letters); (f) the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers; (g) Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 95 P.3d 34 (2004); (h) Taylor 
v. AlA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011); (i) Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 
826,243 P.3d 642 (2010); G) Taylorv. Riley, 157 Idaho 323,336 P.3d 256 (2014); and (k) other 
authorities and information disclosed in Reed Taylor's discovery answers pertaining to my 
opinions and the basis therefore. 
24. An attorney may not to not make any false statement of material fact or law to a 
third person and must disclose material facts when necessary to avoid a fraudulent act. An attorney 
must ensure that facts are not concealed from a court and that an attorney must take remedial action 
to disclose facts if necessary. 
25. I.C. §§ 30-1-2 and 30-1-6 were applicable to the redemption of Reed Taylor's 
shares in 1995 (they were repealed in 1997). The language in I.C. § 30-1-6 and the definitions 
provided I.C. § 30-1-2 are clear and easi1y understood. The definitions of"earned surplus" and 
"capital surplus" provided by J.C. § 30-1-2 are clear and easily understood. The meaning ofI.C. § 
30-1-6 was easily understood-either there had to be suffi~ient "earned surplus" to "allow a board 
of directors to authorize the redemption of shares or, if not, a share redemption could be authorized 
through the use "capital surplus" by a majority shareholder vote of the shareholders or an 
equivalent provision in a corporation's articles ofincorporation. 
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26. I have read Judge Brodie's decisions finding the redemption illegal and denying 
Reed Taylor's motion for reconsideration in Taylor v. AJA Services. I have also reviewed Judge 
Greenwood's two decisions and the Idaho Supreme Court's decision finding that Riley owed Reed 
Taylor a duty of care. The Idaho Supreme Court held that Turnbow assumed a duty of care to Reed 
Taylor, so it follows that Riley assumed a duty of care to him as well. 
27. I have reviewed Mr. Riley's opinion letter (which is on Eberle Berlin, Kading, 
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered (''EberleBerlin")'s letterhead) dated August 15, 1995 ("Opinion 
Letter"), which was prepared, approved and delivered to Reed Taylor as a condition of closing the 
stock redemption transaction, together with the attached exceptions and Certificates of Corporate 
Status. 
28. The Opinion Letter defines "Transaction Documents" to include the Stock 
Redemption Agreement, the Stock Pledge Agreement, the $6M Note, the Security Agreement, the 
Consulting Agreement and the Noncompetition Agreement. When I refer to "Transaction 
Documents" in this Declaration, I am using that term to describe the foregoing documents. 
29. The term "Customary Practice" refers to a general understanding and consensus 
among legal opinion practitioners which prescribes and defines the manner in which legal opinion 
letters addressed to third parties are structured and expressed, as well as the nature and extent of 
the legal research and analysis necessary for the expression of the legal conclusions set forth 
therein. 
30. As a Statement on the Role of Customary Practice in the Preparation and 
Understanding of Third-Party Legal Opinions (approved by more than twenty Bar Association 
Committees, including Tri Bar) explains: "Customary practice pennits an opinion giver and an 
opinion recipient ( directly or through its counsel) to have common understandings about an 
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expected to perform to give opinions." 63 Bus. Law. 1277 (2008). 
A~ 139 
31. The customary diligence element of Customary Practice "requires the opinion 
giver to conduct such review as lawyers in similar circumstances would normally conduct." 
TRlBAR OPINION COMMITIEE, Tunw-P AR.TY "CLOSING" OPINIONS, 56 Bus. Law. 591, 601 (1998). 
32. An opinion giver must ensure that a third-party closing opinion letter is not 
misleading to the opinion recipient. In other words, even if the counsel for the opinion recipient 
and the counsel for the opinion giver agree to deviate in any way from customary practice, the 
opinion giver must ensure that the opinion recipient is not misled. As the TriBar Report states: 
An opinion the opinion preparers believe to be misleading should not be delivered 
until disclosures are made to cure the problem ... When considering if an opinion to 
be given will mislead the opinion recipient, opinion preparers must think not only 
about the opinion itself but also about areas excluded from the opinion ... The 
question the opinion preparers must consider is whether under the circumstances 
the opinion will cause the opinion recipient to misevaluate the specific opinion 
given. 
TRIBAR OPINION COMMITTEE, THIRD-PARTY "CLOSING" OPINIONS, 56 Bus. Law. 591, 602-03 
(1998) ( emphasis in original). The requirement that opinions not be misleading is a common sense 
part of customary practice. 
33. As noted by my coUeague on the TriBar Opinion Committee Donald Glazer, 
"[ e ]ven an opfytion that has been prepared with care and that is technically correct may be 
misleading to the .opinion recipient." GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL OPINIONS, § 1.8 at 52 (3d 
ed.). Consistent with the TriBar Report quoted above, Mr. Glazer further notes "[t]he opinion 
process would be subverted if, with knowledge of the opinion preparers, a closing opinion instead 
became a vehicle for misleading the opinion recipient about the very matters on which the opinion 
preparers have been asked to provide their professional judgment." Id. at 54. Finally, consistent 
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TriBar Report quoted above, Mr. Glazer states that "if the opinion preparers ""'"""'"'A.<," 
that an opinion will be misleading to the opinion recipient they should disclose the problem to the 
recipient (or decline to give the opinion)."1 Id. at 53. 
34. When opinion givers and opinion recipient counsel refer to "clean" opinions, they 
are referring to opinions which are not qualified or reasoned opinions. "Clean" opinions are more 
valuable to the opinion recipient because they advise the recipient that there are no known issues 
or impediments to providing the opinions. If opinions are "reasoned" or "qualified," this puts the 
opinion recipient on notice that there may be issues regarding those opinions. This, in turn, would 
lead the opinion recipient to make inquiries of the opinion giver and to investigate or conduct due 
diligence or legal research relative to legal issues subject to the "qualified" or "reasoned" opinions. 
35. In order to ensure that I was using the correct standard of care for my opinions 
below, I consulted with an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho with experience preparing, 
approving and delivering third-party opinion letters. I learned that Idaho opinion practitioners, like 
other states, use the national standard of customary practice for preparing third-party opinions 
letters as discussed in this Declaration. 
36. While I do not agree with Bart Harwood's opinions, I agree with his testimony 
regarding the standard of care set forth in paragraphs 4-8 of his affidavit dated January 19, 2015 
(which I am also relying upon for the customary practice in Idaho necessary to render my opinions 
in this Declaration). 
37. Riley was a shareholder and senior attorney who acted within his scope of 
employment with Eberle Berlin in drafting, approving, and delivering the Opinion Letter to Reed 
Taylor. 
1 Scott Bell and the other attorneys at Caimcross were not named or pennitted recipients of the 
OpiniQn Letter, so they could not rely upon the Opinion Letter for any purpose. 
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38. 1994 and 1995, Reed Taylor owned the controlling majority interest in AIA 
Services Corporation, specifically, 613,494 common shares (rounded up :from 613,493.5 common 
shares) or approximately 63% of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock of the 
company. 
39. In 1995, AIA Services Corporation, by and through Reed Taylor's brother R. John 
Taylor and other investors, sought to purchase Reed Taylor's majority interest in the company 
through a share repurchase in order to obtain operational and financial control over the company. 
Their plan was to take the company a different direction by selling new insurance products and 
then to effectuate a public offering of the stock or sell the company. 
40. Initially, AIA Services Corporation and certain of its other shareholders desired to 
acquire 500,000 of Reed Taylor's controlling interest through a proposed merger with another 
corporation. That merger did not materialize and was abandoned in early 1995. Although Reed 
Taylor had granted an option to Centennial Insurance to purchase 500,000 of his common shares 
for $7.5 million on September 9, 1994, AIA Services Corporation sought to reacquire that option 
so that it could redeem 500,000 of Reed Taylor's common shares. 
41. AJA Services Corporation, other shareholders and certain investors (James Beck, 
Michael Cashman and Richard Campanaro ( collectively "Investors")) then desired to redeem all 
613,494 of Reed Taylor's common shares. Beck and Cash.man were sophisticated and accredited 
investors who had vast experience in the insurance ·industry. 
42. The Investors entered into an Investment Agreement dated June 30, 1995 with AIA 
Services Corporation wherein they had the right and power to accept or reject the final terms of 
the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Like Reed Taylor, they too were entitled to receive an 
opinio~ Jetter from Mr. Riley opining on many oftbe same issues which were the subject of the 




Opinion Letter to Reed Mr. represented AIA Services for the 
preparation and finalization of the Investment Agreement. 
43. The Transaction Documents were negotiated by Reed Taylor's independent 
counsel, Cairncross & Hempelmann, and Eberle Berlin, as general counsel for AL.I\ Services 
Corporation. The final terms of the Transaction Documents were approved by an independent 
committee of AIA Services Corporation's board of directors, which such committee was 
comprised of outside directors. When I refer to "outside directors" in the foregoing sentence, I 
mean that the directors were not officers or employees of AIA Services Corporation, nor were they 
major stakeholders. Bruce Sweeney, an Idaho Senator at the time, chaired the independent 
committee and that committee was represented by Mr. Riley. 
44. Reed Taylor was advised by the Board of Directors of AIA Services Corporation 
to seek and obtain separate and independent counsel to represent him in the sale of his shares back 
to the company and he did so, retaining the Seattle, Washington Jaw firm Cairncross & 
Hempelmann. 
45. The parties agreed that the consideration for the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares 
was agreed to be $1.5 million cash (which was later revised to a $1.5M Down Payment Note) at 
closing and a $6M Note due in 10 years for 500,000 of his common shares (the same price 
previously negotiated by Centennial Insurance) and approximately $1,118,656 for his remaining 
1 i3,494 common shares. ·Reed Taylor was to be ·given security interests in the commissions of 
AIA Services Corporation and the stock of all of its operating subsidiaries. The total value of the 
transaction exceeded $8.5 Million. 
46. On July 18, 1995, the Board of Directors of AIA Services Corporation approved 
the general terms of the purchase of Reed Taylor's common shares. 
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47. On July 18, 199S, AIA Services Corporation held a shareholders meeting, but no 
resolution was submitted to the shareholders to approve the use of capital surplus to authorize the 
purchase Reed Taylor's shares as permitted by I.C. § 30-1-6. Although the shareholders were 
provided notice of the general terms of the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares, they were not asked 
to vote on any of the agreements, to approve the purchase under I.C. § 30-1-6, or to authorize the 
use of capital sUiplus to purchase the shares under LC. § 30-1 -6. 
48. The Transaction Documents (except for the $6M Note) were signed effective July 
22, 1995. The $6M Note was signed effective August 1, 1995. 
49. Section 2.5(j) of the Stock Redemption Agreement set forth the requirement that 
the Opinion Letter be delivered as a condition of closing and further required the opinions to be in 
form and substance acceptable to Reed Taylor or his counsel. The Opinion Letter expressly states 
that it is being provided to Reed Taylor "pursuant to Section 2.5G) of the Stock Redemption 
Agreement dated July 22, 1995." 
50. If the Opinion Letter were not delivered in a form and substance acceptable to Reed 
Taylor or his counsel (i.e,. by providing the "clean" opinions contained in the draft opinion letter 
attached as an exhibit to the Stock Redemption Agreement), Reed Taylor had no obligation to 
close the redemption transaetion. 
51. The content of the opinions and representations in the Opinion Letter was 
negotiated by Reed Taylor's independent counsel, Scott Bell ofCairncross & Hempelmann: and 
counsel for AIA Services Corporation, Mr. Riley of Eberle Berlin. 
52. According to Scott Bell, in the negotiation for the contents of the Opinion Letter, 
Eberle Berlin initially refused to deliver certain opinions, but it later agreed to give those opinions. 
However, as noted he.rein, Riley never provided any reasoning or disclosures in the Opinion Letter 
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to prevent that Opinion Letter from 
of the Opinion Letter.2 
misleading to Reed who was the sole recipient 
53. On August 16, 1995, the final form of the Opinion Letter was approved by Scott 
Bell and Mr, Riley. I am assuming that such approval occurred on August 16, 1995 because that 
was the date that Mr. Riley confirmed that the Opinion Letter was ready for delivery. 
54. The final Opinion Letter was dated August 15, 1995, but was not delivered to Reed 
Taylor until on or about August 17, 1995. Toe fax cover sheet to Reed Taylor's counsel indicated 
that the final Opinion Letter would be federal expressed to AIA Services Corporation's offices for 
the closing. 
55. The redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was closed on or about August 17, 1995. 
I am assuming that August 17, 1995 was the date of closing based upon communications that I 
reviewed wherein Riley indicated on August 16, 1995 that closing would be "tomorrow." This 
further evidences that the Opinion Letter was a crucial part of the transaction. 
< 
56. The Opinion Letter was prepared by Mr. Riley (although, as discussed above, the 
content was negotiated by Mr. Riley and Scott Bell). 
57. The Opinion Letter specifically acknowledges that Eberle Berlin was general 
counsel for AIA Services Corporation and that the Opinion Letter was based on the "actual 
knowledge" of Mr. Riley and Mr. Turnbow. Toe Opinion Letter was Mr. Riley's first one. 
58. Toe Opinion Letter is addressed to Reed Taylor and specifically invited his reliance 
by limiting him as the only party who may rely upon the Opinion Letter. 
2 The issue is whether the opinion recipient Reed Taylor was misled by the Opinion Letter, not 
Scott Bell or any other attorney from Cairncross. I am not opining herein that Scott Bell or any other 
attorney at Caimcross was misled by the Opinion Letter. 
EXPERT WITNESS DECLARATION OF RICHARDT. McDERMOlT- 13 
006367 
A-145 
As stated above, when I refer to "clean" opinions in this Declaration, I mean 
opinions that are not reasoned or qualified. The Opinion Letter contains several "clean" opinions 
implicated in this lawsuit, which were custommy in transactions such as the stock redemption. 
including, without limitation: (a) that AIA Services Corporation had the power and authorif;y to 
enter into the Stock Redemption Agreement; (b) that all necessary actions had been taken by 
shareholders; {c) that the Transaction Documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of 
AJA Services Corporation; (d) that the Transaction Documents {including the .Stock Redemption 
Agreement) are enforceable in accordance With their terms; (e) that the Transaction Documents 
(including the Stock Redemption Agreement) did not violate any laws; (f) that Reed Taylor had 
perfected secmify' interests in the common .shares of AIA Services Corporation's operating 
subsidiaries; and {g) that Reed Taylor had creditor rights under Idaho law. The Opinion Letter did 
not contain any reasoning or disclosures to support any of the foregoing opinions and thus they 
60. When the Opinion Letter was delivered to Reed Taylor on or about August 17, 
199S, AJA Services Corporation's articles of incorporation did not aul:horize the use of capital 
surplus under r.c. § 30-1-6 to redeem Reed Taylor's shares nor, as stated above, did AIA Services 
Corporation's shareholders vote on a resolution authorizing the use of capital surplus under J.C.§ 
30-1-6. The Opinion Letter did not provide any reasoning or disclosures fur the opinions, 
including, those opinions referenced in the preceding paragraph: The Opinion Letter did not 
disclose or provide any disclosures or reasoning that (a)Mr. Riley had deviated ftom the plain and 
ordinary meaning of "earned surplus'' under LC. § 30-1-2; (b) Mr. Riley had relied upon a so-
called "fair value" test to purportedly comply with the ''earned surplus" restrictions under I.C. § 
30-1-6 (which essentially applied the definition for "capital surplus" in place of the de:ffnition for 
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"earned surplus"); (c) Mr. Riley had allegedly relied upon the compliance ofl.C. § 30-1-6 based 
on certain payments to Reed Taylor for the redemption being mbordina:teto the payments to Donna 
Taylor (which in tum allegedly meant that AIA Services Corporation could only make payments 
to Reed Taylor ifit oould legally make payments to Donna Taylor); and (d) Mr. Rilley had relied 
upon La Yoy S1J.JJp1y Co. v. Young, 84 ldaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (1962), which stated that "A 
corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared megal," to support his 
opinions because AIA Services Corporation could not purportedly disavow its obligations to Reed 
Taylor. 
61. At closing, all of Reed Taylor's 613,494 common shares in AIA Services 
Corporation were canceled. 
62. The stock redemption transaction was restructured in 1996, Reed Taylor's $I.5M 
Note was restructured (giving him over $350,000 in additional consideration), and AIA Services 
Corporation agreed to reimburse him for the attorneys' fees and costs incurred. Neither AIA 
Services Corporation nor any other party formally objected to the restructuring nor did they 
demand that the purchase price be renegotiated. 
63. When the transaction was restructured in 1996, Mr. Riley did not provide Reed 
Taylor with any disclosures or reasoning for the basis for their opinions in the Opinion Letter nor 
did he provide supplemental disclosure or a corrected Opinion Letter containing that information. 
. . . . 
There is no evidence that Mr. Riley provided any disclosures to Reed Taylor that he had deviated 
from plain and clear meaning of the definitions for "earned surplus" under LC. § 30-1-2 and the 
application of that definition to "earned surplus" in I.C. § 30-1-6. The Opinion Letter continued to 
be misleading and no action was taken by Mr. Riley to cure the misleading Opinion Letter in 1996 
or at any time thereafter, including, during Taylor v. AIA. Services-when Reed Taylor and his 
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attorneys were seeking that information. 
64. Several years after Mr. Riley prepared the Opinion Letter in 1995, he left Eberle 
Berlin and joined the law firm of Hawley Troxell. Mr. Riley was an attorney at Hawley Troxell 
during the entire time Taylor v. AU. Services was being litigated before Judge Brodie and on 
appeal. In the instant case, Mr. Riley filed an affidavit stating that he "communicated" with other 
attorneys at Hawley Tmxell relative to the litigation in Taylor 11. lJJA Services. Despite this 
communication, Mr. Riley never disclosed to Reed Taylor the reasoning for the opinions in the 
Opinion Letter while Taylor v. lJJA Services was pending, despite repeated requests, and he and 
his attorneys (the same law firm representing him in the lnstant lawsuit) failed to disclose the 
reasoning to Reed Taylor or his counsel while that lawsuit was pending before Judge Brudie and 
on appeal. 
65. The $6M Note matured on or about August 1, 2005. On January 29, 2007, Reed 
Taylor filed suit in Taylor v. AlA. Services to collect the sums due to him on the $6M Note, to 
enforce other contractual obligations and assert claims flowing from or relating to the security 
interests granted to him and sums owed to him. 
66. On February 8, 2008, the district court granted Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the default of the $6M Note. 
67. On April 16, 2008, the defendants first asserted the illegality defense in Taylor v. 
AJA Services. At that time, the defense was based upon an alleged "riolation of I.C. § 30-1-46. 
68. Prior to the defendants asserting the illegality defense on April 16, 2008, there were 
never any allegations of illegality asserted in Taylor v. AJA Services. In fact, AIA Services 
Corporation had moved to dismiss Reed Taylor's unjust enrichment claim in 2007 because it 
asserted that Reed Taylor had valid contractual rights to pursue his claims, and, therefore, an unjust 
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enrichment claim was improper. The district court agreed and dismissed that claim in 2007. 
69. On February 12, 2009, however, the defendants in Taylor v. AJA Services asserted, 
for the very first time that the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares violated I.C. § 3()...1-6, and, 
consequently, the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable (AIA Services 
Corporation's 401(k) Plan previously asserted the violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 on December 29, 
2008). 
70. Despite Reed Taylor's numerous requests to disclose the basis for Mr. Riley's 
opinions in the Opinion Letter and the legality of the transaction, he refused to do so. 
71. In 2009 in TOJJlor v. AU Services, Mr. Taylor's counsel, Mr. Bond, moved for a 
motion for continuance pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(t) to depose Mr. Riley and sought to depose Mr. 
Riley to ascertain the 1acts and reasoning re1ied ul)On by Mr. Riley for his opinions in the Opinion 
Letter. However~ Mr. Riley and the defendants' attom.cys snooesstblly prevented his deposition 
from ever taking place. Neither Mr. Bond nor Mr. Taylor could set forth by affidavit the 
information that they expected to obtain JromMr. Riley to prevent the entiy of summary judgment 
because they had no way of knowing what information and reasoning Mr. Riley relied upon for 
his opinions in the Opinion Letter because the opinions were clean and no reasoning was provided 
72. On June 17, 2009, the district court ruled that AIA Services Corporation had no 
. . . . 
earned surplus and the shareholders had not approved the use of capital surplus to purchase Reed 
Taylor's shares as provided in I.C. § 30-1-6. Judge Brodie also rejected a number of arguments 
that Reed Taylor asserted in an attempt to enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement, irrespective 
of it being illegal. On that same day, Judge Brudie also denied Reed Taylor's motion to continue 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f). 
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73. Reed Taylor moved reconsideration. On August 2009, the district court 
denied Reed Taylor's motion for reconsideration and rejected other arguments that he had asserted 
to persuade the court to enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
74. Reed Taylor appealed the district court's rulings that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement was illegal and unenforceable. Reed Taylor also appealed the district court's refusal to 
enforce the agreements on a number of legal theories. On September 7, 2011, the Idaho Supreme 
Court affinned the district court in all material respects, and, like the district court, found the Stock 
Redemption Agreement' to be illegal and unenforceable and left Reed Taylor where it found him: 
[W]e affinn the district court's finding that AJA Services had insufficient earned 
surplus at the time it entered into the Stock Redemption Agreement. .. 
* * * * 
AJA Services' shareholders did not authorize the use of capital surplus to redeem 
Reed Taylor's shares ... 
·*- * * * 
Because AIA Services had no earned surplus and was not authorized to use capital 
surplus when it agreed to purchase Reed Taylor's shares, the Stock Redemption 
Agreement violated the earned and capital surplus limitations of I.C. § 30-1-
6 ... [and] is thereby prohibited by law and illegal. 
In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically noted that "it appears that none of the parties 
recognized the potential violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6." Further, the Idaho Supreme Court affinned 
Judge Brudie's refusal to allow Mr. Riley's deposition to take place because, once again, Mr. 
Taylor and his counsel could not set forth precisely what information that they would obtain from 
Mr. Riley. There. was no way that Reed Taylor or his counsel could possibly know the r~oning 
and disclosures for Mr. Riley's opinions when such reasoning and disclosures were omitted from 
the Opinion Letter. 
3 In the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion, "Stock Redemption Agreement'' was defined to include 
both the original 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure 
Agreement. 
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75. On remand, Reed asserted yet additional legal theories to attempt to 
persuade the district court to award him damages or to allow him to recover his attorneys' fees and 
costs based upon severing all other terms from the Stock Redemption Agreement. The district 
court refused to grant Reed TayJor any relief. 
76. Based upon the illegality of the Stock Redemption Agreement and Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement, Reed Taylor lost all of his contractual rights, security 
interests and claims to obtain payment of the $6,000,000 in principal and accrued interest owed to 
him under the $6M Note and his common shares were canceled and thus destroyed. 
77. 011 October l, 2009, Reed Taylor filed his complaint in this action. From the ti.me 
Reed Taylor filed suit until early 2012, Mr. Riley failed to disclose and concealed the facmal basis 
and legal reasoning for their opinions and representations in the Opinion Letter. It was not until 
February 2Z 2012 that Mr. Riley formally disclosed> for the first time, some of the reasoning for 
the opinions and representations in the Opinion Letter. 
Opinions 
78. Based upon my knowledge, education and/or experience, together with the 
authorities and information I have reviewed, assumed and disclosed above, I render the following 
opinions: 
79. Mr. Riley, as an Opinion Letter preparer owed and/or assumed a duty of care and a 
. . . . 
duty of good faith and fair dealing to Reed Taylor to prepare and deliver the Opinion Letter in a 
non-negligent manner and to ensure that the Opinion Letter was not misleading, which was to 
prepare, approve, and deliver the Opinion Letter exercising the degree of care and skill that a 
reasonably prudent opinion preparer would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. 
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80. Mr. Riley breached his duties to Reed Taylor when he failed to exercise that 
required degree of care and skill, thereby delivering to him an incorrect and misleading Opinion 
Letter, which, inter alia: (a) failed to state that the redemption transaction violated I.C. § 30-1-6 
(i.e., Mr. Riley did not decline to give the opinions); (b) incorrectly represented and opined that 
AIA Services Corporation had the power and authority to enter into the Stock Redemption 
Agreement; (c) incorrectly represented and opined that all necessary actions had been taken by 
shareholders; ( d) incorrectly represented and opined that the Transaction Documents constituted 
the valid and binding obligation of AIA Services Corporation; (e) incorrectly represented and 
opined that the Transaction Documents were enforceable in accordance with their terms; (:f) 
incorrectly represented and opined that the stock redemption transaction did not violate any laws; 
(g) incorrectly represented and opined that Reed Taylor had perfected security interests in the 
common shares of AIA Services Corporation's operating subsidiaries; and (h) incorrectly 
represented and opined that Reed Taylor had creditor rights under Idaho law. 
81. The statutes in question. J.C. § 30-1-6 and I.C. § 30-l·Z were easily read and 
understood. Mr. Riley. whose firm was general counsel for AJA Services Corporation. 
intentionally engaged in an extreme deviation from opmion practice st.andatds by disregarding the 
plain meaning and definitions ofI.C. § 30-1-2 and J.C.§ 30-1-6 by, Inter a/la, substituting the 
definition of "capital surplus" in place of the definition of"eamed surplus" and by oot delivering 
reasoned opinions disclnsing and explaining those deviations, partieularly because of Idaho's long-
standing and well-settled rule .of law that any contract that violates a statute is illegal and 
unenforceable. Even if Mr. Riley had provided the required reasoning and disclosures for his 
opinions, he still would have breached the applicable standard of care by not applying the plain 
and ordinmy meaning of "earned surplus'1 in I.C. § 30-1-2 to purportedly comply with I.C. § 30-
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1-6. While the reasoning would have prevented the OpinionLetterftom being misleading, it would 
have still be negligently prepared. 
82. . If the Opinion Letter had disclosed that it was based on a so-called '~r value" test, 
a so-called subordination test or other reasons purportedly utilized by Mr. Riley to justify 
compliance with LC. § 30-1-6, rather than the plain language of that statute, Reed Taylor or any 
other reasonable opinion recipient would have elected not to sell his shares. However. Mr. Riley 
deprived Reed Taylor of the foregoing option because his Opinion Letter tailed to make the 
necessary disclosures or provide the required reasoning. Mr. Riley breaehed his duties of care 
owed to Reed Taylor by delivering to him an intentionally misleading Opinion Letter, even 
assuming that there was any applicable legal support of his opinions. 
83. Mr. Riley's assertions that the redemption of Reed Taylors shares was legal 
becanse certain payments were to be subordinate to payments to Donna Taylor for the redemption 
of her shares (Ms. Taylor's shares were only redeemed. as payments were made, while Reed 
Taylor's shares were redeemed and canceled. in mil in 199S) as a basis for sustaining the legality 
of the transaction is not supported. by any provision in I.C. § 30-1-6 or I.C. § 30-1-2 and was also 
an intentional and recldessly extreme deviation of opinion practice by not applying the plain and 
ordinary meaning of those statutes. 
84. Because of the nature of the special relationship between an opinion giver and an 
~ " . . 
opinion recipient (although Mr. Taylor had independent counsel. Mr. Riley had been Mr .. Taylor's 
divorce attomey and they had a special relationsbip)1 the failure ofMr. Riley to make the required 
disclosures constituted, under these circumstances, a breach of a fiduciary duty owed by Mr. Riley 
to Reed Taylor (including the fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing). 
EXPERT WITNESS DECLARATION OF RICHARDT. McDERMOTT - 21 
006375 
A-153 
85. Mr. Riley intentionally made no efforts whatsoever to disclose the material factual 
basis and legal reasoning for his opinions to Reed Taylor in 1995, in 1996 or anytime thereafter, 
and intentionally and recklessly concealed the reasoning :from Reed Taylor while he was seeking 
assistance from him in attempting to enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement before Judge 
Brodie and before the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal. 
86. It was an outrageous and intentional recklessly extreme deviation for Mr. Riley to 
conceal the alleged factual basis and legal reasoning for bis opinions and representations in the 
Opinion Letter irom Reed Taylor until after Judge Brodie bad ruled that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement was illegal and unenforceable and the Idaho Supreme Court bad affirmed that decision 
in 2011. even though Reed Taytorts counsel bad requested information pertaining to the opinions 
in the Opinion Letter on numerous occasions from 2008 through 2010. This conduct was 
performed by Mr. Riley with a disregard for the likely, foreseeable consequences. 
· 87. Mr. Rilers series of acts and omissions (which occurred during Taylor 11. AJA 
Services) represent outrageous conduct which intentionally and recklessly deviated :from any 
acceptable standards applicable to opinion givers based upon 1he following: (a) Mr. Riley 
preparlag and delivering the Opinion Letter as discussed in other opinions herein and not 
discl~ the reasoning for those opinions to Reed Taylor or his counsel during Taylor v. AJA 
Sernces~ despite repeated requests by Reed Taylor•s counsel for information; (b) Mr. Riley's 
intentional failure to disclose and COJlCealment irom Reed Taylor of the analysis of and reasoning 
for their opinions (.including the so..called "fair value" analysis and other reasons discussed above) 
and that they believed that their opinions were correct while Taylor v. AM Services was pending; 
and (c) Mr. Rileyts intentional acts permitting bis law firm Hawley Troxell to undertake legal 
representation disavowing the opinions in the Opinion Letter and his refusal to endeavor to stop 
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such conduct :from occurring in Taylor v. AJA Services. 
88. When Mr. Riley's law firm Hawley Troxell was asserting in a judicial proceeding 
in Taylor v. AJA Services that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable, 
notwithstanding the Opinion I..etter stating the direct opposite, it was outrageous and intentional 
of Mr. Riley to ignore repeated requests by Reed Taylor•s counsel to assist the recipient of'the 
opinion, Reed Taylor, in defending the Stock Redemption Agreement against the charge of 
illegality and in seeking to enforce it in accordance with its terms. Mr. Riley's conduct in this 
regard is particularly outrageous because he was concealing :from Reed Taylor both the reasoning 
for his opinions in the Opinion Letter and his belief that the Opinion Letter was correct and the 
transaction was legal. 
89. There is no .question that Judge Brodie and the Idaho Supreme Court were both 
misled because they were not apprised of the factual basis and legal reasoning for Mr. Riley's 
opinions in the Opinion Letter, as well as their belief that the Opinion Letter was correct and the 
transaction was legal, which separately constitutes outrageous and intentionally reckless conduct. 
In my opinion, at a minimum, Mr. Riley should have voluntarily filed an affidavit or intervened in 
Tay'lor v. AL4. &nices to disclose the factual basis and legal reasoning for his opinions in the 
Opinion Letter, even if Mr. Riley would not have talcen a position as to whether the Stock 
Redemption Agreement should be enforced. At the very least, full and fair disclosure and candor 
would have ·been shown to Reed Taylor, Judge Bmdie and the Idaho Supreme Court. 
90. Mr. Riley intentionally prepared and delivered the misleading Opinion Letter to 
Reed Taylor, despite the fact that Mr. Riley knew that bis opinions should have been reasoned and 
disclosures should have been made to cure the misleading Opinion Letter. It was impossible for 
Reed Taylor or his counsel to obtain the disclosures and reasoning Mr. Riley relied upon for bis 
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I D.ECLARBUNDBRPENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER nm LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO THAT TfIB FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
October 23. 2015 at New York New York 
Date and City and State Signed 
4 Likewise, Mr. Tll.ylor and his oounscl had no knowledge of the facts pertaining to the misleading 
Opinion Letter until after Taylor v. McMchols bad been dismissed and afl:inued by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
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rn,m 11a I 
!'lie first numbered 0Ldu1os1 dming opin-
ion addresses the company's status as a curporatio11 or other 
cnt Ir the transaction involves tlte issuaw:c of sl 
numbered ()araura1Jli usually states th;11 the swck is 
n r ,, 
validly fully and 
what many the most 
on LIH: enforceabili 








Before a financial transactio11 
investor or h the assistance ul' it 
nm ducts "due diligence" to it self that the 
1s itself to he from a 
,;tamlpoint and that the 1.ransanion does not 
problems. The nature or the review it conducts 
and size or the transaction and may include 
1 analysis of financial informal 
1racts and other dou1me11ts, ;111d visit to the 
.\L the closing, the company nmlirms that tts 
1 lie co11tirmc to lie true, and ofliccrs deliver 
various factual mailers. In some transact 
retained by the company deliver lc11ers 
'l;iirness opinion" from au investment ba11kcr 
valuation !i·om 
advice is anoLhcr 
I, mmcial transact ion conduct. due 
I', 
11 
the pmpusc of 
de Rm:hcmon!, 
mit dt:11 L:SA RIW/\Vi\D-Rcdll der 
:ire Lt:l-(al m International 
I 
'l !. :: . I Introduction 
, [(1,i1t,.\ 1,·itli nothing i>ul prurnises and oilier i11ta11gibln 1wnna ll y 
(and unde rsta ndably) wants advice frolll a lawyer 0 11 the legal 
slatus of wha t it is bringmg lwt11c. 
The principal way a party to a transact.ion satisfies itself about 
its legal p osit io n is through tltc services of its own counsel. A party 
looks to its own crnmsel to hdp stntclllre die transaction and to 
prepare and negoti,llc the agree 111ct1ts . It also looks to its own 
coume l 1.0 idc ntif)' worrisome legal problc::1ns and to prnvide 
advice 0 11 how to solve them . Somcri 1ncs, rhc advice a pa r ty 
recei ves fro1n its own rounsd takes the fornt of a legal opi11io 11. 
Rccci pl of lt:ga l advice fron1 it:; own counse l, however, normally is 
nu t the only way a party w :1 tramaniurt in fornis itself about the 
lega l as pens of the transaction . 
,\nol11t.•1 wm a part · ., lr,111 ,I~ d1111 01J1,1111 111(111111,allrnl 
.abulll i .. , ll· ',ti po itit II i l oh1,1i11 al lo i11 , up111io11 l'i m11 llllll t·I 
frn I la1: utlw1 1cl .".!. \ tl11rcl-pan ·lo,i11 , 11pi11io11 , h M<'\ r. i . 1111h · 
~ Revist:d :\ l)i\ (;u icldi11e, § 1. 1 a l K7:'i [App. ·I al 4: 2]: 
\Vht·11 received, the d osi11!{ o pi11io11 se1 vc, a, ,l pan u r 1hc n.:c1 p1t'.l tt 's 
dili ge11n •, providin g Ila: recipient wit h the opi11io11 g iver\ prnft:ssio11al 
j 11cl g111t'. ll t <HI legal issues co11cer11iug the 011i11io11 giver's cl ie11t , ihc tr.111s-
ae1io11, or both , that the 1·ccipie11l ltas d,·1 c 1·111i11ed to lie i111portalll in 
co1111cctio11 with the u·a11s.1ctirn1. 
S,•e also Cali forn ia 200'J Rcpon at 7 [App . 2'.! at '.!'.!: l(i l (" a11d cli t:11ts 
oft e11 (ite due dilige11ce ;1s the principal reasu11 for n :qut"sti11g opi11iu11 lctt,: rs in 
ln1'1ll t~, u,u1 s,1C tions."); C.tl ili.miia 2004 Remedies Opi1 1ion Repon i\p11 . ·I at 2 
[:\pp . '.! :I ,ll 2'.UH ]; .\lichigan Repo rt at :i [1\pp . ;17 at :\7·7 j ("op inion pro· 
, ·id,·, . .. comlc>rl with respert lO legal 111a1ters''); T exas Report §! l.C [:\pp . ·12 
;,r ·l :':~ilj ("T !w p r ima1y rn le of 1lw Opinion is lo providtc some forn 1al co11lir-
111;11ion through a wri11 en s1,neme11t or p rol'es.~iona l _judg men t liy a la,,·ye1· as IO 
till' ;"·,1ibliility 01 ·1he esse ntial ele 111 e1lls of 1he 1ra 11s,1ni,111 for which 1he panies 
h,1,T li;t1ga i11ed "); \Vashi11gto11 State Re11o r1 [t\p p. ·1'. I at ,1;1 :7] (" purpose of a 
leg, il " pi nio11 is 10 pru1·ide ,tssurall(;e as II> th e lq{:tl u11derpi rrn i11 gs of a 1ra11s-
anirn1, 1ml 10 i11su re agains1 loss aris ing mll o f tile 1rn11saCLio11 ") . 
.. \ , p;il'l of !licir overall due d iligenn :, 1lic u11derwri1ers i11 public oln: ri11gs of 
,<'1111 iti (', and invesiors in private ofkri11 gs 111>1'111, dl y 111.ike rt·ceip1 o f' a d os i11 g 
11 pi11 i1>11 ;1 co11di tion of rlo, ing. Ba11ks ,111d ll ih t r i11stilllt io11al lenck rs also o f'l e n 
n :q11i rv dm111 g op inions (,ts d" a(qui n -r, 111 ,rn11e acquisit ions of privatt: I)' held 
co111pa 11 i,·s) . .'i,•,•, ,•.g.,§4 .-·I "r tltl' Pri vate l'l .11 c111 t·1 1t L11ha11, e11 1t: nt l'n ~jen 's Mock·! 
IO 
Introduction §1.3.l 
it buil 111~.' l~I i_t ~ in 111 • n· tt 1t:111' ht_' 1111,rt'II ·e. Third-
party closing op1111ons address spccil1c kgal 1ssue::r and by design 
Forms (i':os. I and~ ) of Note Pun:hase i\gree111e 111 (Sep t. 1:1, lml-1), dev:nb,.d i11 
l\lassherg, Bi rd & ( :a l,:, lkl>1 Fi11ami11g Develop me nts in Negotiated Acqtw,iti011s 
.111d Leveraged Tra 11sanio11s. 8 Insights No.!) at 4, () (Sept. I !)q,1 ). For ;1t1 an ide 
.1rgui11g that, in a typical loa11, some o rtlte o pi11 io 11s that le 11de1·s trad itionally have 
requested from coumd liJr the !mrrnwer are 1101 cos t,justified, .m, cV[ ason & Suid,·r. 
rhose T hinl-l'an y Closing Opinio11s: Can l.0;111 T ransaction Co.q s lie Rnltucd :, 
i Bus. I .. Today 48 (Se in ./( kt. I D!J7) (predic:ting th ,11 "niany lenders will l"T'" 10 
lireak li·o111 traditio n" a nd slot> n:q11esti11g enli 11u:ahility and LCC: opiniom lrnll1 
1,orrower's counsd). 
Rhode bland has e nact ed lcgislatirn1 prnhibiting financial iusti1uti .,11, 11!.11 
<llake loans i11 that slate and I hei1· legal couu,el l'nun n:.:quiri 11g, ,ts a n111d11 "'" 1111 
making a loan . th at borrower\ counsel a11 opi11io11 on "1he bi11 di111,\ 
,·I feet, m· enfon:cabili ty of any l)r the loan don1111c nts or 1he ;ivailahilit y or rem· 
, dies thereu nder.'· Opinions 011 th(' ;111 thnri l)' and stal\l., ol I he brnTrnV<T a1 1d 
111.\lters rd:tt ing Ill th\· co lla1c ral .in· excluded fron t the statut ory prnhihition 
·" are o pi11iom li,r puhlic olleri11gs of i11del 11ccl 11ess. R.L C t·11. l.aws ~ l!l -!l-7 . 
\ !though not subjeu to a sta tutory p ro hibition , l·:ngl ish law firms, in the 
,·x p 1::1·ie111;c of' ,Ill En g li sh co11 1111e1ll,ll< ll' , sim ila rly rc, ist givill){ cnli1rn·.ilii!i1 )' 
"pinions lo p;1rties to ;1 1ra11sae1io11 who an: uo t their clients. They resis t l'VC II 
"he11 the agree 111 t· 11 ts ;1n; g" vcr11t:d hy F. ,q.; li sh law ;11 1d so nu: of die par lics ;1r<' 
, ,,g,mi?.cd in foreig11 ju1·isdiclio11s where l hircl -p ,lrl)' c11forcealii lity np i11iom an-
, 1t,10111a1y. S",: Y,:owar1 . .111pm * 1. 1 note !i, at I fi7 . The ci ted article, lwwev"r, 
does appear to co11 1c 111pla1c the 11 iving ofe11fo rc1::a bilit )' opi11io11s to ll01H.:lic 11 1., 
"' ;H least sorn c cross-bonier 11',msactions. Id. al I (ii:l (bs1 paragraph ol 1-:igh th 
l'rinciple). 
A11 opinion leu er also 111ay be rcqu1n:d by a reguh1tnry .igc·11<;-. 1:or 
, , ample. tlw SF.<: n :q11in:s th.it a11 opinion lc:ller co11li r111 i11g the lel-\;ility or 
, nJmpany\ stock be (i!t-d as an cxhibi1 to a rcgis lG1 ti011 st:11e11 wn1 11 111!<:r ti,,. 
·.,·, ·urities t\ct of I \):1:1 . S,:i, Sc:rnri tics J\n ol I !l'.1:1 Regu la tion S-K, Item :iO\J . ' I l1t· 
\ Iii\ Repul'l 011 Opin io ns in SEC Filings LApp. 71 discusses those opinion, ;11 
I, 11gth . 
:, Su Rev ised I\ Bt\ Cui del i 11es ~ 1.2 at 87 (i l i\pp . 11 ;u ·t :2 l: 
l'he o pin ions i11cluded in ;1 closing opinion lw uld iil' lin1i ted lo 1·e,isrn1 -
;1hly sp ec ifi c and dett:rn1inahk 1nalll'rs that i11vo lv 1:: t.hti exercise or 
pro l'essional judg nu~nt hy tlie opinion givti1·. 
Counsd !tn the rn 111pa11y oftt:11 wi ll be in the bes t position tu ,1ddress Ill.li t)' 
, d il1e issues covered by ,1 stand.ml closing upi 11 io11 . That cou 11sd, for t: xa mp k. 







do not cover many legal matters l 
dose. l Receipt, therefore, of a11 
counsel is no substitute for the genera 
recipient is expected to receive from 
che lJ·;u1sanion ,!lid 
, ott,idet atiom, of<.·co110111y 
a n:queM fm 
if it were 
opinion,. for t·xampl,·, arc 1101 1 
e lo n>V<'r local law t111k·,, 1 lwv do 
§11.C. ;\It 
llt{{t? -...(l< 
'S,·,· Re,1atemeu1. of l .aw 
WI Clhe 
"llit' tlie dient of the 
,mdenake to advise the third 
la"· ,md do not impose an 
California 2005 Repon ;it 7 [App. 22 at 22: 
n1mpm1e111 of a panv\ due diligence. but 
,uhstitute for due diligence perfrmned by 
12 
Section 7 of the AB,\ Accord expres~,·, 
lh,H ,tdopt th~· Accord: 
The Opinio11 Recipient may not rdy mt 
for any leg.ii or other analysis beyond tlm! 
such ;1, the broader guidanlT and cou11,e! 
to the diem. 
)t lk1 
;tt1d Ill 







Some have that another benefit ola closing 
111 1s thal its delivery may dissuade a company from late,· 
laking that arc inconsistelll with the legal opinions 
by its cmmscl. ( )thcr however, have 
skepticism that by company cmmscl of a dosing opinion 
would prevent the c0111p,llly' from assert ing whatever defenses it 
l.ttcr identifies as hcing available to it or pn:vent a court from 
its own legal condusions. Cases holding that ttl ilit ies 
powtT to c11tcr into supply' crnttracts notwitlista1 
to 1hc their nH111sd sugges t tltat Ili c 
lh:tt lllU!Ual lu11d w;1s IHll 
for 11oud1sdosrn<.· under lcdc1al sn 
AT&T. 7(il F 0!7fi (S.D. )hio l\l\l (slid1v1 ol 
rule lo,1 hccattsc dirn tors had 110! hce11 inlorm('d di.ll opi111011s 
to F.SOI' as an1i1.ikeover denn· omilted "validly issiwd, 
and 1w11asscssabk•"); I<r,1111cr v .. Jasper, ( :iv. :\. '\o. 88-li7'.>. I , I !)')0 
W[ '.li!(i8 ll. 1';1., f an. l I \)(IO) (rdiann· 011 legal opi11io11 helped acrnt11ll;i1!1 
cstalJlish that lie lacked sciemer and illlel!t 1tecessa1y for rn111mon law fraud) . 
( }1lwr benefits a.scribed to dosi111,; opinions are th.1t the)' "help tlw p,trncs 
lO achieve a 1mnual, tmdersmnding oft.he meaning and dkn of tl1t·i1 
(( Report§ l .O:j !App. '.I:\ at :Ill: I:.\ J) and that they "may help 
to , har;H 1erize tht; business 1rn11saction as an ann's·length agn·cme11t 1h,11 
should be upheld" '.W07 Repon at :H .ii :1,1: ! 81). R<'<eip1 
also lli<l)" be necessary to co111ract11;tl or n·qt1ll'<'-
( :alifornia '..100r, Report at 7 [App. '.12 at '.1'2: I (i I. 
7 Sc,, S1uith, Rendning [ Opinions, in I !'v!assad111se11s llnsitwss 
l, 4-(i (S. Keller ed .. l 991) ("Requiring a legal opiuion lrnm 
tile party the represet1talio11 .. . 111,ty III srn,m· 
cases h,1ve ,t prnctical estoppel dJect on the client ii the client wanted lo 
the agreemem at a lat.er date, since the client would effectively 
lawyers iu ordt,·1· to make the challenge"). 
See cases ci1ed in ~!J.,', note\), The California 2004 Remedies Opi11-
io11 Report !App . '2'1] considers at length whether n,ce1pt of au opiuio11 mi the 
of.m agree111clll (disu1ssed in Chapter D of this book) prnvides the 
basis for that the opin ion dienl is equitablr estopped 
14 
I 11troductio11 § l.3,2 
,\111Jt lw1· lw11d11 , m1t·t1 111t· ,i:-,rnlwd ,1 IO IIJ.: h lo a 
, l(l,111 • opi11irn 1 i, 1h.11 11 t•1 , ., a, ,111 irn,mwu,· poli ' . l '11likc 
ilw hold(·r ol a11 i11 111.1111,· p11l1n·, lim t'\'t·r, thl' rc·cip i1·11 I ul a 
, lmmg up111io11 Ii.I\ IICI < lai111 ,i111pl lit·l\ 111\1' ii"• Of HIit< 11, 'IV<!U 
In II ptm•,• tel lit· 1111111u·11 . l.c•gal 11pi11i111h ;111 · c• pl'l' ,io11 uf 
111111·, iu11.ilj111 l 1 111, ·11t , 11111 •11.11-: 111H·n tli:11 a llllll w1ll 1c·.1 Ii 
l la · :111 w < 11cl ll,irn , .,~ ti It' opi 1111111 "i \'t ·r .'' I 111:t \' I i:i hie 
h nin dai111l11g th;ll ~Ill undt•rtahing it 1u;ul<' i 11 IIH· ,tgnTlll<'fl t Ull <'f\l'orcc ;1 b lc, 
I lie report co11clude., tlt;tt ll do\', 11ut Iii<' H'l " "t ;ihn cousid t'IS wli,·tli,T I 
to 1u;1kc .tll ><·I" .t1g1t111,·111 li;i, ;illy otlw1 l1t·1wl 11 ll 
<> ncludc, that ii do t's lint w1il1 tlw 
n.•m,gntiatnl , II Ill.I)' provide tlw :t l,,isi s "111, n11111 , ·1" 
Lum lit<' opi111011 , li<'lll tli;ll dw ,·1·11t,·111 lt;is 11 d 11111it ic, ." 
I ;dili,rni:1 '.J.(1().1 Rcn1cdit's ( lp1111<J11 IZ..purl r\pp. ·I ;11 ;11 
"1\1\/\ ( >pin1om !11111< iplt·, Ill I IH' npt11io11, , rntL!ll lt 'd 
lt·llt't ;tn' ol prot(·,:-.Hn1;it 1t·g;1 n hng li t<· 
111.iuer, :iddn·sst•, ,111d 11< 1! g11,11;lll!t'<'' tl1,11 ,1 nn111 will l<':h It 
,null,"): H<'visi·di\ll1\(;uid,·l1nn I al l1\p1• I ;it I 11wl11d<'d 
optll!OII ,liould ii!' li11utnl tn .. m.111n, 1li;1l t11 volv, · th<' ,·xcn <i i 
l'rnfcssim1;tl jll!lg11w11t hy ilw, "); ( ::dtl«rni;, '.!00', lfrp"rl , ti ii 
l,\pp. ,11 l•i l: (;,,mg i;1 l{,·111>11 l,\1111. :1:1 :t l :1:'.:I lcxas l{q« 111 
.C. I 1\pp . ;11 ·1 '.!:7'.!I ( hl<' , rn11 t lta, q1mt,·d with l.1vrn il l(' lnll,mi 11 g 
1 •assag1' lrn111 ! lie 1:,.1,·word lo I I w 1\1\i\ 1.<'g.d ( lp1t 11rn 1 l{l'pot l 
A t!tinl ·11arty l,•g;d np111trn1 1, ;u1 1 nl i ll [ 
the kg;d iss!l<'S ,·xplicitly· ;u ld1t·sS<·d. 
the npinioll d, H'S 1ml I 1t'l<>lt1t' .tll iw,tu c1 or gu:11 ;11J1t11 
sion ol judl{lllt'lll 
lrn v. Mass. M1111. Wlinl,·sak 1':lc,. ( ,., 1-1\I! 1, Supp. 
Vi. l!lW,) (q11n1in,14 ;\I\,\ l < lpi1111>n lfrprn·t :ti I I ii\pp . : 11 I). 
!he Forcwonl 011 to slate, "Nor drn·s the n·1tdtTll1g of.u1 opi11io11 g11a r;111 t,T 
1 lie Olll<Hlllt' nl ,Ill)' dispw,· 1 lt.11 11iay ans1· lllll ol I lw 11;111s;u 1101 1. 
\notlwr <'<Hll'I, addressing lilt' lin,ad,T dltl)' ;1 law)'n li;ts 111 11!,· L1w 
,,,1 .. , ow11 clic11l, ltas sta!cd: 
:V!assad1us,·1ts law rcquin·, an 11llon1<')' . to advtst' tltc die 111 n1 a t11a11 
ner that permits th<' !alter inttdltg,·ntly lo assess !lie risks ol 
particuLtr anio11. But even high priced 
are not guarnntors of' lavoralil,· rcs11l1.s. l lius, 
.. to antidp,t!<' remote risks. 
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Ill In mauy states, third parties who have relied ou a11 opinion may seek 
1·elief based upon a claim of negligent misrepresentation. In those states, neg-
ligen t misrep resentation, unlike malp.-acti<:e, has been held not to require an 
attorney-client rela ti onship between the complaining party and the opinion 
g iver. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & 
\Vood, 605 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1992); Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. 
Central Bank of Denver, N .A., 892 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1995) (addressees of dosing 
opinion who were not clients of opinion giver per mitted to bring action for 
negligent mis1·epresentation but not for legal malpn11:1icc). In some: stales, 
howeve1·, au atLorney-clielll relat ionship is 1·equired and nonclie nts a1·c not enti -
tled to b1·ing a negli gent misrepresenta ti<>n claim against an opinion giver, even 
when the opinion is addressed l<> them. See Michigan Rep<>n at 7-9 (App. 37 al 
37: 11 -14]. The liability of opinion givers to nondients is addressed in §51 of the 
Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers and discussed in §2.3.2, infra. See Re-
statement of Law Governing Lawyen §51, Comment e (App. I al I :5] ("cause o r 
action ordinarily is in substance identical to a claim f<n negligent misrepresen-
ta tion and is subject to rnles such as those concerning proof of materiality and 
re liance (see Restatement Second, Torts §§552-554)"). 
The law in England on the liability of an opinion giver for an incorrect 
opinion appears to be the same as the law in the United States. In a passage that 
a United States lawyer could have wriuen about the liability of United States 
<>pinion givers, an English conunentator, addressing the liabili ty of opinion 
givers in England, has written: 
"l"he views contained in an opinion leuer are expressions of professional 
j udgmelll on the legal issues addressed and are not guarantees that a court 
will necessati ly reach any particular decision. The prnvider of an opinion 
leuer may be liable to the addressee ift.he opinion is negligently gi\len, but 
is not automatically liable merely because an opinion prnves to be incorrect. 
Y eowart, .rnJ1m § l I note 6, at 166. 
11 Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers §§51 , 52, 95 [App. I at I: 1-2, 
22, 38]; Sta te Bar ofTexas Committee on Lawyer's Opinion Letters in Mortgage 
Loan T ransactions, Prel iminary Draft of a Statement of Policy Regarding Law-
ye1·s' Op inion Letters in Mortgage Loan Transactions, 23 State Bar Newsletter, 
Real Estate, Probate and T·rust Law No. 2 at 20, 2 I (Jan . 1985). See generally 
Freeman, Legal Opinion Liability, in .J. Sterba, Drafting Legal Opinion Leuers 
§ I 2 ('.Id ed . 2003). 
Over 1-20 years ago the U.S. Supreme Court, in rnnsidering a claim arising 
from a defective opinion on a l)()rrnwel"'s title Lo real estate used to secure a loan, 
repeated what it 1·egarcled as settled law that a lawyer is not "liable fo1· every 
16 
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mistake that may occur in practice, or . .. for every e!Tor <>(judgmem. " Savings 
Bank v. Ward, I 00 U.S . 195, 198 ( 1879). Elaborating, the Court explained that 
"attorneys do not profess to know all the law or Lo be incapable of error or 
mistake in applying it to the fact s of every case." If 1hat were the standard, 
1he Court pointed out, "even the most ski llful of the profession would hardly 
be able to come up to lit]." The "tr ue rule," accord ing to the Court, "is that the 
attorney is liable for the want of skill , care and diligence as men of the legal 
profession common ly possess and exercise in such matters of professiona l 
employment." 100 U.S . al 199-200. See also Coastal Orthopaedic Institute, 
P.C. v. Bongiorno, 807 N .E.2d 187, 191 (Mass. App. 2004) (opinion 011 risks 
of litigation "is not to be measured by perfection in preclicrnbility of outcome, 
1101· by infall ibil ity in opinion detennination"; la.vye1· not a guaran tor ofa favor-
able result); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961 ): 
The auorney is not liable for every mistake he may make in his practice ; 
he is not, in the absence of an express agreement, an insurer of the sound-
ness of his opinions ... and he is not liable for being in error as to a 
question of law on which reasonable d oubt may be en tertained by well-
informed lawyers. 
See also Foreword to ABA Legal Opinion Report, quoted in note 9, .rnprn. 
One commentat.or has suggested that, in the comext. of imemational trans-
actions, a lawyer "could possibly limit his liability within a scope known to him by 
declaring his own national law applicable LO the opinion letter." Working (;roup, 
The Opinion Letter, l 981 Eludes et Documents Pour le .Juriste Internat ionale 
73, 79 (comments of Paul Storm). That suggestion is discussed in Legal Opin-
ions in Imernational Transactions IO- I I. For a general disn1ssio11 of liabi l-
ities for closing opinions under the laws of the United Kingdom, Fnmce and 
Germany and under interna tional law.see Harries, Die Rech tssrhein-haft.ung h.ir 
fehlerhafte Rechtsgutachten bei internationalen Verm1gen, i11 Festschrifi Fur 
Konrad Zweigert 451 (Tubingen 198 1 ). 
When an opinion is delivered in connection with a sale of securities, the 
opinion giver may be subject Lo liability under the !ederal securities laws. 
Although private suits (as opposed to suits by the Securities and Excha nge 
Commission) against aiders and abeuors of violations of§ I O(b) of the Sewri ties 
Ex.change Act of 1934 ai·e foreclosed by the Supreme Coun's 1994 decision in 
Cen tral Bank of Denver, N .A. v. First Intersta te Bank of Denver, N .A., 5 11 U.S. 
l 64 ( 1994), private suits against prima1y violators ,u-e not. See, e.g., Rubin \'. 
Schou.enstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998); Kline v. First W. Govt. 
Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994) (lawyer cannot esc:ape liability under Rule 
I Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for an opinion letter containing a 
misleadi ng facnial description lawyer knew would be shown LO prospective pur-
chasers simply by pointing to statement in <>pinion le tte1· tha t fac ts were 
17 
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N,·:-.1 i,1 i!1 v liic rdrchv is the cluster of' optrnons that C<>Vl't' 
·"lw, l'i n l tltc tra11sactio t1 . such as th e transaction 's e ffect Oil tl w 
( t1111p;u1y's other cont racts . that are not addressed by thc o piu io11 
on the agTeeme11t's c1il u rceabil ity. 7 These o pinio ns ordi11,1rily 
a re imc11ckd l o e li cit i11for111a tio11 a lrc.tdy k11own LO tltc opi nion 
pre pa rers o r ,tva ilablc wi I ltout ex t raord i11ary l.:lfort. Whet It er t licy 
an: gi ven and what they cover iuvolvcs i11 c;1d1 case ;1 balancing of' 
the wo r k re qu ired to support Lli e111 agai nst the lic11cfi1 lo t ll<' 
opinion recipien t. Tlte opinio11 preparers have tll (lt'C rootn lo 
negotiate tlt e word in g o f' these opi11io11s . to include appropriate 
litni ta 1io11s ;u1d qu,ilifications, and i11 m 111t: cases 10 rcf11sc to g ive a 
particula r o pi nio 11 a t all. K 
i\t tile liou otn of the hiera rchy a n : the p11n:ly "li,1ckgnn1111l " 
opi11io ns, s11ch ;1s t ltose addressing the co111 pa 11y \ rn11sta11ding 
stock (a~ o pposed t.o tlt c stock be ing iss1 1<·d i11 t it<' tr,11 1sa<"1io11 t 
ur tllc .1lisu 1ce o f' pe11di11g o r tltrca tc11cd !i1i gatio11 t l1 at lrnrld 
lia\'e ,1 111a llTial adv<.:rsc e lkct 011 t hl· crn11p,111 y. 111 \Vii.it ;11 1d 
how 11n1d1 tlte.se o pi11io 11 ~ say, .i nd i11clccd wltctltcr IIHT an· 
give11 at all, ultirnatcl)' will dcpc11d rn1 a bal.t11cit1g ol' the u,st of 
the ir preparntiou ;1gai11st tile lic ncfit to the opinion rcci pic111. 11 
·, Ser ( :li.1p1ns l ;I, 1-1 , 1:, a11 d Ii i. ' J'hi s rl11s1cr of opi11io11., ,tlsn i11 ch1tlt' s 
"op i11iom" i11 the absenn: o r lega l p ron:cd i11gs n·la1i11 g 10th,· 1r,111Sactio11 . .\,·,· 
~ 17. I , i11/m. 
" !;or exam ple , " linu th.1t does not nor111.illy rcprt'St'III 1l w tOIIIJ>;111y hut 
th,11 has hel'n l,rnught in fo1· the tn111sa<:tio 11 mi g ht wdl n ·s ist !,!; il'i 11g a lt opi 11i <111 
th.it would requite it lo review a ll or the co111ra.-1, Ji,1nl h)' tilt' co11 1j1:i11 )' in iii ,· 
·"··hedu ln to the .1gTeeme111. (The no bre,1ch o r d<'h11h 0 11111i1>t1 is disn1sscd it1 
Chapter I (i.) If' the co mpa11,· has inside cou usd cw n ·g«l;, r ou1, id ,· n ,u11wl, w «· ol 
tlie111 111 ii-: ln give !ht· opin ion. s,,,, Tri lia r I !)D8 Report ,t i (i(i'l . (i7: \ I Al'Jl · \ l a1 q : 111'.! , 
I 08 J ( rll us1J·a1 ive ( lpi niot1 I .t'llet, of Inside Cou nsel ) 1\ !1,·,·11,11 ivcly, d1e fi1111 111igh1 
.iq.;ue iii .ti lite rec ipie ut sl1ould rely 011 ib uwn (tll' ii own n H11 1S<:1' s) r,~vicw ol'iltosl' 
Ultlli ',Hl\. S,,,, C.difornia '.WO:'i Repol'I a l J,l [App . 22 a l 22:2/ ij (ins tead ol'opinion , 
"time ,11 1d li11,111t."i.d n:sources of' the panics and their t·o1 1nsd o lieu are li,·11n 
sen·t:d " by rcp res<:! ntatious in ag ree me nt a nd n-,c ipi, ·111 ' .s own i11vest iga1io11 ). 
"See ~10.lll, i11/i-11. Ser California 2005 Re prnt at 14 [App. 22 a t 22:2lil 
(ci1i11g o pin ion 011 ou ts tanding stock as example ol' opinion th at "ofien is 1101 
nist-t: lfen ive"). 
'" See C h.i pte r 17. 
11 S,•,· gl'11 n11!/y Tri Bar I \lD8 Report at :",9 \).( iOO [App. '.) .tt '.): IO J. 
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Whc t1 Lit e cost of prcp,trit1g ,, "Ii: •1 "11 1HI" o pinion will lw h igh . 
the o pwi o1 1 preparer., s li t11 d d p, ,1111 1 iial out. to the op 111ion 
rec ip ie nt a nd , ii' 1t cn:ssa1 y , c11!i s1 t.ltc aid ol-'tli e n J1 11p,t11y in rcsis1 -
mg the opi11io11 rl'qucst. L! 
S U l'l'Olfl 'IN(. 1\ CLOSIN(; Ot'ti\: 1()1\:; l.1 1\ l\lt.lT\' 
~ Ui. I Dul y 01· ( :a r('; Role or C:t tSIO!ll.11 ')1 Practi C(' 
la\\'\<' I who cl ·lin· ,.._ :i c 111,111~ op111im1 ow· a duly ol t ,U l' to 
1h •opi11i11111c•c 1p1c·111 c•\·c·111hrn1 •Ii ll1c· 1t·t ipic·11t1, 111111111· l,m c r's 
c Ii 'IH , 1 ' l 'ltat du! )' rcquitTs lite lawyer 1101 (o "lt1ttc lio11 ;1s a1 1 ;td vo -
cate li>r till · lq.~·,tl 01 l;1n11;il pos ition of' t il l' lawyl'1 ·\ din11 " liut 
10 prnvid1· tlt t· ff<'ipw11 1 ;in opi11io11 that is '' Ltir and oh11·c li ve ":: 
and tli ;ll lt as lw<' lt pn·p; t1\'cl wi !l1 tlt1· " n> 11q w1c111T ;111d d ili g<' llt<' 
l:' ; \ , llw R<" vis<'d 1\l\1\ ( ;,udt· li11<"s ,1; 11<' , "'f'lic lll'tlt'f1 1 o f ,111 "l "11 irn1 lt1 tlw 
r<:!cipie 11l shutdd w;1rr; 1111 tli<' 1it11<· a nd n q><· us,· l't ''lllin·d tu p1·,· 11 ;i t'<' it." lfrv1, ,·d 
1\BA C11id,·li1tt·, §I .'.! al W71i l; \pJ ' · fat ·l:'.!i , .\,·,· California '.!OO!, lfr pt11 1 ;it 1·1 
!App. 2'! ;i i 2:.!::! tij ("11j1i11i1111 gi 1·t·t · , lw11ld .. . l'<"s i, 1 anp1i<" sl'i 11g lo 011i11 io tl\ 111 1 
mal(i: r, ii i. ti an · 11< ·1 ·ij1lwral ' " lit<· 11 ·;t11 sa<tio11 ;11 ila11d "). 
§Ui I l{ t'sla1t•111t·11t ol' I.aw L11v<' rni11g J.;1wy,..-s ~'ii('.') (;,) l -'\l'I ' I a l 1.11 
(" a lawyl' r mw, a d11I }' 1,, 11 , ,. , ·,11 ·,, . .. 111 a 111111di .. 111 wl1t ·11 ,11 1d tu ilw ,·x 1,· 111 
1hat .,, the la11')'l'1'11r (wit It 1lw lawyn\ ;wq11it· sn·11n ·) tit<' lawy,·r ·, di, ·11 1 i11vi1t·, 
1he 1w11dk11 1 lo r<'i )' 0 11 Iii<' 1:twyn\ opi11irn1''). .'-i,·,· g, ·11 ,·mll, '.1.'.\.' !, 111/r11 
' l'h,·on·1 ically. a11 o p i11 i1111 g iv<' r 1;1111 1111dil)' its d111y olc:IJ't' liy t·x1 11,·" bn 
guag-c i11 Iii(' " i' i11io11 . Wh1· ;t n·,·ipi,·111 would at '<'< 'l'I s11cil ,111 011 i11i<1 11 , l1t>1l't'l'<T , i, 
,lllOliilT 111 :t ll<T. .)/'/' M;1d, I \\':till K.itts.1 , ( :i1r lla11k 1• ._l;wksrn,. l\n 111ilk11 ,•, l'()lil s .. 
1,irk y. I'.<: .. 1) f:! S.W.~d !, :a; (1\-111. Cl . ,\J>p . I !)! 1°,). [11 Mad: 'f 1,w11 , 1lt,· ,rn ,n ltdd 
1liat th<' nTipi, ·11 1, ;1 .. , .. ph i,1i1·;11t·d i111'('stor ," t1 11 tld 11111 lt ;1vt · ju.,1 ifiahly l'l'ii,·d 011 
the o pi11im1s ,·xpn'" ''d i11 an "l' i11111n l<'llt'l t <lt 1tai11i11g 1111· lt1llmving disifai 11 1<·, .. 
"Thi s o p i11i1111 is v;did a , n l ii)(' d ,11<" 11< ,rcol , 111 11 11•,· 1:1kt' 110 rnpo11,ili ili1i, ·s to any 
1nfon 11 atio11 o r n pi11io11s culll i1lt1cd lt(' rt' in .'' !{t:jccliug the nTipil 'tll \ ;1~scrt io11 
tl1;1t the di,dai111cr co ntained a typog·r;1pliic;1I nror, tli t' coml d<"c l111nl Ill 1r;1d 
11 * ' tltc clisclai 11 w,· 1 ltl'. wo rd "11pd;11c" I H' l wc,· 11 I lie words "10 " and "a11 y," · 1 ·1 u · cou rt 
, lid so evc11 tlHHl!{h "11pdatc" appean:d i11 tlte o pi11io11 i-:iver\ othe r o pi 11it 111 lcllt'l'S 
,t11d addii1i-: it wo11 ld have 111adt' Ilic disdaiu1t·r n•ad (n1orc s,·11,il,ly as wdl as 
g rammatica lly) "but we takl: 111 1 J't'spunsil,ilii ics to llJldatt' a ny inliirt1 1at ion t1r 
"Jlin io11s n111 1a i11,'.d hen,i11. " 





of care, a lawyer like a any pro-
skill and knowledge 
uossc::sseo by members that profession ... in good standing. 
of care does not require average performance, which 
that the less skillful part of the would 
be committing malpractice"; _ , the duty "is 
in the circumstances."" What is reasonable 
dosing opinions, unless otherwise is deter-
customary practice lawyers who regularly give 
who regularly represent recipients of opinions of the kind 
What is reasonable also will depend, as discussed in 
Restatement of Law Governing §52( I) [App. l al I :22J. See also 
1d. §95, Comment c: lApp. l ,1L l :42] ("legal opinion . . constitutes an assurance 
that it is based 011 legal research and analysis customary and reasonalJly appro-
in the circumstances"). 
·1 Restatement of Law Lawyers §52, Comment b [App.lat l :23] 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §299A). 
Restatement of Law Lawyers §52, Comment b l at 
:2:1]. See California 2004 Remedies Opinion Report App. 5 at 2 [App. 23 at 
is measured by the competence and diligence normally exercised 
in similar circumstances"). 
2004 Remedies Opinion Report al 148·1 n.8 [App. 12 al 12::lj: 
Like the law, dosing opiniom are the product not 
... Molded IJy cuswmary tempers 
a realistic assessment of what 
standpoint of and cost, to 
See Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi, No. 01-2595 BL'>, 2004 WL ,>O l 9442, at 
12 (Mass. . CL Dec. '.{, 2004) ('To prevail, the plaintiffs here must dem-
onstrate that [opinion giver] ... failed to conform to customary practice"); 
Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers §95, Comment e [App. I at I :44J ("cus-
wm,uy practice will ... det.erm ine the nature and extent of the factual and legal 
diligence to be employed by the opinion giver") and §52, Ccmuneul b [App. I at 
I :23 J ("normal professional practice ... define[s] the ordinmy standard of care 
l,1r lawyers"); California 2004 Remedies Opinion Report App. 5 at I [App. 23 al 
23:68) ("customary practice ... provides a standard for determining whether 
the lrgal duty ofcare owed by the opinion giver to the recipient has been met") and 
at 5 [App. 23 at 23:73] (stating, with reference w enforceability opinion, "it 
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who t'IM'll l,,.r/" 
trnms,'tct,ions"\ '!"he standard to which are 
any competent would do but rather what who ,.,,,.,.,-.. , .. 
opinion letters of the same type in similar transactions would do. First 
Mass. B,~nk N.A. v. ~'lorian,_ No. 024007 BL5 I, 2007 WL 182937!1, at (Mass. 
. Ct. .June 12, 2007) (md1catmg that the issue to be addressed was whether 
the actions "foll below the standard of care and skill of 
in a field that includes the regulation of insurance 
, . As the California 2004 Remedies Opinion App. 
23:G8] also correctly pomts out, customary not only 
for . . h~bd1ty but also a rond1u:t among: 
clients g1vmg, rece1vmg and interpreting opinions." See also ABA 
Prmoples §LB ("the work counsel is expected to 
· · . on the customaiy practice of lawyers who regularly and who 
_i·~gularly advise opinion recipients regarding, opinions of the kind involved"); 
I nBar 1998 Report at 60 l [App. !lat !l: 12] ("an opinion is en tilled to 
assume that the opinion has followed customary 
o~inion"); Californi;i 2005 Report at 9 22 at 22:20) 
mmmg whether an opinion rec1uisite care "should not 
the opinion _giver co1dcl have found but what a competent 
customary d1hgence, would have found") [emphasis in The Restate-
ment and bar association sometimes also use the ··cusiom and 
practice." See Restatement Law Governing Lawyers §95, Comment 
at I AHA Guidelines, Introductory Paragraph. "Custom and 
"cuslOmary practice" are synonymous. 
_ In addit_io'.1 to establishing what lawyers are expected 
pa~-ocular op1mons (customary diligence), customary 
opuuons are to be interpreted (customai-y usage) (see §I 
and skill required to prepare a dosing opinion California 
2004 Remedies Opinion Repoi-t App. 5 al 3 LApp. 2'.1 al 23:71 J (customary 
derermmes competence")). Cuswmary does not 
establish, however, what should be or under what circum-· 
stances. See § 1.8 note 6, 
Customaiy pmaice, as described in the Restatement and !Jar association 
repon_s, applies whether or not it is referred to in a closing opinion. For those 
who wish to underscore the point. by stat.ing it expressly in their opinion letters, 
the Boston St.rearnlined Opinion oilers the following sentence: 
This opinion letter shall be interpret.eel in ac,:ordanct: with the Legal 
Opini_on Principles issued by the Committee on Legal Opinions of the 
Amencan Bar Associat.ion's Sec1.io11 of Business Law as published in 53 






of an opinion letter onlinarily 
and should a dear 
the opinion letter is to say when the 
ABA Guidelines§~. l a1 877 LApp. -lat ·1:-l]: 
the 
""'"""'" Both sides should work in good faith lo agree on a 
letter. 
upon as 
in transaction, before the parties are committed to 
§ I .05 [App. 33 at 33: 17] ("the text of an opinion .. 
should be time the Agree111ent is negotiated");seea/so Yeowart, 
§J l nmc 6, at 168-!'19 (allirming that same principle applies in ... .,,_,...,",. 
firms a review before delivery of a 
In firms that the opinion preparers should make no cmmnitmems 
to the opinions lO be until that review has been 
preparers have off, a recipient can come to 
a !inn has to give as carved in stone and resist 
that it would have readily while the opinion leuer was still being 
cussed. Some Jinns include a legend on all their draft opinion letters noting I hat 
of a Jinal opinion leuer is to compliance with the firm's internal 
50 
constructive adjustments in the documents and the 
structure. . . " Revised ABA Guidelines §2 .1 at 877 
major problem later is identified, the opinion preparers 
alert counsel for the opinion " Id. 
Revised ABA Guidelines §1.3 at 876 lApp. 4 at 4:3]. 
1 Revised ABA Guidelines § J .2 at. 876 4 at 4 :2]. See California 2005 
Report at 13-14 [App. 22 al § l notes and I 
§1.04 33 at 33:15] ("If the cost of 
of it, the 
is served the 
[App. 42 at 42:78] 
,arnn1u,,1uwhen wmpared with the 
not cost-effective . . and should not [be) 
Report at 5ml [App. 9 at 9: l OJ. See 
enforc:;eability opinion should he ,.,,,,.,,,,_,,,n or " .. . ., .. _ .. , " 
"RevisedABA Guidelines §3. l at 878 [App. 4 lit 4:.i-6]. See Cahf01 m.1 200:> 
Report at 12-13 [App. 22 at Georgia § 1.04 33: 16]. 
The "Golden Rule" also applies in England. See Yeowart, s1,fm1 
J64-IG5 the rule as "No law firm should 
circumstances if the mies were reversed, the 
not be prepared to an opinion itself in the sa:ue terms. 
6 ln another section, the Revised ABA Gmdelmes state that 
should not he requested "that are beyond the professional competence of law-
yers." Revised ABA Guidelines § 1.4 at ~76 l":PP· 4 al. 4:3]. Cusiomary . 







recipient should not b d . d 
. e enie an OJ)inio J "I expenenced in the matters u d . n t 1at awyers 
render in co111na1-able . . . n er cons71deration would commonly 
. . · r snuat10ns " A l . 
op1111on to be delive1·ed . t l . . . . . s t 1ey discuss the form of 
· . · .t c os1ng each · · t , " h 1 fa1t h to acrn•e on a ·f1'n··· l t· . " 8 , . sic t. s ou d work in good 
0 • « orm and " · I 
othe1~ fi. J ctin i1 g ·th . "9 is emu ed to assume that the 
E ·c n an opini n th-••t h 
h , " 1 prepar · h ni II o IU.t be . . 1 cli IL · re and that 
Ii m, ·a ng Lh opinion 'pi Ill . • >r x.unµI , may · 
a pr blem that is cli ff ,., nta,n a common ·x ption 
nr and rno1 .~ •rious than tJ ,e 
~;-tdd~-;-·be -;:;;ques1ed~ ir it did what i . . . . 
dete nn1ned l>I' the "11nrk~1 " . . '. . s ,llld Is uot approp1·iate would J,u 
J · • ' ,. , ,1 posll!on 1·e1ect d · I 1 ~ I.Iles, and the California 2004 Rem , r . . e . m lot l the Revised AHA ( ;u idi:·-
(,mdelines § I.Ci !App 4 ·1t -l·'l]' C t;.1es ()pirnon Repor t. Seti Revised ABA 
App. 4 at I [App. 23, 'It ,23 ·3.6]' (",al l orn1a 2004 Remedies Opinion ReJ)on 
111 k .,, J ' • .. t ie overused W 
ar et c oes not justi fi., a renue l f, . . · · 'l~f>ant comment that 'it is 
det · · · ' , s 0 1 ,Ill enforceab1J 1 · · 
. em1H1auu11 of whether an enl'o rceabilit . . . l y opimon). Instead, the 
tu1 n on a cost/henelit anah•sis ,. > op1nw11 should be requested should 
c ·t f . ' , · · ,,ee note 4 mJ;ra . d i°~ 0 preparmg an opiniou substamiall • . . ' '. a;i. acrn111pa11ying text. ff the 
t le op1mon should not be i·, , . ·l y Ollt\\e1g is l!s benelit to the reci1>ien1 
wh ! I . . equeste< absent Sf)eci· l . ' 
a ~ le recipient claims "the 111·11·k l·.. I . a Cll'cumst,mces, no mauer 
' R · , e to Jc. 
·. e v1 sed ABA Guide lines §3. ! al 878 LA> .· . . • , .. 
h om the passage quoted in the text i·e· J . l/,·,4 ,It ·l:5-6J I he clause o111iHed 
ar s <1s ,o ows: 
a.ssuming tl1at the requesied o inio1 . . . . . 
(,111d('1mes and the o1J1·111·0 l . p I I is otherwise cons1s1e111 with rhµse 
· . 1 giver 1as the · . · . ~ 
profess1onaljudgmem is ab! t . j . . re<1~,s~te expertise a11d in its 
11 • e o 1 enc e, the opimon. 
!> Revised ABA Guide lines §2. 1 ar 877 [ 
ABA Legal Opinion p . . l App. 4 at 4 :4J. 
t nnc1p es §IF Unfo ' L l 
o treat a closing opinion ·1s ,· r,·t we. · . . , l unate )', some lawyers continue 
• · ' · 1 ea conu--inu· J . · · 
opuuons they can regardless ofan o in' ,' , _a p1ov1s1011 , push to get whatever 
they perce ive themselves to be in l1 su~er;:~:~ i p 1 o~mety and play "hardball" when 
overzealous counsel for the . . I . . argam111g position. When pressed by 
Inv l I opmmn rec1p1ern belea . I · · 
' e >een lea rd to compare op >osin c ' . gue1 e( opmmn p1·ep,ll'ers 
th~ movie mogul, who is repon e~J t;J I ~ ' ~m;st' unfavorably lo Samuel Goldwyn, 
opu1H.lll: I'll give it lo you. " Many lawv~1~: ~.::: c . a youn~· '''.riter, "Wheu I wam your 
,Ill OJ)l!l!Oll n :quest that clearly "Oes 'I (' . ~ found lh,11 a good way to respond lo 
ABA Legal O pinion PrinciJ)les ~o :., ex~ J,u is to lllV<.>ke the Golden Rule and the 
mg · · · · • u e I e ev·1111 inss· · 1 ' op1rno11s --- and to hold their . d \ ' , . ,1ge.~ mt 1e literature on clos-
·1g'ai · J · gi oun · · "1he11 faced , · h J · · 
, , ns1 l lt:'111. the Jawvers ou the tl .. 'd ' ,, I!. t le weight ofauthoritv 
, o 1e1 s, e normally will back off . 
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I utroduction §1.8 
, •111111 p1 nl rclinaril w Id 
, 111 nd Tri.Bar 199 
"l'mion pr p rs gniz 
, h,· opini n recipient they 
1t1 ipi m (or · to gi 
10 T riBar 1998 Repon at 602-603 [App. 9 at 9;13-14]. Ci ting the TriBa1-
l'l'l8 Report for a "general discussion of this subject (including the role of dis-
• I, .sure)," the Revised ABA Guidelines state the principle as fo llows:" An opin ion 
l:"'1·1· should not render an opinion thal the opi nion giver recognizes will mis-
1,·;id the rec ipient with regard LO the matters addressed by the opin ions given." 
!{.-vised ABA Guidelines § 1.5 at 876 [App. 4 at 4 :3]. See also California 2005 
l~q >ort at IO (App. 22 a l 22 :21 ]; California 2004 Remedies Opinion Report App. 
Io at 16 [App. 23 at 23: 127): 
FINAL ADMONITION: 
Opinions must not be misleading: If, under the circumstances of a given 
lransaction, an opinion giver believes that an opinion would be mislead -
ing to the recipient were the opinion giver (in reliance upon customary 
practice or otherwise) to leave unstated an exception that .. . [under the 
analysis of' California law in Appendix I OJ it. is not necessary to state, the 
opinion giver should consider making an appropriate disclosure, so as to 
avoid rendering a misleading opinion. 
The Revised ABA Guidelines point out that § 1.5 "does not p reclude limiting the 
matters addressed by an opinion through the use of specific language if the 
limitation itself will not mislead the recipient." Revised ABA Guidelines § 1.5 
n.8 at 876 [App. 4 at 4:3}. · 
The rnle against lawyers' g iving closing opinions that mislead recipients is 
analogous in some ways to the nile against auditors' certifying misleading finan-
cial statements that was adopted almost fony years ago by the Second Ci1·cuit 
Court of Appeals. U.S. v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 196D). In Si11wn, in a11 
often-cited opinion by Judge Friendly, the Second Circuit n ,jected the argument 
that compliance with generally accepted accounting principles afforded an audi-
tor absolute protection from liability. Instead, the court held that evidence of 
compliance may be highly persuasive buL that a Jinde1- of fact still has room to 
determine that the auditors did not act in good faith and that the certified 
financial statements were materia lly misleading. 425 F.2d at 805-80G. 
In 2002 the ABA House of Delegaies approved an amendment to 
Comment I to Rule 4. I of the Model Rules of Professional Condm:t that 
addresses misleading sta tements to third persons. The amendment states that 
statements by a lawyer that are partially 1n1e but misleading are the equivalem of 
aflirmarive false siacements. 
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.8 Introduction 
1 1 See § 1.3. l, .m/Ha. 
1:?The rule aga i11s1 misleading the opinion recipienl 1·ela1es only to 1he 
opinions being: given. It is no1 a full disclosure rule such as thal imposed by Llw 
federal securities laws. Sl'l' last paragraph of§ 1.:1.2 note 11, .w/m1. As the TriBar 
I !)!)8 Report puts it : 
IT]ht: omissio n of information not relevant IO tht: opinion given ... does 
no! mislead. 111e question the opinion preparers must consider is whether 
under the cin:umstances the opinion will cause the recipient to miseval-
uate the specific opinion given. 
TriBai· 1998 Report at 603 [App. 9 at 9: 14]. See Mega Group, Inc. v. Pecheneck & 
CuJTo, P.C., :\lo. 98694, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9812, at. *4 (N.Y. App. Div. 
Aug. 3, 2006) (finding that opinion lette1· that <lid not disclose material li1i g-<1tion 
contained no misrepresentations where opinion letter contained "precisely the 
infonnation" called for in the purchase and sale agreemelll and that informat.ion 
did not include anything on litigation). Nevertheless, ift.he opinion preparers are 
awan,• of i11 format.ion unrelated to the opinions being given that is not known to 
the opinion recipient and tlwt they regard as problematic, they should consider 
wbt: ther they wish to cont.im1e w be associated with the transaction and, by deliv-
ering an opinion letter, to facilitate the closing. See § I. 7 note l I, rn.pm. 
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i:i See Revised ABA Guidelines §3.1 at 878 [App. 4 at 4:liJ: 
( >pinicm givers and counsd for opinion recipients should be gu ided by a 
sense of professionalism and not treat opinions simply as if they were 
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§2.3.1 The Opinion Framework 
ula dosi11g m from counsel !ill' tire other side. For 
if the cornpany is cmcri11g into a credit agree111cnt, it 
may n ·ccivc from cotmsd for the lender an opinion on 1ts righ1 
lo take down additional funds m the linrn·e; if' it is not publicly 
traded a11d is · acquired for stock, it 111ay1 receive from counst'I 
for tltt' ring co111pany an opinion on !ht· stock\ validity·." 
\Vltc11 the trnusaction in question is a S)'1tdict1io11, crnmscl 
111,w lie asked the placement agcrn lo addtcss <Ill npi11irn1 lct l ('I 
gcm:rically, for ex;1mplc. to "the pimhasers of iutcn·s1s in the 
Partnership." I .awyt.·rs slmuld think r;urrullv hcliin· ;1gnT111g 
(> s11d1 a request lwcmtsc ol thc likelihood 111.1 1 111;111y ol' tlw pur 
d1ascrs will not lie represented by counsel or know ('t10t1gl1 1lwrn -
sclves a lHH l l opinions to u nderstand llil' opin1011s tltqr an· 
' By analogy to the opinion lctl(T ol ( 0111pa11y rrn111:-cl 
1nSH. !lie la.,khHn· .'w, Op1mo1"nl 
I ht: 1\li,\ Sn I i011 o f l\u,111<',., I .di\'. I li;II rq>< II I f Hllllh Olli I h.11, 111,t<·ad ol 
i"t1l'd," 111a11y bwy,Ts g1v<', .111d l h<' SI·:<: sLIII an-ep1,. 1 l w 11101<· 11·;11 I it irn1;d "d11 ly 
aui hori1,·d" ;111d '\·,tlidlv issrn·d" Im 1111da1io11, ol I lw "I 11111<>11 (1h,n1,., .. d in ( 
IO oi llii, book). l ( lp111in11S i11 SU: i'ili11gs al '.!:l'l 11\pp. ;11 I-
i\ dosing opinion aho 1uay lw d1•liv1•1·,·d lo 1111' ,·rn11p;111y h)' 1m111wl li,r 
the in .i 11 ;di-, il\h 11.ll t.S.H I inn lo1 <'>.;1111pll', 011 ilw 1·11 ln11 <',ii ,i 111 v 111.111 
n·qui1111g tlte ,1,quinT to make addi1imi;d <ilsli f'd)'l11c111, 
upon iithi,·v,·11H·111 of s11<·cilted ,._11·11i11g, largvts. WIH·11 .i11 upi111rn1 i, oul)' 
addrvsscd to iii<' l co111p;111y. slrnkltuld,·rs ol tht· ;1<q11ir<'d <<1111p;i111· 
111;1y 1101 lie :1hlc lo "11 it. Frn ,1 dist uss1t111 ul 1lia1 prohlc111 a11d ;i 
solt11irn 1, wr l;ist pa1.1gTa[>li ol nole 10, m/m. 
·; ;\1 1 opinion to on cu,1<>111,uy pr;1ct1n· "pn·n11.wd 011 tli<' 
that the opinion will he repn·"·111vd hy 1lt,·ir ow11 trn111s..J 
will !lwn1selvcs lie knowledgeable a!m111 n1s10111.11y pr;u 11< , .. lfrs1.1te111tc111 nl 
( !.aw)•t·1·s §:lfi , ( :olll!Hc11l a !App. I al l ::IHI; f'ril\ar I \J!)H lfrporl al 
fi() 11.'.!·l l:\pp. :11 D: I '2. I I Revised i\ Bi\ ( ;11idt'li11t•s stale 1h:t1 a11 t1pi1t1011 
i, c11titled to ass11 111,., wi1lioul so slating, thal "ill<' opi11io11 n:cipi,·111 (;tlum· or wit It 
its nn111,el) famili:1r wit It <11Slrn11:11y pr,1<ti, ,. <01H<'llli11g th,· preparation ,llld 
" lfrvised i\!11\ ( :rnd, ·li111·s ;i! I at 
i11 tit,· ( :w1t,:x1 of .i l'riv:111• !'lan ·111,·111, i1.1 
I\)!) I al '.!(i:,, '2.7:1 (Pl .I) ("the 11ddn·ssee iss11e is 
plat ,·11w111 l lw 
qu:dil1ed ;111d restnued, 10 ' tlw ul 
· though as to lorn1. 111volves co11sidt:rahl,· 
rhc will tmderstaml dw 
The Opinion Framework 
m an ut1derwri1 tell Dt'i(.Ting, the op111 trn1 lcl!er i 11 a syndical cd 
offering 11onnally should lie addn·sscd only to ti 
rnent agent attd not to the purchasers." 
Liability to 1\ddrcssvcs ;111d 01 IH·rs 
I f l'oll t ' Hl ,I WI ' 
,Ill' otlt,-r 11011 1 lit·llh \\'hu111 "llw l,t\ 
IIOlt 
·'l'Pli1 .,hh· lmt l:11 •. 
~tu Willi 
op111irn1 or wili 11sc tlic op11w>11 111 tlw i11fc11dnl lllilllll<T "). :;,.,. 
,u/Ho. Sonu· oftlu· ntost (l'tHthl<"sorut' i nurl ca ses n·lat(' lo 
ncnirn1 w111t Iii<' 111 tax ,lwlic1,. l 11t1!<' 
I lie is 1w1 p<Tll't I I w, ;i1 is,· t lw pun li;1.\t'l s In 11111 lw t.\Sll<'r 111 ;1 !11 n1 
co111111i111w111 1111d,·1wrill<'11 olli:ri11g 11n· 1101 tlw p11l,li, 111vc,1ors lirn tlw 1111d,·1 
wri1c1·s. N,· v,TI I wlt-ss, ii I Ii<' 1111dn \\ri11Ts w,·n· lt1 ;1sk, 0111pa11y, 01111,,·l tn :1ddn·" 
j ls Of'l lllilll ii'! It '11 U I he pd 1Jic 111\'t'Slt>l'.S, C0111p:t II y C1ll ill"'' l l<l do11lil \l'Ol lid it'IU.w. 
"Wliil<' 1·cli:111<t· liy tlw 1,·,ipic111 is 11,·n·ss,11y Im ii lo ,·,1;1!ili•,h 
n:lian," ;tlo11,· 1101 s11f!ic1<·111. R,·li,111, ,. l,y 11,c re, quc111 11111,1 lw 1<·11\!111;ili lc. 
Fi1,1 M;iss. l\;111k, N .A. \'. l•lwi111, i\;o. 0'.1·!007 II(:,; I. '. 100'/ W!' 18'.!'IT/!1, ,II IC I '.I· 
20 (Ma,,. S11p<'I. ( :1 .f111w I'.'., '.!00'/) (li11tli11); 1cli;1111,· liy h;111k nnl 1,·;iso11;il1lc 
sopliis11c:lli1111 u( h:111k 11 11d ii, n11111wl); lfr,1111,·11w1l1 ol I ,!IV ( 
L1wy<'rs I, ( :0111111t•111 ,. l 1\f'p. I .ii :·11 n\\'t'1' t lo nnw !r,·111 
cli,·111 ,s i11v1l<'d to lt'ly 1111 l:tW}'<T's op11111111 al!d "tltc 11u11dic111 drn·, 
so"): liill:11 I !l\}H Rcl'orl 111 liO·l !1\pp. !) 111 1): I <ii 1,·, 1pi,·11 1 l,;i, 1tn t1g l11 
I<> ;i11 d r<'iia11< ,. i., 11111·caSt111a l,lt- 1111tl<T Ilic nn 11111,1:m, ,., rn 
opinio11 is k1ww11 liy tit,· opi11io11 It'< i1iie11t lo !It' l.1b,·'l 
111 OIi<' l'<'Ct'II( l':l.SI.', ('\Tl! 1lirn1gli tilt' op1111rn1 I<'( 1p1t·111 did 1101 
!)l'OV<' that II l'<'l!i·d 011 lite npi11iu11, the ,·0111·1 W,i' In prc"1111t· rdi;irn,• <111 
tlic gro1111d, th;1! tilt' npini,m was a ,rn1di1iu11 <1(a11d "pn:se111" ;11 !11t· 
Dl'a11 Foods Co. v. 1':1pp:11ha11a,i, No. 0 l-'2.:i'l:1 111.S, 200·1 WI. :IO l 
I ( l lt·t . '.I, ::00·1) that p1n1d,·11t ol 
had cxa111i11<:d 11 sd1edulc lo I he ;1g1cc111t·111 tilt' sa11w mau,·r, ;;s w,·n· 
covered i11 01Ji11im1 Inn nowhere stat i11g that lie rdicd rn1 opi11irn1. 1tsd{'; 
argumenl th;tt opi111011 :111 exf.l';meous, 1ierl 1;ip~ rcduud:11H, 
urn10ticcd a11d 1111rnred lor i11 a rack ol donm1c111.s 111 the 
1" Rcsliltc111c11t of Law Coverning §:> I ('2.) Ji\pp . I at l: I J. 1-'tlr d1S-
cussio11s in hai· association reports or opi11ioi1 liabilitv to sci· 
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('OtlrlS 
ng opinmn and 
allowed stand 
l t.o To avoid an>1 
lll<Tg<T 11011t·lh<'!t·" 111:1y lw umvilli11g lo 
,1ockliold<'l's ,11 uilH'nvi,e .1111ltrni1,· ill('lll l" 
11 , 1:ir,1 Nai'I 11:mk oil hll':1111 v. I r:111, 
( ;"')'ta,. 111, l'roud, 8'.!li l'.'. 1d l 
::111n (\'ii V. Supp. 70 l .\' 
( :t'1111.1l ll.111k of I >,·11v,·r N 
Oil(', 
whether a knder h:1d a claim 111 






expected to perform to give opinions." 63 Bus. Law. 1277 (2008). 
31. The customary diligence element of Customary Practice "requires the opinion 
giver to conduct such review as lawyers in similar circumstances would normally conduct." 
TRIBAR OPINION CO:MMITIEE, 'DnRD-P ARTY "CLOSING" OPINIONS, 56 Bus. Law. 591, 60 I (1998). 
32. An opinion giver must ensure that a third-party closing opinion letter is not 
misleading to the opinion recipient. In other words, even if the counsel for the opinion recipient 
and the counsel for the opinion giver agree to deviate in any way from customary practice, the 
opinion giver must ensure that the opinion recipient is not misled. As the TriBar Report states: 
An opinion the opinion preparers believe to be misleading should not be delivered 
until disclosures are made to cure the problem ... When considering if an opinion to 
be given will mislead the opinion recipient, opinion preparers must think not only 
about the opinion itself but also about areas excluded from the opinion ... The 
question the opinion preparers must consider is whether under the circumstances 
the opinion will cause the opinion recipient to misevaluate the specific opinion 
given. 
TRIBAR OPINION COMMITI'EE, THIRD-PARTY "CLOSING" OPINIONS, 56 Bus. Law. 591, 602-03 
(1998) ( emphasis in original). The requirement that opinions not be misleading is a common sense 
part of customary practice. 
33. As noted by my coUeague on the TriBar Opinion Committee Donald Glazer, 
"[ e ]ven an opiµion that has been prepared with care and that is technically correct may be 
. . . 
misleading to the _opinion recipient." GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL OPINIONS, § 1.8 at 52 (3d 
ed.). Consistent with the TriBar Report quoted above, Mr. Glazer further notes "[t]he opinion 
process would be subverted if, with knowledge of the opinion preparers, a closing opinion instead 
became a vehicle for misleading the opinion recipient about the very matters on which the opinion 
preparers have been asked to provide their professional judgment." Id. at 54. Finally, consistent 
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with the TriBar Report quoted above, Mr. Glazer states that opinion preparers recognize 
that an opinion will be misleading to the opinion recipient they should disclose the problem to the 
recipient (or decline to give the opinion)."1 Id. at 53. 
34. When opinion givers and opinion recipient counsel refer to "clean" opinions, they 
are referring to opinions which are not qualified or reasoned opinions. "Clean" opinions are more 
valuable to the opinion recipient because they advise the recipient that there are no known issues 
or impediments to providing the opinions. If opinions are "reasoned" or "qualified," this puts the 
opinion recipient on notice that there may be issues regarding those opinions. This, in turn, would 
lead the opinion recipient to make inquiries of the opinion giver and to investigate or conduct due 
diligence or legal research relative to legal issues subject to the "qualified" or "reasoned" opinions. 
35. In order to ensure that I was using the correct standard of care for my opinions 
below, I consulted with an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho with experience preparing, 
approving and delivering third-party opinion letters. I learned that Idaho opinion practitioners, like 
other states, use the national standard of customary practice for preparing third-party opinions 
letters as discussed in this Declaration. 
36. While I do not agree with Bart Harwood's opinions, I agree with his testimony 
regarding the standard of care set forth in paragraphs 4-8 of his affidavit dated January 19, 2015 
(which I am also relying upon for the customary practice in Idaho necessary to render my opinions 
in this Declaration). 
37. Riley was a shareholder and senior attorney who acted within his scope of 
employment with Eberle Berlin in drafting, approving, and delivering the Opinion Letter to Reed 
Taylor. 
1 Scott Bell and the other attorneys at Caimcross were not named or pennitted recipients of the 
Opini9n Letter, so they could not rely upon the Opinion Letter for any purpose. 
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38. In 1994 and 1995, Reed Taylor owned the controlling majority interest in AIA 
Services Corporation, specifically, 613,494 common shares (rounded up :from 613,493.5 common 
shares) or approximately 63% of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock of the 
company. 
39. In 1995, AIA Services Corporation, by and through Reed Taylor's brother R. John 
Taylor and other investors, sought to purchase Reed Taylor's majority interest in the company 
through a share repurchase in order to obtain operational and :financial control over the company. 
Their plan was to take the company a different direction by selling new insurance products and 
then to effectuate a public offering of the stock or sell the company. 
40. Initially, AIA Services Corporation and certain of its other shareholders desired to 
acquire 500,000 of Reed Taylor's controlling interest through a proposed merger with another 
corporation. That merger did not materialize and was abandoned in early 1995. Although Reed 
Taylor had granted an option to Centennial Insurance to purchase 500,000 of his common shares 
for $7.5 million on September 9, 1994, AIA Services Corporation sought to reacquire that option 
so that it could redeem 500,000 of Reed Taylor's common shares. 
41. AIA Services Corporation, other shareholders and certain investors (James Beck, 
Michael Cashman and Richard Campanaro ( collectively "Investors")) then desired to redeem all 
613,494 of Reed Taylor's common shares. Beck and Cashman were sophisticated and accredited 
investors who had vast experience in the insurance ·industry. 
42. The Investors entered into an Investment Agreement dated June 30, 1995 with AlA 
Services Corporation wherein they had the right and power to accept or reject the final terms of 
the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. Like Reed Taylor, they too were entitled to receive an 
opinio~ letter from Mr. Riley opining on many of the same issues which were the subject of the 




Opinion Letter to Reed Taylor. Mr. Riley represented AIA Services Corporation for the 
preparation and finalization of the Investment Agreement. 
43. The Transaction Documents were negotiated by Reed Taylor's independent 
counsel, Caimcross & Hempelmann, and Eberle Berlin, as general counsel for AIA Services 
Corporation. The final terms of the Transaction Documents were approved by an independent 
committee of AIA Services Corporation's board of directors, which such committee was 
comprised of outside directors. When I refer to "outside directors" in the foregoing sentence, I 
mean that the directors were not officers or employees of AIA Services Corporation, nor were they 
major stakeholders. Bruce Sweeney, an Idaho Senator at the time, chaired the independent 
committee and that committee was represented by Mr. Riley. 
44. Reed Taylor was advised by the Board of Directors of AIA Services Corporation 
to seek and obtain separate and independent counsel to represent him in the sale of his shares back 
to the company and he did so, retaining the Seattle, Washington law firm Cairncross & 
Hempelmann. 
45. The parties agreed that the consideration for the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares 
was agreed to be $1.5 million cash (which was later revised to a $1.5M Down Payment Note) at 
closing and a $6M Note due in 10 years for 500,000 of his common shares (the same price 
previously negotiated by Centennial Insurance) and approximately $1,118,656 for his remaining 
1 i3,494 common shares. ·Reed Taylor was to be given security interests in the commissions of 
AIA Services Corporation and the stock of all of its operating subsidiaries. The total value of the 
transaction exceeded $8.5 Million. 
46. On July 18, 1995, the Board of Directors of AIA Services Corporation approved 
the general terms of the purchase of Reed Taylor's common shares. 
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47. On AIA Services Corporation held a shareholders meeting, but no 
resolution was submitted to the shareholders to approve the use of capital surplus to authorize the 
purchase Reed Taylor's shares as permitted by I.C. § 30-1-6. Although the shareholders were 
provided notice of the general terms of the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares, they were not asked 
to vote on any of the agreements, to approve the purchase under I.C. § 30-1-6, or to authorize the 
use of capital surplus to purchase the shares under I.C. § 30-1-6. 
48. The Transaction Documents ( except for the $6M Note) were signed effective July 
22, 1995. The $6M Note was signed effective August 1, 1995. 
49. Section 2.5(j) of the Stock Redemption Agreement set forth the requirement that 
the Opinion Letter be delivered as a condition of closing and further required the opinions to be in 
form and substance acceptable to Reed Taylor or his counsel. The Opinion Letter expressly states 
that it is being provided to Reed Taylor "pursuant to Section 2.5G) of the Stock Redemption 
Agreement dated July 22, 1995." 
50. If the Opinion Letter were not delivered in a form and substance acceptable to Reed 
Taylor or his counsel (i.e., by providing the "clean" opinions contained in the draft opinion letter 
attached as an exhibit to the Stock Redemption Agreement), Reed Taylor had no obligation to 
close the redemption tnmsaction. 
51. The content of the opinions and representations in the Opinion Letter was 
negotiated by Reed Taylor's independent counsel, Scott Bell ofCairncross & Hempelm~ and 
counsel for AIA Services Corporation, Mr. Riley of Eberle Berlin. 
52. According to Scott Bell, in the negotiation for the contents of the Opinion Letter, 
Eberle Berlin initially refused to deliver certain opinions, but it later agreed to give those opinions. 
However, as noted herein, Riley never provided any reasoning or disclosures in the Opinion Letter 
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to prevent that Opinion Letter from being misleading to Reed 
of the Opinion Letter.2 
who was the sole recipient 
53. On August 16, 1995, the final form of the Opinion Letter was approved by Scott 
Bell and Mr. Riley. I am assuming that such approval occurred on August 16, 1995 because that 
was the date that Mr. Riley confirmed that the Opinion Letter was ready for delivery. 
54. The final Opinion Letter was dated August 15, 1995, but was not delivered to Reed 
Taylor until on or about August 17, 1995. The fax cover sheet to Reed Taylor's counsel indicated 
that the final Opinion Letter would be federal expressed to A.IA Services Corporation's offices for 
the closing. 
55. The redemption ofReed Taylor's shares was closed on or about August 17, 1995. 
I am assuming that August 17, 1995 was the date of closing based upon communications that I 
reviewed wherein Riley indicated on August 16, 1995 that closing would be ''tomorrow." This 
further evidences that the Opinion Letter was a crucial part of the transaction. 
< 
56. The Opinion Letter was prepared by Mr. Riley (although, as discussed above, the 
content was negotiated by Mr. Riley and Scott Bell). 
57. The Opinion Letter specifically acknowledges that Eberle Berlin was general 
counsel for A.IA Services Corporation and that the Opinion Letter was based on the "actual 
knowledge" of Mr. Riley and Mr. Turnbow. The Opinion Letter was Mr. Riley's first one. 
58. The Opinion Letter is addressed to Reed Taylor and specifically invited his reliance 
by limiting him as the only party who may rely upon the Opinion Letter. 
2 The issue is whether the opinion recipient Reed Taylor was misled by the Opinion Letter, not 
Scott Bell or any other attorney from Cairncross. I am not opining herein that Scott Bell or any other 
attorney at Caimcross was misled by the Opinion Letter. 
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As stated above, when I refer to "clean" opinions in this Declaration, I mean 
opinions that are not reasoned or qualified. The Opinion Letter contains several "clean" opinions 
implicated in this lawsuit, which were customary in transactions such as the stock redemption, 
including, without limitation: (a) that AIA Services Corporation had the po,ver and authority to 
enter into the Stock Redemption Agreement; (b) that all necessary actions had been taken by 
shareholders; (c) that the Transaction Documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of 
A1A Services Corporation; (d) that the Transaction Documents (including the Stock Redemption 
Agreement) are enforceable in accordance with their terms; (e} that the .Transaction Documents 
(including the Stock .Redemption Agreement) did not violate any laws; (f) that Reed Taylor had 
perfected security interests in the common shares of AIA Services Corporation's operating 
subsidiaries; and (g) that Reed Taylor had creditor rights undeddaho law. The Opinion Letter did 
not contain any reasoning or disclosures to support any of the foregoing opinions and thus they 
were "clean" opinions. 
60. When the Opinion Letter was delivered to Reed Taylor on or about August 17, 
199.s, AJA Services Corporation's articles of incorporation did not authorize the use of capital 
surplus under I.C. § 30-1..fi to redeem Reed Taylor's shares nor, as stated above, did AJA Services 
Corporation's shareholders vote on a resolution authorizing the use of capital surplus under I.C. § 
30-1-6. The Opinion Letter did not provide any reasoning or disclosures for· the opinions1 
including, those opinions referenced in the preceding paragraph: The Opinion Letter did not 
discJose or provide any disclosures or reasoning that (a) Mr. Riley had deviated from the plain and 
ordinary meaning: of"eamed surplus" under LC.§ 30-1-2; (b} Mr. Riley had relied upon a so-
called ''fair value" test to purportedly comply with the "earned surplus" restrictions under J.C. § 
30-1-6 (which essentially applied the definition for "capital surplus" in place of the definition for 
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"earned surplus"); (c) Mr. Riley had allegedly relied upon the compliance ofI.C. § 30-1-6 based 
on certaiD. payments to Reed Taylor for the redemption. being subordinate to the payments to Donna 
Taylor (which in tum allegedly meant that AIA Services Corporation could only make payments 
to Reed Taylor if it could legally make payments to Donna Taylor); and (d) Mr. R.iiley had relied 
upon La Yoy SflJJply Co. v. Young, 84 ldaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (1962), which stated that "A 
corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared. IDegal,'' to support his 
opinions because AIA Services Corporation could not pmportedly disavow its obligations to Reed 
Taylor. 
61. At closing, all of Reed Taylor's 613,494 common shares in AIA Services 
Corporation were canceled. 
62. The stock redemption transaction was restructured in 1996, Reed Taylor's $1.5M 
Note was restructured (giving him over $350,000 in additional consideration), and AIA Services 
Corporation agreed to reimburse him for the attorneys' fees and costs incurred. Neither AIA 
Services Corporation nor any other party formally objected to the restructuring nor did they 
demand that the purchase price be renegotiated. 
63. When the transaction was restructured in 1996, Mr. Riley did not provide Reed 
Taylor with any disclosures or reasoning for the basis for their opinions in the Opinion Letter nor 
did he provide supplemental disclosure or a corrected Opinion Letter containing that information. 
. . . . 
There is no evidence that Mr. Riley provided any disclosures to Reed Taylor that he had deviated 
from plain and clear meaning of the definitions for "earned surplus" under LC. § 30-1-2 and the 
application of that definition to "earned surplus" in LC. § 30-1-6. The Opinion Letter continued to 
be misleading and no action was taken by Mr. Riley to cure the misleading Opinion Letter in 1996 
or at any time thereafter, including, during Taylor v. AJA Services-when Reed Taylor and his 
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attorneys were seeking that information. 
64. Several years after Mr. Riley prepared the Opinion Letter in 1995, he left Eberle 
Berlin and joined the law mm of Hawley Troxell Mr. Riley was an attorney at Hawley Troxell 
during the entire time Taylor v. AJA. Services was being litigated before Judge Brodie and on 
appeal. In the instant case, Mr. Riley filed an affidavit stating that he .. communicated" with other 
attorneys at Hawley Troxell relative to the litigation in Taylor v. AJA. Services. Despite this 
communication, Mr. Riley never disclosed to Reed Taylor the reasoning for the opinions in the 
Opinion Letter while Taylor v. AM. Servicu was pending, despite repeated requests, and he and 
his attorneys (the same law firm representing him in the instant lawsuit) failed to disclose the 
reasoning to Reed Taylor or his counsel while that lawsuit was pending before Judge Bmdie and 
on appeal. 
65. The $6M Note matured on or about August 1, 2005. On January 29, 2007, Reed 
Taylor filed suit in Taylor v. AJA. Services to collect the sums due to him on the $6M Note, to 
enforce other contractual obligations and assert claims flowing from or relating to the security 
interests granted to him and sums owed to him. 
· 66. On February 8, 2008, the district court granted Reed Taylor's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the default of the $6M Note. 
67. On April 16, 2008, the defendants first asserted the illegality defense in Taylor v. 
AJA. Services. At that time, the defense was based upon an alleged violation ofl.C. § 30-1-46. 
68. Prior to the defendants asserting the illegality defense on April 16, 2008, there were 
never any allegations of illegality asserted in Taylor v. AJA. Services. In fact, AIA Services 
Corporation had moved to dismiss Reed Taylor's unjust enrichment claim in 2007 because it 
asserted that Reed Taylor had valid contractual rights to pursue his claims, and, therefore, an unjust 
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enrichment claim was improper. The district court agreed and dismissed that claim in 2007. 
69. On February 12, 2009, however, the defendants in Taylor v. AlA Services asserted, 
for the very first time that the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares violated J.C. § 30-1-6, and, 
consequently, the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable (AJA Services 
Corporation's 40l(k) Plan previously asserted the violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 on December 29, 
2008). 
70. Despite Reed Taylor's numerous requests to disclose the basis for Mr. Riley's 
opinions in the Opinion Letter and the legality of the transaction, he refused to do so. 
71. In 2009 in Taylor v. m Services, Mr. Taylor>s counsel, Mr. Bond, moved for a 
motion for continuance pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(1) to depose Mr. Riley and sought to depose Mr. 
Riley to ascertain the facts and reasoning relied upon by Mr. Riley for his opinions in the Opinion 
Letter. However, Mr. Riley and the defendants' attorneys successfully prevented hit deposition 
ftom ever taking place. Neither Mr. Bond nor Mr. Taylor could set forth by affidavit the 
information that they expected to obtain ftom Mr. Riley to preventthe enny of summary judgment 
because they bad no way of mowing what information and reasoning Mr. Riley relied upon tor 
his. opinions in the Opinion Letter because the opinions were clean and no reasoning was provided 
forthem. 
72. On June 17, 2009, the district court ruled that AJA Services Corporation had no 
. . . . 
earned surplus and the shareholders had not approved the use of capital surplus to purchase Reed 
Taylor's shares as provided in LC. § 30-1-6. Judge Brudie also rejected a number of arguments 
that Reed Taylor asserted in an attempt to enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement, irrespective 
ofit being illegal. On that same day, Judge Brudie also denied Reed Taylor's motion to continue 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f). 
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73. Reed Taylor moved for reconsideration. On August 2009, the district court 
denied Reed Taylor's motion for reconsideration and rejected other arguments that he had asserted 
to persuade the court to enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
74. Reed Taylor appealed the district court's rulings that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement was illegal and unenforceable. Reed Taylor also appealed the district court's refusal to 
enforce the agreements on a number of legal theories. On September 7, 2011, the Idaho Supreme 
Court affinned the district court in all material respects, and, like the district court, found the Stock 
Redemption Agreement' to be illegal and unenforceable and left Reed Taylor where it found him: 
[W]e affirm the district court's finding that AIA Services had insufficient earned 
surplus at the time it entered into the Stock Redemption Agreement ... 
• * * * 
AIA Services' shareholders did not authorize the use of capital surplus to redeem 
Reed Taylor's shares ... 
·*· * * * 
Because AIA Services had no earned surplus and was not authorized to use capital 
surplus when it agreed to purchase Reed Taylor's shares, the Stock Redemption 
Agreement violated the earned and capital surplus limitations of I.C. § 30-1-
6 ... [and] is thereby prohibited by law and illegal. 
In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically noted that "it appears that none of the parties 
recognized the potential violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6." Further, the Idaho Supreme Court affinned 
Judge Brodie's refusal to allow Mr. Riley's deposition to take place because, once again, Mr. 
Taylor and his counsel could not set forth precisely what information that they would obtain from 
Mr. Riley. There_ was no way that Reed '.faylor or his counsel co~ld possibly know the rC4Soning 
and disclosures for Mr. Riley's opinions when such reasoning and disclosures were omitted from 
the Opinion Letter. 
3 In the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion, "Stock Redemption Agreement'' was defined to include 
both the original 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure 
Agreement. 
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75. On remand, Reed asserted additional legal theories to attempt to 
persuade the district court to award him damages or to allow him to recover his attorneys' fees and 
costs based upon severing all other terms from the Stock Redemption Agreement. The district 
court refused to grant Reed Taylor any relief. 
76. Based upon the illegality of the Stock Redemption Agreement and Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement, Reed Taylor lost all of his contractual rights, security 
interests and claims to obtain payment of the $6,000,000 in principal and accrued interest owed to 
him under the $6M Note and his common shares were canceled and thus destroyed. 
77. On October l, 2009, Reed Taylor tiled his complaint in this action. From the time 
Reed Taylor tiled suit until early 2012, Mr. Riley &iled to disclose and concealed the factual basis 
and legal reasoning for their opinions and representations in the Opinion Letter. It was not ontil 
February 22, 2012 that Mr. Riley formally disclosed. for the first time~ some of the reasoning for 
the opinions and representations in the Opinion Letter. 
Opinions 
78. Based upon my knowledge, education and/or experience, together with the 
authorities and information I have reviewed, assumed and disclosed above, I render the following 
opinions: 
79. Mr. Riley, as an Opinion Letter preparer owed and/or assumed a duty of care and a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing to R~ Taylor to prepare and. deliver the Opinion Letter in a 
non-negligent manner and to ensure that the Opinion Letter was not misleading, which was to 
prepare, approve, and deliver the Opinion Letter exercising the degree of care and skill that a 
reasonably prudent opinion preparer would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. 
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80. Mr. Riley breached his duties to Reed Taylor when he failed to exercise that 
required degree of care and skill, thereby delivering to him an incorrect and misleading Opinion 
Letter, which, inter alia: (a) failed to state that the redemption transaction violated I.C. § 30-1-6 
(i.e., Mr. Riley did not decline to give the opinions); (b) incorrectly represented and opined that 
AIA Services Corporation had the power and authority to enter into the Stock Redemption 
Agreement; (c) incorrectly represented and opined that all necessary actions had been taken by 
shareholders; (d) incorrectly represented and opined that the Transaction Documents constituted 
the valid and binding obligation of AIA Services Corporation; (e) incorrectly represented and 
opined that the Transaction Documents were enforceable in accordance with their terms; (f) 
incorrectly represented and opined that the stock redemption transaction did not violate any laws; 
(g) incorrectly represented and opined that Reed Taylor had perfected security interests in the 
common shares of AIA Services Corporation's operating subsidiaries; and (h) incorrectly 
represented and opined that Reed Taylor had creditor rights under Idaho law. 
81. The statutes in question, I.C. § 30-1-6 and LC. § 30-1-2, were easily read and 
undemtood. Mr. Riley, whose :firm was general eounsel for AJA Services Corporation, 
intentionally engaged in an extreme deviation ftom opinion practice standal'ds by disregarding the 
plain meaning and.definitions of J.C. § 30-1-2. and J.C. § 30-1-6 by, inter alta. substituting the 
definition of "capital surplus" in place of the definition of "eamed surplus" and by not delivering 
reasoned opinions disclosing and explaining thosedeviatioos, particularly because of Idahcts long-
standing md :well-settled. rule of law that any contract that violates a statute is illegal and 
unenforceable. Even if Mr. Riley had provided ·the required reasoning and disclosures for bis 
opinions, be still would have breached the applicable standard of care by not applying the plain 
and ordinary meaning of "earned surplus" in I.C. § 30-1-2 to purportedly eomply with I.C. § 30-
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1 ~6. While the reasoning would have prevented the Opinion Letter :from being misleading. it would 
have still be negligently prepared. 
82. . If the Opinion Letter had disclosed that it was based on a so-called "fair value" test, 
a ~called subordination test or other reasons purportedly utilized by Mr. Riley to justify 
compliance with I.C. § 30-1-6~ rather than the plain language of that statute, Reed Taylor or any 
other reasonable opinion recipient would have elected not to sell his shares. However. Mr. Riley 
deprived Reed Taylor of the foregoing option because his Opinion Letter failed to make the 
necessmy disclosures or provide the required reasoning. Mr. Riley breached his duties of care 
owed to Reed Taylor by delivering to him an intentionally misleading Opinion Letter, even 
assuming that there was any applicable legal support of bis opinions. 
83. Mr. Ril~s assertions that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was legal 
because certain payments were to be subordinate to payments to Donna Taylor for the redemption 
of her shares (Ms. Taylor's shares were only redeemed as payments were made, while Reed 
Taylor's shares were redeemed and canceled in full in 1995) as a basis for sustaining the legality 
of the transaction is not supported by any provision in I.C. § 30-1-6 or I.C. § 30-1-2 and was also 
an intentional and reeldessly extreme deviation of opinion practice by not applying the plain and 
ordinary meaning of those statutes. 
84. Because of the nature of the special relationship between an opinion giver and an 
~ ,. . . 
opinion recipient (although Mr. Taylor had independent counsel. Mr. Riley had been Mr. Taylor's 
divorce attorney and they had a special relationship), the failure ofMr. Riley to make the required 
disclosures constituted, under these circumstances, a breach of a fiduciaty duty owed by Mr. Riley 
to Reed Taylor (including the fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing). 
EXPERT WITNESS DECLARATION OF RICHARDT. McDERMOTI - 21 
006375 
A-153 
85. Mr. Riley intentionally made no efforts whatsoever to disclose the material factual 
basis and legal reasoning for his opinions to Reed Taylor in 1995, in 1996 or anytime thereafter. 
and intentionally and recklessly concealed the reasoning :from Reed Taylor while he was seeking 
assistance :from him in attempting to enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement before Judge 
Brudie and before the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal. 
86. It was an outrageous and intentional recklessly extreme deviation for Mr. Riley to 
conceal the alleged factual basis and legal reasoning for his opinions and representations in the 
Opinion Letter :from Reed Taylor until after Judge Brudie had ruled that the Stock Redemption 
Agreement was illegal and unenforceable and the Idaho Supreme Court bad affirmed that decision 
in 2011, even though Reed Taylors counsel had requested information pertaining to the opinions 
in the Opinion Letter on numerous occasions :from 2008 through 2010. This conduct was 
performed by Mr. Riley with a disregard for the likely, foreseeable consequences. 
· 87. Mr. Riley-s series of acts and omissions (which occurred during Taylor 11. AJA 
Semces) represent· outrageous conduct .which intentionally and recklessly deviated fiom any 
acceptable standards applicable to opinion givers based upon the following: (a) Mr. Riley 
preparing and delivering the Opinion Letter as discussed in other opinions herein and not 
disclo~ing the reasoning for those opinions to Reed Taylor or his counsel during Taylor 11. AJA 
Services:, despite repeated requests by .Reed Taylor's counsel for information; (b) Mr. Riley-s 
intentional failure to disclose and concealment :from Reed Taylor of the analysis of and reasoning 
for their opinions (ineludingthe so-called "fairvalueu analysis and other reasons discussed above) 
and that they believed that their opinions were correct while Taylor v. AJA Services was pending; 
and (e} Mr. Riley's intentional acts permitting his law firm Hawley Troxell to undertake legal 
representation disavowing the opinions in the Opinion Letter and his refusal to endeavor to stop 
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such conduct ftom occurring in Taylor v. AM Services. 
88. When Mr. Riley's law firm Hawley Troxell was asserting in a judicial proceeding 
in Taylor v. AM Services that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable, 
notwithstanding the Opinion Letter stating the direct opposite, it was outrageous and intentional 
of Mr. Riley to ignore repeated requests by Reed Taylor's oounsel to assist the recipient of the 
opinion, Reed Taylor, in defendillg the Stock Redemption Agreement against the charge of 
illegalify and in seeking to enforce it in accordance. with its terms. Mr. Riley's oonduct in this 
regard is particularly outrageous because he was concealing ftom Reed Taylor both the reasoning 
for his opinions in the Opinion Letter and his belief that the Opinion Letter was correct and the 
transaction was legal. 
89. There is no question that Judge Brodie and the Idaho Supreme Court were both 
misled because they were not apprised of the factual basis and legal reasoning for Mr. Riley's 
opinions in the Opinion Letter~ as well as their belief that tbe Opinion Letter was oorrect and the 
transaction was legal., which separately constitutes ontrageous and intentionally reckless oonduet. 
In my opinion, at a minimum, Mr.Riley shoutd have voluntan'ly filed an affidavit or intervened in 
Tay/1,r 11. A.L4. Services to disclose the fad:ual basis and legal reasoning for his opinions in the 
Opinimi Letter, even if Mr. Riley woutd not have taken a position as to whether the Stock 
Redemption Agreement should be enforced. At tbe very least, full and fair disclosure and candor 
would have ·been skown to Reed Taylor, JudgeBmdie and the Idaho Supreme Court 
90. Mr. Riley intentionally prepared and delivered the misleading Opinion Letter to 
Reed Taylor, despite the fact that.Mr. Riley knew that his opinions should have been reasoned and 
disclosures shoutd have been made to cure the misleading Opinion Letter. It was impossible for 
Reed Taylor or his oounsel to obtain the disclosures and reasoning Mr. Riley relied upon for his 
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opinions in the Opinion Letter orto ascertain that the Opinion Letter-was intentionally misleading 
when such disclosures. and reasoning were omitted from the Opinion Letw until Mr. Riley first 
disclosed that in1brmation on February 22; 2014 which was years after Jndge Bmdie mled that 
the opinions in the Opinion Letter could no( be :fraud and after he was affirmed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court {because Mr. Taylor had oo evidence or knowledge of the mets to support the 
intentionalmisleadingnalure of the Opinion Letter until Mr. Riley disclosed them for the firsttime 
on February 22, 2012).4 
I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER 'IHE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING rs TRUE AND CORRECT. 
October 23. 2015 at New YorA; New York 
Date and City and State Signed 
-~~~A~ 
Richard T. McDermott 
4 Likemse, Mr. Taylor and his counsel bad no knowledge of the facts pertaining to the misleading 
Opinion Letter until after Taylor v. McNichols had been dismissed and affirmed by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 23rd day of October, 2015, I caused to be 
served true and couect copies of the foregoing document to the following parties via the method(s) 
indicated below: 
Keely E. Duke 
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DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
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251 East F.ront St. 
Boise, JD 83704 
Fax: (208) 384-5844 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile - (208) 342-3299 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement) 




~ z 0 
0 ....... ;....I 
:; 
~ v ..... 
~ ....) 
r 'u -' ,...._ c.... V 
< ;_. ;....I ~, e 
V 
1--< 
= ,.., ,..._ 
;::::- '-' 














= ... ~ 
, :.. : , :.f.- - -- = 
,.. ·- ~ ~ --
= =-~ 
-· > ==- - .. -- --:... -= - -:., ;., 
:,; ·- I :: : - ... ~ -











~ -1 = ,,. ::: - .. - ;. ~ 
-, 
= 
- -: = ::. 
- ::; 
= 













_r r.~. - -
• <oJ - . .. 
"" -- - - - 7 ~ ~ '-!'- - F = ;: - ~ 




i~:! ~ ~ '!.~ 
~ f 1 ~ t ~ -r~ 
· :;. ! .::. .. :: · ~ 
- -= - :., 

















-;: ~ -= :; 
= ::... ::.; 








· - J'. ::: 
:: i: 
tg z --
:: - ::. 
-" --g_~_ -~ ::: 
..... :;_ --;; ,_, -




• . - r. 
,... -:; ..;:; = 
-~ :: - -
~-= ~ 
.:::- ::: ; -- , ,-.. -
:i_ .:: = S: 
-= ~ ·~ .2 
158 
I ') ·"' Introduction 
lrom r 
takes the form of a 
Like any bminess letter. 
lll,lll I !id 
The lirst munbered paragraph o!' allllost evcrr 
ion addresses the company"s status as a corporat 1rn I or other 
f the t involves the issuaun" of 
numbered paragraph usually states tltal the stock is 
validly iss11cd, paid and 1101 '" 
what many the most i111porta111 
on the Foll< 
m 110 
:\lt\ 
Se,, 11/.w TriBar H!D8 Report at (i00-G02 [App. !l al 0: I I- HJ. 
:i Variations are set forth and discussed in §1!.8, iufin, a11d ( :hapler 3. 
1' t'he prinlipal focus of this bouk is opiniom m1 rnq>orat.iom. Clmpter 19 
add11°sst·, opi11io11.1 on limilt!d liability rnrnpa11ies. This book does not spedfi-
<'ali)' ;iddn1ss opinions 011 other business t.•11tities. Much of the discussio11, 










the stat us under t lie Uniform ( 
to the lender. 
a financial transaction 
mvestor or underwriter 
1 onducts "due diligence" to 
I! is itself to be from a business, !i11ancia! 
~ta11dpoi11l and that the trnusanion 1101 
problems. The nature of' the review it conducts 
l>'PC and size or the transaction and may indudc 
!llanagement, analysis of financial i II formation, 
1racts and otltcr dou1rnc11ts, and visits lo the 
\1 the the cornpany confirms that its 
continue to lie tnic, and otliC('l'S deliver 
matters. In some t 
retained by the crnnp,my deliver l<'llcrs 
'foirncss opinion" from an invcstrnent banker on 
or an asset valuation from 
advice 
1 rnrncial transaction conduct due 
1 For several illustrntive closing opinions, .111e i\ppcmfa:1:s i\- l, ,\ .. \/, H- l and 
I', ':! to th,: TriBar 1998 Report. TriB,1r I !l!)H Rt:pol'l al (i(\7 -07•1 (App. !) al 9:!JH. 
110]. 
§1.3 1 For a discussion of the purpose of a closing opinion from a 
I uropean point of view, see Ja11der & de Rochemont, Die Legal Opinion irn 
1(,-chtsverkchr mil den USA RIW/WAD-Rcdll der l11tcrnatio11ale11 Wirtschaf'l, 
I tt11e l !J7ti, at 13111!. Se11 also Legal Opinions in International Trnnsanions 9-1 :1. 
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~ 1.:~. j Introduction 
, lo,i1 1,: wi1h nothing bu t promi st:s a nd 01 hn i11ta11gibks 1to rn1a lly 
(a nd u nd e rsta ndably) wants ad vice fro m a lawyer mi the legal 
sraws o f, ,1hat it is bri11gi11g hom e. 
The principa l way a party to a tran saCLio n satisfies itself about 
it s legal position is thro11gli the serv ices o l'i1s own couusel. A party 
looks to its own counsel to hel p stru ct.un: the tra11sactirn1 and to 
p rq >a1·c and negotiate the agreerne 11 ts . It also loo ks l o its ow11 
counsel to ide ntify \\'orr isomc legal prnble tus and to prnv ide 
ad vice 0 11 how to so lve them . Some tim es, the advice a part)' 
recc ivt:s l'ro1n its ow11 un 111sd takes the fo rr 11 of a legal opi 11i o 11 . 
Rc Tc ip 1 ol k ga l adv ice l'rom its Oll'll cou 11sd , however, 110n11all y is 
1101 the on ly way a party to a transactirn1 i11fo rms itself about the 
legal a s 1leCls of the trnnsactiou. 
,\1u11h ·1 \\ii a p:111 • ,1 11,111. ,1t11u11 11ht,1111 i11l111111a111111 
.il w 111 i 1, le al pcl'i tirnt i lO ubiai11 ll I I I i II ' up111io 11 r. Olli ll I Ill ·I 
I , 1 llwu1h ·r 1th.: ? .\ 1hircl-1nnr lo in • 111111im hrn, ., ·1. 1, nnh 
~ Rev ised :\l~A Cu id di11es *I . I al K7:'\ L1\ pp . ·I al ·1:2 1: 
\Vhe11 rec1: ivcd , the dosing opi11io 11 sci vc, as a part o C the n ·,·ipi c 111 ·., 
diligence, 1m,viding the recip ien t witlt tl w opinio11 g-ivt:r 's prnfrssio11al 
j 11dg-1ne lll 0 11 leg-a l issu es co1ice rni 11 g tl1< , <> 1> inio11 giver's cl ient, Ilic l r.111s-
;1etio11, 11r both , that the n:cipicnl lia., dc: tcn11i11ed lo lw imporla1ll i11 
u,1111ed io 11 wi th th e 1ra11s.1ctio11. 
.'i,·,· lll1u Calif'ol'll ia '.!!HJCi Report al 7 [App . 22 :11 2'2 : I (JI (" Lm, yc.·r, and cli t·nb 
often cit,· d u,• dil ige nce ;1s tltc pdncip;il n::;i su11 li ll' n ·q1ws1i11g opi11iun l<'lte1, in 
hu s1110 , 1rnn sac1io11 s."); Cal iforn ia '.!O(M Re med it·s O pinion Re port ,\pp . ·I at 2 
[:\1 1p. 2:1 al 2'.',:'.18 ); Mich iga n Re port ,ll 5 [,\pp . '. \7 al :1 7:7 1 (" opi11 io11 p ro· 
\' ides ... , 0111 fon wi th re,peu to legal 111 ,1lter. ") : T<.:x;1s Re11on ~r l.C [App. 42 
al -l'.!:21ij ("The pri111a1'Y rn le of Iht• Opinio n is lo prnvi de so me liinnal co n!i r-
111a1io 11 throug h a wriuen statement of p ro fessiona l _jucl f{ 111e11 t by ;1 lawye1· as to 
ilw ,1vaib b ili1 y o l' the esse ntial elements ol' the tra11s:iction fo r whirh !hl' panics 
h,m · li.irµ; ai m·d"); \Vash i11gto 11 St,l!e Repo n 11\pp . ·1'. I al 4 '. l:7J (" puqwse of a 
kg:i l op i11 io11 is ro p rmid e assu ra11ce a~ to the lcg-,d uncle rpi1111in gs ofa 1ra11s-
anio11, no t ln i11 surc llg ai11s1 loss (trls iug out o f the lrn 11 sac 1io11" ). 
.\ s p:irt of their ove rall due dilif{t::llce , 111<: n11derwrite rs i11 llllb lic ofl't.:ri11 gs ol' 
"'' 111 i1i('s and in ves tors in privar,: offcri11 gs 11o n11;dly m:ike receipt of a dosi11g 
op i11 io11 ,1 co11di tio11 of cl nsing. lla11ks a11d <l lh e r i11sti111tio11 ;il le11dns also t> t'l t' ll 
l' ('qum· rimi ng o pin ions (a, dt1 at quir .. r., 111 ,011H: acquisi tio ns o!' pri\·ately held 
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.. 1 bml liu ' hind, tn: tlw n ·1 11 1 11 t' du · d1l1 •1·m· . Th ird-
party closing opinions add ress spccilic legal issues:1 and by design 
Forms (Nos. I and ~) ol' No te l'md1ase .\gree111c11t (Sept. I '. I, I U\H), de,111/m l m 
1\lassbe rg-, Bi rd & Cale, l)t'bt l•i11a11cing Dcvdop111e 1Hs in ;\cgotiatcd Anp11s i1ions 
.t11d Leveraged Transactions , 8 Insights No. !) al 01, !) (Sept. I !l!M ). Fm an art icle 
.1ri:,ri.ting that. in a typic:d lo.11 1, so11 1< ~ ol'lhc opi nions that le nders trad itiona lly h:iw 
l'equested frolll cot 11tsd !,.JI' thc liwTower an.: 1wtcost_j11s1i{ied,s,,i1 Mason &:S11id n . 
I hose T h ird- Party Closing ( )pinions : C.111 r .oan Trnnsaction Costs he Rcd11n·, I:, 
i Bus. L. T oda)' 48 (Sep t./Oct. l 'l!l7) (predicting that "11 1a11y lender, will lw::in 11> 
1,rt·ak fro111 tradit io11 " and stop rcqucsti llf{ c11filrceabilit}' a11d l :( :c : op ini , ,11., h·, ,111 
1,orrowe r \ cou11sd). 
l{hode ls l,111d h,ts e n;ictcd legislatirn1 1irnhibiti11g fi11;111cial in,ti1t11i o11, !1 1. li 
111ake loa11s i11 tha t stale ;md their lc!,ial cou11.\el t'rom requiring, as a nmd 111, ,i, I< ,1 
111akiug a loan , that borrowcl''s ('ottmd an opinion 011 "1 he binding 
,·lf'cct, or cnfo1n:ahility ol ; 111 y of llw loan dorn1 11c 111 s o r the ;1,·ai lability of rc111 -
' dies thereunde r. " Opi11io11, 011 the ;111t lwrit}' ;111d st,1lt t.s o f the hrnTowcr a 11d 
1t1;1t1ers relating to the co llat e ra l arl' e xcluded fro11 1 th e statuto ry p rn lt ibi1 io11 
·" ar<.: opi11io 11s l<>I' pub lic o lkri11g~ of i11dc li ted11ess. lU. <:1· 11. I.aw, ~ I \l-!l-7. 
\ !though 1101 subjcu 10 a s1.11ut01) ' p rn hil>itio 11 , 1':it f{ li sh l;iw fin us, i11 th" 
,·xpe1·ic 11cc ol' an l-'. 11 gl ish co11111 1e111ator, si111 il ad y n :sist givi ng e111i,rn·ahil i1y 
" p inio ns to pani<.:s to ;1 1ra11sac1io11 who arc 1101 thei r clients. They resist <'V(' I I 
" hen th e ;ign:e11 1e111, ;ire g1>ven 1ed by English l;1w a11d s<>111<: of the p,1r li<', ;ire 
"i'){ani1.ccl in foreign _jurisdinicrns where 1hird-p,1ny c11 fo rccalJ1lit y opi11 io 11s an· 
, ll,to111ary . . 'fr" Yeowan , .111/1m § I. I 1101e Ii, m I (i7 . The cited arrick, 110\V\.'V(T, 
, Ines ap1>ear lo co11i:en1p lalt' I he givin g of' e nforc<.:abi lity opinions lo 11rnH.:lic11ls 
"' at least so111e cross-border tr;msactio11 s. Id. at I !i8 (last paragraph ol Eight Ii 
I', imiple). 
An opinion k ll,· r a lso may be required Ii)' a l'C!,ill l,nmy d!,i<'IH J. For 
, "1111ple . rhe St,:( : n :quires that an opi11io 11 IL:ue r co11lir111 i11g- the lcg,tl i1 y ol 
, n ,mpany\ s tock he [i k d as ;111 exhi bit to a reg is1rati t>11 sta t.l' ll tenl tt 11d,T the 
.. . , uriti es Act of 19'.l:I . s,,,, St:rn r it ies 1\ct of 19'.I'.\ Regu lat ion S-K, lte m :iO\). 1'1 1<· 
\l it\ Repun 011 Op in ions in S lO:C Fi lings LApp . 7J d iscusses thost' o p i11i o11s at 
I, 11g-th . 
'1 See Revised 1\l>t\ (; 11 ide li11es * I .~ ,1( 87 (i I.App . ·1 ;11 ·I :2j: 
1·1i t' o pi ni o ns i11 c.:lt1d ed in ,1 closin g opi11 io 11 should bt' li111ited to rea~rn t· 
;1hly speci fi c and dc1e rn1i11alil <.: 111auers Lha l involve the exe rci se of' 
l'rof'essional judg-111 c1ll hy the opi n ion g iver. 
Cou nsel frir the CO lllpa ny oli.t:n wi ll be i11 the best positi on to add rt:ss uia ny 
.. 1 r he issues covered Ii )' a sta11cl;1rd dosing op inion . Thal counsel, for e x;1111p le, 
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§ 1.3 .2 Introduction 
So1lle law yers have suggested that a 11otl1 t: r benefit ol'a closi11g 
opin ion is that its delivery may dissuade a colllpany from later 
takin g positions that a re i11consistc11l with the lega l opinions 
givt'n by its counsc l. 7 Other lawyers, however, have expressed 
skept ic: ism t.hat del ive1y by crnupany co unse l of a closi ng opiniou 
wou ld prevent the company from asse rting whatever detenses i1 
late r ident ifies as hein g available tu it or prevent a court li·on1 
reaching its ow11 legal co11dusio11s. Cmcs ho lding that ut iliries 
lacked the power to c 11 Lcr in to supply cou tract s 11otw ithstamli 11g 
opi n ions to the co 111r;1ry g iven liy their co 1111scl s11ggest that th e 
skeptics 111ay he r1g lit.8 
lrn lu, .. ti 1< ., !-1 1 ii I• . Su pp. I W,'.! ( E. l>. ~fo 11. [ qq:1 ) . . 'i,·r grn ,.1111/y I law,·, . Rc li, u" , . 
:\dvi, ,. ot ( :u un , e l a, ;i I klt·11,,· in ( :.,q ,or.11,· ;rnd S,·, uri l i, ·, ( :a,c, , (i'.! V:i . I .. 
Rn . I i 11)71, ) (Ill id ly di ,rn,si11g 1di;111< e 0 11 lei,;al opi 11 inm ;11 '\'.!-'.II). LJ. SE( · v. 
Stc;1d11w1 , \H i7 l'. :ld ti'. Hi, (i -11 (I ).( .. Ct!'. I !l!l~)(1di.111ce rn1 ;1 lega l 0 1>1111<>11 s1;11i11g. 
111, on ,·.-1l y. 1lta1 lllllt\lal li111d w;1s 1101 req 11 in·d 10 n:gi , 1, ·r lt..l ped est ;ihli,lt t li,11 i1 
!ackl'd the , cie1u e r necessary for liah ilit)' l,w 11rnalisdos11n· 1111dcr k de1;d .\lTtll'i -
ties l. 11,·s): \'CR Corp. 1·. :\T&T. 7til F. Supp . ,17;-, (S. D. Ohio I\Jqf ) (s lwl1, ·r of' 
ln1, i1 1e,sj udg111 t·11t rn le lost h,·c n!st' di nTtors had no 1 la:t, 11 infi ,n ned that <> p i11iom 
m1 .slclt ·k iss11ed lo l·'.SO I' as arnit.ikeov,· r d,:1·wc o n1 i11,·d ph r.tst· "qlidly iss11<'d , 
l'ull jsicl p;iid, and 11<H1.1, .,cs.,ablt'"); K1·;11 11e 1· v .. I aspn, t:iv. ,\ . :\io. 88-(i7'.! I, I()\)() 
\V ( :! H( i8 (F .. D. l'a.,J an. l(i , I\)<)()) (rclia11n : on legal o p i11io11 helpt'd alT<>llllt ,1111 
establbh that he lacked ,rie11ter a11d i11te111 11en:ssa1y li,r con1111rn1 law l'raud ). 
01 her be 11di ts ascrih t:d lo dosi11g opinions are 1h;11 die)' "he lp tlw par! i, ·s 
lo achit·1·e ii 111u 111a l, subjenive understanding of the 111<:a11i11g and el!ccl of1lwi1 
'agrcc!l1t'.!ll "' (C eorg ia Re port§ I .O:.l [App. :l,l a t :13: I :I J) a11d that !he)' "111.t)' hdp 
lu clia raneri ze the business transaction as a n ;1rn1 's-lt.'11 g1h agrce111t:111 11!:u 
should be uphl' ld " (Mary land '.!00 7 Repu rt .tl 7 li\pp. :H ill '.H; 181). Rcn:i p1 
ofan opi11io11 also 111 ay bt: 11ecess.11 y to s.ttis i)' c11 n11 ·ac1.11;,I or rq.\·tda1ory l'<''( llin ·-
11 1e111 s. S1'1' Ca lili,rn ia 2005 Re port .it 7 [App. :l'.! ,IL 22: I (ij . 
7 Su S111ith, Rendering I.cg;,! Op in ions, in I Massachusetts l\usi11..ss 
Lawyering ,ll 4- 1, 4-(i (S. Ke lle r ed ., 1~191) (" Re quirin g ii lega l opi11io11 l'rn11 1 
the la11')'t: r rt: prL· sen ting !ht: p:tl'l)' 111akiug the 1e pr..:se 11 tat io n .. . 11 1ar iu " >1.11< · 
c tSl'S have ii pri!L'l ic;tl t'S lo ppe l e ffect 011 the c li,:111 if the clit: 11 1 wa 111 ecl i lo 
d 1a ll e 11ge the ag ree111e111 at a la1e r da le, since t.he d ie l!l wou ld efft:n ivc l)' li.~'c 
ID change lawrt: rs in o rder to make the challe n ge ") . 
~ S1!t c. tst:s citt:d in *9. '.l 1w1e 9, inji'lt. The Ca lifornia 2004 Re medies O pin -
ion Re port [Ap p. 2,1 J considers a l length whe ther rece ipt o f an op i11 ion rn1 the 
(.'l d<,rreabil it)' nf a n agree111t~1ll (d iscussed in Ch,1pt.e1· 9 01'1his book) p rnvides the 
n ··( it ii,:111 a bas is 1<11' assening 1'1 ,11 t li c opi11io11 g ive r \ di e11 t is equitably eswpped 
14 
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• 11011!.·1 hc11d11 , n111t 11111t·, .,~ 111>,·d \\ 11111 ,h In a 
, In 111 • 11pi11m11 i 111,11 II "'I \l'' ·" .111 111 111,111< 1-· polu \ . l ' 11 li C 
11 11' ltuld1•1 11/ ;111 i11,111 .1111l' poli,, , ltow,•,1 ·1, 1111 · n ·, qii, · 111 of a 
, 111,111 1,1 op111iu11 h,I\ .1111 tl .1i111 ,imph I,,· ". 111 c· lilt' opi111011:. 'l\1·11 
1,111 prm t· 10 lw imrn H·ll l.q~al 11p111i01h . 111· 1·. 1u1·.., io11, 111 
p111I .., 11111.11 111 I 11111 · 111 , 11 11 ~ 11.11 .1111u·, 111:11 ., m un ,,ill rtadi 
th · a1111 · c1111h1,i111.1 .1 . 1l11 · 11p111 ic 111 •h•,·1:11'Lawy(:r1\111,1 IH:liahk 
i1 01n da i1tt i11 g lhal ;u1 t1 11dt·r1akit 1g it 111 ;u l c.: i 11 tlu: a~n·< ~111 c1 1t i, t t1 1t•tt l( 1n<c :1hl1. · . 
I he report t'111H ·l11de., 1ii a1 it d,w, 11 0 1. Tl!(' n ·111•rt ;1bo n,11sid .. rs wlw1!1t T il l<' 
.,lii lit.y lo 111 akc an ",•s1o p1H ·I" aq.;11111<·11! Ii;" d i! )' ,1!111'!' ['l',tn ic;tl lw11dit. i\ga i11 , i1 
, 1111clud,·s th:11 it drn·, 11 <>1 wi 1h iii, · pos,i h l,· 1·xn·(ll irn1 1h;11, ii tll<' ;1gr<'t'1111·111 i, 
I. ti <'!' l't.'IH.'goli,11, ·d , il 111;1!' [>1n v1d, · ill<' <1 pi11 io11 n· , iti i, ·111 ;1 li.,,i, "10 < 0, 11 ,1,·1 ·" ;1 
, l, t llll by ll u· o p i11i<>ll g il' 1· r ·,, li,·1 11 !1 «11 di<' .1 g 11 ·, ·1111 ·111 Ii.I\ "lq,,d i1tl11111itin. " 
t ,difort1 1.1 '.! <Hl·l R,·111nli,·, (lp111i1111 Rqiort ;\ pt• · ·I a1 :d i l1\p11 . '.!'. \ :tt '.!: l:l ·l · llij . 
'' i\1\1\ I.q;al Opinions l'nrn ipln ~I.I ) ("Thi' 011i11io11, , 0111.11 11<'<1 111 .11 1 
,, p111io11 l, ·11, ·1· ;i n · t'X['l<'"ioiis ol p10!.·ss11 ,11:tl .1'1dg 111\'l!I 11 ·g;i 1d111 g !lw k g.ti 
11,allers .idd n ",st·d ,111d not gt i.11;1111,·,· , 1lt ;11 "11>111! wi ll n·;11 I, .11, y p :1r11, 111.11 
1<·,111!. "}; Rn •i,<'d t\ l\ i\ ( ;,1idt'li111·, §I.'.! .11 W/ (i 11\1'1' · t ;i1 l :'.! I ("01>1111"'" i11 , l,11kd 
11 1 ;1 clos i11 g o pi1 1io11, lt 111 tld II<' li111i1n l to . .. 111 ;1ll1 '!', 1l,a1 i11\'olv<' !111· ,·x,.,., i"· oi' 
p rofessiu11 ,d .ill( lg 11 11 ·111 hy lil<' o p i11ini , giv, ·1 "); 11·,· ( :;di1 11rni:1 '. '()(I:', R"l1111 ·1 ;!l I i 
!, \pp. 2'.! ;!I '.!'. !: I (i i; ( ;,.org 1;1 R,·p11 !'1 ~ I .lH !1\ l' I'· :1:1 :il '. I:\: 1·11; T<' ~.t, l{quwl 
·; t\'.C. I [!\!'I' · ·1'2 ;11 ·1'.! :7'.!I . ( >1 1<' , 0 111 I lt ;1s <jll<>l<'d witl1 l;1v<11 ti!<' lo llo wing 
l'.t ssag,· h·11 m 1li,· l•rn ·, ·wonl to ill<' 1\l\r\ l.,·g: d ( )11 i11i u 11 l{q,orl : 
;\ rltinl -p;11 ·t)' ll'g al 11p1 11i.,111, :111 ,·x111,·ssio 11 o l p roil's,irn1.dj11dg 111 <'11i 011 
lhc lega l iss 11t ·s <'X plic i!ly addn·s"·d . Hy n·11d<'!'III ).\ :1 p1 <1 l1 ·ss irn1:il n p 111 io 11, 
the opi11io11 g iv,·r d 11t's 1w1 l,,·,rn11<· :111 i11 , nn·r 11 1· gn;ir, 1111,>1· "' 11 11' <'lqll·,·s 
sinn of' p rol<-s.s io11a l j11dg11w111 
\Vashi11gt1111 !'.I,·, ·. < :,u ,p .. 1111. v. i\fa,., . M1111 . Wl1<1 l<'s: d, · l·'. I,·, . Co., H! H i". S11p1 •. 
i77 , 7'.H I ( I) , Vi. I \l!) r,) (qll(lli!I J.[ t\111\ I .<'g; il ( lpi11 io 11 Rq ,orl ,t i 17 1 I App. '.! ;11 '.! :'i I). 
1 ·1te F"n·won l ){"' ·.s 01 1 lo ,1; 11< •, "Nord,"' ·' ! Ii <' 1·t:11,kl'i11 g ol il ll opi11io11 w 1a1·:11 11 ,·,· 
1 l, e OUlU l! llt' o f :111}' il:g·;tl d is Jll ll<' tJial 111ay :11-i., (' <1 111 <1 J' tl1t· I ra 11 s:1l'lio11 ." 
\ 110 1he 1· crn11·1, ;iddn:ss i11 g ill<' li road,·1 · d 11 1r a law)'<'!' has i11 , ·rn 11 1" ·l i11 g- lh<' l.iw· 
\T l' 's own dic 111 , l, ;is s t.11l·cl : 
:V!as.sad1us,·1 t.s l;1\\' l'<'<)Uir,· ., ;111 a 1101·11,·y . .. to adviw tl 1t· clk11 1 in a 111 a n -
11er th at pc rn1ils 1!.1,· la u c r i1ll<: lli g<'nt ly lo assess !Ii<' 1·i.sks ot' 1;ik i11g . . a 
particula1· ,1clio 11 . 1\111 lawyns -·-- evc11 hi g h pl'ic t'd lawy <' l'S ...... ordin:t r ily 
a rc 1101 g ua rantors o f' fa vorable n:su li s. Thus, lall')'(.'t '.S an : 1101 
obli !-;t:d . to anticipal<' 1·c111 o tl.' ri.sks . 







for n Ii en 
ar not liabl 
··or i11L nti nal mi · ndu ·t, bm th 
ing wrong .. 11 
10 In mauy states, third parties who havt: relied 011 au opinion may seek 
relief based upon a claim of negligent misrep1·esentation. In those states, neg-
ligem misrepresentation, unlike malpractice, has been held not to require an 
attorney-client relationship between the complaining party and the opinion 
giver. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & 
Wood, 605 N.E.2d 3 18 (N.Y. 1992); Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. 
Cemral Bank of Denver, N .A., 892 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1995) (addressees of closing 
opinion who were not cliems of opinion give1· permitted to li1·ing action frw 
negligent misn:presentation but not for legal malprnltice). In som<;> stales, 
however, an attorney-client relationship is required and nonclients are not enti-
tled to I.iring a negligent mi srepresentat ion claim against an opinion giver, even 
when the opinion is addressed to them. See Michigan Repon at 7-9 [App. 37 at 
3 7: l l-14]. 'f11e liability of opinion givers to nonclienls is addressed in §5 J of the 
Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers and discussed in §2.3.2, infi'a. See Re-
staremem of Law Governing Lawyers §5 l, Comment e [App. I at l :5] ("cause of 
action ordinarily is in substance identical to a claim for negligent misrepresen-
ta t.ion and is subject to rules such as those concerning proof of materiality and 
re liance (see Restatement Second, Torts §§552-554)"). 
The law in England on the liability of an opinion givt:r for an inconecl 
opinion appears to be the same as the law in the United States. In a passage that 
a Un ited States lawyer could have written about the liability of United States 
opinion givers, an English commentalOr, addressing the liability of opinion 
givers in England, has wriuen: 
The views con tained in an opinion leuer are expressions of professional 
judgmelll 011 the legal issues addressed and are not 1,ruarantees that a court 
will necessarily reach any panicular decision . The provider of an opinion 
letter may be liable to the addressee if the opinion is negligently given, but 
is nor. automatic:ally liable merely because an opinion proves to be inco1Tect. 
Y cowart, m/m1 §I. I note 6, at 166. 
11 Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers §§5 l, 52, 95 (App. l at I: 1-2, 
22, 38]; State Bar ofTexas Committee on Lawyer's Opinion Letters in Mongage 
Loan Transactions, Preliminary Drnfl of a Statement of Policy Regarding Law-
ye1-s' Opinion Letters in Mortgage Loan Transactions, 23 State Bar Newsletter, 
Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law No. 2 at 20, 21 (Jan. 1985). See genera/~1· 
Freeman, Legal Opinion Liability, in .J. Sterba, Drafting Legal Opinion Letters 
§ 12 (3d ed. 2003) . 
Over 1·20 years ago the U.S. Supreme Coun, in considering a claim arising 
from a defective opiniou on« borrnwer's title to real estate used Lo sewn:! a loan, 
repeated what it regarded as se11led law that a lawyer is not "liable for every 
16 
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mistake that may occur in prnclice, or ... for every error ofjudgment." Savings 
Bank v. Ward, I 00 U.S. 195, 198 ( 1879). Elaborating, the Court explained that 
"at.tomeys do not profess lO know all the law or to be incapable of error or 
mistake in applying it to the facts of eve!)' case." If that were the standard, 
the Court pointed out, "even the most skillful of the profession would hardly 
be able to come up to [itJ. " T he "t.rue rule," according to the Court, "is that the 
attorney is liable for the want of skill, care and diligence as men of the legal 
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matten of professional 
employment. " l 00 U.S. at 199-200. See also Coastal Orthopaedic Institute, 
P.C. v. Bongiorno, 807 N.E.2d 187, 191 (Mass. App. 2004) (opinion on risks 
of litigation "is not to be measured by perfection in preclietaliility of outcome, 
nor by infallibility in opinion determination"; lawyer not a guarantor ol'a favor-
able result); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961 ): 
The attorney is not liable for every mistake he may make in his prac:tice; 
he is not, in the absence ofan express agreement, an insurer of the sotmcl-
ness of his opinions .. . and he is not liable for being in error as to a 
question of law on which reasonable doubt may be emertained by well-
informed lawyers. 
See also Foreword to ABA Legal Opinion Report, quoted in note 9, .mj>ra. 
One commentator has suggested that, in the context ofinternational trans-
actions, a lawyer "could possibly limit his liability within a scope known Lo him by 
declaring his own national law applicable to the opinion letter." Working (;roup, 
The Opinion Letter, I 98 l Eludes et Documents Pour le .Jtn-iste I111emationak 
73 , 79 (comments of Paul Storm). That suggestion is discussed in Legal Opin-
ions in lmernational Transactions 10-1 l. For a general discussion of liabil-
it.ies for closing opinions under the laws of the United Kingdom, France aud 
Germany aud under international law, see Harries, Die Recl1tssche in-haftung for 
fehlerhafte Rechtsgutachten bei internationalen Vertragen, in Festschrift Fur 
Konrad Zweigert 451 (Tubingen 1981 ). 
When an opinion is delivered in connection with a sale of securities, the 
opinion giver may be subject to liability under the federal securi ties laws. 
Allhough private suits (as opposed to suits by the Secmities and Exchange 
Commission) against aiders and abettors of violations of§ l O(b) of the Sewrities 
Exchauge Act of 1934 are foreclosed by the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in 
Central Bank of Denver, N .A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N .A., 5 11 U.S. 
164 ( 1994), private suits against primal')' violators a1·e not. See, e.g. , Rubin v. 
Schot.tenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998); Kline v. First W. Govt. 
Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994) (lawyer cannot escape liability under Rule 
I Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for an opinion letter containing a 
misleading factual description lawyer knew would be shown to prospective pur-




:'\! , ·, ; i11 the liicr;1rch y is th e clus te1 of opin io ns tha t cover 
.1~ 1>< ·, h o l the tra nsaction . sucli ;is th e transactio n 's e ffect 0 11 the 
, " 111 pa 11 ( s ot he r comracts, that a re ll ol. a d dre sst'. d b)' the opiniou 
(lit t h e ag reeme nt's e nforccabili ty. 7 These opinions ordinarilv 
a re int.e nded LO el ic it i11 forrna t io11 alread y k11 uw n l o t lt c o pi11io 11 
prepa re rs o r available w itlirn11 c x traon li11 ,t1 '}' effort. Wh et h er th ey 
arc given and what they cover i11vo lvcs i11 caclt case a bala11ci11g of 
the work req uired to support th e lll ;1g,1i11st the hc ndit to tlic 
o pi11io11 recipi e n t. Tltc opinio n prepare rs have 111 o rc roo 111 to 
nq.;-mi;ite t li e wo rding ol ' these o pi11io11s, lo include appropriat<' 
li111i ta tio11s and qualifications, and in srnn c cases to r e fuse to g ive a 
part icula r o pini o n a t ;ill.~ 
/\t t he lio t tolll of' the hierarchy arc til t' pmdy "liackgrn und " 
opini o m, such as those address ing the con1pa11y's <lltlsla11di11g 
stock (a\ o pposed t u t li c stoc k bc i 11 g is:-; 1 wd i II t It(' t ransact ion f 
Dr the absc 11 n : of' pe udi ng or t Ii rca te 11 n I I ii ig,ll io 11 t li ;1 1 n ,uld 
h av e ;1 n1.it c ri a l adverse effect t J11 t he c o111p,111 y. i n \Vliat ;u1d 
how 111 uch these opi11io 11s say, ,llld indeed whcdwr t hc y ;1r<' 
givc ll a l a ll , ul timate!)' will depc11d CJ ll a balanci11 g o l' Ilic ('()S( of 
the ir prcparat io 11 ag,1insl the bc 11dit l o t lt c opi11i o 11 rccipic1ll. 11 
·1 sa C ltapters l '. l , 1·1. If> and l(i. Tlti , d11s1n o l opi11i .. 11 , ;1bo i11r l11d,·s 
"op i11 io 11s" i11 1he ;tl ,se11 re o l' leg-a l p rnn :t:d i11g·s rl'la1i11g In iii ,· 1r;111 sac1io11 . .\,·,· 
~17. I , 111/m . 
i< 1.-.. ,. exa111p lc, ,t lir111 that does no t 1wrn1a ll y rt'prcs<'II I 1l w roi11pa11y l,111 
1ha1 ltas htTll l,rnuglll in li ,r lite tra 11sactio 11 1111 gl 11 well n •sis1 givi11g a11 o p i11ioll 
1h,n would require ii to n::v ie1,· all o r the:: co11 1r,tt·b li., 1cd by li1< · co111p.1 11 y in 11 1,· 
scheduk, to tlte agn :'t' tlle 11 t. (The 1w breac lt or , 1c-1;11i11 upi11 i" 11 i, di,rnssn l iu 
( :h.ipler I fr ) 11 il l<' com pan)' ha, inside n>u11sd or 1 <'g·1 d;n· oi 11sid<', rn111w l, , >II ( ' ol 
the m 111 ig lt l give I he opin io n . .'iff · l'r i Bar 19\)8 Rq ,rn I a l (il i\J, li7: I I :\p1 ,. :J ;11 'l : IO'.!, 
I 08 l (llh1sti-;Hivc ( l p in io 11 I .,· tt i: r, o f lus ide Counsel ). /\ l1,-r1i; 11 ively. d ie Iii Ill 111 ig l11 
.irgue 1lia t ilw rcci1>ie lll should n :ly on it , own (or it o w 11 co111 1.S<:l's) rev iew 01'!1 10.Sl' 
crntll ,ll 1, . .\re C tl iii ,rnia '.!(H l:-1 Repml al l 'l [i\pp. '.!:! ;ii :! :!:'.>.ti i (in stead ol'opi 11i011. 
"1in1e ;u1d li11a nci;d resources of tl1<.: pani es and 1he ir cou 11 , d o lk 11 , ll't' hclln 
S<:l'l' t·d" ii )' re pre.,e 11la ti o1 1s in .1gTee111e11L and r,:cipi, ·111 's ow11 i11vest if{at io 11 ). 
"See * 10. 10, in/i 11. S1i1• California ~Oll!i Re pml a1 1,1 [/\ pp. :!'.! a l n ::! li l 
(ci tin g o pin ion 0 11 ou ts w ndi 11 g stock as ex,111q,le ol' o p inio n Lim, "ol't c 11 is 1w1 
wst-e ffoc:1 ive") , 
10 S1:r! C: hap L,T 17. 
11 \,•,· g1' /l l' fllily T riB:i r I () \)H Re po rt a l :,9 D-(ill0 [,\ p p . :l ,II \): l OJ. 
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\Vhe n thc cost o fprq>,tri11 g ,1 · I H111 d" o pi t1i o 11 will lie high . 
t h e o pi11i o 11 pre pare rs sh .. 1d,I P"1111 tli a t rn1 t to I lic o pi11io 11 
recip iC lll a11d , ii ' llCCc:-.sa rr; l'llii st t he a id of til e l'O i llp a 11 y i1 1 r cs isl -
tng the opr11 trn 1 l'('qt1csl. · 
§ 1. (1 St Jl'l'Ol{Tt N(; ,\ C t.<JSIN(; Ol'i i\ l()f\; l.1 /\ 1111.l ' f \' 
~ Ui. I Duly ol' (:ar<'; Role ol' ( :1tslot11ary Prac ti ct' 
,\ law l 'l'\\11111 ddiv1·1, ., t l1"1 11g 11pi11 io11 rn •,· . . , tl 11 1 111 c .tu · 111 
tilt' opioio 111, ·1 1111 ·1111·, 1·11 tl111n: II 1111· n·c 1p 11·111 1 11 111 tltc 1,1\\ , . , \ 
:ltt·nt. 1-'l'liat du ty l'('<jttirl's tli l' lawye r 1101 to " l1111 ctio n ;1 s a 11 ;1 d v11 -
cate !'o r tht· lega l or l;l(' t ll al pos iti on ul' t il l' lawyn \ dil'11t " ln 1l 
to prnvid<' th<' 1ccipi1·111 ;rn opi1 1ion tha t is "l:1i r a11d ohicn iv<· .. :· 
;md tlt;tt lias lwl' ll prq,a rcd wi tli tltc "n llllpt ·l t' ll lT ;111d dil i)~t· 11n · 
i :i ,\, !lw R<' vi "·d i\111\ ! ;.,jdd11u ·s , 1;i1<•, "Tli l' i>l' 11cilt ol .111 "l'll ll« ll 111 tlw 
rec ipi c "l , hu11ld w:11 -r;i111 t li<' 1i11l<' ;i11<l 1·x1><·11 S< ' l'<' <p 1in ·d lo p rq,; 11·, · ii. " lfrvi, <'d 
i\B/\ (;11iddi1l<'s § I. '..! :11 W7 (i l:\pp. ·I a t ·I :'.!!. S,·,· <:alili ,rni;i '.!00!, Rq,1111 ;11 l ·l 
j!\pp. :d'.1. al '.! '.!: ,!Iii ("opi11io11 gi ve r , l"'1ild n·.,i ., 1 :icq11i, ·,c i11 J; I<> 0 11i11i"" ' 01 1 
111allt'. r, !l1a1 ;11 ·,· 1><-riplwral to ill<' 11 ·;111 satlirn1 :ii lia11d"). 
§ l.(i 1 1{,·st:llt 'llll'III ul l .;iw ( ;ov<'l'll i11 i4 I . .1wyn , ~,; I ('.! )(.1 ) li\1'1' · I :i i l : 11 
("a l.111')'<'1' owt'., a d1tl )' lo 11.st · , ·a n · . . . '" ;1 11 1111d il'1tl wli <' 11 a 11d ' " ll w ,·x1< ·111 
thm 1lic lawy,'l' 111 · (wi1l1 11,,· lawy,·r 's ;1< 1111i,·sn ·1 1t r ) llw lawy,·r \ , lin11 i11vi 1< ·, 
1iie 11rnl<'li<·n1 lo n·l y 011 1lw l:1wy<'r's opi11irn1" ) . .'fr,· ,1: ,,111·ml/v '.! .:I. '. ', 111 /m 
l'l 1l'o!'<'l 1t ;ill y. ;11 1 upi11 i<1 11 g ivn, ;111 111rn lil)' it s d ul y o l .-;11 ·,, liy n;I'"''' Lu, 
g-uagl' i11 li !l' o p i11 in11 . \V liy ;1 1·,·, ·i11 i, ·1 11 wou ld ,wn ·pt s11cli :11 1 , q, i11i 1111. ltow,·v,T, 1, 
,lllOllt<T lll .J ll<T . .\1'1' i\Lirk ( w;i i11 l\,l( l\,I\ ( '. ii)' ll.111 k l' ._ ja, KS<Jll , ll rn11ill<'II<'. ('olds .. 
Kirl t:)', I'.< ... <JI :! S, \\' . '.!d ·,:H, ( r1fo. ( :1. 1\l'I' · I \Vil ",). l 11 ,\Im!. '/'wm11, 1 Ii " « 11 11'1 ltdd 
t li at till' t <'ci pil' III , :i ·,oplti, 1ic; t1<'d i1 11•,·s1ur," , 1111ld 11 01 h:iw ju,l il ia lil)' n·li<'d 011 
lhe o pi11io11s ,·x1m ·,st·d in a11 o pi11 i1111 lc11 n «11 11 a i11 i11 g t ilt' fi1llrnvi11g di,d:1 i111 n : 
" rhis o pi11io 11 is va lid a, ui'il 1t · d.11,· li crn ,r, ln(I w,· ta k, · l l<> rn p 111 1,ihili li<'s lo ;H1y 
11tiiJn11at io11 or , q, i11ions n, 111.1i1l<'d li l' l'<' i11 ." Rcj(:Cl i11 g 111<· n·.c ip1(·111 \ ;1 ,.'< ·rt1011 
1iia t d ie di , da i111t T c01llai 11l'd ,1 l)' Jlogr,q,l, k :il <Tl'<> r , tli <' co11r1 d c<" lin, ·d 1 .. 1< ·.1d 
11 11 0 the clisda i1 11,· r l I ll' word "11pd,,1<' " i>l' l1Ve<·11 ti 1<: wo n Is "10" a nd ",<11)'·" T li l' <'< Hirt 
d id so eve n though "11pd:itc" appean :d i11 lh<' o p i11 io11 ).\ivcr's od1n o pi 11 io11 l<'ll t· rs 
.111d adding ii would ltave 111ad<' lit<' di sdai111t:r read (111rn ·c st"11 sihly ;is w, ·11 as 
::,rammaii ca lly) "but Wt: 1.1ke no n :s po 11sil, ili1i cs l.ll 1q1d a1 c :tll )' i11fo r111a1 io11 o r 
"l'i11 io 11s Ctlt1la i11ed lt, :n :i11 ." 
~ Restalc 111c1ll of Law ( ;o vc rn in g L1wyi: rs *\>:, , Co 111111 c111 t · [Ap p. I a l I :· lll l, 
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that profession ... in standing. 
performance, which 
that the less skillful part the would 
committing malpractice"; _ , the duty "is 
uuu,. .. ,,.,,_,J in the circumstances."" What is reasonable 
in the case of dosing opinions, unless otherwise is det~r-
customary prnctice lawyers who regularly give 
who regularly represent of opinions of kind 
What is also will depend, as in 
Restatement of Law Governing §52( I) [App. J at l :22]. See also 
§95, Comment c J.App. I al l :42} ("legal opinion ... constitutes an assurance 
that it is based m1 legal research and analysis customary and reasonably appro-
in the circumstances"). 
Restatement of Law Lawyers §52, Comment b [App. I ,it I :23 J 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §299A). 
Restatement of Law Governing §52, Comment b [App. l al 
See California 2004 Remedies Opinion Report App. at 2 [App. 23 at 
is measured by the competence and diligence normally exercised 
in similar circumstances"). 
20(M Remedies Report at 148·1 n.8 [App. l 2 al 12:31: 
opinions are the product not only of logic bur of 
Molded by customary praccice tempers 
a realistic assessment of what lawyers 
of and cost, Lo 
Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi, No. 01-2595 BLS, 2004 WL 30 !H442, at 
12 (Mass. Ct. Dec. 3, 2004) ("To rhe plaintiffs here must dem-
onstrate that [opinion giver] . . . lo conform to customary practice"); 
Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers §95, Commeul e LApp. I at l :44] ("cus-
tomaiy practice will ... determine the nature and extent ()fthe factual and legal 
diligence to be employed by the opinion giver") and §52, ~;0111me11t b [Ap~. I al 
I :23] ("normal professi<mal prart.ice ... define[s] the ot'dmary standard of care 
for lawyers"); California 2004 Remedies Opinion Repo_rt App. 5 a~ I_ LApp. 23 at 
23:68] ("customary practice ... provides a standard for dt:termmmg whether 
the legal duf.-w ofmre owed by the opinion giv<:r to the red~ient ha_s _been 1.n~t") a·~~ 
at 5 I.App. 23 at 23:73] (stating, with reference w enforceab1hty opnuon, It 
30 
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to assume that court~ will 
who,.,,,,,.,,,,..,., 
·n1e standard to which 
any competent would do but rather what who 
opinion letters of the same type in similar transactions would do. 
Mass. Bank N.A. v. Florian, No. 024007 BU,I, 2007 WL l8W~i7!J, (Mass. 
. Ct. June 12, 2007) that the issue to be addressed was whelher 
the opinion actions "fell below the standard of care and skill of 
in a field that includes the regulation of insurance cnm11:u11,os· 
As the California 2004 Remedies Opinion Repon App. 5 
23:68] also correctly points out, customary not only nnw.,·1,,, 
for liability but also a cowlnc/ among 
clients giving, receiving and interpreting opinions." See also ABA 
§LB ("the work counsel is to 
on the customary practice of lawyers who regularly and 
,.,..,er,,,,,. .. " advise opinion regarding, opinions of the kind 
1998 Report at 60 l [App. 9 at 9: 12] ("an opinion is entitled to 
assume that the opinion has followed customary 
opinion"); California 2005 Report at !J 22 al 22:20J 
mining whether an opinion care "should not 
the opinion giver could have found but what a competent 
customary diligence, would have found") in 
ment and bar association rep,ffts sometimes also use the "n1ston1 and 
" See Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers §95, Comment 
at I :38]; ABA Guidelines, Introductory Paragraph. "Custom and 
"customary practice" are synonymous. 
hi addition LO establishing what lawyers are exuet.u··u 
particular opinions (customary diligence), customary 
opinions are to be (customary (see 
and skill 
2004 Remedies Opinion 
determines 
stances. See § 1.8 note 6, 
practice, as described in the Restatement and bar association 
reports, applies whether or not it is rele1Ted to in a dosing opinion. For th()se 
who wish to underscore the point by stating it expressly in their opinion letters, 
the Boslon Streamlined Opinion offers the following sentence: 
This opinion Jetter shall be interpreted in accordance with the Legal 
Opinion Principles issued by the Committee on Legal Opinions of the 
American Bar Association's Section of Business Law as published in 53 







Revised ABA Cuidelines §2. l a1 877 [App. -l a! 
of th<:> transaction counsel fi:11· th<:> 
r • ., .. ..,,,,,," should specify the opinions the opinion wishes 
should respond promp1ly with any concerns 
to the extent. practicable, the form of 




transaction, preierably before the parties are committed lo 
§ 1.05 [App. '.13 at 33: 17] ("the text of an opinion . . 
should be same time the Agreement is negotiated");seealm Yeowan, 
111/m1 l. l note 6, at l 68-169 (alfoming that same principle applies in England). 
law firms a review before ofa 
opinion. In firms that 1he opinion prepa1·ers should make no commirments 
with regard to the opinions to be giveu until that review has been completed. 
Once the opinion preparers have signed off, a recipient can come Lo view the 
opinions a firm has agreed to give as being carved in stone and resist changes 
that il would have accepted readily while the opinion letter was still being dis-
cussed. Some firllls include a legend on all their draft opinion letters noting that 




As the Revised ABA Guidelines 
be limited to matters that are 
and the benefit to the 
"should warrant the time and expense 
Moreover, in deciding on the 
should guided bl what the 
Rule.,,., That rule 
and that the to be 
time See § 1.6.3 note 26, supm. 
Besides 111 the transaction, 
and the issues it raises "while the transaction documents are 
constructive in the documents and 
structure ... " Revised ABA Guidelines §2.l at 877 
m~jor problem later is identified, the opiniou preparers 
alert counsel for the opinion " Id. 
Revised ABA Guidelines § 1.3 at 876 
1 Revised ABA Guidelines § 1.2 al. 876 
J 3 .. 14 22 at 1.5 notes 
33 at 33: 15] ("If the cost of wc,v!fltn<Y 
of it, the should """"'"''''µ 
the 
when 
not cost-effective ... and should not 
at 599 [App. 9 at 9: l OJ. See rronp.rmrt<i 
u•,unuLv opinion should be or 
'' Revised ABA Guidelines §3. l at 878 [App. 4 at 4:5-6). 
Report at 12-13 [App. 22 al §1.04 . _I 
The "Golden Rule" also applies in England. See Yeowart, su,pra § 1.1 n?t~ 6, ~t 
164-165 (stating the rule as "No law firm should re~uest a lega~ op~mon m 
circumstances where, if the roles were reversed, the fffm requestmg 1l would 
not be prepared to give an opinion itself in the same terms.").. . . . 
ti In another section, the Revised ABA Guidelines state that op11~1ons 
should not be requested "that are beyond tht~ professional competence of l~w-
yers." Revised ABA Guidelines § 1.4 at 876 [~pp. 4 a~ 4:3). Cu~t<~mary pracuc~ 





should ~;;- be ~ ;-1ues1ed- I·f. ·t 1· I I · 
J · · · 1 < 1< , w iat 1s "l I · . 
r etermmed bv the "nnrk~, ".1 . · · . ' nc is 1101 apµrnpriate would fiu r . ' ~ ' , posmon re1ected . I I ~ 
uies, and the Californi·1 ')0()4 ., . d". Ill >ol l the Revised ABA ( ;uid~-
C · J · ' - "eme 1es O · · ' 
,uic elmes § I .6 (Af)!l, •J 'H '··'IJ· ('· 1·c . . pmwn Report. Sl'P Revised t\BA 
'\ 4 . · • ".. , ,a 1101·n1a 2004 R. ., · . . 
. pp. .it l [App. 23 'It 23·36] (~ I emeuit:s Opmwn Re1Jor1 
m· ·k •" , ' · .. l ie overused ff . a_i et c,oes not justifv -1 re . ,. ipp,ml comment rhat 'i1 is d t . . . . • quesr ,01· an enfon:eab·i· . . · 
e en11u1a11u11 ofwhe1he1· ·'11 ~nf' b·1· I II)' opm1011). Instead 1l1e " ~ on:ea 1 11y · · 1 • turn on a cos!/benelit ,11nl}·s1· . ,. op1111011 s iould be requested shoulcl 
f. ' · s. , l et' IIOle 4 W·"r . cl cost o preparing an OJJiniou s11b ·t· . ll , . .,.. a,_ an accompanyiug text. ff !he 
ti . . . s ,111oa y outw I . . b . ' 
ie op1111on should nor be reque t l . b . e1g ~s its ene!H to the recipient , 
what ~llt': i·ed piem claims "the nia~-::;. atus~t special rnu11nsta11ces, uo matter 
. . Revised ABA Guidelines §3. l at 878 [Al . . . . r. • • • 
h om !he p assage quoted in the text re· J . _ l,Pl·J 4 ,1L 4 .. >-Gj. I he clause <>milled 
d( S ,IS 10 OWS: 
a_ssuming that the reyuested o Jiniou . . . . 
( , 111delmes and the oni111·0 l . I I is (}the1w1se cons1Ment with lhe.se 
. t· . . r I g rver 1as the r · · . 
p1 o ess1011al.1udgment is able l . I . . . eq~1s'.ce experuse a!ld in its 
8 o ' enc e1 the opuuon. 
Revised ABA , . · 1 · 
!' utile e lrnes §2. I at 877 [A 
ABA Legal Opinion Princi Jes IF pp. 4 ar 4:4]. 
to treat a dosing opinion ·1s i'f1'1 w ~ § . . Unfortunately, some lawvers cominue 
· · ' '·· · e1 ea contnrctu· J • ·. · ' 
op1111ons they can regardless ofan . . . a p1ov1s1on, push lo ger whatever 
I hey p e rceive themselves lo 1:e in a sopm_ionbs Jll'Opriety and plity "hardball" when 
ov. - . J • . upe11or anrammo- .· . e1 zea ous counsel for th . . . . " "pos1uon. When pressed by 
hav I J e opm1011 i·ec1p1em bele·1 . , I . . 
e >een lean ! to compare o , >osin . , . , gue1 ec opm1011 p1·eparers 
the movie mogul, who is re•>orrlecll l . I g COU1!1slcl unlav01~1bly to Samuel Goldwvn 
o . . I 'I . . . , o Jave lo c ·1 }'OU .· " . , ' 
pm ion, J give it to you "~"·tiii· la• I ' ug "'' Iler, \,Vhen I waut vour . · . · " '' . .vvers 1ave fi)l I I . . , 
d ll op,n,on n :'quest thm d early goes.[( t: .. : me I. l,ll a good ""-1Y lt) respond 10 
/\BA Legal Opi11io11 PrinciJ)les l :. x~ 1,11 is lo im·oke 1.J1e ( ;0Jde11 Rule and the 
11 · · · • • ou1<>1 eev·11ll1ns .. · 1 . ig op1111ons - a11d to hold tl1~1·1· r I \ 1' ' s,iges in t ie hten !lure on clos . · · ,. grounc . ,v ien f' . J • • I I . · · 
<1ga111s1 them. the lawve1·s o11 tlw' rJ . ··d acec w1t 1 l iewe,ght ofauthoritY 
. o ie1 s, e normal!}' will back off . 
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,,111ni n r 
• ,11id lin 
n prep 
inion 1 
nt (or d 
10 TriBar 1998 Report at 602-603 [App. 9 at 9: 13-14). Citing the TriBar 
I '1!18 Report for a "general discussion of this suqject (including the role of dis-
; I, ,sure)," the Revised ABA Guidelines state the principle as follows: "An opin ion 
g1\'t'r should not render an opinion that the opinion giver 1·ecognizes will mis-
1,·;ul the recipiem with regard to the matters addressed by the opinions given." 
l<n·ised ABA Guidelines § I .5 at 876 lApp. 4 at 4 :3). See also California 2005 
l<• ·pon at 10 [App. 22 at 22:2 l ); California 2004 Remedies Opin ion Report App. 
Io .ti 16 [App. 23 al 23: 127]: 
FINAL ADMONITION: 
( >pinions must not be misleading: If, under the circumstances of a given 
rransaction, an opinion giver believes that an opinion would be mislead-
ing to the recipient were the opinion giver (in reliance upon customary 
practice or otherwise) to leave unstated an exception that ... [under the 
analysis of California law in Appendix I OJ it is not necessary to sr.ate, the 
opinion giver should consider making an appropriate disclosui·e, so as to 
avoid rendering a misleading opinion. 
The Revised ABA Guidelines point out that§ 1.5 "does not preclude limiting the 
matters addressed by an opinion through the use of specific language if the 
limitation itself will not mislead the recipic~nt." Revised ABA Guidelines § 1.5 
n.8 at 876 LApp. 4 at 4:3]. 
The rnle against lawyers' giving dosing op inions that mislead recipients is 
analogous in some ways to the rule against auditors' certifying misleading finan-
cial statements that was adopted almost forty years ago by the Second Ci1u1it 
Court of Appeals. U.S. v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969). In Simon , in au 
often-cited opinion by Judge Friendly, the Second Circuit rejected the argument 
that compliance with generally accepted accounting principles afforded an audi-
tor absolute protection from liability. Instead, the court held that evidence of 
compliance may be highly persuasive but that a finder of fact still has room to 
determine that the auditors did not act in good fa ith and that the certified 
financial statements were materially misleading. 425 F.2d al 805-806. 
In 2002 the ABA House of Delegates apprnved an amendment: to 
Commem I to Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that 
addresses misleading statements to third persons. The amendment states that 
statements by a lawyer that are partially trne but misleading are the equivalem of 
aflirmative false stalements. 
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11 See § 1.3 .1 , m/;m. 
I'./ The rule agai11s1 misleading: the opinio11 reC'ipit'tll relates only to I he 
opinions being given. ll is not a foll disclosure nile such as that imposed by the 
federal securities laws. St'e last paragraph of§ 1.3.2 nole 11, s11Jm1. As tht' 'friB,u· 
1998 Report puts it: 
IT Jhe omission of information not relevam to the opinion given . .. does 
not mislead. The question the opinion preparers must consider is whether 
under the circumstances the opinion will cause the re<'ipient lO miseval-
uate the specific opinion given. 
TriBar 1998 Report a t 603 (App. 9 at 9: 14]. See Mega Group, Inc. v. Pechencck & 
Curro, P.C ., No. 98694, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9812, at *4 (N.Y. App. Div. 
Aug. 3, 2006) (finding that opinion letter that did not disclose material li1igation 
contained no misrepresentations where opinion letter contained "precisely the 
infonnation" called for in the purchase and sale agreemellt and that info1rnat.ion 
did not include anything on litigation). Nevc::rtheless, if the opinion preparers ,ll'e 
aware of in fonnmion uurel,tted to the opinions being given that is not known IO 
the opinion recipient and that they regard as problematic, tht:)' should consider 
whethe1· 1hey wish lo cominue co be associated wi1h the transaction and, by deliv-
ering an opinion letter, Lo facilitate the dosin g. See §I. 7 note I I , sn/mt. 
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sense of professionalism and not u·eat opinions si mply as if they were 
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§2.3. I The Opinion Framework 
addrcssct: ola dosin g opi11irn1 fro1n crn msd li,r th e otl1e1· s ide. [•or 
exa 11 qile , i f tile co111pany is c 11te ri11g: into ,1 credit ag:rce111e11t, it 
mar rece ive fro m counsel li1r Lh e lender an opinion 011 its rigltt 
lo take dow11 additional funds in the fotmc ; ii' it is nor p11blidr 
traded a ll([ is be ing: acquired li 1r ,tock, it lllay rccc i\'c fro111 n )u11 s< ·l 
for tli t: acquiring n H11pauy a11 opinion on tltc stock's validi1 y. 1; 
Whc1 1 til e t1 ·a11 sauio11 i11 qUt:stio11 is a sy11dic.1t io11 , counsel 
111 ,ty he ;1skcd by the placct11 t· 11t ;1g:e11t to addr<'ss a11 opi11io11 kt i('r 
gcllcrira lly, i<ll' cxa111p lc, to " tltc ptm lias<'l's of i11 tcn·sts in tlil' 
P,trl11 c1·s l1ip ." l.awye rs should thi11k c;ucl'till y helm t' agrn·i11 g 
lo S llCfi a rl'<jllt' St IJcC, tllSC 01' tltl' likt·lilloocl tlt ;1t lll d ll )' ol'ill<' pt1r 
di;iscrs will 1101 he rc prcsc11tcd I>)' cot111scl or kt1ow t·11011glt 1lic111 -
sdvcs about o pi11iom lo 1111de rstaucl Ilic , q,i11 io11s illl')' ;tn · 
tc('eivi11g.'; By analogy to the opinion lcttn ol co111 p;u1r n1t111~<·I 
i11 SH. l'i ling, \:\pp . 71. ;, n·port by div t ·;1,k h n n · 1111 S,·, 111 it it's I ~11, ( >11i 1111111s o l 
tlw ,\l \i\S(·,·ti o11 o l' ll11,i11c, ., l.;1\\' . ·11t,11 n·p ,,r1 p11 i111> 0111 th ;11 , i11 , tf'.1d ol "kg;dl )' 
is,11,·d," 111a11y 1:iwyns g ivv, .1 11<1 1 Ii,· SI'.( : stair ;wcc p1, , 1 I H' 111111·1· I l'adi1 i1111 ,il "duly 
au I hol'i1.,'.d " and "v;tlid!y iss11n I" fo111111l a1 irn 1' ol' I h,• op i 11 irn 1 ( disn iss<"d i11 ( :I i: 1 p l, ·1 
IO ol' thi s lmuk). l .t"g,d ( lp111iu11' i11 SH : l-'ili11gs ;11 '.!'.l') lt\pp. 7 .11 '/:-! \. 
"i\, losing 11 pi11 io11 ;dsn 1uay J,.. dvliv1·n ·d 10th <" co11q1,t11y Ii)' ,·rn111 s,·l lor 
tliv ;1rq11 ir!'r i11 a11 all -ca,h 1r;111s;1< tirn, 1'111 , ·,.,a111ph·. u11 till' ,·,di,n rah ilit )' 111':111 
"c; ,n , 0111 " pnl\'isio11 n ·1p1i ri 11 g· thv anl'1 in 'I' 10 111.1 kt' ;1< ldi1 io11;tl c 1sh pa y1111·11 1s 
upon ;id1i,·v(·111<· 111 111' ' I 1< 01·ificd ,·an1i11gs 1,trg,·ls . Wll<'11 <1 11 11pi11i1111 is 011 1)' 
;idd n·.,sl'd 111 illl' ,ll'ljl lir('d n ,111p ;111 y, slrn kltold,·1., 11 1 till' a,quin·d ,011111.111v 
111ay 11o t be ;1bl,· 111 rd y 0 11 it. l.'ur .i d isc11"io11 ol 1lia1 1•nohlc111 and ;i pms il>I,· 
so lut ion ,·"''' last parag1·;q ,h of 11ote I 0 , i11/i'11 . 
·i 1\11 011i11iw1 giver's abili ty lo i'dy u n rns lt Hll,ll')' l'Lt l'lirt· is pn·111isl'd rn 1 t li ,· 
cxp<Tta lion that the o pinion rec ip ie nts will i>e r,:pn·" ·111 ,·d hy il ll'ir 11w 11 n u111M ·l 
or will t li (·111,d ws i>e k1H.>wledgeabk :1i>m 11 ,w;tm11:11 y 1•r:ic11n·. l{,·sta1,·11w11 t oi' 
l . .111' ( ,ove rnin;.f l . .iW)' <' l 'S *D:i, ( :ornm,:111 ;1 [ApJ 1. I al l ::IH I; · 1 ·ri 1\,11' I !lOH R!'J >< 11'1 al 
tiO I 11.'!. ·l l,\pp. :H \): I '.l \. Tlw Revised ,\l\A ( ;uidt'li111•, st:11c 1h;t1 all opi11io11 gi l'l'I' 
is e111 itkd lll ass11111c, witl111111 so ,1a1i11g, tl1a1 "tl1t· opi11io11 l'ecipi ,· 111 (al1111t· o r wi 11t 
it, <'<HlllSt'i) i., li11nil i,1r wi 11t n1sto111;lt')' pranin· crn11r 111i11 g tht' pn:pa1·;11io 11 a11d 
i111crprl' l:it io11 of'dosi11gop i11io11s." l{ l'Viscd i\ 111\ ( ;11i ,lt- li11es ~ 1.7 ,ll K7fi [1\pp. ·I al 
·1::1-·1 I. S,·,· Cwmdl, l.cg al Opi11irnis in the< :11111,:xl or ;1 l'riv:11t· l'lan·n1,:111. i11 
Upiuiorn in SH: Trn11s;1uio11, !\!DI ;11 '!.(i:i, '!.7:, (1'1.1) ("The address,:,: iss11e is 
ol p.inind.ir (llll<'ern i11 tll<' ,y11di ,·,11nl privat,· plan-111<·111 . I h<' delin·1 )' o r a11 
upi11io11 , cvc,11 011e appr,,pri;i tely quali l11:cl ;111<1 rest ri , tl'd , lo 'the jllll·di.1sers o l 
interests i11 i\ lJC !'an11e rship,' tliough ,tCce pLablc as to liin 11 , involves cousid .. rable 
peril , i, tn, the lawyer c,1111 1lll be certai11 that the n :c ip1c 11t will u11der.,1a11 d th,· 
{Hi 
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in a n u11dcrw rit1c:11 o l'lt.Ting, tlt c 01>111i o u letter i11 a sy11dicalcd 
priva te offcri1t ).{ 11ortlla ll y should he ad d ressed 011l r to tit\' pLtn· -
mcnt age nt a nd 1101 10 tltc pun:lia~crs.x 
~~ .:L '.2 I .i;1li ili1 y 10 1\d< lrcssct·s and ( )1 ltns 
'l'f;i(: j,t.CtHlt'}il !'1;1 1'e,.n:U . lfahilit:y .fa that H,. l~lW)"Of owes a · (I t tt y 
ul (ittfti t(i .1 u111i-c li'l-111 .11l1lu·~"·1· 1·11' a di1,111g ul'i11io11 ,11111 LH 
.11w 11tlwr 11rn1-< li1·11h wl111111 "1llt' la\\')t't w (wirh tltl' lawyct''s.a<:qui -
btwy~i1·'.~tfitmchwit1t11" .. , 10 !'<tly" Sll ·k>itgas tlt('.11011 -
<:;IW,1'.)t i\)fa~i(n.it..bt! (lphli<>llu<i,o<l ~i-. 11111, 111 u li- r .1ppli., .1lil1 · 1111, l,1\,. 
too n·111111c· ln1111 lli°c· law\·1·1· ,tn lw .,:11111kcl to-fn:nH:ttion;"w v\li1 l1 
Ol'\\' lll 1rs<' 111<· opi11iu11 in Ill<' i111<"11d('tl ma11111·r. ") . .\'1 •1· 11/111 ~I I 11111, · I:\ , 
_,ujno. Sn111t · ol'lh<' 111ost l1 '11t1hl,·su11H ·, «11 1rf t ·: 1.,cs 1·cb1c to n pi 11io11s giv<"II ir 1 1 un 
11enio11 wit h lilt' ,y11dil';11i o11 ul l;ix ,ll<' h, ·r, . . \,.,· ~-l.2 .:\ . 1 1101,· :1:1. 111/1t1 . 
:i - 1'11<: <11ta logy i." 11111 I H'dl·t'l lll'c; 11ts<: I l u · 1 H1rd1a~<· 1 s lr111111 l w i'.\~1 lt' I' 111 ;1 f& n n 
cm11 111 il111<'11I llll(k1wr i11 ,· 11 <>ikl'i11 g· ;ire 1101 t lw p11li li< i11v<".,lors hut th, · 1111d,·1 ·-
wri1crs . N,·,·,Ttlwlt-" , il'il11· 11nd .. 1wri1,· ,·s w,·1·,· 111 ask, 1111q 1;i11 y , ,11111" ·1 111 ;itldn·,, 
it, op i111011 l,·t lt ' l' lo Ilic I" ii ,lit" 11 IV<"Stnrs, \'1111q i.,11y co1111 wl Ill/ d1111l,1 W!lll ld l't'li '·"'. 
'·'wl,ik rc lia111, · 1,y tl1< · n·,i1,i,·111 is 11t·,1·ssa 1r Im it 111 ,·s t;ilili ,li li; d,i li1y. 
n: li~tttc '(' ~tl(lllt' is 1tu l s1dfici,·n 1. R<"li ~tllt(' '·r t h (' n·t ipi \' 111 II HI\ I IH~ l('; \ \ tlll;d>ll' . 
Fi1·, 1 M;i.ss. l\ ;111 k, N.1\ . v. Flo1·i;111 , f\ o . 0'.!·11111 '/ 111 ;·;I , '.!tH l 'i WI . I K'.!!l'.17!1 , ,11 " I !1 -
2 0 (M,1.ss . . 'iup,..-. c:1.J111w t :! , './Oll'i ) ( li11di11 f: 1di.111<1 · hy l,;i uk 1101 1·,·;is1111 al d1 · 
s11pl1is1i,a1i1111 u l' l>:111k ,111d i1' cu1111s,·I); R,·,t.11, ·111,· 111 .,j' [ ,;1w (;11v1 ·1"11i,q~ 
~r, I, ( :01111111·111 <' 11\pp. I .II I :·11 (L11vy .. , <ll\T,S d111 y '" IIOIH 111'111 ii 111111 
cli,·111 is i11 vi 1<"d lo 1-dy 011 l;11vy1'l''s 11p111 it11 1 :n1d "tl1,· 11 0 11di,•11 1 n ,asn11;ilil )' drn· .s 
, o "); Trill;ir I !l!)H 1{1·11<11·1,11 1;11·1 11\pp . ! l ;ii 'l : i(il ("llp i11u ,11 n·, ll' i,·111 h;i, 11<1 rigl 11 
lo rel)' OI i a 11 o l' i11 io 11 ii t'l'li,111n· i,; rn 11 ·casrni.1i>k 111td<"r til t' cin 11111,;t ,111<·1·, 111 · till' 
o pi11ion is k11owu 1,y iii (' opi11iou 1·,Tipi,•111 to lw l;il.si .' ' ). 
111 <>111· 1·,·,·,·111 c; 1,w, ,·v,·11 tl1ouglt tlu· 011i111t111 n·, ipi1·111 ;111 11.ll't' 11 ll y did 1101 
prnve tltat it rl'ilt'd 1111 tit, · o pi11io11, ill<' nn 11 ·1 w;1s willing lo pn·,1111u• rd i.11111 • 011 
the gn111111b tltal till' opi u i11 11 wa, ,I ,rn1d i1io1111f;i11d "pn:sc111 " .11 tlie d osing. S,·1• 
lk.111 Foo d s C:11 . v. l';q,p:1il 1ana,i, No. 01 -:!:,W, 111 :'i , '!.O(H \VI . :IOl!l-1 ·12. at '1' 10, 
"' I 1) ( Ma,,. S1 11 H'l'. ( :1. I lei'. :I , '!.00·1 )(poi 111 i 11 g 1111 11 hat p l'!'s id,·1 ll lll <>!'i 11ion 1·,·< i pit ·111 
had cx,11ui11cd a .sd1e1luk lo the a ;;rn:11 1t:ut r ovtTi11g the sa11H· 111.tl!<'!', as wen· 
covtTt:d i11 opinion but 11owlicn: stating that he relied tilt o p inion itsell'; n:icvti111,; 
arg1111«:1 1t that "l'inion "wa, just ,111 ext1·a11euus, pcd1ap, rt·tluudaot, pin,· ol'p.iper 
u111 m1iccd ;ind 1111c.in:d 1(11· in ,track or docunH·11b at til t· 
111 Rcstate 111c 1ll of l.all' C:overni11g L1W)'et'S ;\5 1 (~) [App . I al l: 11. Fm d is-
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THIRD-PARTY "CLOSING" OPINIONS 
A Report qf The TriBar Opinwn Committeei 
Introduction 
This is a Report about legal opinion letters that lawyers in business 
transactions render to non-clients. Among the issues covered by this Re-
port are (i) the content of opinion letters, (ii) the procedures opinion givers 
follow when conducting the factual and legal investigations required to 
support their opinions, and (iii) the meaning of language often used in 
opinion letters. 
The TriBar Opinion Committee was formed more than twenty years 
ago, at a time when third-party legal opinion practice was as much folklore 
as analysis. Drawing its members from the three largest New York bar 
associations, the Committee consisted of lawyers from throughout New 
York State, from big firms and small, from larger cities as well as smaller 
ones. The Committee members began their work by exchanging infor-
mation about and discussing their own opinion practices. The Committee 
members came to see that those on both sides of the opinion process-
opinion givers and their clients on the one hand and opinion recipients 
and their counsel on the other-had a need for practical and continuing 
guidance on customary practices in giving and receiving legal opinions. 
The various TriBar Reports followed. 
This Report is generally consistent with TriBar's prior reports. It reex-
amines and replaces TriBar's first report (the "1979 Report"), the two 
Addenda to it and the Committee's Special Report on the Remedies Opin-
ion. 2 This revision considers the nearly two decades of court decisions, 
l. Reflecting the broad use of its Reports, the Committee in recent years has expanded 
its membership beyond New York. The TriBar Opinion Committee ("Committee" or 
"TriBar") now consists of designees of the following organizations functioning as a single 
Committee: (i) Special Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, New 
York County Lawyers' Association; (ii) Corporation Law Committee, The Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York, and (iii) Special Committee on Legal Opinions of the Business 
Law Section, New York State Bar Association. Members of the Allegheny County (Pa.), 
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Delaware and Ontario Bar Associations and of the State Bar of 
Texas are also members of the Committee. The members of the Committee and the Re-
porters and Editorial Group for this Report are listed in Appendix C. 
2. See Legal Opinions w Third Parties: An FA.Sier Path, 31, Bus. LA w. 189 l ( l 979); An Addendum-
Legal Opinions w Third Parties: An Easier Path, 36 Bus. LAW. 429 (1981); Second Addendum to Legal 
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ARTICLE I GENERAL MATTERS 
SECTION 1.9 CONTAINS A GLOSSARY OF CERTAIN 
TERMS USED IN THIS REPORT AND IS INTEGRAL TO 
THIS ARTICLE. TERMS DEFINED IN THE GLOSSARY 
APPEAR IN BOW ITAUCS WHEN INITIALLY USED IN 
ARTICLE I. 
1.1 SCOPE OF THIS REPORT 
Substantial business transactions often involve the delivery of an opin-
ion letter to parties to the transaction who are not the opinion giver's 
client.5 These opinion letters usually are delivered at a closing and cover 
a number of legal and factual issues. This Report focuses on certain opin-
ions that are often included in opinion letters to non-clients and the pro-
cedures lawyers usually follow in preparing them.6 
A consensus has developed regarding the meaning of language used in 
third-party opinion letters as well as the factual and legal investigation 
required to support particular opinions (together referred to as "custom-
ary practice", see Section 1.4). This Report provides guidance on cus-
tomary practice in giving these opinions. 7 
Adherence to the customary practice described in this Report may not 
be sufficient to meet all of the rules and practices imposed by government 
agencies having authority in particular regulated areas (e.g., securities law, 
taxation and patents). Also, in transnational transactions consideration 
must be given to the application of cross-border and foreign opinion prac-
tices. 
1.2 SOME OPINION CHARACTERISTICS 
(a) The Opinion Letter Context 
An opinion on a legal issue provides the opinion recipient with 
the opinion giver's professional judgments about how the highest 
5. The discussion in this Report also has implications for opinion letters to clients. The 
literature on legal opinions is largely devoted to third-party opinions rather than opinions to 
clients. Opinion letters to clients often follow the form of third-party opinions. However, the 
obligations of the opinion giver to a client differ from those to a third-party opinion recipient. 
6. The Committee's reports on U.C.C. security interest opinions and opinions in the 
bankruptcy context address opinions that are not discussed in this Report. See UC. C. Security 
In/nest Opinions, 49 Bus. LAW. 359 (1993); Opinions in the Bankruptcy Context: Rating Agent)\ 
Structured Financing, and Chapin II Transactions, 46 Bus. LA w. 71 7 ( 1991 ). 
7. The vast majority of closing opinions follow customary practice. To the extent they 
depart from customary practice, disclosure is required. See Section 1.5. The Accord contained 
in the ABA Opinion Report does not rely on customary practice but rather constitutes an 
agreement between the parties as to how opinion letters that incorporate it by reference 
should be interpreted. 
8. See RESTATEMENT (fHIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 152 cmt. c (fen-
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596 The Business Lawyer; VoL 53, February 1998 
court9 of the jurisdiction whose law is being addressed would appropriately 
resolve the issues covered by the opinion 10 on the date of the opinion 
letter. 11 The possibility of later developments or changes of law or fact 
and other factors (e.g., the possibility that an undertaking in an agree-
ment will be invalidated on policy grounds by the courts of a jurisdiction 
whose law is not covered by the opinion 12) limit the predictive value of an 
opinion letter. An opinion is not a guaranty of an outcome, but rather an 
expression of professional judgment. That professional judgment is nec-
essarily limited by a variety of factors as discussed in this Report. 
The opinion giver acts only with the assent of its own client (sometimes 
referred to in this Report as the Cotnpany) in giving an opinion to a non-
client. If an opinion is rendered to a non-client, in most jurisdictions the 
opinion giver thereby takes on .an obligation to the opinion recipient to 
exercise care in preparing the opinion.1 3 However, rendering a third-party 
opinion does not establish a lawyer-client relationship with the opinion 
recipient. Rendering a third-party opinion is one aspect of counsel's role 
in representing a client and does not give rise to an ethical conflict between 
the client and the opinion recipient. I 4 
The relevant agreement in a business transaction will often provide for 
delivery of an opinion letter as a condition of closing. In some cases, such 
as a loan, the borrower will furnish an opinion letter of its counsel to the 
lender. In other cases, such as in some mergers, each side will furnish an 
opinion letter of its counsel to the other side. Opinion letters generally 
relate to matters involving the opinion giver's client (e.g., corporate status, 
corporate power and authorization, lack of regulatory approval require-
ments). If a remedies opinion is rendered on the enforceability of an agree-
ment, it will only cover the extent to which the opinion giver's client is 
tative Draft No. 8, 1997) (stating that in rendering opinions the lawyer "does not function 
as an advocate ... [His] duty is to provide a fair and objective opinion."). 
9. An arbitration will not necessarily produce the same result as a judicial proceeding. 
Nevertheless, in the experience of the Committee, parties to agreements are no less likely to 
seek legal opinions because the agreement is subject to arbitration. 
10. See Sections l.9(o) and 4.1. The opinion letter, if it contains a remedies opinion, will 
cover the question whether the law chosen in the agreement (see Section I .9(p)) will be applied 
by a court Sometimes the opinion letter will also contain a separate opinion on governing 
law. See Section 4.4. 
11. An opinion giver may not properly be asked to foresee changes in then applicable law, 
whether statutory, regulatory or decisional. Thus, an opinion giver is not expected to seek 
out information concerning proposed legislation that if adopted would require qualification 
of the opinion or a different legal conclusion. The opinion giver is responsible, however, for 
existing law, including legislation that has been adopted but is not yet effective. The signifi-
cance of that legislation should be noted in the opinion letter if necessary to avoid misleading 
the opinion recipient. See Section l A(d). 
12. Su Section 4.5. 
13. See RFSTATEMENT(THIRD} OFTI!E LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§§ 73 and 152 (Ten-
tative Draft No. 8, 1997). 
14. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3. 
A-174 
Third Party "Closing" Opinions 597 
bound (based on the assumption that the other parties are bound). Some-
times only counsel for one side will render an opinion that counsel for 
both could have rendered (e.g., on the application of the usury laws or 
effectiveness of Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." filings). This kind 
of division of labor is common. 
Opinions arc ollen subject to qualifications some stated and some not. 
Each qualification to an opinion is rcfencd to as an ucqlicm (which 
term includes both a l;mil,d;io,a and an ,JrcwioN). Some opinion ex-
ceptions are understood to be applicable whether or not stated. See, e.g., 
Section 3.3. l. These exceptions are referred to as "standard exceptions". 
Other exceptions are understood to be applicable only when stated. Opin· 
.ions that arc subj~flo stated exccptioru: that arc not customary in opinions 
of the type to which they relate are referred to as 'l'"'liJi• opiNimu 
(.rn cction l~9(i)). In JOme cases opinion leners contain nucnud (JOmc-
timcs called ~l.irudJ opiNio,aa (.ra Section 1.9())), which may or may 
not be qualified.1 5 See Sections 2.6.1, 6.5.5 and 6.8 as to the use of the 
phrase "to our knowledge". 
Except for opinion letters containing reasoned opinions, opinion letters 
do not ordinarily identify the reference materials the opinion preparers 
have consulted, be those materials a case, a treatise or a law review article. 
By custom opinion preparers take into account all materials they have 
considered in preparing an opinion letter even when those materials are 
not described in the opinion letter. 
The description of the meaning of particular opinions in this Report 
assumes that the opinion discussed is only subject to standard exceptions. 
(b) No Obligation To Update 
An opinion letter to a third-party does not require updating after its 
delivery, unless it specifies otherwise. By custom, the opinion giver provides 
a professional judgment at a specific time, ordinarily to facilitate a closing, 
and has no continuing responsibility to the non-client opinion recipient. 
(c) The Bankruptcy (Insolvency) Exception And Equitable 
Principles Lun.itation 
The bankruptcy exception and equitable principles limitation are stan-
dard exceptions to the remedies opinion and are discussed in that context 
in Section 3.3. However, opinion givers often include language in their 
opinion letters that purports to make other opinions or the entire opinion 
letter subject to the bankruptcy exception and equitable principles limi-
tation. They do so because bankruptcy and equitable principles can affect 
opinions other than the remedies opinion. For example, an opinion that a 
security interest has been perfected indicates that the interest has achieved 
that status under the UC.C. and that the holder of the perfected security 
15. Lawyers have sometimes referred to "clean" opinions, by which they mean opinions 
limited only by standard exceptions. As opinion forms have become more varied in complex 
commercial transactions, the term has been used less frequently. 
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No opinion letter should be sought that is so broad that it seeks to make 
the opinion giver responsible for its client's factual representations or the 
legal or business risks inherent in the transaction. An opinion recipient, 
for example, should not seek an unqualified opinion on an uncertain or 
disputed legal issue.21 An opinion cannot change the facts or the state of 
the law. 
Opinion exceptions that are not common to opinions of the type to 
which they are applied often indicate transaction-specific risks. Sometimes 
a transaction can be restructured to avoid these risks, thus eliminating the 
need for an exception. 
Three simple techniques are particularly helpful in negotiating opinions. 
First, the lawyers negotiating the opinion on behalf of the opinion recipient 
should consider whether, if they were counsel for the opinion giver's client, 
they would be prepared to furnish the opinions they have requested (with 
the assistance of local or specialized counsel, to the extent appropriate). 
Conscientious application of this "Golden Rule" will reduce requests for 
overly broad, burdensome or otherwise inappropriate opinions. Second, to 
avoid misunderstanding and last minute delay, the parties should agree 
early in the negotiation of the transaction documents on the precise word-
ing of any required opinion letter. The need, if any, for local or specialized 
counsel's opinions should also be established at that time. See Article V 
Third, material not relevant to the transaction should not be included in 
opinions. To do otherwise obscures the meaning of an opinion. 
1.4 CUSTOMARY PRACTICE 
(a) Customary Practice As A Starting Point 
This Report describes what an opinion giver should consider when pre-
paring an opinion letter. The starting point is customary practice. Opinion 
givers must of necessity use their own judgment as to their conformity 
with customary practice in the circumstances they face. The &statement 
(Suond) ef Torts and the R.estatement (Third) ef the Law Governing lAw')m in-
clicate that the customary practice of lawyers similarly situated is a key 
factor in determining liability.22 
Customary practice establishes the ground rules for rendering and re-
ceiving opinions and thus allows the communication of ideas between the 
opinion giver and counsel for the opinion recipient without lengthy de-
scriptions of the diligence process, detailed definitions of the terms used 
and laborious recitals of standard, often unstated, assumptions and excep-
21. See ABA Guidelines Section I(B)(3). 
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) m· TORTS § 552 (1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TIIE LAW GOVERMNG LAWYERS§ 152 cmt. e (fentative Draft No. 8, 1997) (stating in part 
that "customary practice will ... determine the nature and extent of the factual and legal 
diligence to be employed by the opinion giver in connection with [the] ... issuance" of a 
legal opinion.). The ABA Guidelines state that they are "drawn from current custom and 
practice". 
A -176 
tions.23 Thus, in opinion 
fessional tool. 
Third Party "Closing" Opinions 601 
customary pr,1et1ce is an pro-
Unless otherwise indicated, an opinion recipient is entitled to assume 
that the opinion giver has followed customary practice in rendering an 
opinion. Reciprocally, an opinion giver is entitled to assume that the opin-
ion recipient understands customary practice and recognizes that it has 
been followed in preparing the opinion letter. 24 Key aspects of customary 
practice are described in this Section 1.4.25 
(b) Customary Usage. This aspect of customary practice relates to 
how words are used in opinion letters. As will be seen in Articles III and 
VI, certain words and phrases expressing legal concepts are, by custom, 
understood to have special meanings in the context of specific opinions. 
Words and phrases are defined by their customary usage in that context 
and not simply by (i) dictionary meanings or (ii) meanings of the same 
words or phrases in other contexts. For example, the meaning of the phrase 
"legal, valid, binding and enforceable" in the context of a remedies opin-
ion is not an aggregate of the dictionary meaning of each of those words. 
Together or separately, those words are understood in the context of the 
remedies opinion to be equivalent to the word "enforceable" used alone. 
See Section 3.1. 
(c) Customary Diligence. This aspect of customary practice relates 
to the extent of the factual and legal investigation an opinion giver un-
dertakes to support particular opinions. Customary practice relating to the 
opinion giver's factual inquiry is described in Article II. As to matters of 
law, customary diligence requires the opinion giver to conduct such review 
of applicable law as lawyers in similar circumstances would normally 
conduct. Opinion letters often state (immediately before the opinion par-
agraphs) that the opinions being expressed are based on a review of certain 
identified documents "and such other investigation as we [the opinion 
23. Some opinion givers, out of an abundance of caution, state assumptions of general 
application and standard exceptions. Stating the obvious tends to impede effective profes-
sional communication. Examples include assumptions regarding "the capacity of individuals, 
the conformity of copies to originals and the authenticity of original documents." Language 
excluding changes of law or fact subsequent to the date of the opinion letter ordinarily falls 
into the same category. 
24. Parties to transactions in which opinions are rendered normally are advised by counsel 
as to the scope and acceptability of those opinions. Opinion givers should consider whether 
an opinion recipient who is not represented by counsel is familiar with customary practice 
applicable to opinion letters. A sophisticated party that regularly requests opinion letters in 
the course of its business may ordinarily be assumed to understand customary practice 
concerning the opinion letters it receives, whether or not it is represented by counsel in 
connection with the transaction. 
25. Customary practice also includes other matters such as the obligations of an opinion 
giver in relying on opinions of other counsel (see Section 5.1) and the appropriateness of 
rendering an opinion on the law of a jurisdiction in which the opinion preparers are not 
admitted to practice. See Section 5.3. 
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giver] have deemed appropriate." The term "investigation" is understood 
to relate to both law and fact. Thus, the "such other investigation" state-
ment merely emphasizes that the opinion letter is given in accordance with 
customary practice and its omission is not sufficient, by itself, to indicate 
that customary practice is not being followed. 
(d) Avoiding Misleading The Opinion Recipient. Prior to the 
delivery Qf the opinion letter, the opinion prep~ must ask themscJves 
whether they bclicvc that the opinions they intend to render will, under 
the circunutanccs, be misleading co the recipient. An opinion the opinion 
prcpa.ren believe lo be misleading should not be delivered until duclo-
n,ru arc made to cure the problem.&, Section 1.9(m). 
When considering if an opinion to be given will mislead the opinion 
recipient, opinion preparcn muJt think not only about the opinion itself 
but a.ho about areas excluded &om the opinion. Ordinarily, a non-standard 
cxc.cpcion26 indicates co the opinion recipient an area of concern. A non-
standard exception i, thus likely to be informative, rather rhan misleading. 
A IWl:d assumption (other than one of general application-.- Section 
2.3{a)) may abo alert the opinion recipient to a problem area. 
Common exceptions may mask problems that arc different and more 
scrioUJ than the mattcn they arc commonly understood co exclude. Con-
sider the following situation. 
The opinion recipient has agreed to accept a "no litigation" opinion 
that is limited to claims asserted in writing, a common form. An 
opinion containing that limitation would be misleading if to the 
knowledge of the opinion preparers (but not to the opinion recipient) 
a substantial and apparently serious claim had been made orally in 
a formal manner (e.g., at a conference involving lawyers for both sides 
at which a draft complaint was discussed but not delivered). 
In the ophuon recipient· col.ild .. be 
avoided by an appropriate disclosure. 
Exclusions from opinions (whether understood without being stated, e.g., 
insolvency law and local law, or stated in the opinion letter) relate to areas 
that are left by custom to the opinion recipient and its counsel. The opinion 
recipient should not assume that the opinion giver does not have significant 
information about these excluded areas. However, the opinion giver is not 
expected to disclose any such information to the opinion recipient. Only 
if the opinion preparers determine that the opinion will, under the cir-
cumstances, mislead the opinion recipient will the need for disclosure (or 
withholding the opinion) arise. 
In determining whether an opinion will lni$1¢a,d,the .opinion prcpatets 
occd only coruidcr wbai the opinion letter (i) states and (ii) omits to tate 
26. for example, "we express no opinion as to the enforceability of paragraph __ of 
the Agreement relating to liquidated damages." 
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that is relevant to what is stated.27 the omission of information not 
relevant to the opinion given (e.,I{., information relevant to litigation no 
opinion is rendered w-ith respect to the absence of litigation) does not 
mislead.28 The question the opinion preparers must consider is whether 
under the circumstances the opinion will cause the opinion recipient to 
misevaluate the specific opinion given. 
NON-OPINION LIABILITY 
OPINION GIVERS SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER APART 
FROM THE OPINION LETTER THEY ARE EXPOSING 
THEMSELVES TO LIABILITY AS A RESULT OF THEIR IN-
VOLVEMENT IN THE TRA''JSACTION UNDER THE ANTI-
FRAUD RULES OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS OR 
WHETHER CIVIL OR CRIMINAL FRAUD STANDARDS 
MAY BE APPLICABLE. THIS REPORT ASSUMES THAT THE 
REQUISITE ST ATE OF MIND (INTENT OR RECKLESS-
NESS) REQUIRED FOR CIVIL OR CRIMINAL FRAUD IS 
NOT PRESENT 
1.5 VARIATIONS FROM CUSTOMARY PRACTICE 
The parties may have good reason to depart from customary opinion 
practice in particular circumstances. A material departure from any aspect 
of customary practice (including diligence or usage) should be expressly 
described in the opinion letter. For example, a mere listing in an opinion 
letter of documents examined is not sufficient to give notice to the recipient 
that the opinion giver reviewed only the listed documents (rather than the 
documents required by customary practice). 
Since the third-party opinion is a part of the recipient's business dili-
gence, the parties to a transaction may agree that more or less investigation 
than is customary to support an opinion should be conducted by the opin-
ion giver. In some situations an opinion letter may state that greater than 
customary diligence was performed with respect to a specific opinion. 
Similarly in other situations, a stated assumption, exception or description 
of the less than customary diligence that forms the basis for the opinion 
will be included. 
27. Bui if. Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976). 
28. However, action by the opinion giver unrelated to the opinion letter (e.g., in making a 
representation in behalf of the client) may mislead and thus give rise to liability. For example, 
in Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 1 JO F.3d 1247 (6th Cir. 1997), rev'd en bane, No. 96-
3017, 1998 WL 224080 (6th Cir. May 7, 1998), company counsel was held liable to the 
recipient of its legal opinion letter, but liability was based on misleading oral statements made 
by counsel and not on the opinion letter. 
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1.6 OPINION RECIPIENT RELIANCE ON OPINION LETTERS 
Customary practice affects not only the conduct of the opinion giver 
but also that of the opinion recipient. The recipient of a third-party opin-
ion letter is cotitJcd (c:xcept in a few jurisdictions) to rcJy29 on rne opinioru 
expressed without taking any action to verify those opinion .'° If an opin-
ion is qua.Lified or rca.>ncd (or both), the opinion recipient must decide 
whether to proceed with the traruaetion in view of the qualification or 
reasoning set forth in the opi.mon lcttcr. 
The third-party opinion recipient is entitled to rely only on what is stated 
in the opinion letter, regardless of what it requested be stated.31 
As with the opinion giver's right to rely on information used in an 
opinion letter (see Section 2.1.4), the opinion recipient has no right to rely 
on an opinion if reliance is unreasonable under the circumstances or the 
opinion is known by the opinion recipient to be false. 
1.7 CLIENT CONTROL OVER THIRD-PARTY OPINION 
LETTERS 
The opinion giver has a professional obligation to protect the confi-
dences and secrets of its client. 32 Thus, the client must consent, specifically 
or by implication, to disclosures about the client before delivery of an 
opinion letter to a third-party. 33 
29. The opinion recipient' ' right «> rely" mc&n1 that a pro(cuionl.l ducy is ~ by the 
lhird·party opinion giver IO the opinion recipient. Al. • rault, in mott jwildiaiom, if the 
opiruon ii nqligenl1y given and raulis in damagl:. IO die opinion recipient, thc opinion 
r«ipicn1 .hu a claim ap.irut the opinion gi,- A few jurisdictions take the position that a 
professional cannot owe a duty to a non-client and, thus, that a third-party opinion recipient 
has no standing to sue the opinion giver. Still other jurisdictions extend the liability of opinion 
givers not only to opinion recipients but also to others to whom harm was foreseeable when 
a negligently prepared opinion was rendered. See TriBar Opinion Committee, Opinions in 
the Bankruptcy Context: Rating Agency, Structured Financing, and Chapter 11 Transactions, 
46 Bus. LAw. 717, 735 & nn. 66-68 (1991). 
30. But see Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Norwest Bank, 854 F.2d 1122, 1125-26 
(8th Cir. 1988), which in imposing a duty of investigation on the opinion recipient does not 
follow customary practice. 
31. Su, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 
318 (N.Y 1992). However, disputes may arise over what particular opinion language is in-
tended to cover. See Section 3.5 relating to the ambit of the remedies opinion. See also RE-
STATEME!'.T (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 152 cmt c (Tentative Draft No. 
8, 1997). 
32. See N. Y RULES OF COURT § 1200.19 (McKinney 1998); see al.so MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rules 1.6, 4.1 & 4.2 (1992). 
33. A failure to consent may prevent delivery. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 152 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997). Ordinarily, consent 
is obvious from the circumstances of the closing, and the opinion letter need not recite client 
consent. In one case a court refused to find a duty of care from the opinion giver to the 
opinion recipient on the ground that the client had not consented to delivery of the opinion 
letter. The reasoning of the decision is weak, but, even if followed, the case would not affect 
opinion letters delivered at closing as contemplated by the agreement. See United Bank of 
Kuwait PLC v. Enventure Energy Enhanced Oil Recovery Assocs., 7 55 F. Supp. 1195, 1203-
04 (S.O.N.Y. 1989). 
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Opinion ordinarily do not obligate themselves in advance to de-
liver opinion letters to non-clients. Indeed, ordinarily have no obli-
gation of any sort to the opinion recipient prior to delivering an opinion 
letter. Even if the opinion giver is prepared to render the requested opin-
ions, release of an opinion letter to a third party is ultimately a decision 
for the client, not the lawyer. 34 
1.8 "OPINION PREPARERS" ACT FOR OPINION 
GIVER 
The term "opinion preparers" is used in this Report (in contrast to 
"opinion giver") to refer to the lawyers in a law firm who take on the 
responsibility to prepare an opinion letter. 35 This usage permits a more 
precise discussion of what a law firm and the lawyers in it must do to meet 
their professional obligations in rendering a legal opinion. 
An opinion letter is usually written on a law firm's letterhead and signed 
in the name of the firm. It thus purports to express the opinion of the 
firm, not merely that of the opinion preparers. The fact that an opinion 
letter is signed in the name of a law firm has given rise to confusion over 
the obligations of a law firm in preparing an opinion letter. A law firm 
practices law only through the lawyers who work on its behalf. The opinion 
preparers determine the content of the opinion letter and are responsible 
to perform the work required to support the opinions being expressed. 
The law firm fulfills its obligations to the opinion recipient through the 
performance by the opinion preparers of customary diligence in preparing 
and delivering the opinion letter. Except to the extent discussed in Section 
2.2.2, other lawyers in the firm are not expected to take action in connec-
tion with the opinion letter. 
1.9 OPINION TERMINOLOGY: A GLOSSARY FOR THIS 
REPORT 
General Ternis 
(a) Agreement; Contract; Undertaking. The terms "contract" and 
"agreement" are used interchangeably and refer to the document signed 
by the parties that sets forth the promises of each party to the other. The 
term "undertaking" is used to refer to a specific promise in the "agree-
ment" and not to the "agreement" itself. Thus, an "agreement" typically 
contains many "undertakings". Note that a statement that "this agree-
ment shall be governed by the law of the State of New York" is an 
34. Any obligation of the client to cause its lawyers to deliver an opinion is a different 
question and depends, among other things, on the wording of the agreement between the 
parties. 
35. If a particular lawyer takes responsibility only for a specific opinion, for example, a 
lawyer specializing in ERISA matters with regard to a pension plan opinion, that lawyer is 
an opinion preparer only as to that opinion and not as to all the other opinions in the opinion 
letter. 
A -181 
606 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 53, February I998 
"undertaking" in that it commits each party to the application of New 
York law. See Section 3.1. 
(b) Charter; Charter Docurnents. As to a corporation, the certificate 
(or articles) of incorporation and by-laws and any related documents, 
such as restatements, amendments and certificates of designation and 
merger. 
(c) Closing. In most substantial financial transactions the parties enter into 
a written agreement that specifies (among other things) the conditions 
upon which the contemplated transaction will be consummated. Delivery 
of a third-party legal opinion letter is often one of these conditions. The 
consummation of the transaction (as opposed to the execution and de-
livery of the agreement) is referred to as the "closing". 
(d) Company. This Report refers to the opinion giver's client as the "Com-
pany". The Illustrative Opinions identify the Company as a corporation 
and at various places this Report refers to corporate officers' certificates 
and board resolutions. For opinions as to other entities, see Section l .2(g). 
Participants 
(e) Opinion Giver; Opinion Recipient. The term "opinion ~r·· re-
fers to the lawyer or law firm in whose name the opinion letter is signed. 
The term "opinion recipient" refers IO the addmsec of the opinion Letter 
and othen, if an~ gran11:d pcrmiaion by the opinion giver 10 rely on 
the opinion letter. The opinion recipient ordinarily receives the letter u 
a participant in a business transaction. 
(f) Opinion Preparers. See Section 1.8. 
Opinion Practice Terms 
(g) Customary Practice; Customary Usage and Customary Dili-
gence. See Section 1.4. 
(h) Opinion; Opinion Letter. At the closing of many business transac-
tions, counsel for one party to the transaction will deliver a letter to the 
other party expressing its conclusions on various matters of legal concern 
to that other party. That letter is normally referred to as an "opinion 
letter". Each separate conclusion it expresses is referred to in this Report 
as an "opinion". (In practice, the term "opinion" is often also used to 
refer to the opinion letter, with the context making dear the meaning 
intended.) "Opinion letters" often contain many "opinions". For types 
of opinions ("qualified", "reasoned"), see Section l.2(a). Opinions that 
are primarily factual in nature (e.g., no litigation) are sometimes referred 
to as "confirmations". 
(i) Q.ualified Opinion; Exception; Exclusion; Limitation. An opin-
ion giver uses an "exception," which term includes both a "limitation" 
and an "exclusion", to narrow an opinion. An exception is often phrased 
to indicate that no opinion is given as to a particular provision in the 
agreement or specific aspect of the matter covered, rather than to pro-
vide a negative opinion on that provision or aspect. An opinion is said 
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to be "qualified" if it contains an exception36 that is not customary in 
opinions of that type, thereby putting the opinion recipient on notice as 
to uncertainties and limitations. Thus, a remedies opinion that excludes 
coverage of an indemnification provision in a supply contract is a qual-
ified opinion, but a remedies opinion containing a "bankruptcy excep· 
tion" (which is standard for remedies opinions) is not. See Section l .2(a) 
as to "standard" exceptions. General unspecified "public policy" excep· 
tions are not used because they make the entire opinion unacceptably 
vague, requiring the opinion recipient to guess at the opinion giver's 
source of concern. 
(j) Reuoaed (or E.:plalaed) Oplaioa.'1 A reasoned (or 'c:xp)ained'1 
opinion is l}'pically rendered when, in the view of the opinion g:ive_r, the 
opinion'• conclusions should not be swcd apan &om its underlying rea-
soning (for aa.mple, when che opinion giver reaches a conclusion dcspi1e 
the aistcncc of possibly conrradiclory authority). By scning forth the 
reasoning behind the opinion, the opinion giver spells out, for evaluation 
by the opinion ruipicn1 and ia counsel, such marten as a lack of judicial 
authority, the presence of divided authority or contrary but outdated 
authority. The conclusions c:xpiesxd in a "reasoned" opinion are some-
times limited by the phrase "while the matter is 001 free from doubt" or 
10mc similar phrase. H~. at other 1imcs the opinion, although con-
taining reasoning, will nOl be limited in this way because the opinion 




Asswnptions. See Section 2.3. 
Asswnptions of General Application. See Section 2.3(a) 
Unreliable Information. See Section 2.1.4. 
(m) Disclosure. A disclosure is a statement that is intended to prevent the 
opinion recipient from being misled. See Section l .4(d). A disclosure dif-
fers from an exception in that it does not directly limit the opinion. A 
disclosure may be made to the opinion recipient within or outside an 
opinion letter. 
Opinion Usages of "Law" 
(n) Law. "Law" means statutory; decisional and regulatory law at the state 
or federal, but not the local, level. Thus, an opinion should not be read 
to cover such matters as local zoning or building codes unless it does so 
expressly. If an opinion letter does not state that it covers federal law, 
that law is understood not to be covered unless the context indicates 
otherwise (e.g., an opinion as to exemption from registration under the 
36. A typical opinion exception states that "we express no opinion as to Section __ _ 
of the Agreement." 
37. Opinions phrased in terms of "would" or "should" convey the same professional 
judgment as to the judicial resolution of the issues covered under statutory law and existing 
legal precedent as applied to the facts on which the opinion is based. Thus, delivery of 
"would" and "should" opinions is equally appropriate as a matter of customary practice. 
TriBar Opinion Committee, Opinwns in the Bankruptcy Context: Rating Agency. Structured Financing, 
and Chapter 1 J Transactions, 46 Bus. LAw. 717, 733 (199 1). 
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